Mr Newcastle: the career of T Dan Smith by Griffiths, John Francis
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Griffiths, John Francis (2019) Mr Newcastle: the career of T Dan Smith. Doctoral  thesis,  
Northumbria University. 
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/43546/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online:  
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
                        
 
 
Mr Newcastle: 
The Career of T Dan Smith 
 
 
 
 
 
J F Griffiths 
 
 
PhD 
 
2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Newcastle:  
The Career of T Dan Smith 
 
John Francis Griffiths 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements of the University of 
Northumbria at Newcastle for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Research undertaken in the Faculty of 
Arts, Design and Social Sciences 
 
March 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the political career of the socialist politician Thomas Daniel 
Smith (1915-1993). It considers the origins and development of his ideology and 
ideas, examines his record as leader of Newcastle City Council, Chairman of the 
Northern Region Economic Planning Council and the Aycliffe & Peterlee 
Development Corporations, and also examines the circumstances surrounding his 
gaoling on corruption charges. Smith was a significant figure in local government 
and in the brief flourishing of political regionalism in the 1960s; this study casts light 
on his actions and provides a new perspective on developments in local government 
and regionalism. 
 
The research primarily rests on examination of written archive resources - those of 
Smith, his political collaborators, political parties and government departments. This 
is supplemented by oral testimonies from taped interviews with Smith and others. 
 
A number of original insights into Smith’s career have emerged from this research. 
These include his early activity in the Independent Labour Party and Workers’ 
International League. The thesis shows how Smith moved 1948-1959 from a 
Trotskyist to a Labour Revisionist stance, and how that affected his plans for the 
redevelopment of Newcastle and the regeneration of northern England. It shows the 
origins of the 1963 redevelopment plan for Newcastle were strongly influenced by 
the 1955 plan for Fort Worth, Texas. It demonstrates the extent of Smith’s efforts to 
reform urban administration in Newcastle to make fulfilment of his ideas possible. It 
shows in detail how Smith’s ambitions for Peterlee came close to success in its 
designation as Britain’s first government-recognised ‘science campus’. It 
demonstrates how several of the criminal charges laid against Smith in 1973 show 
major flaws. These findings are important in illuminating a number of areas. They 
offer a new perspective on the history of the wartime Trotskyist movement. They 
cast new light on the impact of revisionism in the postwar Labour Party. They 
contribute to the history of 20th century urban redevelopment by identifying the 
intellectual origins of the influential Newcastle plan. The findings on Peterlee 
 
 
provide a case study of science policy in a postwar new town. The examination of 
the criminal charges casts doubt on the stereotyped portrayal of Smith as a ‘corrupt 
city boss’. Overall, the research shows Smith to be an influential and innovative if 
highly controversial politician whose career offers fresh perspectives on local 
government, regional policy, and the postwar Labour Party. 
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Introduction 
 
Thomas Daniel Smith (1915-1993), popularly known as T Dan Smith, was a socialist 
politician in north east England who rose to fame in the early 1960s as a result of his 
dynamic leadership of Newcastle City Council. As council leader he cleared many of 
Newcastle’s remaining slums, introduced in the city a new style of civic-led urban 
regeneration, piloted the first of a new wave of modernistic city development plans, 
and a pioneering administrative structure, led by a chief executive, which was to be a 
model for future developments in England. As well as council leader, he was the first 
chairman of the Northern Economic Planning Council, chairman of the Aycliffe and 
Peterlee new town development corporations, a member of the steering committee 
for the Buchanan Report on Traffic in Towns, of the Sports Council, and of the 
Royal Commission on Local Government in England. He was one of the most 
significant figures in British local government in the last hundred years, or even 
longer: a successor leader of Newcastle was to describe him posthumously as a 
figure to rank alongside Joseph Chamberlain and Herbert Morrison.1 
 
This thesis takes the form of a critical biography examining the political career of 
Dan Smith. It covers the period from his youth until his conviction and gaoling on 
charges of corruption in 1974, looking in detail at the social, ideological and political 
influences that affected his thinking and his actions over the course of his active 
career.  
 
Outline 
The account falls into two main phases. The first is a formative period lasting from 
his youth up to 1958, when the Labour Party gained power in Newcastle City 
Council. With a background in Marxism learned from his father, and Christian 
Socialism imbued from his mother, and tempered by hardship and frequent 
unemployment during the 1930s, Smith sought an understanding of the modern 
world and how it could be improved, moving from the Christian Socialism of his 
youth, to the peace movement in the late 1930s. His pacifism led him into the anti-
 
1 Interview with Sir Jeremy (now Lord) Beecham, 3 January 2008 
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war Independent Labour Party in the early war years, but in the ILP he rapidly began 
espousing a radically left-wing viewpoint, and, while rising high in the party’s 
hierarchy, becoming a regional organiser and the North East England representative 
on the ILP’s ruling council, he also became a covert member of the Workers’ 
International League, a Trotskyist group seeking to infiltrate the ILP. Expelled from 
the ILP in 1945, Smith was openly a member of the WIL’s successor party, the 
Revolutionary Communist Party, until he was expelled from that, too, in 1947. 
Disillusioned with revolutionary socialism, and influenced by reading The 
Managerial Revolution by American ex-Trotskyist James Burnham, he joined the 
Labour Party and in 1950 was elected to Newcastle City Council. There, in eight 
years in opposition, he was able to build up a group of supporters, based not upon 
institutional power (he did not, for example, have a strong trade union power base in 
the local party) nor upon factional political support (the number of former, or current 
Trotskyists on the council was small), but on his ability to form and communicate 
coherent policies and plans for Labour in Newcastle. At the same time, although 
many of his political activities in the 1950s could be described as Bevanite, his ideals 
and aspirations moved away from the ‘old Labourism’ focus on a heavy industrial 
base (a position common in NE England, where the economy was still heavily based 
on coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding and engineering), and towards the revisionist, 
modernising position associated with Anthony Crosland and exemplified in 
Crosland’s The Future of Socialism.2 
 
The second key period covers the twelve years when Smith occupied positions of 
power and influence, and lasts from 1958 until January 1970. Labour gained control 
of Newcastle in 1958, and Smith became leader of the Labour group – in effect, 
leader of the council – a year later. As group leader until 1965, and as chair of the 
major committees at different times over the 1958-65 period, Smith piloted major 
reforms through the council, covering housing, education, city planning and 
administration. While many of these policies, especially in planning and 
administration, were extremely innovative and put the city in the national media 
spotlight, Smith’s view was not just municipal. He believed that the changes being 
made in Newcastle were essential for the modernisation of the wider north east 
 
2 Crosland, Anthony, The Future of Socialism (1956; reissued London 2006) 
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region, and while leader sought co-operation with neighbouring authorities on 
numerous issues, simultaneously campaigning for local government reform and the 
creation of an all-Tyneside authority and other regional and sub-regional structures. 
In 1965, when the new Labour government established regional Economic Planning 
Councils, Smith became chairman of the Northern EPC, believing that the bodies 
would have an influence on regional and national economic policy and would form 
the groundwork for devolved regional government. He resigned from Newcastle city 
council in 1966. However, he rapidly became disillusioned with his work for the 
NEPC and in 1968 was appointed chairman of the Aycliffe and Peterlee 
Development Corporation. This position allowed greater scope for his abilities and 
enthusiasms, aimed at developing the New Town of Peterlee into a hub for scientific 
and technical research. In a remarkable double achievement, he was able to persuade 
IBM to open a research facility in Peterlee, and persuaded the government to 
announce that Peterlee was to be the officially-supported science campus for the 
north of England – the first such designation in the UK. But in early 1970 Smith was 
to step down from his official positions after being arrested on corruption charges 
relating to the London Borough of Wandsworth; the impetus to develop other 
advanced research facilities in Peterlee was lost, and the planned Centre for the Arts 
and Humanities in the town was to become a central factor in the charges brought 
against Smith in 1974: Poulson had been selected as the preferred architect. 
 
The thesis will concentrate on this core of Smith’s political career. Among other 
issues, it will provide a close examination of the activities of the Independent Labour 
Party and its Trotskyist rivals in the wartime North East of England – a history not 
previously addressed in detail . It will show how Smith was influenced by the 
managerialist theories of James Burnham and advocated policies strikingly similar to 
the revisionism in the later 1950s Labour Party of Gaitskell and Crosland. It will 
argue against the portrayal of Smith as an American-style ‘city boss’ but show how 
he was not greedy for personal power, but rather, setting up rival poles of power 
within the city administration of Newcastle. And it will argue that Smith’s ideals for 
city and regional development, based on looking forward to new technologies and by 
seeing education and culture as key factors in social and economic development, 
anticipated by decades the ‘culture led regeneration’ policies of the 1990s and 
subsequently. 
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These ideals formed a coherent vision for North East England. He believed that the 
staple industries of the region, and particularly coal mining and shipbuilding, were in 
decline and that their disappearance was not necessarily a disaster since science and 
technology, aided by regional and national economic planning, would be able to fill 
the gap. This he attempted to do in Newcastle by the redevelopment of the city and 
the encouragement of culture: a twentieth century version of a renaissance city 
would, he believe, attract forward-thinking entrepreneurs; in Peterlee he placed 
advanced technology at the top of his agenda, and briefly succeeded in having to 
town recognised as the first officially recognised ‘science campus’ in Britain.   
 
The planning of a new social and economic order required the development of 
institutions appropriate for this task. This lay behind his campaigns for the reform of 
outdated local authority areas and the creation of a new regional level of government 
able to deliver plans at the regional level; and it lay behind his work in modernising 
and streamlining the administration of Newcastle City Council. He believed in the 
power of art and culture to improve everyday lives, and to form an environment 
conducive to new economic development, and in both Newcastle and Peterlee 
cultural policy formed an integral and important part of his thinking. And, closely 
linked to his commitment to the arts and culture, he believed that city redevelopment 
would bring about a greatly improved environment for people to live, work and play 
in: “I wanted to see the creation of a 20th century equivalent of Dobson’s 
masterpiece, and its integration into the historic framework of the city.”3  He 
admired the modern and brought celebrated architects to the city, and steered 
through council and Whitehall an innovative development plan that sought to 
remove traffic from the city centre and create a ‘walkable city’. 
 
Elements of this vison will recur, explicitly and implicitly, throughout this thesis, 
and its successful and unsuccessful aspects addressed. 
 
To date the only published biographies of Smith have been his 1970 autobiography, 
Dan Smith. An Autobiography, and a biography by journalist Chris Foote Wood, T 
 
3 Smith, T Dan, Dan Smith. An Autobiography (Newcastle 1970) p46 
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Dan Smith. “Voice of the North - Downfall of a Visionary.4 This thesis arrives at a 
timely moment for an academic examination of Smith’s career, in a period where 
Newcastle and North East England is passing through a period of change and a time 
when his life, career and impact is being reassessed. It aims to provide a critical re-
examination of the career of a politician whose reputation has too often been 
overshadowed by the circumstances of his fall from grace. 
 
Is a perceived need for critical re-examination a sufficient reason? Patrick O’Brien 
would argue not. He sees political biographers as treating their subjects as either 
“extraordinary and omnipotent”, or as or as predictable and typical representatives of 
a particular government (his essay assumes that subjects of political biography are 
holders of an office of state, or, at least, MPs).5 The career of individuals cannot be 
seen as typical of a political class, and biographies cannot hope to fulfil the “core 
aspirations” of political history: “a proper understanding of evolving political 
institutions and processes, and an appreciation of the lasting achievements of 
significant individuals operating within those systems.”6 The use of the life story as a 
framework for biography means adopting “a literary and rhetorically persuasive 
device for writing about, and all too often exaggerating, the significance of its 
subject” and biographers “seek acclaim and significance for the people they study.” 7 
Political biography – while it has its uses – is not, O’Brien argues, “a serious enough 
genre to engage the attention of academic historians.”8  
 
Such views are far from unique, Maurice Cowling, for example, arguing that 
biography almost always misleads, by abstracting the individual focus of a study 
from a political system of complex relationships.9 Tosh argues that Cowling’s 
arguments lose much of their force in systems where power is concentrated in one 
man.10 And Smith, while a democratic politician working in a democratic political 
 
4 Ibid; Foote Wood, Chris, T Dan Smith. “Voice of the North” – Downfall of a Visionary (Bishop 
Auckland 2010). 
5 O’Brien, Patrick, ‘Is Political Biography a Good Thing?’, Contemporary British History 10 4 (1996) 
pp 60-61 
6 Ibid pp60-61 
7 Ibid pp64, 65 
8 Ibid p61 
9 Cited in Tosh, John, The Pursuit of History (5th ed 2010) p68 
10 Ibid pp68-69 
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system, was nevertheless – through ideas and personality rather than force or legal 
power – a dominating political figure for several years at the peak of his career. 
 
O’Brien’s vigorous denunciation of a complete genre of historical writing does 
contain some useful correctives, most notably the danger of exaggerating the 
significance of one’s subject, but his implication that the only proper field for the 
study is “evolving institutions and processes” forms what Croft describes as an 
“extremely rigid definition of political history.”11 Croft takes issue to with O’Brien’s 
argument that individuals should have lasting achievements to merit study, arguing 
that the second rate and the lesser figures can also be illuminating, and that 
O’Brien’s narrow criteria exclude also most women.12 Might one suggest that it 
would also exclude a  regional politician whose career ended in disgrace? 
 
John Derry also stands up for the values of academic political biography: an 
interpretation of character and circumstances, contextualisation, the relation of 
political career to political structure, a thorough critical knowledge of sources and a 
capacity to evaluate relevant literature being the “preconditions for successful 
biography.”13 
 
Some of the difficulties are highlighted by Ben Pimlott: historical biography is a 
hybrid, based in the historical method but frequently drawing upon other disciplines: 
“the biographer needs to be a jack-of-all-trades, and hence is liable to be considered 
the master of none.”14 But what O’Brien might consider a drawback Pimlott sees as a 
benefit: biographers are not, he argues, tied by conventions -to follow a life from 
birth to death, to regard biography as “an encyclopaedia of school report”, to draw 
distinctions between public and private life, even “to ferret out the ‘whole truth’ 
about a character”. The biographer, he say, “is tied by the truth, and has a duty to 
seek it out and not suppress it. But that does not make him primarily an investigative 
reporter… The main job of the biographer is to tell a story that will make the reader 
 
11 Croft, Pauline, Political Biography: A Defence (1), Contemporary British History 10 (4) (1996) p68 
12 Ibid pp70-71 
13 Derry, John, ‘Political Biography: A Defence (2), Contemporary British History 10 (4) (1996) p76 
14 Pimlott, Ben, Pimlott, Ben, Frustrate Their Knavish Tricks. Writings on Biography, History and 
Politics (London 1995) p150 [from an article ‘The Future of Political Biography’ first published in 
Political Quarterly 61 (2) (1990)] 
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happier, sadder, even a bit wiser. Here his purpose is no different from that of the 
novelist, and this is the only convention that matters.”15 
 
Pimlott argues that the biographer should pursue not “the abstraction truth” but 
understanding. In seeking truth the writer risks “an obsessive pursuit of sources, and 
biographies will get longer and longer…”; rather, “[t]he aim should be to understand 
n individual life, the forces that shape it and the motives that drive it, in the context 
in which it is shaped.”16 And if understanding is the aim, then all parts of a life, 
‘public’ and ‘private’ are relevant: “everything goes into the pot”.17 If that is the 
case, then this thesis can only be at best a partial biography, for I have largely passed 
over the private life of my subject – for which the available sources of information 
are in any case limited – and much else, in order to retain focus around a central 
thread tracing Smith’s political development and how this affected his actions.  It 
may well be that a ‘total’ portrait, with ‘everything in the pot’, might have enabled 
greater understanding of Smith’s career, but that presupposes that there existed 
ingredients to go into the pot. 
 
This thesis therefore exists within limits. It provides an account of one individual’s 
political development, but it attempts to contextualise this in the changing political 
and social circumstances from the 1920s to the 1970s; and it is written on the 
premise that the career of Dan Smith provides a lens through which far left-wing 
politics in the 1940s, the ideological battles within the Labour Party of the 1950s, 
and the urban planning and regionalist movements of the 1960s can be viewed. 
 
The thesis also examines the circumstances of his fall from power in 1970 and 
gaoling on corruption charges in 1974. A description of Smith’s public relations 
career, his relationship with the architect John Poulson, and his gaoling for 
corruption – part of Chapter 6 and all of chapter 7 - may be open to criticisms of 
superfluity or irrelevance in a thesis that is presented as a political biography. A 
good deal of discussion and consideration was given to this question in the planning 
 
15 Ibid p152 
16 Ibid pp157-158 
17 Ibid p158 
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of the thesis, and I eventually decided that these issues did merit inclusion in some 
detail, for a number of reasons. 
 
Firstly, very many, perhaps nearly all mentions of Smith, in histories, newspaper and 
magazine articles and in the broadcast media, refer to his gaoling and in very many 
cases define him by the circumstances of his fall: the ‘disgraced councillor’ trope, 
addressed below. To ignore the circumstances of his fall, even in a politically 
focussed account, could seem perverse – Hamlet without the prince - and might also 
lead to the charge that the thesis might be attempting to whitewash Smith’s 
reputation. 
 
Secondly, Smith’s business interests and his involvement with Poulson were of a 
part with what might be described as his modernising mission. Smith was good at 
communicating. It was natural that when in the 1960s he sought ways to make 
money he should use his communications skills in the field of public relations; and 
he had a genuine admiration for Poulson, seeing Poulson’s creation of a 
multidisciplinary practice in conflict the conventions of the architectural 
establishment and his work in developing modern town centres, housing, leisure and 
educational facilities as similar to Smith’s attempts to remodel the environment of 
the city and the organisation of local government. To that extent, Smith’s business 
career can be seen as an extension of his career in politics and public service, and not 
as a separate part of his life. In addition, the 1970 corruption charges that brought an 
end to his public life had a particular impact in Peterlee, where the impetus behind 
his plans to create a science campus was lost and the town’s administration returned 
to a more conventional development path. 
 
Thirdly, an examination the charges laid against Smith before the 1974 trial arguably 
raised questions about their fairness, in particular the charge relating to Peterlee. 
Once these were raised during the research for this thesis, it would be unjust to a 
balanced portrait of Smith’s life not to have included a discussion of the issue in this 
narrative. 
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Myths 
A further aim of the thesis is to counter the many myths which have grown up about 
Smith and which obscure understanding of his career and the history of Newcastle 
and NE England in that period. In most of the country beyond north east England he 
is not remembered, if at all, for his achievements. Instead, his name has become 
inextricably linked with that of the architect John Poulson; ‘T Dan Smith’ has 
become shorthand for local government corruption, and the truth about his career in 
public and commercial life has become subsumed into modern political myth which 
portrays the irredeemably corrupt local councillor doing the bidding of his 
paymaster.  
 
Christopher Flood in Political Myth defines political myth - as opposed to sacred 
myth - as “an ideologically marked account of past, present or predicted political 
events” which needs to be accepted as true by a community or social group – 
whether the account is factually accurate or not is immaterial.18 However, in the case 
of Smith the most pervading myths do incorporate falsehoods or deliberate absences 
and evasions over and above issues of selection and interpretation of facts. A survey 
of press articles and other sources in recent years provides numerous examples. 
Smith’s obituary in the Daily Telegraph is typical, containing the following:  
 
Known as ‘Mr Newcastle’, Smith was the nearest Britain has had to a Chicago 
style city mayor. He controlled all the key committees on the city council, 
which he used to further the interests of John Poulson, a corrupt architect and 
developer who was the chief client of Smith’s public relations firm.19  
 
The cliché of ‘Chicago style city mayor’ – Smith differed in his style of leadership 
from Chicago’s Mayor Richard Daley in far more ways than the two men were 
similar – is frequently encountered, and began long before his fall; but there were 
also rebuttals of this: a newspaper profile in 1965 arguing that “The portrait of Dan 
Smith as the town boss, a provincial dictator, is a myth created by remote 
metropolitan journalists out of touch with the facts. His achievements have been 
 
18 Flood, Christopher G., Political Myth (London 1996) pp42-44 
19 Massingberd, Hugh, The Daily Telegraph Fourth Book of Obituaries: Rogues (London 1999) 
pp223-227 
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gained within the tortuous framework of local government…”.20  
 
The Telegraph obituary is incorrect in saying that Smith used his public office in 
Newcastle to benefit Poulson, whose companies undertook no work in Newcastle 
while Smith was in a position on the council to help him. John Ardagh’s A Tale of 
Five Cities went further: 
 
“At [Smith’s] trial in Leeds, it was proven that he had misused his public posts 
- on the city council and later the NEPC [Northern Economic Planning 
Council] - to award building contracts to big national firms from whom he 
took large sums of money as commission.”21   
 
No charges were related to his Newcastle role; and Smith’s role as Chairman of the 
NEPC was purely advisory and held no power to award building contracts. 
 
A further aspect of the Smith/Poulson myth consists of its localisation as a north 
eastern affair. Thus: “… the Poulson scandal of the 1960s - when members of the 
party’s finest in the North-east were found to have taken backhanders from a venal 
architect…”22; and “The Poulson scandal in the north east of England involved the 
payment of bribes to politicians in exchange for building contracts”23 Such 
judgements ignore the fact that Poulson’s network extended throughout the United 
Kingdom and overseas. Among the dramatis personae were John Cordle, 
Conservative MP for Bournemouth East & Christchurch, and Reginald Maudling, 
Tory former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Herbert Butcher, clerk of West Riding 
County Council, Alfred Roberts, MP for Normanton, and George Pottinger, under-
secretary at the Scottish Office in Edinburgh. Poulson’s interests spread to Angola, 
Nigeria, Malta, Egypt, Greece and the Middle East. In Britain Smith, working for 
Poulson, had connections from Scotland to Margate (over 200 authorities in all being 
approached. It was very far from being a local north eastern problem.24 
 
20 DF/TDS Box 3839: Tom Little, ‘A View from Tyneside’, Northern Echo 27 February 1965 
21 Ardagh, John, A Tale of Five Cities (London 1979) p207 
22 Taylor, D J, The Independent on Sunday 14 June 2009 
23 Johnston, Philip, Daily Telegraph 14 May 2009 
24 The most comprehensive existing survey of the Poulson affair is Fitzwalter, Raymond & Taylor, 
David, Web of Corruption. The Story of J G L Poulson and T Dan Smith (London 1981) 
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To a metropolitan-centred media and political establishment the north east of 
England may seem far away and irrelevant. A corruption scandal in this distant 
province remains just that, rather than a reflection on the moral health of the nation 
as a whole. Portrayal of the north east as the wayward ‘other’ can bring, and 
continues to bring, complacency, so three decades after the Poulson scandal, the 
myth still has its uses. Journalist Leo McKinstry wrote, regarding allegations 
regarding the Labour Party in 2007: 
 
Nothing better exposes the sleaziness within the Labour-dominated political 
culture of the North East than the party’s latest financial scandal.25 This is a 
region where abuse of office, self-enrichment, nepotism, dodgy payouts and 
favouritism have been going on for decades. Indeed, it is this northern climate 
of sharp practice which led to the biggest political corruption scandal in British 
history… Smith had presided over epic abuses in the city’s development 
programme…”26 
 
Or Ben MacIntyre, writing about the same matter in The Times: 
 
…the whiff of scandal blowing off the Tyne is a familiar story of big money, 
local business and political funding, the outcome of a political culture where 
one party has dominated for generations… some have not been able to resist 
recalling the most notorious scandal of the 1970s, the jailing of T Dan 
Smith… and the architect John Poulson, for their part in huge bribery web 
[sic] relating to the award of building contracts in the North East… T Dan 
Smith, the leader of Newcastle council, was probably the closest thing this 
country has ever had to a US-style Big City Boss… Linking up with the 
architect John Poulson, Smith was responsible for an astonishing abuse of the 
city’s development programme, encouraging local councillors to push 
through Poulson’s building schemes, and earning an illegal fortune estimated 
at £156,000 in the process.27  
 
More serious still is the way that myth can infect the writing of history, and prevent a 
balanced assessment of events and careers. One guide to local government referred 
to Poulson’s “mediocre municipal architecture … none more famous than the work 
he undertook for T Dan Smith’s Newcastle”, continuing that Smith sought to 
 
25 The supposed irregularity of a loan made by a Newcastle businessman to the Labour Party. 
26 McKinstry, Leo, Daily Mail, 28 November 2007 
27 Macintyre, Ben, The Times 3 December 2007. As stated earlier, Smith’s contacts on behalf of 
Poulson covered the whole of Britain, and Poulson played no role in Newcastle’s city developments. 
Smith’s PR companies earned a total of £156,000 in payments from Poulson for PR services in the 
1960s; this figure does not represent Smith’s personal gain. 
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influence other authorities “relying on corrupt practices and Masonic networks to 
further this.”28 
 
Likewise, Dominic Sandbrook: “…Newcastle’s council boss, T Dan Smith… turned 
out to be up to his neck in the Poulson corruption scandal, having pocketed generous 
kickbacks in return for approving miles of tower blocks.”29 
These examples are given as some justification for this work. While myths, and the 
purposes behind them, can be studied as evidence of attitudes and states of mind in 
history, I would argue that myth itself can be the enemy of history, albeit often a 
beguiling enemy. 30 This is a contentious view.  In this I am at one with those 
historians who, argue Samuel and Thompson, “are apt to see myth, if the notice it at 
all, as an impediment to their true work.” 31 Myth is, they argue fundamental to 
human thought and historians are by no means immune to using myth in the form of 
‘symbolic categories’ such as ‘the nation’ or ‘the common people’.32 Indeed, they 
continue, referencing Elizabeth Tonkin, “too many of us weigh evidence with an 
instinctive naivety which rests on out failure to recognize rationalistic realism as the 
special myth of our own Western culture.”33 Tonkin argues that the view of myth 
and history as opposites is a false dichotomy.34 Commenting on oral histories, but 
emphasising that her arguments apply equally  to written histories, Tonkin argues 
that “representations of pastness” are dependent on the genre or manner of discourse, 
and that one cannot fully interpret such a representation unless familiar with the 
genre. “It follows that professional historians who use the recollections of others 
cannot just scan them for useful facts to pick out, like currants from a cake. Any such 
facts are so embedded in the representation that it directs an interpretation of them, 
 
28 Stevens, Andrew The Politico’s Guide to Local Government (2nd ed London 2006) p 26. Poulson 
did no work in Newcastle while Smith was leader; nor was Smith a Freemason; the issue of whether 
Smith was corrupt will be addressed later in this thesis. 
29 Sandbrook, Dominic, State of Emergency. The Way We Were: Britain, 1970-1974 (London 2010) p 
26. The only place where Smith had the power to approve housing developments was in Newcastle, 
where Poulson received no contracts. 
30 One political biographer who I had contacted for advice emailed to me – tongue in cheek - that “I 
hope you don’t disprove too many of the legends that have grown up about Dan” 
31 Samuel, R & Thompson, P, ‘Introduction’ in Samuel, R & Thompson, P (eds), The Myths we Live 
By (London 1990) p3 
32 Ibid p4 
33 Ibid p4 
34 Tonkin, Elizabeth, ‘History and the myth of realism’ in Samuel & Thompson op cit p25 
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and its very ordering, its plotting, and its metaphors bear meaning too.”35 Meaning is 
only transparent if the conventions of the author are shared; while “‘myth’ is 
recognized as an unfamiliar code for representing changes and events”.36 
Were this thesis a study of popular or media perceptions of Smith, or of twentieth 
century planning, or of the Poulson affair or of local government corruption, then the 
study of the myths I have cited would be justified and would be useful evidence. But 
in a political biography seeking to establish, as far as possible, the facts about 
Smith’s career and to put those facts in context, they are largely valueless. 
Moreover, myth allows the truth, or at any rate objective and verifiable facts, to be 
distorted or denied for political ends: as Margaret Macmillan wrote, “Political and 
other leaders too often get away with misusing or abusing history for their own ends 
because the rest of us do not know enough to challenge them.”37 The 
Mephistophelean image of Dan Smith created and perpetuated by the myth-makers is 
a distortion and over-simplification of an often complex reality, replete with 
contradictions, and – Macmillan again – “We must contest the one-sided, even false, 
histories that are out there in the public domain. If we do not, we allow our leaders 
and opinion-makers to use history to bolster false claims and justify bad and foolish 
policies.”38 
Macmillan’s comments apply equally well, however, to another myth which affects a 
balanced consideration of Smith’s career: the self-mythologising of his 
autobiographical writings which form an important source for a study of his life. The 
mythical element, argues Peneff, forms the framework on which individuals create 
their life stories, turning “incoherent and arbitrary” facts and memories into a 
structured narrative.39 And, as Samuel and Thompson write, “Any life story, written 
or oral, is in one sense a personal mythology, a self-justification. And all embody 
and illustrate character ideals: the desire for independence, say, in those who 
 
35 Ibid p27 
36 Ibid p27 
37 Macmillan, Margaret, The Uses and Abuses of History (London 2009) p 36 
38 Ibid p37 
39 Peneff, Jean, ‘Myths in Life Stories’, in Samuel & Thompson op cit p37 
14 
 
celebrate their childhood for its moments of freedom, or filial loyalty for those who 
fetishize family tradition.”40  
Smith’s 1970 autobiography shows such character ideals and self-justification in 
large measure. In recounting his achievements and even his failures, he presents 
himself as fair minded and in the right, generous with his energies, and 
magnanimous.41 In the final pages, he attempts to “look in on my own character, 
make-up and aspirations…”.42 Of his public life, he muses: “What has prompted me 
to spend such a lot of time, and so much energy on it? If I had devoted the 
equivalent… time and energy to my business career, I might by now be a rich man… 
So what has motivated me? Three things, I believe. The desire to serve, the challenge 
presented by problems, and my interest in people.”43 
On the final page, he refers to “the sensitive part of me which wanted to be 
understood. Not thanked, or reverenced, or liked. Just understood.”44 
The presentation of a misunderstood paragon is in itself a self-created myth, 
notwithstanding that the claims made by Smith for his achievements in the 1970 
autobiography were largely factual. But self-mythologising can also involve 
omission or blurring of facts. His account of his wartime activity in the peace 
movement and the ILP portrays agitation for a better post-war world; his treatment 
of his activities in the ILP, the controversy they aroused, and his career in the 
Trotskyist Workers’ International League/Revolutionary Communist Party - in 
which he was the led an undercover Trotskyist group within the ILP working for the 
WIL/RCP – is covered the bald statement that “I had been a member of the ILP and, 
for a brief spell, had become a Trotskyite. I had been expelled from both 
organisations.”45 An account of his somewhat Machiavellian activities during this 
period, covered in chapter 2, might not have fitted with the impression of the idealist 
 
40 Samuel, R & Thompson, P, ‘Introduction’ in Samuel &Thompson op cit p10 
41 Smith, T Dan, Dan Smith. An Autobiography (Newcastle 1970). On magnanimity, for example, 
p151: “…if some people have responded by thinking the worst of me, I can only repeat I bear no ill 
will towards them, or indeed to anyone.” 
42 Ibid p150 
43 Ibid p150 
44 Ibid p151 
45 Ibid p30 
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and rebel that he was seemingly trying to create.46 As sociologist Jean Peneff writes, 
“Many people let themselves off lightly in telling their life story, so that shameful 
behaviour is seldom recalled…”47 Indeed, Peneff argues that the mythical element is 
central to the recounted life stories of individuals, with common elements recurring 
in particular types of person, the ‘self-made’ businessman, for example. Accounts of 
family life are “always tinged with fiction, whether we run it down or embellish it,” 
and no life story should be accepted as an accurate account, but subject to close 
examination, with “searches for deceptions and mistakes, criticisms of probability or 
good sense.”48 In dealing with autobiographical accounts, he continues, one has to 
distinguish between imagination and observation, to realise “by experience or 
intuition” where the subject will be a good or vague source, and that a narrator can 
display both these qualities, “since detachment, a sense of objectivity, and an 
aptitude for realism of perception can coexist with blindness to what is portrayed, a 
wish to pass over critical moments of existence, or a tendency to systematic 
misrepresentation.”49 
The history of Smith’s career remains an intensely controversial and political issue in 
the north east, marked by private debate, controversy in newspaper pages, and still 
invoked in debate on issues of polity. Clearing away the myths that obscure and 
prevent a proper understanding of Smith’s career might in itself be a sufficient 
justification for this work. 
A critical assessment of Smith’s career is timely for other reasons. Smith was a 
powerful advocate for regional administration, an issue which periodically appears 
on the national political agenda. Government policy in recent years of encouraging 
major cities to adopt the ‘elected mayor’ model of governance, and ‘regional 
mayors’ in charge of municipal agglomerations is also focusing political and media 
attention on the issues faced by regional conurbations. Such matters are better 
understood with an appreciation of the history that lies behind them; and an 
assessment of Smith’s career forms one part of that history. 
 
46 Ibid p 30: “…I was conscious of having been a rebel for 20 years… [Labour Party members looked 
on Smith as] …a sort of devil incarnate who would not accept party discipline. They were sure that I 
would do what I wanted to do and say what I wanted to say. They were dead right!” 
47 Peneff op cit p39 
48 Ibid pp36-42 
49 Ibid p42 
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A critical biography of Smith would also contribute to an understanding of the 
regional history of northern England and of responses to the decline in its staple 
industries, as well as illuminating and explaining many of the changes that occurred 
in the regional capital, Newcastle, during the 1960s and 1970s. Regional history may 
currently be in the position occupied by the discipline of urban history forty years 
ago, and “with equally daunting methodological and conceptual problems” but it is 
expanding in scope.50 Its overlaps with disciplines such as geography and political 
science may be obvious; there is room, too, for biography in assessing the role of 
significant individuals. 
As an examination of Smith’s core political career, the thesis will not describe his 
business career, except (as mentioned above) insofar as it was to bring about the end 
of his career through his relationship with John Poulson. Nor will it examine the 
other criminal trials faced by Smith – the Sporle case in Wandsworth in 1970-71, in 
which he was acquitted, and the 1975 trial in Birmingham in which corruption 
charges were brought against Smith and his colleague Ron Dilleigh, among others; 
Smith was found not guilty on the instructions of the trial judge. The thesis will not 
look at his personal and family life, nor his time in gaol, or his post-prison 
activities.51 
 
Sources: published material 
The thesis draws upon a wide range of sources. Smith wrote two autobiographies. 
One – Dan Smith. An Autobiography - was published in 1970. 52 Later he wrote a 
second autobiography which was not published.53  I treat with caution both these 
autobiographies, and other autobiographical fragments: these may be useful on his 
feelings and opinions, but can be factually inaccurate and are unreliable about 
episodes such as Smith’s wartime political activity. In addition, as referred to above, 
 
50 Lancaster, B,  Newton, D & Vall, N (eds), An Agenda for Regional History (Newcastle 2007) p vii 
51 Many of these aspects are covered in Foote Wood, C, T Dan Smith “Voice of the North” - Downfall 
of a Visionary (Bishop Auckland 2010) 
52 Smith, T Dan, op cit 
53 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography (n.d.). This is held by the Amber Film and 
Photography Collective in Newcastle, and consists of a typescript approximately 400 pages long 
(there are anomalies in the pagination). It has no title or date but has references to events up to 1977; 
Smith appeared in and was to a large extent the subject of the Amber film T Dan Smith. A Funny 
Thing Happened on the Way to Utopia released in 1987, and it might not be unreasonable to assume 
the manuscript was produced between 1977 and 1987. It has recently been digitised and is available at 
amber-online.com/collections/t-dan-smith-autobiography/ 
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in Smith’s own writings, as well as recorded interviews, he is not immune from self-
mythologising. The autobiographies of a number of his contemporaries and 
associates have also been used; similar caveats apply, perhaps most of all to the 
autobiography of John Poulson54. 
 
Published material focussing on Smith’s career consists of the 1970 autobiography 
referred to above, and T Dan Smith. “Voice of the North” – Downfall of a Visionary 
(Bishop Auckland 2010) by regional journalist and local government leader Chris 
Foote Wood.55 Foote Wood’s account is primarily a factual survey without a great 
deal of contextualisation or analysis, based largely (albeit not completely) on 
secondary sources, presenting a generally positive impression of Smith. Journal 
articles examining Smith’s career consist of Elliott’s 1975 study ‘T Dan Smith in 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne’ in Public Administration and articles in a special edition in 
1994 of North East Labour History Bulletin. 56  
 
Elliott’s account, published at the nadir of Smith’s fortunes, portrays Smith’s 
leadership of Newcastle City Council in glowing terms, verging at times on the 
hagiographic, and sometimes at variance with Smith’s own accounts: for example, 
describing Smith’s ability to build up support in the local Labour Party where Smith, 
in his autobiography, stresses his ‘outsider’ status.57 Elliott, in describing the 
changes wrought in and by Newcastle City Council during Smith’s leadership 
emphasises above all the importance of leadership: “The position of leader will vary 
in power and prestige according to the use to which it is put by the man elected to 
serve. If he is energetic and talented, with definite ideas, he will be able to use the 
position to put the ideas into practice; he will, in fact, lead.”58 Smith was able to 
apply these leadership qualities as Labour group leader and as the head of the various 
council committees he chaired; in making organisational changes to the council; and 
in bringing about “changes in attitudes and expectancy” by appointing progressive 
 
54 Poulson. J G L, The Price. The Autobiography of John Poulson, Architect (London 1981) 
55 Smith, T Dan op cit; Foote Wood op cit. Chris Foote Wood, a former Liberal Democrat councillor, 
was for several years leader of Wear Valley District Council in County Durham, and was an elected 
member of the County Council (ibid p345). 
56 Elliott, J, ‘T Dan Smith in Newcastle-upon-Tyne’, Local Government Studies 1(2) April 1975 
pp33-43; North East Labour History Society Bulletin 28 (1994) 
57 Elliott (1975) op cit pp33-34; Smith, T Dan op cit pp30-32 
58 Elliott (1975) op cit p35 
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officials and in winning the support of councillors and officers to his ideas.59 Smith 
gained authority from his “forceful, dynamic personality, his ability and hard work”, 
but at the same time had “an engaging and stimulating personality” and was a good 
listener, willing to engage with groups outside the council.60 Opposition to Smith 
and his proposals is portrayed as relatively minor, or capable of being dissolved by 
his persuasive oratory.61 
 
Elliott does address Smith’s faults, but in a much more perfunctory way: cutting 
corners and riding rough-shod over opposition, discouragement of critical 
discussion, a tendency to select prestige projects, gloss over difficulties, not think 
things through, and excessive trust in ‘experts’ are among the factors listed in the 
single negative paragraph.62 
 
The 1994 North East Labour History Society Bulletin offers a greater diversity of 
views. ‘T Dan Smith. The Youthful Revolutionary’ by Ray Challinor is an uncritical 
survey of Smith’s early political career, arguing (with some exaggeration) that he 
“emerged as a political figure of significance” during the war years. More 
realistically, Challinor points out that it was in this period that Smith developed his 
talents for oratory, organisation and tactics. 63 David Byrne takes a rather different 
view in ‘T Dan Smith. The Disastrous Impact of a Liberal, Authoritarian 
Moderniser’.64 Byrne asserts that Smith’s aim in entering local government was to 
gain council contracts ; that he became rich by corrupt activities; but also that he 
“did the greatest harm when he was trying to do good for others as well as for 
himself” – in the redevelopment of Newcastle.65 This was carried out in a manner 
described by Byrne as “an authoritarianism of the insiders against the outsiders.”66 
Smith, Byrne concludes, shared the contempt for democracy that, in “socialist 
analysis”, is a feature of right-wing social democracy and the “derivatives of 
 
59 Ibid p36 
60 Ibid p37 
61 Ibid pp 34, 36, 37, 39-40 
62 Ibid pp 40-41 
63 Challinor, Ray, ‘T Dan Smith. The Youthful Revolutionary’, North East Labour History Bulletin 28 
(1994) pp15-18. 
64 Byrne, David, ‘T Dan Smith. The Disastrous Impact of a Liberal, Authoritarian Moderniser’, North 
East Labour History Society Bulletin 28 (1994) pp19-26 
65 Ibid; quote from p25. 
66 Ibid. 
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Leninism” – both traditions having influenced Smith. He concludes that Smith – 
influenced both by “the derivatives of Leninism” and “right wing social democracy”, 
shared the contempt for democratic process that (in “socialist analysis”) is a feature 
of both.67 
 
A more measured assessment is given by Nigel Todd, in his essay ‘Ambition and 
Harsh Reality. Local Politics… Local Politicians’. Todd sees Smith as a figure of 
many contradictions: “fierce commitment” to state education, yet sending hisn own 
children to private school, concern for social justice for the poor with what Todd 
describes (somewhat arguably) as “a lavish personal lifestyle”.68 Todd argues that 
the price for Smith’s modernisation of the city was “too high” and muses about 
Smith’s motivations. “Was he a Socialist idealist who felt that his ends justified the 
means and got lost along the way? Was he an authoritarian town hall ‘boss’ 
advancing the interests of builders and planners…? Or was he simply ‘on the make’? 
The answer probably combines each of these elements, but the root of the enigma 
lies in what proportions.”69 These arguments are to some extent based upon a belief 
in Smith’s guiltiness of corruption charges, an issue I examine in chapter 7. 
 
The literature of planning history contains a number of works that focus – if not on 
Smith – on the plans for Newcastle introduced by him, in whole or in significant 
chapters. This lies on a continuum from technocratic celebration to later 
condemnation, and a swing back towards revisionism and reappraisal. 
 
Key among the technocratic works are Burns, Newcastle. A Study in Replanning at 
Newcastle upon Tyne and Holliday (ed), City Centre Redevelopment.70 In the former, 
Wilfred Burns describes in detail his city redevelopment plan, and an essay in the 
latter by Burns’ successor as City Planning Office Kenneth Galley takes the story 
forward to the early 1970s.71 Both, naturally enough given their authors’ profession, 
 
67 Ibid p26 
68 Todd, Nigel, ‘Ambition and Harsh Reality. Local Politics… Local Politicians’ in Flowers, Anna & 
Histon, Vanessa (eds) Water under the Bridges: Newcastle’s Twentieth Century (Newcastle 1999) 
p99 
69 Ibid p99 
70 Burns, Wilfred, Newcastle. A Study in Replanning at Newcastle upon Tyne (London 1967); 
Holliday, John (ed), City Centre Redevelopment (London 1973) 
71 Galley, Kenneth, ‘Newcastle upon Tyne’ in Holliday op cit pp207-233 
20 
 
are uncritically accepting of the policy of large scale urban redevelopment. A more 
qualified, though largely positive, assessment of the Smith-Burns era occupies a 
chapter in Lionel Esher’s A Broken Wave. The Rebuilding of England 1940-1980.72 
 
Two works deal with the aftermath of the optimistic municipal housing programme 
of the 1960s. Elizabeth Gittus’ Flats, Families and the Under-Fives is a case study 
of provision of housing for young families in the Cruddas Park area of Newcastle, 
developed in the early 1960s, drawing attention to the problems of high-rise 
accommodation for parents with young children.73 The Evangelistic Bureaucrat by 
Jon Gower Davies examined housing policy in the Rye Hill area of west Newcastle, 
relating how a policy originally intended to retain and improve nineteenth century 
houses (hailed by Smith as ‘Operation Revitalise’ and covered in chapter 4)  led to 
‘planning blight’ and the eventual demolition of the properties, and examining the 
culture of the city’s planning department, which he described as a “charismatic self 
conception”.74 
 
David Byrne argued in ‘The Reconstruction of Newcastle’ that the 1960s replanning 
was carried out in the interests of the commercial elite of the city, and failed the 
interests of the working class people of Newcastle.75 Smith was, states Byrne, the 
“leading groupie” of technocratic planners: “What drove him was a sense of ‘vision’- 
vision not so much of social justice as of the ‘new’ as ‘good’… There was no 
political vision of any kind set against the technical vision of the planners.”76 An 
argument that Smith completely lacked a political vision for the changes he urged is 
at complete odds with the purpose of this thesis, which in tracing Smith’s political 
career attempts to show how his beliefs led him to seek change and modernisation at 
the civic and regional level (and by doing so to influence change at the national and 
international level), and how his political vision embraced more than economic 
determinism and management but also art, science and the environment. 
 
72 Esher, Lionel, A Broken Wave. The Rebuilding of England 1940-1980 (Harmondsworth 1983): 
Chapter 4 pp172-93 on Newcastle. 
73 Gittus, Elizabeth, Flats, Families and the Under-Fives (London 1976) 
74 Davies, Jon Gower, The Evangelistic Bureaucrat: A Study of a Planning Exercise in Newcastle-
upon-Tyne (London 1972); quotation from p121. 
75 Byrne, David ‘The Reconstruction of Newcastle. Planning since 1945’ in Colls, Robert & 
Lancaster, Bill, (eds), Newcastle upon Tyne. A Modern History (Chichester 2001) pp 341-360 
76 Ibid p350 
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More positive views of Smith’s legacy have also been voiced. John Pendlebury has 
drawn attention to the pioneering work of Burns and Smith in establishing proto-
conservation areas in Newcastle.77 A nuanced portrait of Newcastle by urbanist 
Owen Hatherley sees the ideals of 1960s Newcastle as “an intriguing fusion of 
regionalism – devolution, fierce local pride – and internationalism, achieved by 
looking out towards Europe and the Third World for ideas both architectural and 
political.”78 This was, continues Hatherley, “a potential enclave, a genuine city state” 
which Smith and his allies were attempting to create.79 
 
The broad range of subject areas addressed in this thesis, including social history, 
political history, local government, planning history, regional development, means 
that distinct literature groups are relevant to the various chapters in Smith’s career. I 
have therefore adopted the approach of an embedded literature review, where the 
sources are addressed and discussed within the relevant chapters. 
 
Sources: oral history recordings and transcripts 
Similar caveats apply to recorded interviews with Smith’s contemporaries. By the 
time research began in 2007, few were still alive, and of the survivors, many had 
failing memories of events taking place forty, fifty or more years previously. Some 
of his contemporaries were unwilling to be interviewed and I believe that in many 
cases this was because of the controversy which Smith’s career was still felt to 
stimulate. 
 
The use of oral history evidence falls into two categories.  One is the interviews that 
I conducted in the course of my research. In these, I was able to direct the 
questioning towards areas in which I was interested, with varying degrees of success. 
The other category was of interviews conducted by others. Most of these formed part 
of the large collection of taped interviews conducted in the 1980s and early 1990s by 
Peter McTigue and Chris Ford for abortive book projects with Smith. Brief 
 
77 Pendlebury, John ‘Alas Smith and Burns? Conservation Planning in Newcastle City Centre, 1959-
1968’, Planning Perspectives 16(2) (2001) 
78 Hatherley, Owen, A Guide to the New Ruins of Great Britain (London 2010) p177 
79 Ibid pp177-178 
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summaries of the tapes used were prepared by the late Bill Griffiths, but no 
transcripts were available for the several dozen hours of recordings. In these 
interviews, I was obviously reliant on the questions which McTigue and Ford wished 
to ask, together with Smith’s own control of the course the conversation took. 
 
Another significant oral source was the collection of recorded and transcribed 
interviews with Dan Smith, Ken Sketheway, and Jack Johnston by Murray Martin 
and Steve Trafford of Amber Collective conducted for the film T Dan Smith. A 
Funny Thing Happened on the Road to Utopia (1987). 
 
Oral history is a contentious methodology, and a relatively young one: although one 
might perhaps describe a writer and journalist such as Henry Mayhew, whose  work 
London Labour and the London Poor (1851-52), together with articles in the 
Morning Post, included much testimony from individuals, as an ‘oral historian’, and 
other social investigators of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also used oral 
evidence, the practice only really gained popularity with the availability of 
(relatively) cheap and portable recording equipment in the post-1945 era.80 Two 
principal schools of practice emerged: historians employing oral history as a form of 
archival practice, and social historians, many with socialist views, attempting to 
create ‘history from below’, empowering and giving voice to the voiceless: women, 
ethnic minorities, and other disempowered minority groups.81 
 
But as a methodology it had shortcomings; Eric Hobsbawm described oral history as 
“a remarkably slippery medium for preserving facts.”82 Arthur M Schlesinger Jr saw 
oral history as “essentially supplementary evidence. What it is good at is to give a 
sense of the relations among people – who worked with whom, who liked whom, 
who influenced whom… the recollected material cannot pretend to the exactitude 
of… the White House tapes of the Nixon years.”83 These drawbacks reflect the level 
 
80 Thompson, E P & Yeo, Eileen, The Unknown Mayhew (Harmondsworth 1973); Grele, Ronald J, 
‘Oral History as Evidence’ in Charlton, T L, Myers, L E & Sharpless, R, Handbook of Oral History 
(Lanham, MD 2008) p 48 
81 Grele op cit  pp 48-49; Green, Anna & Troup, Katherine, The Houses of History. A critical reader 
in twentieth-century history and theory (Manchester 1999) p231; MacRaild, Donald M & Taylor, 
Avram, Social Theory and Social History (Basingstoke 2004)  pp126-127 
82 Green & Troup op cit p230 
83 Greele op cit p45 
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of usefulness of oral testimony in this thesis. So far as my own interviews are 
concerned, I was not preparing a social history where exactness about dates or events 
was not expected. Nor was I interviewing people out of interest in their own lives; I 
sought mainly information about my subject, Dan Smith, and the milieu in which he 
operated. Failing memories, the passage of time, perhaps faults with my interviewing 
technique may all have contributed to what were, by and large, fairly disappointing 
results from my point of view. 
 
Interviews conducted by others likewise had drawbacks. Most of the material in this 
category consisted of interviews with Smith. He was a voluble interviewee and his 
words were often difficult to transcribe in a useful (to me) way, as his responses to 
questions or comments would become long, unstructured replies moving from topic 
to topic in a way that was almost stream of consciousness. It was also important to 
bear certain factors in mind when listening to Smith talk. He was speaking in the 
1980s and 1990s of events that had taken place between the 1920s and the 1970s. 
How good was his memory of those events, how accurate was the information he 
related? Was he presenting his actions in a positive light? To what extent was he 
unconsciously mythologizing his past actions to fit an appropriate narrative for the 
behaviour of a socialist in mid-twentieth century Tyneside? This last question recalls 
particularly the work of Alistair Thompson whose work with ANZAC veterans on 
their experiences of the First World War applied a theory of ‘composure’ developed 
by the Popular Memory Group at Birmingham University. This argues that people 
compose their personal memories to make sense of past and present, composing 
memories that give comfort and repressing those that are painful or unsafe, to 
conform more nearly with a national memory or myth, in this case that of the heroic 
ANZAC soldier , courageous but egalitarian, motivated by ‘mateship’.84 
 
Sources: written archival material 
The main archive source used were the papers of Dan Smith held at Tyne & Wear 
Archives and Museums. The great bulk of this large collection contains Smith’s 
papers from the mid-1950s onwards, with only a very little earlier material. It is 
 
84 Green & Troup op cit p237; Thompson, A, ‘ANZAC Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory 
into Practice in Australia’ in Green & Troup op cit pp239-252., Thompson, A, ‘The Anzac legend: 
exploring national myth and memory in Australia’ in |Samuel & Thompson op cit 
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complemented by material currently in my possession, donated by the Smith family 
and by Peter McTigue. 
 
On Smith’s wartime and immediate postwar career, other  main sources used were 
the Jock Haston papers at the University of Hull Library, the ILP archives at the 
London School of Economics Library, the Glasgow Caledonian Archive of the 
Trotskyist Tradition (GCATT) at Glasgow Caledonian University, the Working 
Class Movement Library, Salford, the papers of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain at the Labour History Archives in Manchester, and the papers of Jimmy 
Deane at the Modern Records Centre, Warwick University. 
 
For his career in the Labour Party, as council leader, NEPC chairman and Peterlee 
chairman, key resources include the Labour Party archives at the Labour History 
Archives, and archives of a number of Government departments held at The National 
Archives: principally the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, the 
Department of Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Technology. 
 
On corruption allegations, extensive use has been made of the transcripts of the 
Poulson bankruptcy hearings held at West Yorkshire Archives, Wakefield, and the 
case files of Leeds Crown Court held The National Archives. 
 
In addition to archive material, use was made of contemporary newspapers and 
periodicals, especially those periodicals relating to politics, local government, and 
urban/regional planning news and issues. 
 
Sources:  
Structure 
The structure of the thesis is broadly chronological, with chapters laid out as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 examines Smith’s childhood and youth. It will consider his family 
background in the context of the debate about roughness and respectability in the 
working class; and examine the influences on his thinking and political awareness: 
his autodidact father, his rudimentary board school education; his spasmodic work as 
a jobbing painter, night classes and the Workers’ Educational Association (WEA) 
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and National Council of Labour Colleges (NCLC), and his move into the Peace 
Pledge Union.  
 
Chapter 2 examines Smith’s political career between the late 1930s and the 
immediate post-war period: his career in the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and his 
advancement in that organisation; his secret membership of the Trotskyist Workers’ 
International League (WIL), his expulsion from the ILP, and his subsequent 
expulsion from the WIL’s successor organisation, the Revolutionary Communist 
Party (RCP).  As well as giving a detailed insight into the workings of the ILP and 
the Trotskyist movement in the wartime north east, it demonstrates how Smith’s 
activities in this period were a formative apprenticeship for his future political 
career. 
 
Chapter 3 examines Smith’s political career between his abandonment of 
Trotskyism in 1947 and the accession of the Labour Party to power in Newcastle in 
1958. While building a private business career, he was simultaneously rebuilding his 
political career as a Labour councillor. The nature of the local Labour Party and its 
opponents, the Progressive Party (a group of anti-Labour councillors), are examined, 
as are Smith’s efforts to build support in the party. The chapter also looks at Smith’s 
ideological development in this period: the influence of James Burnham on his 
thinking, and Smith’s position in the swirling currents of Bevanism and Revisionism. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the six years during which Smith served as de facto leader of 
Newcastle City Council. In that period he introduced plans that changed the face of 
the city and made significant changes to the way it was run. This chapter examines 
some of these changes, focusing on the physical replanning of the city centre (set in a 
historical context of planning in Newcastle) and the inspirations for the plan, the role 
of arts and leisure in his plans, Smith’s views on the role of Newcastle as a regional 
capital, and – importantly – his innovative creation of administrative structures and 
processes to implement change – in particular the creation of the powerful new posts 
of Chief Planning Officer and Principal City Officer.  It will also consider the failure 
of the plans to be carried through to completion.  
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Chapter 5 examines the origins and development of regionalist policies, and 
Smith’s role in advancing the regionalist debate and his work as chairman of the 
Northern Economic Planning Council (NEPC) and member of the Redcliffe-Maud 
Commission on local government reform. It concludes that his efforts to advance 
regional structures by means of his stewardship of the NEPC were wasted as he had 
taken on a position with no power and waning influence, as central government lost 
interested in regional planning. 
 
Chapter 6 Dan Smith was involved with the Peterlee New Town for eight years, 
initially as a public relations consultant and subsequently as chairman of its 
development corporation. At Peterlee the different strands of his career came 
together with, for Smith, catastrophic consequences. The episode is worth examining 
in detail for the light it casts upon his methods of work: as a networker, as a lobbyist 
for his business clients and for the New Town, as a ‘quangocrat’, as a ‘visionary’ 
able to inspire senior business executives with his futuristic ambitions, and as a 
capable player of the political game even in the corridors of Whitehall.85 It involves 
an assessment of how realistic was the proposal for Peterlee to become a pioneering 
science centre. Close examination of the network of relationships between Smith, 
senior officials at Peterlee, and the architect John Poulson also, I believe, offers a 
further corrective to the ‘T Dan Smith myth’ outlined below and questions the 
Peterlee-related charge against him.86 
 
Chapter 7 examines the development of Smith’s role as PR consultant for with the 
architect John Poulson, including his trial for corruption in 1974. It considers the 
nature of the charges laid against Smith, concluding that his association with Poulson 
was located in “an ill-defined borderland” where lobbying shades into inducement, at 
a time when the moral borderline was shifting as a result of publicity engendered by 
the Poulson affair. 
 
Chapter 8 draws together thoughts and conclusions about Smith’s career and its 
significance. 
 
85 I am grateful to Professor Keith Shaw for introducing the useful neologism ‘quangocrat’ to me. 
86 This re-examination was suggested to me by Foote Wood op cit pp195-206 
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Chapter 1: A Wallsend Upbringing 
 
Family background 
 
Thomas Daniel Smith was born on 11 May 1915 at 62 Holly Avenue, Wallsend, a 
shipbuilding and mining town lying on the north bank of the River Tyne east of 
Newcastle. His father, Robert Smith, was a coal miner born in County Durham; his 
mother, born Ada Clifford, was a farmer’s daughter from Cumberland, formerly in 
service.87 Ada was one of eleven children - ten sisters and a brother. After her 
father’s death, Ada, her mother and some of her sisters moved to Coundon in County 
Durham, where her mother remarried and ran the Parkhead public house.88 Around 
1910 Robert Smith and Ada, now his wife, moved from Middlestone Moor in 
County Durham to Wallsend, where Robert had secured a job in the Wallsend 
Colliery ‘G’ pit.89 With them came Robert’s father, Daniel, and brother George. 
Robert and Ada settled on Holly Avenue, where a daughter, Lucy was born, and 
around three years later they had a son, Thomas Daniel.90 The couple had no other 
surviving children. 
 
Christian Socialism 
Robert and Ada Smith were both socialists and practicing members of the Church of 
England. In the early twentieth century the rector of the principal Anglican church in 
Wallsend, St Peters, was a renowned radical high church cleric, Canon Charles 
Osborne (in office 1906-36). Although Dan Smith was baptised at St Luke’s church 
in Wallsend, closer to home, the Smith family attended St Peters as well.91 Smith 
was to recollect in his published autobiography that Osborne “was a socialist. He 
was not terribly popular, but he was a well-known figure and impressed me 
tremendously with what I was pleased to call his speeches.”92 The St Peters parish 
 
87 Robert Smith was born 31 October 1878, Ada around twelve years later: TDS Archive Disk 5B 
88 TDS Archive disk 5A 
89 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography (n.d.) p1 
90 He was named Thomas Daniel after his maternal and paternal grandfathers respectively. Amber, T 
Dan Smith unpublished autobiography p15 
91 North Shields Library, Baptism Register, St Luke Wallsend. Dan Smith was baptised on 26 May 
1915 by the Rev A G Davidson 
92 Smith, T Dan op cit p5 
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magazine in the interwar period makes numerous references to social issues, 
pacifism and disarmament, the Peace Ballot, industrial reconciliation, the 
Unemployment Welfare Association, and the work of Henry Mess and the Tyneside 
Council for Social Service.93  
 
One might – perhaps - excuse as naivety the canon’s 1933 encomium of the new 
German Chancellor: “[Nazism] is not mainly a militarist movement. There is a 
splendid feature in the ‘conscription’ of all able bodied men and youths, whether rich 
or poor, for hard manual work… Hitler is dealing drastically with the cinema, 
stopping all lewd cinema advertisements. Also books advocating free love are 
consigned to the flames… Hitler is strong for healthy and moral family life. There 
are no slums as in England. Of course there is another side to his movement. It is not 
carried out with kid gloves…”94 
 
It seems likely that Ada Smith was the more devout; Dan Smith recalls that it was on 
her insistence that he attended church; his father went “not to listen to the sermon, 
but because he liked singing”.95 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Robert Smith was, in his son’s recollection, “on the whole very well read”96. 
Although it is unlikely that he had received anything other than the rudimentary 
education deemed appropriate for a pitman’s son, he was something of an autodidact. 
He had a bent for philosophy and would read, and discuss with his son, the works of 
Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx, H G Wells, Bernard Shaw; he would take the 
young Dan to performances at the People’s Theatre, and to see Chaliapin perform at 
the City Hall.97 At the same time music was important to the family - Robert Smith 
introducing his son to the performances (on shellac) of Caruso and Clara Butt; Lucy 
Smith became a talented amateur pianist, and Dan a boy soprano.98 
 
 
93 Northumberland Archives EP44/77/29 Wallsend S. Peters Magazine, various 
94 Northumberland Archives EP44/77/29 Wallsend S. Peters Magazine vol 33 no 9 (September 1933) 
95 Smith, T Dan, op cit, p5 
96 Ibid p2 
97 Smith, T D, An Autobiography (Newcastle upon Tyne 1970) p10; TDS Archive Disk 5B; TDS 
Archive disk 42A. The People’s Theatre was founded in 1911 by members of the Independent Labour 
Party in Newcastle. The Russian opera singer Feodor Chaliapin (1873-1938) sang at the City Hall on 
Tuesday 27 November 1928 (Newcastle Daily Journal and North Star 28 November 1928 p9) 
98 Smith, T Dan op cit pp3,5 
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It would be a mistake, however, to assume from this cultural activity that the Smith 
family was necessarily part of the ‘respectable’ side of the ‘respectable’ versus 
‘rough’ model of working class society. This issue has exercised historians and 
cultural commentators for decades; indeed since the emergence of a new working 
class identity in the late nineteenth century as charted by Gareth Stedman Jones. 
Stedman Jones portrays the working class culture that emerged in London in the 
years 1870-1900 in terms of a distinctive new pattern, hedonistic, apolitical, and 
introverted, but the picture he paints is essentially homogeneous.99 Other historians 
have described working class divisions in terms of a simple dichotomy of rough and 
respectable - according to Standish Meacham, describing a similar period to Stedman 
Jones, a “concrete and ready-to hand distinction” well known to the working class, in 
which respectability could be ensured by adherence to “a strict but uncomplicated 
list of ‘don’ts’”.100 
 
 Jackson and Marsden cite a twentieth century grammar-school-educated working 
class interviewee who gave a succinct definition of the difference: “There are two 
kinds of working class - the ones who swear, and the ones who don’t, in the bus 
queues.”101 They also add another category, the ‘sunken’ or ‘submerged’ middle 
class, to their working class typology. John Clarke offers a similar, twofold analysis: 
“The rough-respectable division has been firmly lodged in the visible signs of the 
home, street, neighbourhood and patterns of consumption… These repertoires have 
also been drawn on, added to and solidified by particular forms of ideological and 
political addresses to the class - the respectable trade unionists, the conservative 
appeal to freedom and family life of Britain, the stigma of the visit from the welfare, 
school board man or social worker, the rough neighbourhood’s reputation, the 
‘scroungers’ and so on.”102  
 
Ross McKibbin posits a kind of continuum of “three kinds of people, ‘rough’, 
 
99 Stedman Jones, G, Languages of Class. Studies in Working Class History 1832-1932 (Cambridge 
1983) pp179-238 
100  Meacham, S, A Life Apart. The English Working Class 1890-1914 (London 1977) pp25-29. The 
‘don’ts’ were: “swearing, except at work; drinking, in excess of an occasional weekend pint or two; 
gambling; persistent rowing; sexual promiscuity on the part of mother or daughters.” 
101  Jackson, B, & Marsden, D, Education and the Working Class (London 1962) p184  
102  Clarke, J,‘Capital and Culture: the post-war working class revisited’ in Clarke, J, Critcher, C & 
Johnson, R (eds), Working Class Culture. Studies in history and theory (London 1979) pp246-247 
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respectable’ and those (the largest number) who were a little of both.”103  David 
Cannadine further expands this classification, citing Thomas Wright’s description of 
the working classes as “not a single-acting, single-idea’d body. They are practically 
and plurally classes, distinct classes, classes between which there are as decisively 
marked differences as there are between any one of them and the upper and middle 
classes.”104 
 
The relevance of the debate has been challenged, not least by Arthur Marwick who 
not only believed that a “sense of a common lot swamps what hints there still are of 
that contrast between ‘respectable’ and ‘roughs’ emphasized in… The Classic Slum” 
(Robert Roberts’ 1971 account of working class life in early twentieth century 
Salford) but that “too much weight need not be given” to recollections that 
emphasised intra-class diversity.105  
 
An examination of the Smith family and its social locus does have value not just 
because, even if one abandons the respectable/rough dichotomy model for a more 
flexible continuum model, it is not easy to place them at one particular point on the 
scale. Like most if not all families, the Smiths occupied a number of different and 
seemingly contradictory points simultaneously.  
 
For all his knowledge of philosophy, Robert Smith “had in many ways the worst 
features of a Durham miner. He was a gambler; he liked to drink.”106 Dan Smith’s 
memories of his father, and attachment to his hard-working mother, were not 
untypical. McKibbin records widespread expressions of bitterness or contempt 
towards their fathers among working class youths in the mid twentieth century: 
“This was not… Freudian hostility… It was the result in many cases of growing up 
in poverty in unskilled working class households with an ill-tempered and apparently 
neglectful husband whose behaviour contrasted unforgettably with the stoicism and 
 
103  McKibbin, R, Classes and Cultures. England 1918-1951 (Oxford 1998) pp198-205, citing Mogey, 
J M, Family and Neighbourhood: Two Studies of Oxford (London 1956) and Stacey, M, Tradition 
and Change: A Study of Banbury (Oxford 1960) 
104  Cannadine, D, Class in Britain (Harmondsworth 2000) p92 
105  Marwick, A, ‘Images of the working class since 1930’ in Winter, J, (ed) The Working Class in 
Modern British History. Essays in Honour of Henry Pelling (Cambridge 1983) pp215-231; quotation 
from p224 
106 Smith, T Dan op cit p4 
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self-sacrifice of Mum. For boys raised during the 1920s and 1930s, when their 
fathers had to cope with pressures their sons could not understand - and frequently 
coped badly - this contrast was uniquely memorable.”107 The Smith family 
relationships clearly fitted this model. Robert Smith would take his son on walks 
“even if he sometimes left me outside the pub while he went in for a couple of pints. 
His pleasures in life, measured in physical terms, were simple. He liked to drink, he 
liked to bet on the horses and he took an interest in following the careers of local 
boxers…”.108  Robert Smith would bet on pigeon races, on illegal rabbit and hare 
coursing, or games of pitch and toss or cards; and these habits were passed on to his 
son although with his father Dan Smith would play billiards and snooker, or chess 
and draughts, games “significant in moulding me as a person. I never underestimate 
the significance of chess in my life because it’s a game where beginning to assess the 
alternatives creates a kind of discipline…”109  Ada Smith, meanwhile, was 
“essentially opposed to drinking and gambling… She steadfastly refused to accept 
the kind of ‘Christianity’ which allowed my father to drink and gamble while she 
had to work until she felt like dropping. She always got the best of the arguments 
and the worst of the marriage deal.”110 She also had an appreciation of finer living 
gained from her experience in service; while a cousin of Dan Smith on his father’s 
side had been a valet to Lord Hambledon, and taught him how to look after his 
clothes.111 For all that, Dan Smith later recalled himself as being “essentially 
working class, primitively working class.”112 
 
Holly Avenue still exists: long rows of Tyneside flats facing the embankment of the 
Newcastle-Tynemouth metro line.113 That they survive, rather than falling victim to 
 
107 McKibbin, R, Classes and Cultures. England 1918-1951 (Oxford 1998) p172. I would suggest that 
there may also have been elements of Oedipal conflict in Dan Smith’s relationship with his father. 
Among other things, his rejection of Robert’s ‘Stalinist’ beliefs for those of Stalin’s arch-enemy 
Trotsky  (known as ‘the Old Man’ to his adherents), and his marriage to a woman who, like his 
mother, bore the name Ada, and both possessed more social refinement and was some years younger 
than her spouse, offer tantalising possibilities for the psychohistorian. 
108 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography p14 
109 TDS Archive Disk 5A 
110 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography p14 
111 TDS Archive disk 5A. Hambledon was the heir to the W H Smith dynasty.  
112 TDS Archive Disk 5A 
113 ‘Tyneside flats’ are a housing form characteristic of Tyneside, generally comprising two-storey 
terraced rows with a flat or maisonette on each storey; the buildings resemble standard terraced 
cottages at the front, except that they have two front doors rather than one (the most cheaply built 
were identified by rows of four adjacent front doors; Holly Avenue was not in this class). 
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slum clearance schemes of the 1930s, 1950s  or 1960s, indicates that they were 
relatively superior housing, but housing for which the Smiths, unlike most north-
eastern mining families, had to pay rent to a private landlord. The family moved 
from number 62 to 75 in 1923, and it was not until 1926 that Robert Smith was 
offered a (rent-free) colliery house, on Portugal Place, on the western side of 
Wallsend.114 “Far from our moving house ushering in a new era of prosperity, it did 
the reverse” recalled Dan Smith.115 Portugal Place was environmentally - and 
socially - a step down from Holly Avenue. As well as pit houses it contained 
Wallsend Corporation’s cleaning depot and stables, a mortuary, the back entrance to 
The Anchor public house, and a public urinal; there was also a farrier’s shop and a 
slaughterhouse in the close vicinity.116 The long postwar decline in the coal industry 
had begun, and Robert Smith was periodically unemployed. The ‘G’ pit closed in the 
1930s; “and when it finished, he finished.”117 He suffered from vertigo - which ruled 
out any chances of working in the shipyards, where an ability to work on scaffolding 
was essential, as it did working for his brother-in-law, who ran a steeplejack business 
in Glasgow.118 The advantage of rent-free (if inferior quality) accommodation was 
lost when the Wallsend & Hebburn Coal Company sold the houses to a private 
landlord, and the Smiths had to take in lodgers to make ends meet.119 Worse, Ada 
Smith had to go to work, as a cleaner - to McKibbin “the… occupation… with the 
lowest social prestige and poorest rewards” - working at Wallsend telephone 
exchange in the mornings and the Shell-Mex offices in Newcastle in the evenings.120 
That Ada Smith had to work would have been a further blow to the standing of her 
husband: as noted by John Clarke, “‘Respectability’ within the working class 
historically has also been demonstrated by the ability of the man to keep his wife at 
home, away from the world of work.”121 
 
Work 
Young Dan Smith had not excelled at the schools he attended - he did not pass ‘the 
 
114 The Journal 12 March 1968; T Dan Smith, An Autobiography (Newcastle upon Tyne 1970) p6 
115 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography p7 
116 Smith, T Dan, op cit, p6; Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography  pp7-8. Mrs Smith 
campaigned successfully to have the urinal removed. 
117 Smith, T Dan op cit p6 
118 TDS Archive disks 5B, 5A 
119 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography pp7, 10 
120 McKibbin, op cit p110; Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography p10 
121 Clarke op cit p250 
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scholarship’ - but was highly enough thought of to be chosen to speak at a formal 
presentation to a retiring headmaster; a former teacher was later to comment that “he 
was an above average pupil but there was nothing at that time to mark him out as a 
leader of men.”122 A photograph of the time shows Smith looking intensely at the 
camera, notably more smartly dressed than most of his classmates. This reflects the 
influence of his mother, “ambitious for me in the way that mothers in humble 
families often are.” Ada Smith’s experience ‘in service’ had given her an 
appreciation of finer things and she had ambitions for her son outside Wallsend, 
variously seeking to persuade him to work in a hotel or to take up farming alongside 
her brother Tom in Cumberland.123 But “[o]n one thing we were all agreed. I would 
never go to work down the pits.”124 Young Smith briefly landed a ‘good’ job, 
working in the mail room at the Wigham Richardson shipyard at Wallsend: indoor 
work, offering a progression up the ‘white collar’ ladder.125 This involved leaving 
school early, at 13 years of age - something seen at the time as a badge of ability.126 
Unfortunately he was sacked after one day, supposedly for failing to address his 
superiors as ‘sir’. “I dreaded the reception which would await me when my mother 
returned from work…” Smith was to recall, “…more worrying that that were the 
kind of comments to which I would be subjected by my school-mates if I had to go 
back to school after holding a job down for only one day.”127 He records throwing 
himself into the search for work, although it appears that he did have to swallow his 
pride and return to school for a brief period.  
 
Shortly afterwards he was engaged as an apprentice painter by Ralph Edward Moore 
of Wallsend, to Robert Smith’s disapprobation: “Why go for a job like that, you’re 
sure to get lead poisoning.”128 The “cruel… almost killing” work of loading and 
 
122 Smith, T Dan, op cit p8; The Journal 12 March 1968 
123 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography pp20-21 
124 Ibid p21 
125 Ibid p22. The advantages in clerking in terms of status and amenity “were… the first steps on the 
route out of the working class and not lightly abandoned. They were, furthermore, often 
compensations for low income: many clerks were less well paid than craftsmen (a fact known to both) 
and without superiority of status and amenity junior clerical occupations might have been even more 
dispiriting than they already were.” McKibbin, op cit p138 
126 Jackson & Marsden, op cit pp60-61: the official leaving age was 14; but passing ‘the Labour 
exam’ permitted leaving at 13. “Under these former regulations, early leaving was paradoxically 
associated by working-class people with ability, and longer schooling with dullness.”  
127 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography pp22-23 
128 Ibid pp 23-24. Smith subsequently did suffer a mild lead poisoning attack, as well as developing a 
TB spot on one lung.  
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unloading supplies and hauling fully laden barrows up and down the steep riverside 
streets, and subsequently of painting “miles” of council house railings was 
ameliorated by the encouragement given to Smith by his boss’s son, Stan, to attend 
night classes at Rutherford Technical College in Newcastle.129 There he learned 
about the history of art and architecture, as well as technical expertise in identifying, 
and imitating with a paintbrush, a multitude of types of wood and stone.130  
 
Nevertheless, the search for self-improvement was tempered by the search for 
pleasure, and Smith would frequently ‘cut’ night classes at Rutherford College to see 
the boxing at nearby St James’ Hall. Perhaps he was one of the “jeering spectators”, 
a “bloodthirsty lot” seen by J B Priestley on his visit to the venue while researching 
English Journey: “I… thought I had never seen a crowd of men whose looks pleased 
me less.”131  
 
Stan Moore broadened Smith’s social horizons in other ways, too: “many evenings 
we would go out together to roller skate, ice skate and certainly we would play 
football, cricket or whatever sport was available and in season. Winter nights also 
took us into the billiard halls where we became proficient in that working class 
game.”132 However supportive his employers may have been, Smith did not stay 
with them long, leaving in 1930 to join a Newcastle firm which had the contract to 
paint signs for the Evening World newspaper. The Evening World closed in January 
 
129 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography p25; Smith, T Dan op cit p31 
130 Ibid p12; Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography  pp29-30 
131 TDS Archive disk 7A; J B Priestley, English Journey (London 1934; Harmondsworth 1977) pp 
277-278. Priestley did not know, or omitted to say, that some of the “stringy lads, who arrived in the 
ring wearing overcoats” were probably unemployed youths who would fight for a paltry five shillings, 
two of which went to the seconds. According to Len Edmondson, a local ILP and trade union activist, 
“Some of them could box and some of them could not. Those who could not just received a good 
punching up… One night at the hall there was a man who looked so weak and tired it was obvious he 
should not have been in the ring. He appeared to have no idea of how to box and was just punched 
about the ring by his opponent… in the second round [he] was so badly punched-up that when he 
went down the referee stopped the fight… The crowd were just beginning to voice their disapproval 
of his poor show when Tommy Murphy, the referee, waved for the crowd to be quiet and explained 
that the man was on the road, had not had anything to eat all day but had come along to the Hall and 
volunteered to fight. He was one the many starving unemployed who were tramping around the 
country looking for work and had volunteered for what he must have known would be a good 
punching-up to earn no more than sufficient to buy him a good meal that night.” Len Edmondson 
papers, TWAM DF.ED 4707/4a. 
132 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography p28 
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1932 and Smith was left jobless.133 
 
It was probably at this point that Smith, still sixteen years of age, was directed to a 
Juvenile Instruction Centre or ‘dole school’ at Jarrow, one of many such centres 
established at the behest of the Ministry of Labour (but run by local authorities) to 
provide retraining for unemployed Workers’ under eighteen years of age.134 “I was 
in my second year City and Guilds painting and decorating course… and it seemed 
to make sense that I should be able to do my night school work during the day. No 
such thing. I could choose between becoming a trainee hairdresser or a joiner.”135 
The somewhat desultory training - attendance was for three afternoons a week - also 
forwarded Smith’s political education. In between jokes about getting their education 
at ‘Heaton and Jarrow’ Smith and his colleagues would “talk of the ‘ruling class’ and 
how we understood their dislike of phrases such as the ‘class war’. We did not like 
the reality of class war - but we certainly [understood] what we meant by the conflict 
in life styles between the rich and ourselves.”136 
 
Nevertheless, like many youths he was, despite the high unemployment on Tyneside, 
able to find work, albeit with periods of unemployment between jobs, a pattern 
consistent with McKibbin’s observation that “[y]ounger men and adolescents, 
widely thought at the time to be as prone to unemployment as older men, were, in 
fact, more accustomed to shorter but more frequent periods of unemployment as they 
moved comparatively rapidly (and often restlessly) from one job to another. The 
juvenile labour market was unstable, characterized by high turnover and low skill, 
‘blind-alley’ or ‘dead-end’ jobs, but not usually by prolonged unemployment.”137 
Smith was to work, among other places, at Hood Haggie’s rope and cable works at 
 
133 Smith, T Dan op cit, An Autobiography (Newcastle upon Tyne 1970) pp13-14; 
www.ncle.gov.uk/wwwfileroot/localstudies/userguides/UserGuide3Newspapers.pdf accessed 10 May 
2011. The Evening World was a relatively new Tyneside paper. It was started in 1929 by Lord 
Northcliffe to compete with the established Evening Chronicle and folded on 29 January 1932 as part 
of an agreement with rival press magnate Lord Camrose whereby Camrose would close his evening 
newspaper in Bristol in return for a free hand in Newcastle. A gable-end sign for the paper - possibly 
originally painted by Smith - can still be seen in Wallsend, a stone’s throw from his childhood home. 
134 Pope, R, ‘‘Dole Schools’: The North-East Lancashire Experience, 1930-39’, Journal of 
Educational Administration and History v9 no2 (1977) p 26-33. Of the variety of ventures set up to 
assist the unemployed, comments Pope, dole schools “were, perhaps, the least successful”. 
135 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography pp31-32 
136 Ibid p 32 
137 McKibbin, op cit p114 
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Willington Quay, east of Wallsend, (where one of the rituals was to ‘lay out’ young 
Workers’: hold them down and molest them), and painting the passenger quarters on 
ocean liners being constructed at the Tyne yards. There he was struck by the contrast 
between the luxury on board and the conditions to which workers were subject: “We 
had to leave the ship… and heat our cans on a dirty old fire… the sheer brutality, 
stupidity of the place and the incompetence and inefficiency just left you speechless 
until you became cynical like everyone else.”138 
 
“I found painters to be a strange group of men,” he recalled. “They had no deep trade 
union tradition and only in the shipyards was trade union membership necessary for 
a job. Those who were ‘strong’ unionists were normally Labour supporters and 
active in the party. Most of them were hard drinkers, the theory being that the drink 
was a good antidote to lead poisoning!”139 
 
Education 
He also furthered his general education by attending Workers’ Educational 
Association (WEA) and National Council of Labour Colleges (NCLC) classes on 
economic and political subjects, while also “learning the skills of debating and 
public speaking”.140 The NCLC affected contempt for what it perceived as the 
bourgeois WEA, which (as stated in one of its pamphlets) “stands for educational 
collaboration with Liberals and Tories and with the Universities - the great centres of 
governing class education”141 Smith recalled the WEA, to which he was introduced 
through his membership of the International Friendship League, as being “far from 
working class… It became a kind of middle class insert [sic]”, though it is arguable 
whether at the time he took much notice of the distinction. Jonathan Rose highlights 
the considerable overlap in membership between the NCLC and the WEA, citing 
among others one student who argued in 1925 that “The average worker-student 
does not care two pence about the WEA and NCLC squabble… With most Workers’ 
it is a matter of chance in which movement they eventually find themselves.”142 Rose 
 
138 TDS Archive disk 7A 
139 Amber, T Dan Smith unpublished autobiography p24 
140 Ibid p35 
141 NLSc NCLC Archive Acc 5120 Box 21 File 6, The NCLC and the WEA. What do you think, 
Chums? 
142 Rose, J, The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes (2nd ed New Haven 2010) p 272 
quoting L C Stone. 
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also argues that “political militancy was as much at home in the WEA as in the 
NCLC”, and indeed that the radical image promoted by the NCLC was exaggerated 
in order to better compete with its rival.143 WEA radicalism well have been the case 
in Newcastle, where Smith recalled one lecturer as having been the Italian Consul, 
an Abyssinian War veteran: “You can imagine that some of the sessions got a bit out 
of hand…”144 
 
Smith was also active in the NCLC, taking classes and subsequently lecturing.145 
Between January and March 1937 for example, the NCLC offered classes in 
Newcastle on the history and function of trades unions, and local government; at 
Wallsend, on industrial history, local government and elementary economics.146 Day 
and weekend schools were also offered. One such in June 1935, at the Labour Club 
on Percy Street Newcastle, offered sessions on ‘Liberty, Egality, Fraternity’, 
‘Evolution and Revolution’ and ‘Marx after Eighty Years’, while in September the 
same year a school at the Trevelyan Community Hut in Tynemouth included talks on 
‘The Economics of Dictatorship’, ‘Recent Industrial and Social Tendencies’ and 
‘The Possibility of State Planning in Britain’.147  
 
Personal 
He met the young woman who would become his wife, Ada Simpson, in 1935 at a 
dance class at the Heaton Assembly Rooms.148 Four years younger than Smith, she 
was from an upper working/lower middle class family in the Newcastle suburb of 
Heaton, and, brought up by a schoolteacher aunt, a “voracious reader”. Her family 
were essentially apolitical, “Robert Aske Liberals” in Smith’s scornful phrase: 
supporters of the local Liberal MP, ‘Tea-party Bob’.149 The couple joined the 
 
143 Ibid pp273, 279-80 
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145 Ibid. He states he began to lecture at the age of around 22-24 (ie 1937-39). I have found no 
evidence to corroborate this; however, he did lecture for the NCLC in the 1950s on local government. 
146 NLSc NCLC Archive Acc 5120 Box 52(4) Division 9. January-March Session 1937. The tutors 
were named as S Rees (the Divisional Organiser), P Carr, J Hardy, J Watson and C F Henricksen. 
Stan Rees was one of the 1909 Ruskin College strikers: The Plebs vol 38 no 5 (May 1946). 
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International Friendship League, enjoying debates and hiking trips in the Lake 
District; it was in the IFL that Smith met Edward Short, his future council colleague 
and later Labour MP. “Ted Short… was even then a very skilled debater. More often 
than not he and I would disagree, but I had a tremendously high regard for his ability 
and energy, and it did not surprise me when he eventually blossomed forth in 
politics.”150 
 
Politics 
The main organisational outlet for the Smith family’s political activism was through 
the co-operative movement rather than the Labour Party, and as a boy Smith 
attended a Socialist Sunday School run at Wallsend Co-op.151 At home, as well as 
discussions with his father, there were “thousands of pamphlets” in the home, 
publications of Gollancz and Lawrence & Wishart, the Daily Herald and Reynolds 
News.152 Public meetings and political speakers were also part of the fabric of the 
times. An early memory of Smith was of walking with his parents at the time of the 
1926 miners’ strike to hear the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain leader A J Cook 
address a mass meeting at Holystone, near Wallsend. Cook’s pugnacious style - he 
began his speech ‘You mugs…’ - impressed the young Smith: “I and hundreds of 
others were spell bound and already I was beginning to be impressed with what was 
being described, in derogatory terms, as ‘Soap Box Stuff.’”153 Later, he would listen 
to, and learn from the soap box orators of Wallsend holding forth at Hedley’s Corner 
and the Borough Field, Wallsend.154 Principal among these was Jimmy Stewart, a 
Scottish baker and formerly a member of the Socialist Labour Party, founder and 
editor of a monthly paper The Young Rebel, the contents of which led to his 
prosecution an imprisonment in 1918 for spreading disaffection.155 After his release 
he rented a shop on Wallsend High Street, where he would sell socialist material and 
conduct classes in social, economic and industrial history; as Special Branch 
reported, “He calls his shop a Labour College.”156 Stewart , who was organiser of the 
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North East Labour College, went on to become a long-time teacher for the NCLC at 
Wallsend, described in 1936, upon his departure for South Shields, as “the father of 
the NCLCers at Wallsend for many years.”157 Dan Smith may well have come into 
contact with him in this capacity, but it was as a public speaker that Stewart had 
most impact on the younger man. 
 
Pacifism 
The Smith family abhorred war and imperialism; the young Smith was instructed 
“never to stand for the National Anthem, and when we had our Empire Day parades, 
when the whole school mustered in the playground and all boys proudly wore their 
fathers’ medals and saluted the flag, I used to go bereft of medals and with the guilty 
feeling that I shouldn’t really enjoy singing then patriotic songs.”158 One might 
question how exceptional Smith was: not only would many of his classmates have 
been the children of miners and shipyard Workers’ - reserved occupations 
unrewarded by medals - but genuine popular enthusiasm for Empire is questionable 
at best. Popular working class attitudes towards the Boer War, far from being 
jingoistic, were deeply ambivalent: supportive of local men in the army, while 
ignorant, or condemnatory, of, the policies that had sent them abroad to fight.159 
Likewise, accounts of Empire Day collated by Rose largely express confusion, 
indifference or cynicism rather than the patriotic spirit the day was intended to 
promote.160 
 
Throughout the later 1930s Smith was concerned with issues of war and peace, and, 
it seems, agonising about his ebbing Christian faith. He was excited by the Oxford 
Union ‘King and Country’ debate of 1933. “I felt that this was a critical point of time 
because although I was becoming disillusioned about the church, I believed fervently 
that Christ would not have gone to war; Christ would not have tolerated 
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the Wall Ends. Recollections of a Tyneside Town (Wallsend 1977) states that Stewart was also a 
Wallsend councillor and recalls attending his NCLC classes on Sunday afternoons, and subsequently 
joining the WEA. Stewart “did a lot of good organising people.” The contributor went on at Stewart’s 
request in 1932-33 to teach economic geography for the NCLC. “I did that for quite a while till they 
gradually eased off and stopped coming. That was when things got better. There were lots of militant 
socialists till they started working. Then they weren’t.” (p41) 
158 Smith, T Dan, op cit p9  
159 Rose op cit pp335-341 
160 Ibid pp335-341 
40 
 
bloodshed.”161 “I resolved my own thinking of war, and became one of the founder 
members of the Peace Pledge Union. Dick Shepherd… came north to meet a few of 
us. I remember there was Large the printer, Sadler of Byker and, I think, Richardson 
of a leather firm.”162 In fact, Newcastle was rather tardy in organising a PPU branch. 
At the start of 1937 there were branches in Morpeth, Sunderland, Durham and 
Middlesbrough, but only in July of that year did Peace News announce that 
“Newcastle is going to have a PPU group at last!”163 Dan Smith may well have been 
an active member but he seems not to have held any office within the PPU that 
brought his name to the attention of Peace News.164 He recollected that “most of my 
energies were taken up with anti-war campaigning… we built up a unique war 
resistance movement in Newcastle. I carried on meetings in the open air and 
indoors…”.165 He was “in touch with” Czech and Basque refugees on Tyneside.166 
Activities carried out by the Newcastle PPU included numerous public meetings 
(including a number at the City Hall, Newcastle’s largest public hall at the time), a 
house to house canvas petitioning for a new peace conference (January 1939), a 
‘poster parade’ through Newcastle to coincide with a trial civil defence blackout 
(May 1939), and a PPU marquee at the Hoppings (the annual funfair held on 
Newcastle’s Town Moor).167 PPU members were active in setting up advisory 
bureaux to help those wishing to claim exemption from conscription.168 By April 
1941 Peace News carried words of praise of the activity in Newcastle: “Newcastle 
has a very active and devoted War Resisters’ Section, and there is a magnificent 
spirit prevailing… Thomas Large and other active leaders having recently left to take 
up farming work and a gap was left which was not easy to fill. That it has been filled 
is a tribute to past inspiration and present determination.”169 By that time, however, 
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Dan Smith’s interests were turning to a new path. 
 
 
Team Valley Trading Estate 
Although he makes no special reference to it in his writings or recorded interviews, 
the late twenties and thirties saw Dan Smith’s earliest exposure to concrete 
expressions of regionalism and modernist urban design. In 1929 Newcastle hosted 
the North East Coast Exhibition, to Byrne and Benneworth the first expression of 
political regionalism “in which local government and local industry came together to 
‘promote’ the region in a time of structural adjustment.”170 Opened by the Prince of 
Wales, the exhibition occupied a number of large pavilions in Newcastle’s 
Exhibition Park: Palaces of Industry, Engineering and Arts, a Festival Hall, the 
Empire Marketing Board Pavilion, an ‘African Village’ and a Great Water Chute, 
laid out in the best City Beautiful manner along a boulevard leading to and spanning 
an artificial lake. Exhibits in the Palace of Industry included two enormous models 
showing the industrial Rivers Tyne and Tees respectively, as conurbations united by 
their rivers rather than - as the administrative map would have shown - divided into 
numerous independent, frequently squabbling municipalities.171 There is no firm 
evidence that Dan Smith was among the four-and-a-half million visitors to the 
exhibition. But it is barely conceivable that the lively-minded adolescent, 
accustomed to attending cultural events in Newcastle, would not have visited; and 
among the impressions received, even if subliminally, would have been of Tyneside 
as a distinct urban community, within the equally distinct industrial region of the 
north east. 
 
A few years later he was to work as a painter on ‘advance factories’ (speculative 
factories) being built on the Team Valley Trading Estate (TVTE) in Gateshead. The 
TVTE was the first Government-sponsored trading estate (industrial estate) in 
Britain, its creation authorised by the National Government a pre-election sweetener 
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by Neville Chamberlain in 1935. The estate was designed by William Holford, of 
whose work Cherry and Penny commented “[n]o architect had subjected a British 
industrial estate to such strict discipline before, and probably none has done so 
since.”172 The buildings were deliberately simple in style, spare in detail, while the 
layout of the estate (in the view of Cherry and Penny) echoed le Corbusier’s Ville 
Radieuse as well as drawing on Holford’s training at Liverpool University with its 
beaux arts tradition, and perhaps on his experience of California, “the only place 
where Holford had seen long, low, floodlit buildings, well back from wide and well-
lit roads, on a scale sufficiently large for it to register with him as a distinct visual 
image”.173 The plans envisaged the provision of sports and recreational facilities, 
canteens and kiosks for the benefit of Workers’.174 Team Valley was the concrete 
representation of a new future for the north east. Just as “the industrial surveys of the 
depressed areas represented a modernist narrative showing industry’s fall from 
grace, the new industrial districts of the south and the Midlands were, by contrast, 
positively inscribed with modernist motifs… The social construction of these 
industrial districts established them as new fields for Fordism. By the 1930s, sublime 
depictions of these industries emphasized their technological and progressive 
nature”175 Team Valley was to be an outpost of this New England, a location with 
good road and rail connections and an attractive environment which, according to K 
C Appleyard, chairman of North-Eastern Trading Estates Ltd , “will give people the 
feeling they are going into a rural atmosphere…”176. Appleyard would present the 
project as a modern miracle, boasting “like a supercharged Soviet commissar” about 
his “small army of men, civil engineers, architects, contractors, builders and 
electricians, creating an ideal city within 700 acres of pasture land” and how 
Kingsway, the main artery of the TVTE, would make London’s Great West Road 
seem “a mere pup” by comparison.177 The former Labour Party leader J R Clynes 
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told a local newspaper that the TVTE project was “very much like turning a rubbish 
heap into an industrial garden…if other national projects could be planned in this 
way, the world would be a better place in which to live.”178 As a foot soldier in 
Appleyard’s army, Smith was aware of the significance of what was going on; many 
years later, he would recall meeting and talking to Holford as the architect toured his 
creation.179 
 
His most fundamental exposure to modernist ideas of design and technology may 
well, however, have come from his work as a painter in the shipyards, particularly 
working on passenger liners, seen as a symbol of process by the modernist 
movement and in particular by Le Corbusier: “A seriously minded architect, looking 
at it as an architect (ie a creator of organisms), will find in a steamship his freedom 
from an age-long but contemptible enslavement to the past… The house of the earth-
man is the expression of a circumscribed world. The steamship is the first stage in 
the realization of a world organized according to the new spirit.”180 
 
Further exposure to new ideas came when Smith’s sister Lucy moved to Coventry to 
train as a nurse. On visits to his sister, Smith “got to know accidentally” Donald 
Gibson, Coventry’s City Architect. According to Tiratsoo, Gibson’s education at the 
Liverpool University School of Architecture had “led him, if not to out and out 
modernism, at least to a strong belief that good architecture was desirable not just in 
terms of aesthetic improvement but also in terms of social reform. At the same time, 
he vigorously believed in the need for, and efficacy of, trained experts, who could 
operate free from bureaucratic niceties, views which again closely matched those 
prevalent amongst key local Labour politicians.”181 Coventry was one of the great 
boom towns of the interwar period; its population rose by 75% in the period 1921-
1939 as Workers’ flooded in to work in the new industries of motor manufacturing 
(and associated trades) and engineering (especially electrical engineering).182 But 
this ‘Klondike’ atmosphere drew thousands of immigrants from northern England, 
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Wales, Scotland and Ireland to a city unprepared socially or spatially for such an 
influx. Its small medieval centre was surrounded by a ring of slum housing and small 
factories and workshops, units in which cycle workshops, the progenitors of 
Coventry’s industrial greatness, had been born.183 
 
But considerations of social reform and new ways of living would have to wait. By 
1939 Dan Smith was immersed in the peace movement. “Ordinary people were 
clearer in their aspirations and were in no mood to keep retreating before Hitler or 
reactionaries at home” he was to recall later. “There was no clear socialist alternative 
on offer in the years preceding the outbreak of war. This meant that when war broke 
out in 1939 and as I had made up my mind to be anti-war and to campaign against 
the politicians who I saw as the ‘friends of Hitler’, I faced at best a long, hard, bleak 
and isolated political struggle.”184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 As Priestley put it, “[The] picturesque remains of the old Coventry are besieged by an army of 
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Chapter 2: Dan’s War 
 
“A plague on both your houses” 
 
“[My] own inclination politically was to say, ‘A plague on both your houses.’ That 
was why I became a pacifist and a socialist.”185 As the 1930s progressed, Dan Smith, 
sporadically in work and frequently unemployed, began to articulate political 
opinions. According to his own recollections, he became an active pacifist, involved 
- or interested - in a range of organisations including the Christian pacifist 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, the No Conscription League and the Comintern-
inspired League Against Imperialism.186 This range of organisations, from the FoR, 
reminiscent of the Anglicanism of his youth, to the League Against Imperialism, 
linked to the Stalinism of his father against which he was rebelling, indicates a 
continuing confusion of belief. At the time of the Abyssinian War in 1935 he even 
considered joining the Friends Ambulance Unit.187 He subsequently claimed to be 
one of the “founding members” of the Peace Pledge Union.188  
 
[Shepherd] came north to meet a few of us. I remember there was Large the 
printer, Sadler of Byker and, I think, Richardson of a leather firm. There were 
half a dozen of us who met in Mundella Terrace at Heaton. Old Jack Sadler 
had been a conscientious objector in the first world war and we took it upon 
ourselves to organise, as best we could the Peace Pledge Union in the North. 
We were excited by the current Oxford Students’ Union debate in which a 
resolution renouncing war had been passed. I felt that this was a critical point 
of time because although I was becoming disillusioned about the church, I 
believed fervently that Christ would not have gone to war; Christ would not 
have tolerated bloodshed. It was very much that kind of fervour which directed 
me to the Peace Pledge Union. I felt that I would be strong enough, if it came 
to the crunch, to reject a military solution to any problem. So the black and 
white of things fell into place for me.189   
 
Despite being “torn” over the pacifist issue, “thinking about the Spanish war”, he 
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was, by the outbreak of war (and newly married, in July 1939), convinced by the 
absolutist argument about refusing service. However, a bout of scarlet fever in 1936 
had left him deaf in one ear, and medically unfit for service.190 
 
Around this time, however, Smith began “to meet revolutionaries”. The location for 
this was the Socialist Café in the Royal Arcade, a faded Regency arcade on the 
fringes of Newcastle city centre which was to later years to be a major point of 
dispute in Smith’s plans to rebuild the city.191 The Socialist Café (or Socialist Club) 
was for decades an important meeting place for left wing political and cultural 
circles on Tyneside.192 Bill Hunter, later a prominent Trotskyist activist, began 
visiting the café in early 1940, cycling from his home in Stanley: “…a group of us 
used to meet there. There were at first five or six of us, Roy Tearse and Dan Smith 
among them, who met with a member of the Workers’ International League, George 
Brown. All of them joined the WIL except me; in the middle of 1940 I went back to 
London.”193  
 
George Brown was one of the earliest Trotskyists in Newcastle, a former member of 
the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), who resigned his membership at a 
CP public meeting on the day that the Soviet Union invaded Poland, in protest at the 
party’s war policy.  Present at that meeting was the pacifist Mark Sadler, who 
recalled inviting Brown to attend a meeting of local War Resisters. He subsequently 
invited “several of [the] young men” from that pacifist group to his home for a 
political discussion, forming a group which met weekly for six months, with a 
claimed attendance of twenty-five. “With the exception of Comrades Rawlings [sic], 
Brown, a Carlisle comrade and myself, the meeting was composed of pacifists 
among whom could be counted Comrades Tearse, Smith, Sketheway and Johnstone 
 
190 It is frequently written that Smith was a Conscientious Objector. However, having initially refused 
to register for war service, he recalled having changed his position, registered, was medically 
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[sic].”194  
 
Brown rapidly joined the Trotskyist Workers’ International League and, according to 
Sadler, “as a result of cultivating comrades Smith, Skethaway [sic] and Tearse and 
Johnstone [sic], persuade[d] them that they had done the wrong thing being 
classified as conscientious objectors and they subsequently submitted to medical 
examination.”195 
 
Around this time the Newcastle Central branch of the Independent Labour Party 
(ILP) was reformed. The ILP had never been particularly strong in Newcastle, the 
dominating figure in the 1920s being Sir Charles Trevelyan who “at his country seat 
at Wallington patronised another, more fey cultural strand popular in some ILP 
circles. Folk dancing and music on the lawn created a sort of arts and craft version of 
a teetotal and herbivorous Merrie England.”196 Erosion of support began in the 
1920s, although there were still pockets of support such as Gateshead and 
Darlington, and, argues A.W. Purdue, “North East party members were… rather 
moderate or realistic in ILP terms.”197 
 
Most of Sadler’s group appear to have joined, seemingly still pacifist at this stage.198 
Roy Tearse recalled:  
 
Together with one or two of the older people we reconstituted the Newcastle 
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branch of the I.L.P that had been dead for several years, and hadn’t been 
dismantled. There were people like Jack Rawlings [sic], Dan Smith (you have 
probably heard of Dan Smith!) - much more of a Tory in recent years - Alec 
Auld, myself and some others… We knocked together a platform. We started 
holding meetings in Bigg Market in Newcastle selling the New Leader, and so 
on. In fact, apart from the Communist party in Newcastle, we were the only 
really active group at that time. Anyway, this is telescoping a tremendous 
amount in a short period of time, but this was of course 1939.199 
 
The Independent Labour Party 
The ILP was founded in 1893 to strive for political representation for working class 
people, to supplement industrial action by the trades union movement, and in 1900 it 
combined with the Fabian Society and the Social Democratic Federation to form the 
Labour Representation Committee (from 1906, the Labour Party).200 It espoused a 
non-Marxist socialism, with what Winter describes as a “very ethical, indeed 
evangelical approach”, and came to be considered the ‘socialist conscience’ of the 
Labour Party, within which it retained a separate existence.201 By the 1920s many 
ILP members were expressing frustration at the perceived gradualism of the national 
Labour leadership and its failure of the second MacDonald government to provide a 
radical programme. Parliamentary rebellion by ILP MPs led to a dispute about ILP 
acceptance of the Labour Party whip in the House of Commons, and this issue was 
to prompt a debate about disaffiliation from the Labour Party. At a special 
conference in March 1932 the party membership voted to leave the Labour Party.202  
 
By the summer of 1939 the ILP was a group living off the prestige of its past, and 
preparing for a humiliating climb-down by considering requesting reaffiliation to the 
Labour Party. The history of the ILP during the 1930s has been the subject of a 
number of studies, largely echoing the view taken by R.E. Dowse that disaffiliation 
was a catastrophic error that led to the marginalisation of the party.203 A study by 
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Gidon Cohen presents a politely revisionist alternative, arguing that the decision to 
disaffiliate was dictated by logic rather than sentiment (or a collective rush of blood 
to the head), and that the 1930s did not see as universal a decline in the party’s 
fortunes as had been previously presented; rather, that it was engaged in a battle for 
political ‘space’ on the left from which it emerged in the late 1930s with greater 
ideological focus than it had possessed in 1932.204 
 
Cohen stresses that while the party saw a great fall both in membership and in 
branch numbers during the 1930s, this decline was neither continuous nor universal. 
Major losses in some of the ILP’s more important divisions, such as Scotland and 
Lancashire, allowed smaller divisions to gain in relative importance, and while No. 2 
Division (Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland and Cleveland) was one of the 
smallest divisions, and had lost heavily in the immediate aftermath of disaffiliation, 
it did experience some growth in the mid 1930s, particularly in Cumberland. This 
occurred through the influence of the Divisional Chairman, Tom Stephenson, a well-
known and well-respected leader of the Cumberland Miners’ Association (and one of 
the few senior ILP figures with significant trade union influence).205 However, the 
growth seems to have halted by the end of the decade; in mid-1940, Mark Simpson 
of the NE Divisional Council was to write to the party secretary, John McNair, that 
“We have had very few new members in recent years. The Newcastle branch is our 
only success in that respect (36 new members).” 206  Cohen’s arguments 
notwithstanding, membership figures for the ILP nationally did show a catastrophic 
decline in the course of the decade, from an estimated 16,773 in 1932 to just 2,441 in 
1939.207 The greatest falls occurred not in the immediate period after disaffiliation, 
but subsequently (1933 saw membership fall by 34% from the previous year; in 1934 
losses rose to 35% and in 1935 39%). In 1936-37 the rate of loss stabilised (if a 
leakage of 10% in 1937 can be so defined), but began to accelerate again in the 
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closing years of the decade.208 
 
While the 1932 disaffiliation may have ‘lanced the boil’ as far as the issue of 
continued membership of the Labour Party was concerned, any argument that the 
following eight years saw the ILP emerge as a more focused, disciplined party must 
be treated with reservations.209 The remainder of the 1930s saw almost continual 
internal turmoil, the defection of sizeable segments of the party (in particular, that of 
Elijah Sandham with the major part of the hitherto powerful Lancashire Division in 
May 1934, and of the pro-Communist Revolutionary Policy Committee and its 
supporters in 1935), and lacerating internal debates over the question of war and 
pacifism, prompted by the Abyssinian crisis in 1935-36 and the Munich crisis in 
1938. This all took place against the background of an on-off flirtation with the 
Communist Party, where the ILP’s ideological confusion and unwillingness to 
openly attack the CPGB (taking seriously that party’s status as the “British 
embodiment of Marxism”) made it prey to the more disciplined Communists.210 
There was a further danger from the infant British Trotskyist movement (see below)  
which was being encouraged by Trotsky to enter the ILP and introduce political 
vigour into that ‘centrist’ party, seen as wavering between revolutionary and 
reformist politics.211    Robert Dowse’s assessment of the period was that “[t]hree 
years in the wilderness had reduced the party to a shambles, a sectarian shadow of its 
former self, the happy hunting ground of the crank and the C.P. Worse was to 
follow… In the mid-1930s it was true beyond question that the I.L.P. and its 
revolutionary posturing had to make way for the Communist Party. Then the C.P. 
attracted the left-wing intellectuals while the I.L.P. attracted nobody.”212 In 1931 the 
CPGB had 2,500 members, by 1939 18,000; the ILP, by contrast, had fallen from 
16,000 in 1932 to 2,500 in 1939.  
 
In the Newcastle ILP 
This was the failing party that Smith and his comrades chose to enter at the outbreak 
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of war. It is ironic that the outbreak of war simultaneously deprived the ILP of its 
best opportunity to re-enter its natural home in the Labour Party, and allowed it a 
swan-song in terms of membership, morale and publicity. “War gave the ILP a 
chance to return to the great simplicities.”213 With three Members of Parliament, the 
ILP was the only organised parliamentary party to oppose British participation in the 
war, and as such - particularly after the Labour Party entered the coalition 
government in May 1940 - it acted as a kind of minuscule official opposition, often 
with comical effect. The wartime electoral truce enabled it to make creditable 
showings at by-elections (which also allowed valuable propaganda efforts), even 
outside Scotland, although it failed to capitalise on a popular wish for unspecified 
‘change’ which Sir Richard Acland’s Common Wealth Party later exploited so 
adroitly. It was also able to draw support from those who opposed the war, whether 
pacifist, pacificist or revolutionary, and after the Soviet Union entered the war “the 
ILP, the new Common Wealth Party, and even WIL derived growth from defiance of 
the consensus”214 
 
In his 1970 autobiography Smith recalls the building up of the anti-war movement in 
Newcastle, with open-air and indoor meetings and arguing that “the defeat of 
fascism and the kind of society that one sought to establish came back to the ability 
of political leaders to enthuse the people about causes for which people would be 
prepared to die. Good, positive causes, rather than to strike a pose by being anti-
German.” 215 
 
The ILP is barely mentioned in this short memoir, but Smith made a rapid rise in its 
ranks, and the Newcastle Central branch was, for a time, the darling of the party 
hierarchy. “For a while everything went along quite harmoniously. Street canvassing 
of New Leaders was undertaken, the branch held public meetings in the Bigg Market 
and a large meeting in the City Hall” noted Mark Sadler in 1943.216 ILP General 
Secretary John McNair, writing on branch news in the New Leader, lavished praise 
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on “the Tyneside boys” and their activities, including their disruption of a public 
meeting at the City Hall at which War Minister Oliver Stanley was presenting the 
Government’s case to the Tyneside public. “What has been the result of this 
militancy and initiative on the part of the Newcastle Branch? Thirty-five new 
members during the last month and branches being formed in Wallsend and even in 
Cullercoats… the lads are all working to get Charlie Smith [C.A. Smith] the biggest 
and best meeting ever. I say lads advisedly. The chairman, aged 22; Tom 
McChesnay, the secretary, aged 19, and the treasurer an old man of 26! These are the 
torch bearers, so we middle-agers can work ourselves out knowing there are others to 
better our efforts!”217 
 
The Newcastle branch was taking an increasingly strident left-wing political 
approach. In the autumn of 1940 the Newcastle branch passed a resolution attacking 
the ILP Chairman CA Smith, who had in the theoretical journal Left and in the 
party’s internal discussion bulletin Between Ourselves criticised the party’s attitude 
towards the war, in which, he argued, “the issue has been narrowed down to the 
survival of the British state, with perhaps the liberation of Europe from Nazidom, or 
the destruction of Britain’s independence, and the establishment in a Fascist Europe 
of a vassal British state… the latter alternative entails the destruction of every hope 
for each single thing for which the I.L.P stands.” The war was no longer a simple 
inter-imperialist struggle, and “[w]e can regard the outcome… with indifference only 
if we believe that Hitlerism is not worse than British capitalism, or, at least, not 
worse than British capitalism would be after a victorious war. Any man who says 
that Hitlerism is no worse than British Capitalism of 1939 (or 1940) is either a fool 
or a Fascist.” Socialists should desire the defeat of Hitler, by a working class 
revolution in Germany if possible, and accompanied by revolutions in Britain and 
France. “In the absence of these, we prefer him to be defeated by the British State 
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rather than be victorious over it.”218 
 
Newcastle’s response was to accuse CA Smith of writing “piffle” and stated “He 
implies that we must choose between British Imperialism and German Nazism… he 
falls into the same trap as the leaders of the Labour Party fell into long ago – i.e., he 
asks us to recognize two forces, they are both Capitalist-Imperialist, and ignore the 
fact that there are only two forces that count – Capitalist-Imperialism and Workers’’ 
Power. There is no distinction to be made between Capitalisms, whether British or 
German, as the Capitalist whole must be opposed, whatever the consequences, and 
we must work for only one thing – Workers’’ Power… The slogan for British 
Socialists… at the present time should be that of Karl Liebnecht [sic], “The main 
enemy is at home”, and the sooner we disregard the irrational choice left to us by 
C.A. Smith, the better.”219 C A Smith’s response was that it was “plain daftness” of 
Newcastle to claim no difference between British and German capitalism; 
“…quickly would the Newcastle comrades realise this if they were transported to 
Germany. If they can’t distinguish Nazism from British capitalism, they should form 
a study group and get down to the facts of the situation before being guilty of such 
imbecile statements.”220 
 
Shortly afterwards Dan Smith and Roy Tearse wrote a fiery article in Between 
Ourselves – the first time that Smith seems to have appeared in that bulletin - 
attacking the ‘People’s Convention’, an attempt by the CPGB to build an anti-war 
united front, headed by the independent Labour (not ILP)  MP D N Pritt with the aim 
of establishing a ‘People’s Government’. Smith and Tearse criticised the ostensible 
class inclusivity of the Convention, arguing that “the experiences in France and 
Spain have shown that the People’s Front is an anti-working class policy and must 
always mean the … subordination of the Workers’ to non-working class interests…it 
is… the Workers’ alone who lose in the outcome of any action by a ‘People’s 
Convention’ and anyone who supports it must of necessity be contributing to a 
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further betrayal of the masses.” As to action, “the only policy to be carried out by a 
Worker’s Party basing its programme on Marxism is that of the Workers’’ Front… 
As far as the People’s Convention is concerned… a policy of isolation and complete 
indifference is useless. The Convention should be attacked and exposed both from 
within and without… Our one aim is the overthrowal [sic] of Capitalism, 
accompanied by the complete annihilation and shattering of the existing state 
machinery. This policy alone can rid us of the causes of war.”221 These aims were 
not dissimilar to those of the Trotskyist Workers’ International League, although the 
WIL did manage to insert members into the People’s Convention who were trades 
union delegates.222 
 
Smith is first mentioned in the pages of the ILP newspaper New Leader in April 
1942, supporting an amendment to an annual conference resolution on war aims, and 
later in the month he is reported as expressing hopes for the establishment of a 
branch at Hartford, Northumberland.223 In May, “[s]ome of the Tyneside boys are 
doing splendid work in the outlying pit villages…”, and in July 1942 “excellent 
meetings” in some pit villages were “undertaken by our energetic comrades, Alex 
Auld, Jack Johnston and Dan Smith”.224 The Newcastle branch was continuing its 
left-wing political approach, and prior to the 1942 National Conference it had tabled 
a resolution taking issue with a statement that the ILP’s ‘Socialist Britain Now’ 
programme might be achieved through Parliamentary means: “…only by the 
development of independent working class action with the sole aim of smashing the 
existing Capitalist system can Socialism be achieved.”225 
 
However, it seems apparent that Smith was already making a name for himself 
before this, and to be developing Trotskyist sympathies. In the spring of 1941 Harry 
Ratner, a middle class Trotskyist with strong links to the French Trotskyist leaders 
Raymond Molinier and Pierre Frank, “managed to make a trip to Newcastle to talk to 
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T Dan Smith who was then active in the Newcastle ILP. I stayed a couple of nights 
at his home in Spittal [sic] Tongues. He introduced me to Roy Tearse. I found them 
to be basically in agreement with the Trotskyist positions on the war, the Soviet 
Union and other issues. I suggested that whether they stayed in the ILP or not they 
should nevertheless be in contact with the Workers’ International League and work 
with it.”226 
 
Tearse himself recalled having been introduced to Trotskyism by an article he read 
in early 1940.  
 
I don’t remember which journal it was [in], but I remember that it made such 
an impression on me that I discussed it with one or two others, that I decided - 
and the others agreed - that we must try and contact the Trotskyist movement. 
We didn’t know where it existed. The first Trotskyist contact that we had was 
really a farce. I don’t know whether we had written to someone, but this young 
chap came to Newcastle with a sealed letter. He was actually sent by the R.S.L. 
[Revolutionary Socialist League] and the letter actually said that we should 
take no notice of this bloke, that he was a bit of a bloody fool anyway - and 
this was to introduce the organisation to us! This put us completely off, and we 
had in the meantime heard about the Workers’ International League, and it was 
decided we should make contact.227 
 
Tearse and a colleague travelled to London and met Jock Haston, Millie Lee and 
other Workers’ International League (WIL) leaders. On returning to Newcastle, 
contact was maintained with WIL, but Tearse wanted to get closer to the heart of the 
movement and in 1941 moved to London, getting a job at De Havilland in 
Middlesex.228  
 
Trotskyism 
From the death of Lenin in 1924, supporters of Trotsky had been increasingly 
marginalised and dissent suppressed within the Soviet Union, but Trotsky continued, 
even in exile, to urge his supporters to work within communist parties and the Third 
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Communist International (Comintern), in the belief that Stalinist dominance was not 
permanent. He changed his stance in 1933. As a result of the Comintern’s so-called 
‘Third Period’ policies, communist hostility had for several years focussed on so-
called ‘social fascists’ (social democratic parties), and no countenance given to co-
operation against fascism. As a result, the German Communist Party was able to 
offer no opposition to the Nazi takeover in Germany in January 1933.229  This, to 
Trotsky, meant that reform of the Comintern was no longer realistic and a new 
International, the Fourth, should be established (this took place in 1938) and new 
parties set up.230 It is perhaps ironic that, as John Callaghan wrote, Until his death in 
1940 Trotsky was both the greatest opponent of Stalin and the greatest defender of 
the Bolshevik orthodoxies which helped paved the way to Stalinism.”231 And when 
the Comintern in 1934 abandoned Third Period communism and sought to establish 
popular front coalition, it was denounced by Trotsky as “the distinction between 
decaying democracy and murderous fascism disappears in the face of the collapse of 
the entire system.”232 Trotsky believed that conditions were ripe for revolution and 
that the leadership of communist and social democratic parties was inhibiting this. In 
The Transitional Programme he declared that  the world situation “is chiefly 
characterised by a historical crisis of the leadership of the proletariat”;  by “freeing 
the proletariat from the old leadership whose conservatism is in complete 
contradiction to the catastrophic eruptions of disintegrating capitalism and represents 
the chief obstacle to historical progress” Trotsky’s supporters could help overcome 
this crisis, by entering and using other parties if they were unable to build mass 
parties.233 
 
The British Trotskyist movement had emerged in 1932 when the British Section of 
the Left Opposition, a small group of Trotsky adherents, was expelled from the 
CPGB; by 1933, now called the Communist League, it had around fifty members 
and was being urged by Trotsky to enter the ILP, both to gain strength and to give 
revolutionary vigour to that wavering organisation.234 The entryist tactic was known 
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as the ‘French Turn’, having first been applied by Trotskyist activists in France 
entering the French socialist party the SFIO.235 The Communist League split over 
this issue, with eleven members entering the ILP, others, based in south London and 
known as the ‘Balham Group’ favouring entry into the Labour Party.236 A further 
group working in the Labour Party was known openly as the Militant Labour League  
or Militant Group.237  
 
The WIL had been formed in 1937, after a small group, largely composed of South 
African Trotskyists who had moved to London in the mid 1930s, split from the main 
existing Trotskyist organisation in the UK, the Militant group.238 The split had been 
occasioned by the spreading of false rumours about Ralph Lee, the leader of the 
dissenting faction, and early members of the resulting WIL (also known as the ‘Lee 
Group’) were Ralph (Raff) Lee, his wife Mildred (Millie) Lee, Heaton Lee (also 
South African, but no relation), Ted Grant, and Jock Haston. Soon to be recruited 
was the Irishman Gerry Healy, who, still a CPGB member, was converted to 
Trotskyism after a fracas with Haston at Speakers’ Corner in Hyde Park.239 
 
The WIL was initially a tiny group concentrated in the Paddington area of west 
London, hugely outnumbered by the remainder of the Militant Group which renamed 
itself the Revolutionary Socialist League (RSL). When the Fourth International was 
formed in 1938 at Trotsky’s behest, the RSL was formally recognised as the British 
Section. The WIL, refusing to merge with the RSL, was left out in the cold. 
Nevertheless, it proved much more skillful at adapting to the changed conditions of 
wartime than the RSL. The RSL had continued to pursue a policy of entrism into the 
Labour Party, despite the prohibition by Labour of its front organisation, the Militant 
Labour League, in 1939 and the near-total cessation of local activity by the 
mainstream political parties following the electoral truce. It advocated a policy of 
‘Revolutionary Defeatism’ as a response to British participation in the war, which 
may well have alienated potential supporters (whereas the WIL agitated for deep 
shelter provision against air raids, refused to oppose conscription, and advocated the 
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more muscular ‘Proletarian Military Policy’, for which it was denounced by the RSL 
as ‘defencist’). And it was to consume itself in a series of internal splits and feuds. 
Ted Grant, who was emerging in the early 1940s as a leading theorist in the WIL, 
was to look back on the RSL of this period with scorn: “This policy of an absolute 
out-of-this-world sectarianism and ultra-leftism on the question of war was linked to 
an intransigent need to continue work inside the lifeless Labour Party! This gave 
them the opportunity in the privacy of each other’s homes of carrying on what they 
imagined was political activity: debating the contents of internal bulletins.”240  
 
The WIL was also abandoning its practice of entrism into the Labour Party – which 
had to a large extent abandoned normal political activity as a result of the truce – and 
switching attention to the ILP. Jock Haston advocated such a shift in March 1942, 
noting that the WIL had gained more new members from the ILP than from other 
parties and that “There cannot be the slightest doubt that a left swing in the [labour] 
movement will herald a period of rapid growth for the ILP from among the best 
sections of the working class… Even if we limit ourselves to this general perspective 
it imposes on us the need to continue to organise a hard, serious fraction within the 
ILP, a fraction capable of winning the majority, or at least wide sections of its 
members to the banner of the Fourth International and into the ranks of W.I.L.”241 
 
Roy Tearse, who had become a leading member of the WIL and was in 1943 to 
become its Industrial Organiser, maintained his links with Tyneside, and Jock 
Haston, in his role as National Organiser of WIL, would also pay visits to the north 
east. In a report of 22 April 1942 to the WIL Executive Committee Haston stated 
“Had discussions with Newcastle and Gateshead I.L.P. members. Two comrades 
from the former will join us. Prospects for several more: composition: proletarian, 
politically confused, mainly C.O.’s but not entirely pacifists - can easily be won 
from this false position.”242 Reporting on the ILP Conference at Morecambe, which 
he had attended with Gerry Healy, Haston noted the performance of “our own 
comrades” who were ILP delegates.  
 
240 Grant op cit p86. Internal bulletins were journals carrying ideological articles and debates 
circulated only to party members. 
241 GCATT/WIL/11 Haston, J, Centrism and the Revolutionary Party, WIL Internal Bulletin 15 
March 1942 
242 Hull University Archives DJH 14B/11a/2 NO’s Report - attached to EC Report 22 April 1942 
59 
 
 
The main gains of the Conference are that a legal platform is now provided for 
our fraction work - i.e. Labour to Power; that our comrades had their first 
baptism under fire in struggle against the pacifist leadership and came out 
strengthened and with their position enhanced on a national scale; and finally: 
as a result of our co-ordinated work, we have a good springboard throughout 
the I.L.P. to conduct our struggle for the coming year. The last conference 
gained us the support of Newcastle and Cardiff. This conference should reap 
more rewards than the last. If conditions allow for another conference, there is 
a good possibility that the pacifists will be completely routed and our platform 
will receive tremendous support, depending upon our work in the coming 
period.243 
 
A month afterwards, a report of the WIL Central Committee noted “two new 
members (ILP) DS and KS accepted” – the initials referring beyond reasonable 
doubt to Dan Smith and Ken Sketheway.244 By November Haston was able to boast 
that “The main political work of the group was being conducted in the I.L.P. 
although the gains had not been spectacular. In the North East our position had been 
greatly entrenched and we expected to have a sympathiser on the NAC in the near 
future. In this and in other spheres we felt the lack of trained cadres.”245 In 
discussion, Healy commented that “As we penetrate the higher bodies of the ILP the 
need for political training of our people become urgent”, while Haston remarked that 
“in the more politically backward areas, such as Notts and Tyneside, there was a 
correspondingly higher industrial level.” 
 
A requirement to raise the ideological level of their members on Tyneside may 
account for the move there in 1942 of Robert Shaw, the son of a Leeds doctor, who 
had been a Methodist lay preacher before joining the ILP and then WIL. One 
account, by Andy Smith, has Shaw being sent to Tyneside as “organizer” by WIL as 
a replacement for the conscripted George Brown. The aim was to recruit local ILP 
members to WIL, and Shaw “struck up a close link” with Smith. Haston visited 
Newcastle in 1942 and “took Smith under his wing and ‘taught him everything he 
knew about organizing’”.246 
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This account may exaggerate Shaw’s role, although Barney Markson was to identify 
Shaw as a WIL District Organiser.247 According to Shaw’s wife Mickie,  the couple 
moved to Newcastle in November 1942 (some months after Smith had joined the 
WIL), after Shaw had lost his job in the shipyards of Barrow, to work at Hawthorn-
Leslie yard in Hebburn. The Tyneside WIL was a small group of three or four, 
“mostly recruited from the ILP and still retaining their membership of that 
organisation.” Though it may be that Smith’s membership of WIL was covert. The 
date of the formation of the Tyneside branch is uncertain – a WIL Central 
Committee report of early 1942 suggests a new branch be formed, but the Political 
Bureau minutes for 10 October 1942 refer to “the lack of a local WIL group” in the 
area.248 “Robert frequently clashed with the local branch members whose politics 
were centrist rather than revolutionary and who were prone to compromise within 
the ILP. He was also disturbed that the WIL leadership appeared to go along with 
this centrist group but he did not at the time voice his concern generally in the WIL. 
The local WIL branch concentrated on working to win recruits from the ILP which 
had a fairly strong following on Tyneside, conducting a continuous attack on the 
policies of Stalinism and deepening connections with the industrial Workers’…” In 
1943, as Heaton Lee and Ann Keen moved to Newcastle, the Shaws moved to 
London to take up full-time work for WIL. 249  
 
Smith, meanwhile, was forging ahead in the ILP. In September 1942 he was 
appointed full-time organiser for the North East Division, for a trial period of 
thirteen weeks (in the same month the party appointed organisers in Scotland, 
Lancashire and the Midlands, the last of these, part-time, being Ted Fletcher, a future 
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Newcastle councillor and Labour MP).250 Smith was soon to prove his value, 
announcing in October 1942 the formation of a new branch at Nelson 
(Northumberland), and commencing to write for New Leader, his first article ‘Why 
Tyne Struck’ (on the ‘Total Time’ strike in the Tyne shipyards) appearing on 17 
October.251 By the end of the month John McNair was remarking on a meeting of 
almost one thousand miners addressed by Smith at Ashington, adding: “If there is 
one modernism I do not like it is ‘cash in’. I can think of no other, however, which 
can adequately describe our recent work on Tyneside. We disposed of 1,250 “New 
Leaders” last week-end. Dan Smith tells me that he hopes to get branches “away” 
(this is Tyneside for “started”) at Heaton, Wallsend, North Shields, South Shields 
and probably Newbiggin.”252 Wallsend was the first ‘away’, chaired by Herbert Bell, 
with Jack Rawling as secretary.253 Shortly afterwards, Newcastle East (otherwise 
Heaton) was established, chaired by Harold Knapman.254 In January 1943 a new 
branch was formed at Carlisle, which lay within the No. 2 Division area.255 Smith’s 
new duties also involved representing the ILP on public platforms and at debates, 
such as that held in Hartford (Northumberland), with William Allan of the CPGB, on 
“Should the Working Class Support the War?”256 
 
By the North East Divisional Conference in February 1943 Smith was able to boast 
the formation of four new branches as well as Carlisle, and “emphasised the 
importance of the shipyards and engineering spheres for activity.”257  
 
However, he was also continuing to speak critically of leading ILP members with 
whom he disagreed: in December 1942 attacking the prolific ILP publicist F A 
Ridley, who in the New Leader on 14 November 1942 had stated that “As an 
International force Bolshevism is finished”. Ridley  railed against the “gratuitous and 
entirely unprovoked attack”  but would “deal only with the essentials of Smith’s 
position and shall pass over his somewhat tortuous ramblings round history in search 
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of bad arguments to justify an untenable position” and went on to attack Smith’s 
arguments on the nature of Bolshevism and the Soviet Union under Stalin: 
“However, say Smith & Co, this is merely Stalinist ‘degeneration’; it is not 
Bolshevism. The metaphysics of an idealist acrobat! Stalinism is Russian 
Bolshevism as it has worked out in the actual course of history and, for an historical 
materialist there is no other criterion.”258 
 
At the ILP National Conference in April 1943 (the Jubilee Conference, celebrating 
the fiftieth anniversary of the party’s foundation), Smith was elected to the National 
Administrative Council, the ILP’s ruling body, as divisional representative for the 
North East, ousting the sitting representative, Norman Winters, of the moderate 
Gateshead branch.259  
 
At this conference the left-leaning Tyneside branches made their presence felt. 
Wallsend proposed an openly Trotskyist amendment to the ‘Basic Resolution’: the 
masses being not yet convinced of the “inadequacy and hopelessness” of reformism, 
and not yet realizing that only revolutionary socialism and the seizure of power by 
the workers can solve their problems, the ILP should declare that they have no 
confidence in the programme of the Labour Party but will give “critical support” to 
Labour Party and trade union leaders taking progressive steps, while “relentlessly 
criticizing the reformist basis and ideas of the Labour Party.” 260  
 
This was defeated, one opponent suggesting mildly that Labour members “would not 
react to the proposed tactic in the manner desired, while the ILP Parliamentary leader 
James Maxton objected that it would associate the ILP with the Labour leadership in 
“another debacle”.261 A further amendment was placed by Smith’s Newcastle 
Central branch: 
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It naturally follows… that we explain to Trades Unionists and Labour Party 
members that their leaders can no longer be trusted and must be removed. The 
fact that they are taking part in the Government assisting the age-long enemies 
of the working-class is no surprise to the I.L.P. We realise that the best place 
for such men as these is in the camp of the working-class enemy. We therefore 
urge the rank and file to repudiate these so-called leaders, but leave them in 
their present place where they really belong. After electing new leaders, 
prepare to conduct a struggle for power…262 
 
This, too, failed to be carried. A further amendment by Newcastle Central had 
appeared in the conference’s preliminary agenda. This stated: 
 
The Labour Party has demonstrated to the British Workers’ that it no longer 
voices their just right to control the products of their labour. It has allied itself 
so closely with the aims of the ruling class that it would be political folly to 
look to it as a guide to Socialist action. It has sunk to an appendage, indeed a 
prop, of the present system; it can never again be the standard bearer of 
working-class struggle.263 
 
“We must not be bloody mugs” 
Smith’s rise in the ILP was soon to receive its first check. The harmony in the 
Tyneside ILP in mid-1940 had, by the end of that year, given way to conflict and, 
testified Mark Sadler in 1943, “an open hostility was being shown to pacifists by the 
followers of Comrade Brown. In my opinion some of these left on account of being 
deliberately snubbed by R. Tearse in particular rather than because of the recruiting 
speeches of the faction with the military policy.”264 A fall in branch numbers caused 
by this, and by members moving away for work, continued Sadler, “did not seem to 
worry the Trotsky faction, who took the view that ‘correct socialist policy’ was less 
liable to be outvoted by a small branch.”265 Despite a falling membership roll in 
Newcastle, Dan Smith suggested the formation of an East End branch, and Sadler, 
who had also been thinking of such a move, was happy with the proposal for the new 
branch which might have “a more social atmosphere”266 
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Jock Haston had written to the new branch offering a speaker, and in due course Ted 
Grant arrived in Newcastle, to address a meeting of around nine Newcastle East 
ILPers, with four guests from the Newcastle Central and Wallsend branches. Smith 
took the chair, then, recalled Sadler, “for an hour we were regaled with a torrent of 
denunciation of the leaders of the I.L.P. separately and jointly, Maxton, McGovern, 
Brockway and Stephens were castigated as traitors to the working class, the Party 
generally was painted playing a counter-revolutionary role… generally the lecture 
was a gross abuse of a privilege given in a friendly spirit by the branch who had 
hoped to benefit from the interchange of views with what we thought were kindred 
parties.” One party member, Barney Markson, “intensely indignant… gave Grant the 
trouncing he deserved”;  he and Smith had to leave the meeting early, but “[t]he 
other comrades and myself had a busy time till after midnight hotly contesting the 
libellous comments of Grant who was ably supported by Comrade Skethaway 
[sic].”267 Markson also was the subject of an argument over a withdrawn conference 
resolution at a Divisional Council meeting, which led to his expulsion from the 
party.268 He appealed to the centre against his expulsion. A delegation composed of  
ILP Chairman Bob Edwards, Secretary John McNair, and Percy Williams, Chairman 
of the Standing Orders Committee was sent to Newcastle to conduct an enquiry into 
the affair. This took place on 22/23 May 1943. 
 
The team examined the disputed Divisional Council proceedings, the nomination of 
Dan Smith as NAC representative, and the issue of ‘Trotsky speakers’ and of 
Trotskyists in the north east ILP, and the ousting of Norman Winters as NAC 
representative. 
 
Herbie Bell of the Wallsend branch stated that the opposition to Smith as NAC 
representative was because he was also the organiser, and went on: “I do not think 
there is much support for Trotskyism. Some of the members may be approaching 
Trotskyism but as far as the statement that Dan Smith was responsible for Trotskyist 
speakers, that is ridiculous.” However, Len Edmondson of Gateshead branch, who 
 
267 Ibid pp19-20 
268 Ibid pp1-2. Markson’s letter of allegations was received and discussed at the NAC meeting on 23 
April 1943. LSE Archives ILP 3/31. 
65 
 
had been involved in the strike at the Neptune yard, told the enquiry that Robert 
Shaw had approached him after the strike and identified him as an ILPer, “and… 
made one or two remarks that made me think that someone in the Party had been 
passing on information… I suspect Dan Smith of passing on information… I have 
not been able to find any evidence against Dan Smith except that Haston stays with 
him”. However, he suspected Smith of leaking information, and he had opposed 
Smith’s appointment as Divisional Council Secretary, as he was full-time 
organiser.269 Another Gateshead member, Maggs, was more open about his views. 
“The Trotskyists are against the Gateshead branch. On the D.C. [Divisional Council] 
anything that the Gateshead branch proposes is put down by the Trotskyists on the 
D.C. Those who take the Trotskyist view on the D.C. are Rawlings [sic], Skethaway 
[sic] and Dan Smith. Auld recently seems to be taking their line. Auld has been a 
good member but is he working for the I.L.P. or the W.I.L.? They are definitely 
trying to turn the I.L.P Trotskyist.”270 
 
Barney Markson went still further. After the departure of Brown and Tearse, 
  
Dan Smith then became leader of the Trotskyist element in the I.L.P. He 
gathered newcomers around him, also Skethaway [sic], Rawlings [sic] and to a 
great extent, Auld. In 1942 Dan Smith met Haston and from then Dan Smith 
seemed to work in close collaboration with W.I.L. Haston taught Dan Smith 
everything he knew about organising. Haston was then advocating that 
everyone should join the I.L.P. It was about that time that I thought with a little 
persuasion Haston would break with W.I.L. and become a good worker for the 
I.L.P. I wrote privately to J. McNair about it. My suggestion was turned down 
and Dan Smith was made organiser, but right from the beginning he adopted 
the Trotskyist approach to new members… No-one but Trotskyists and 
Trotskyist-inclined were encouraged to address new members so that they got 
a good grip.271 
 
In late 1942, Markson went on, the WIL changed its policy to one of attacking the 
ILP, and sent emissaries to Tyneside: Haston, Harold Atkinson, Shaw (who he 
identified as District Organiser for the WIL) and Grant. Markson had demanded that 
Trotskyist speakers be barred but was opposed by Smith and Auld. Eventually, a 
debate between Markson and Bob Shaw was arranged, but the Gateshead branch was 
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not informed. “Dan Smith was away, but at other times when I had tackled the 
Trotskyist sympathisers Dan Smith had always opposed me except at the meeting 
where Grant was so vile and Dan Smith remained silent… I concluded that Dan 
Smith was working secretly in co-operation with Shaw.”272 He had also met Mark 
Sadler: “He said, ‘From observation I am convinced that the W.I.L. are out to smash 
the I.L.P. and Dan Smith is the leading instigator on the Tyne’. I found then that the 
Trotskyists were trying to get all the chief offices in the Division - Sketheway was 
nominated as Treasurer - Rawlings [sic] was nominated as New Leader Organiser, 
Johnson [sic] was re-nominated as Industrial Organiser and Auld was Newcastle 
representative on the D.C.”  
 
Norman Winters told a similar story, and alleged that the election of Smith as DC 
secretary (by 21 votes to 19) was unfair as the Ashington branch votes had not been 
received. He also criticised the personal nature of the campaigns within the Division 
against Markson and himself. “Skethaway [sic] and Dan Smith have gone to 
Gateshead and slandered me… These comrades entered the I.L.P. as 100% Pacifists 
and now they are 100% revolutionary. I am convinced personally that they cannot be 
tolerated in the I.L.P because I am certain they will smash the I.L.P.. Sadler says his 
branch is being disillusioned. They have formed new branches but eventually we 
shall lose them and probably the old branches as well.”273 
 
Smith, by contrast, presented a picture of sweet reason. He was friendly with Haston, 
“a likeable chap”, and would even have CP people to stay (and debate) with him. He 
blamed Markson, Sadler and Winters for spreading dissatisfaction. “The reason [the 
issue of the WIL] is being raised in these three branches is because one member goes 
to another branch and talks to other members. That is not the general position in the 
division. The charges that I have disrupted the I.L.P. will not bear inspection. I want 
to endeavour to prove to you that these complaints are because of the real sabotage 
of the I.L.P. I do not admit that the Trotskyists have tried to capture offices in the 
I.L.P…. The allegations that I am a Trotskyist and am trying to seize the I.L.P. is 
[sic] ridiculous… I believe that the I.L.P. is the future revolutionary Party - that is 
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why I stop in the I.L.P. If I believed that W.I.L. were the future revolutionary party I 
would leave the I.L.P. and go to W.I.L.”274 At this point Smith had been a member 
of the WIL for almost exactly one year. 
 
Despite the evidence suggesting malpractice, and displaying the corrosive infighting 
within the No. 2 Division, the investigating committee chose to ignore most of it. 
Markson had been unjustly expelled, they felt, but, said McNair, “With regard to 
Dan Smith, I am not going to insult him by talking about his work - he has done 
tremendous work. No member of the committee has the slightest suspicion of any 
underhand work.”275 The possibility that Smith would become Divisional organiser, 
Divisional Council Secretary, and NAC representative was seen as an unwelcome 
development: “It puts too much power in the hands of one member.”276 An 
unspecific warning was given about contacts with WIL, “[p]robably our bitterest 
enemies apart from the C.P…. We know that everywhere W.I.L. has interfered in 
Party work - they have wrecked the branches - the object of the W.I.L. Group is to 
smash the I.L.P. We must be tolerant but we must not be bloody mugs.” WIL 
speakers should not be entertained without adequate defence from ILPers; and 
members such as Sketheway had supported attacks on the party. But beyond this 
mention of Ken Sketheway’s role (he and Jack Johnston had refused to give 
evidence), no official censure of any individual member was made. 
 
The Committee’s report was put before the National Administrative Council on 1 
August 1943 and “examined in detail”. “Several members…felt that the phraseology 
of the report should be sharpened but the general feeling of the Council was that the 
position had been clearly stated and there was no particular point in modifying the 
wording…”. Its acceptance was proposed by Fenner Brockway and carried 
unanimously; and the NAC “requested the North East Division through its 
representative, Comrade Smith, to do everything possible to implement the 
recommendations of the report with the object of strengthening the movement in the 
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North for the I.L.P. and for Socialism.”277 
  
Following this controversy, matters settled down for a few months. In November 
1943 it was decided to put forward Dan Smith as ILP parliamentary candidate for the 
Wallsend Division, and Alex Auld for the Wansbeck Division; at the same NAC 
meeting, John McNair raised a disagreement over indiscreet and discourteous 
remarks made by Ken Sketheway in an article for the internal bulletin Between 
Ourselves.278 As editor of BO, McNair had refused to publish the article, and despite 
visiting Sketheway, had been unable to achieve resolution. Dan Smith supported 
Sketheway’s case at the NAC, but the committee gave McNair a vote of confidence. 
As attention turned to the end of the war, and the resumption of electoral activity, the 
ILP leadership also began to consider an electoral understanding with the left-of-
centre Common Wealth Party, which had achieved a number of successes. In 
February 1944 it was agreed that Fenner Brockway and John McNair should meet 
CW representatives if conflicts arose. “Dan Smith and Tom Reed registered their 
opposition to this proposal.”279 No 2 Division had also written protesting “the 
unprincipled electoral alliance made by the N.A.C. with Common Wealth. The G.S. 
[General Secretary] was instructed to point out to these comrades that there was no 
electoral alliance with Common Wealth but simply an agreement to avoid conflicting 
candidatures for the time being. He was further instructed to mention that this matter 
would be fully discussed at Annual Conference.”280 
 
The Tyneside Apprentices Strike 
By the time of the 1944 Annual Conference, in Leeds, a much greater political issue 
was occupying Smith’s attention. The strike of engineering and shipyard apprentices 
on the Tyne (as well as on Clydeside, Blyth, Wearside, Middlesbrough and 
Huddersfield) in March and April 1944 was the latest incident in a growing wave of 
industrial unrest which both the ILP and its Trotskyist adversaries sought to 
encourage and publicise. Trouble in the yards and among the apprentices was 
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nothing new, and the ILP, traditionally weakly represented in industry, was on 
Tyneside trying to establish links.281 On 9 August 1942, for example, an Industrial 
Conference was held at Newcastle for engineers and shipbuilders, addressed “by a 
speaker who works at De Havilland” (almost certainly Roy Tearse).282  At the 1943 
NE Divisional Conference Smith, in his organiser’s report, “emphasised the 
importance of the shipyard and engineering spheres for activity. During the big 
Tyneside strike [the ‘Lost Time’ strike] New Leader sales were 2,000. Despite lack 
of organisation, the I.L.P had become well known. There was a call for increased 
industrial organisation, and [a resolution was] carried unanimously urging the setting 
up of an I.L.P. Industrial Committee with representatives from the nine divisions of 
the Party and a National Industrial Secretary.”283 In March 1943, in an article entitled 
‘Storm in the Yards. Why Shipbuilding Workers’ Strike’ Smith wrote that the 1942 
strikers returned on the bosses’ terms, “but not without learning tremendous lessons. 
They kicked out C.P.ers from the Workers’’ committees, having seen their anti-
working class policy in action, and also established a militant Shop Steward 
leadership.”284 The following week, he outlined the programme of ‘Militant Trade 
Unionists’: 
 
1. For 100 per cent organisation 
2. Clear out bosses’ agents in T.U. ranks 
3. Strengthen Trades Councils. Every T.U. Branch a delegate. 
4. Substitute militant Shop Stewards for reactionary T.U. leadership 
5. Develop a fighting national Shop Steward movement 
6. Re-establish independence of T.U. Movement 
7. Repeal E.W.O. [Essential Work Order] and anti-working-class legislation 
8. Confiscate war profits. Open books to T.U. inspection 
9. Workers’’ control of production285 
 
Shortly afterwards, he was to report on a brief strike by engineering apprentices over 
the loss of a customary Shrove Tuesday half-holiday. Apprentices who had walked 
out were suspended for three days, but “[their] solidarity was such that the 
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management lifted the suspension after half-a-day’s pay had been lost”. Attempts to 
win back the lost pay failed, and the likelihood of an EWO being imposed led the 
apprentices to submit their claim to arbitration. Commented Smith: “The apprentices 
have learnt the need to strengthen their ranks and to make contact with older militant 
trade unionists.”286 
 
This was a prescient remark. When, in late 1943, Tyneside shipyard and engineering 
apprentices became worried that the Bevin Ballot Scheme - the plan to divert 10% of 
all conscripted youth to work in the coal mines - might be applied to them, they 
began to organise, and rapidly established contact with older, militant political 
activists and militant union organisers. After an impromptu meeting was held by 
Grey’s Monument in the centre of Newcastle, recalled Jack Rawling,  
 
One or two I.L.P.ers, on their way to the Arcade [the Socialist Club], passed 
Grey’s Monument, and asked what all the fuss was about in the blackout, 
learned from these kids what they wanted, and took them down to the Arcade, 
where they could have a meeting - and as good as they could have one in a 
pub, or as they could have one in a café. It was a political club, so they hoped 
they could enjoy themselves and listen and discuss with these kids. 
 
I don’t know whether they were directed, but one of them asked to see the 
Committee of the I.L.P. We were having a meeting in a room, so we just 
suspended the meeting and asked them in. It was young Bill Davy, and he 
wanted to know whether the I.L.P. would assist them in publicity for their case, 
and so on. So Dan Smith and Ken Skethaway [sic], and I think Johnston, were 
sitting at the table, and they had quite a bit of discussion. It was decided that 
they should also have a discussion with Heaton Lee and Ann Keen, who were 
distributing the Socialist Appeal. But, of course, we were all very close, we 
were members of the W.I.L. or close sympathisers. They went along to 
Walker, and we took them along, and we had a long discussion about the 
prospects of a strike… and we really told them that at that particular moment 
the strike would not be very popular with most of the Workers’, and they 
couldn’t expect very much sympathy.287 
 
The WIL activists and sympathisers provided help and advice to the fledgling Tyne 
Apprentices Guild, formed by the disgruntled apprentices, while the Militant 
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Workers’ Federation, of which Roy Tearse was organiser, facilitated contact with 
apprentices on Clydeside, Barrow and Sheffield.288 A deputation of apprentices 
lobbied Parliament, but failed to meet their prime target, the Minister of Labour, 
Ernest Bevin. Finally, in March 1944, by an administrative oversight, an apprentice 
named Martin was sent call-up papers. Although Martin’s conscription was rapidly 
cancelled (on 11 March), a light had been put to the fuse, and, following a further 
lobby of Parliament on 27 March, on 28 March apprentices struck on the Tyne, 
Clyde and at Huddersfield, rapidly followed by Blyth, Wearside, and Teesside.289 
The strike petered out after a fortnight; meanwhile, alarmed by the stoppage and by 
simultaneous, unrelated strikes by coal miners, Ernest Bevin announced a crackdown 
on disruption, and on 5 April 1944 detectives raided the headquarters of the 
Revolutionary Communist Party (formed by the merger of the WIL and RSL in 
March 1944) in London, and homes of members and sympathisers in Glasgow, 
Nottingham and Tyneside. On Tyneside, the home of Heaton Lee and Ann Keen in 
Walker was raided, as was that of Bill Davy in Wallsend. The outcome of the 
subsequent investigation was that four RCP members, Jock Haston, Roy Tearse, 
Heaton Lee and Ann Keen were tried and convicted under the Trades Disputes Act 
1927 of acting in furtherance of a strike. All four were gaoled, for periods ranging 
from 13 days to one year; in the summer of 1944 the convictions were overturned on 
a technicality.290 While Trotskyist historiography presents the strike and the trial as 
the apex of wartime political activity and a victory for working class agitation, they 
provoked the first use of the Trades Disputes Act (an act passed in the wake of the 
General Strike to prohibit political strikes), and the adoption of Defence Regulation 
1A(A), which likewise curtailed the right to strike. The number of days lost through 
strikes - which had been rising steadily since 1942 - dropped sharply. Even the RCP 
itself - whose inflated self image was epitomised by the hubristic title of the WIL 
1942 policy document, Preparing for Power - privately saw the outcome of the 
strike as a defeat: in May 1944, its Political Bureau announced that to challenge 
1A(A) would be “the worst form of adventurism. It would be an ultra-left gesture 
which could only lead to the beheading of the leadership and the smashing of the 
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growing left wing. Our task is to retreat, but to retreat in good order.”291 
 
Tyneside legend has it that Dan Smith was ‘one of the leaders of the Apprentices’ 
Strike’. However, his role may have been more marginal, if useful. As leader of the 
local ILP he was able to allow its resources be used to help the strikers, and as a 
correspondent for New Leader he produced favourable publicity for their cause. He 
was also active in the Anti Labour Law Victims Defence Committee (ALLVDC), the 
body established to campaign for those prosecuted as a result of the apprentices’ 
strike.292 Assessment of other activity on behalf of the strikers is hampered by a 
paucity of information. During the security crack-down on the supposed ‘hidden 
hand’ behind the strike, his name does not appear in any of the newspaper accounts 
of the strike or investigations of the Trotskyist movement that I have seen, nor does 
it appear in such security reports as are available to researchers.293 His house is not 
reported as having been raided by Special Branch officers during the investigation, 
nor does he appear to have been arrested or questioned in connection with it. He 
certainly was not one of the four Revolutionary Communist Party members charged 
with furthering the strike. Bill Landles, a member of the Strike Committee and WIL 
member from circa 1943, does not recall Smith playing any role in the strike 
organisation.294 That is not to say that Smith was unknown to the security services. 
As a prominent left-wing, anti-war agitator his activities were monitored by the local 
Special Branch.295 However, his undercover membership of WIL may well have 
remained secret even to other paid-up Trotskyists: Landles recalls being unaware 
that Dan was a WIL/RCP member prior to his expulsion from the ILP and open 
‘joining’ of the RCP in April 1945.296 
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The Trotskyists - Clear Them Out!!! 
Meanwhile, the Trotskyist-dominated No. 2 Division was opposing moves to 
reaffiliate the ILP to the Labour Party, while simultaneously pushing the RCP slogan 
‘Labour to Power on a Socialist Programme.297  Smith’s own Newcastle Central 
branch went even further at the 1944 Annual Conference, making a text-book 
Trotskyist amendment “The immediate future of Europe is one of revolution. The 
creation of a revolutionary Marxist leadership capable of leading the coming 
revolution to success is the supreme task of the day.” The Newcastle and Wallsend 
branches also jointly proposed that the ILP should approach the Fourth International, 
the governing body of the Trotskyist movement, established in 1938.298  However, 
the ‘peace’ brokered in 1943 had not lasted even the year. In November 1943 a 
minor spat between Ken Sketheway and John McNair - over the latter’s refusal to 
print an article by the former in Between Ourselves - reached the NAC.299 A few 
months later, in April 1944, the NAC was considering protests by various branches 
“regarding the recent ballot for N.A.C. membership in the No. 2 Division. The 
Council instructed the G.S. [General Secretary (McNair)] to proceed to Newcastle at 
the earliest possible moment to examine the matter and report by letter to the 
N.A.C.”300 In June McNair reported to the NAC: “he said that he thought his report 
covered the position as far as possible and hoped that it would be sufficient for the 
N.A.C. to come to a decision.” The NAC ruled that a new ballot be held for the 
position of NE representative on the NAC, and turned down an amendment – 
inspired by a plea from Smith - that the enquiry be reopened.301 McNair reported yet 
again in August, placing all relevant documents before the NAC, and stating “that he 
had nothing more to add.”302 Frustratingly, these illustrative documents are not 
present in the archive. However, McNair was able to respond to a vote of thanks by 
saying “that any success which had attended his efforts was due to the spirit of co-
 
297 New Leader 5 February 1944 p6, on the Divisional Conference resolution opposing reaffiliation 
with the LP and any electoral alliance with Common Wealth; 15 April 1944, p4, Dror Binah of 
Sunderland branch urging ‘Labour to Power’, a slogan of the RCP (also LSE Archive 5/1944/5 Final 
Agenda of Resolutions and Amendments, 52nd Annual Conference, Leeds 8-10 April 1944).. 
298 LSE Archive ILP 5/1944/5 Final Agenda of Resolutions and Amendments, 52nd Annual 
Conference, Leeds 8-10 April 1944 
299 LSE Archive ILP 3/31 NAC minutes 6-7 November 1943 
300 LSE Archive ILP 3/32 NAC minutes 10 April 1944 
301 Working Class Movement Library, ILP NAC minutes 10-11 June 1944 
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operation and the general desire to assist which had been manifested by the N.E. 
comrades.”303 This re-run of the 1943 affair does not seem immediately to have 
harmed Smith’s prospects: he was, in November 1944, appointed a corresponding 
member of an enlarged Political Committee.304 At the same NAC meeting, he 
protested strenuously against a proposal to dissolve the ALLVDC, which had formed 
a major institutional point of contact between ILP and RCP members. However, 
further discussions at the same meeting may indicate growing wariness of the 
activities of Smith and his increasingly assertive Trotskyist colleagues. The council 
decided that National officials should not be eligible for election to the NAC, nor 
should divisional officials - such as Smith had been - be eligible for election to 
Divisional Councils. Full time officials should have full membership rights on DCs - 
with the exception that they have no vote. Tellingly, the NAC also decided that 
“future Divisional Ballots for the N.A.C. should be conducted from Head Office 
and… the votes be scrutinised at Head Office.”305  
 
This was to prove too little and too late to preserve peace within the N.E. Division, if 
such was its intent.  Within a very few weeks further disruption had broken out in the 
division over voting procedures and activities by individual Trotskyist members, 
principally Sketheway and Auld, provoking a storm of criticism of Trotskyist 
practices in the pages of Between Ourselves. In the course of an increasingly 
rancorous debate on ‘means and ends’, in the September-October 1944 Between 
Ourselves Sketheway had contributed an article which rashly included the line “Has 
John McNair ever witnessed a strike?” This proved too much even for the long-
suffering McNair, who, while stating that he had given Trotskyist opinions a fair 
hearing, gave a blunt definition of the I.L.P.’s stance: 
 
1. The I.L.P. is not a Communist Party. 
2. The I.L.P is not an opposition-Communist Party 
3. Therefore the I.L.P is neither a Stalinist nor a Trotskyist Party. All official 
Communist Parties are Stalinists. All opposition Communist Parties are 
Trotskyists. We belong to neither, nor shall we belong to either. 
What is the I.L.P? It is a British Revolutionary Socialist party…306 
 
303 Ibid NAC minutes 12-13 August 1944 
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One exasperated ILPer, Fred Nixon, in a piece unambiguously entitled ‘The 
Trotskyists - Clear Them Out!!!’ responded to Sketheway in the same February 1945 
BO: 
 
At last the I.L.P. has wakened up to the fact that Trotskyists are active in its 
midst… I would add that a Gateshead comrade, Norman Winters, warned the 
Party over 2 years ago that the Trotskyists were active on Tyneside, and would 
split No. 2 Division. Now to the real starred item of Dec. “B.O.” The 
manuscript of a Genius!!? Skethaway [sic], in which his parrot-like phrases 
reveal his intelligence! Previously he had asked: ‘Has John McNair ever 
witnessed a strike? John McNair, a comrade whom everyone knows has more 
experience in that particular line than any Ken Skethaway’s [sic], Dan Smith’s, 
or anyone else of that calibre. Dan Smith, I consider to be the most dangerous 
of the Newcastle ‘ultra-revolutionaries’, for he has kept silent, making the 
bullets for others to fire, in other words, allowed his stooges to do the 
attacking… Finally, I would say “THE TROTSKYISTS --- CLEAR THEM 
OUT, AND MAKE THE I.L.P. A CLEANER PARTY.”307 
 
Don Bateman, Divisional Organiser of the Yorkshire ILP, wrote in the same issue 
that Yorkshire ILPers: 
 
are beginning to feel that a concerted attempt is being made by the R.C.P. to 
sabotage and then capture our Party… I feel that the whole issue is laid bare by 
Fairhead, who openly states: “I, myself, would like the R.C.P. to disband itself, 
its members to join the I.L.P., to link themselves with Trotskyists already in 
the I.L.P. and at the next Annual Conference to flood the supporters of the 
present leadership. These last, infuriated and horrified… would resign or be 
expelled.” We are indeed grateful… for this gratuitous exposure of Trotskyist 
tactics….It is surely time the Party woke up to the fact that these people are 
sapping our energy…The “any-means-justified-by-the-ends“ tactic of the 
Trotskyists is a Stalinist yardstick, and it is at complete variance with our 
(Marxist!) attitude that ends and means are interwoven and each condition the 
other. Their squawking is interrupting our constructive work and diverting our 
resources. They shout for a disciplined Party! Very well, let us give them one. 
Let us exact the discipline of the Revolutionary Communist party where 
disruptionist tactics would not be tolerated for one moment. These people do 
not share our cause; they have no right to share the privilege of Party 
membership.”308 
 
And Edgar Parker anathematised the Trotskyists as “the Jesuits of the left. I seem to 
 
307 Ibid Between Ourselves February 1945 
308 Ibid Between Ourselves February 1945. I don’t know who Fairhead was. 
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feel that they desire power for the sake of power, and terror for the sake of terror… 
The same fanatical evil runs through their utterance about the revolution and the law, 
as runs through Fascism…”309 
 
In the winter of 1944-45 the conflict reached crisis point. As was by now almost 
traditional, protests had arisen about polling procedures in the No. 2 Division. The 
Standing Orders Committee met representatives of No. 2 Divisional Council and the 
secretaries of four branches within the Division, and decided that the Divisional 
Conference was unconstitutional and invalid, and that DC resolutions and 
amendments should be deleted from the 1945 National Conference agenda.310 The 
investigation had found irregularity in voting procedures, based on precedent, since 
there appeared to be no divisional constitution. Voting rights for branches were 
based upon affiliation fees paid (by “stamps”), and should have been computed 
according to a financial year from 1 January to 31 December. “This was not done. 
On the contrary the allocation was based on various periods ranging between 7 to 26 
months, thus overlapping into other financial years. This naturally created serious 
misunderstanding, leading to the withdrawal of four branches from the Divisional 
Conference. We found further irregularities in the crediting of voting strength on 
exempt stamps which unduly favoured one branch.”311 
 
Reading between the lines, this strongly implies that skullduggery had been taking 
place. However, the passing of more than seventy-five years and of most, if not all, 
of the participants makes it difficult to reach a conclusion about what was going on. 
What is presented as fraud, may equally be, in whole or part, due to administrative 
incompetence, by Smith, whose record will show repeatedly that he was never good 
at, or interested in, the minutiae of administration, or by individual branches of the 
ILP. Many branches, even in an area lauded for its energy and expansion like the 
north east, were tiny, many kept alive by a handful of ageing stalwarts, or by a 
sudden influx of new and organisationally inexperienced members. That such people 
 
309 Ibid Between Ourselves February 1945 
310 LSE Archive ILP 5/1945/7 Preliminary Agenda of Resolutions for the 53rd Annual Conference, 
Blackpool, 31 March-2 April 1945. The Standing Orders Committee comprised Fred Barton, Tom 
Colyer, Arthur Eaton (Chairman), Tom Murray and Emrys Thomas. 
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submitted membership stamps at seemingly random intervals is, to anyone who has 
spent time investigating ILP records of this period, far from unlikely. The ILP was 
not a smoothly-running machine.312 Certainly, there does not appear to be any real 
evidence in support of the allegation that Dan, like some Tyneside Chichikov, 
established ‘ghost branches’ in the Northumberland coalfield to provide phantom 
votes to bolster his own faction.313 
 
In December 1944 the Executive Committee had instructed John McNair to seek a 
“full report on the recent incidents in this Division and on the position generally 
since the N.A.C. enquiry was held in May 1943.”314 The report was presented to the 
NAC on 24-25 February by Smith, who protested bitterly at the Standing Orders 
Committee report. John McNair then put the case for the four dissenting branches 
and for the Standing Orders Committee report, and referring to the enquiries of May 
1943 and June 1944, and speeches made by Auld at Gateshead and by Smith at the 
Divisional Conference.315 In the ensuing discussion reference was made to articles in 
BO, “and to the activity of Comrade Sketheway at Ashington”. Walter Padley then 
moved, and Don Bateman seconded, the dissolution of the Divisional Council and 
the suspension of Smith, Auld, Dror Binah, Sketheway and Jack Johnston; and the 
formation of a committee of enquiry, to report to the NAC before Conference. The 
motion was passed by 11 votes to 1, the dissentient being Smith, who then withdrew 
from the meeting. His last act, before his suspension was moved, was to vote against 
a motion recommending reaffiliation to the Labour Party. It was passed, by 8 votes 
to 5. 
 
312 See, for example, the plaintive response by Mark Simpson to a 1940 circular from Head Office: 
“Only two branches, Gateshead and Bishop Auckland, contribute to the Power Fund. Of our 15 
branches, 11 paid fees on the last report submitted by our treasurer and two have paid since. We have 
less than 200 members in the whole Division, seven of our fifteen branches have less than 6 members 
each. Finally, the position is very bad in this area, and I do not see any hopes of a revival at present.” 
LSE Archive ILP/10/1/6, Mark Simpson to John McNair (reply to letter dated 9 July 1940) 
313 For example, Challinor (1994) p17, Thwaites, P J, The Independent Labour Party 1938-1950 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, London School of Economics 1976) p 139 footnote 96: “some of the 
branches said to be in existence may be fictional as Smith was supposed to have opened them”. 
Thwaites’ source was an interview with Don Bateman, the Yorkshire ILP leader opposed to Smith. 
314  LSE Archive ILP 3/33 NAC minutes 25-25 February 1945 
315 On 19 November 1944, at a public meeting in Gateshead, Auld had said “The line of the ILP 
during this war is very similar to the line the party took during the last war, the ILP has not taken 
proper cognisance of the changed circumstances during this war, and it would be wrong to delude the 
people into believing that the ILP is a revolutionary party. We have not yet got a decent measure of 
revolutionary thought in the Party.” After saying that a proper revolutionary organisation was needed 
to establish Socialism, he added “but the ILP is not yet the party for the job.” Hull University 
Archives DJH/23/12 Copy of Minutes of the ILP Executive committee. 22 December 1944. 
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Percy Williams, a fellow NAC member, wrote a gleeful letter afterwards to the 
senior ILPer Francis Johnson.  
 
In the absence of Jimmy’s [Maxton’s] too pacific influence we at last took 
action against the seditionists. We suspended the N.E. Divisional Council and 
suspended leading members including Dan Smith. I felt pleased when another 
committee of enquiry was appointed, that Dan Smith objected to me being a 
member on the ground I wasn’t impartial. The joke is that Ballantine was put 
on the committee and he will treat ‘em a damn sight rougher than I would with 
much less logical reason.316 
 
Surviving ILP documents draw a veil over the events at Blackpool, but the party’s 
enemies were not so delicate. A CPGB report on proceedings records  
 
Fenner Brockway and J. McNair… led the attack. The 5 were accused of 
working in the ILP for the RCP whose sole aim was to wreck the ILP - McNair 
quoted an RCP internal document to this effect. There was also a subsidiary 
[sic] charge concerned with NE finance. 
 
The accused were allowed to state their case but could only say “RCP is a 
party of realists. Under our leadership the ILP in NE England is recognised as 
the leading working class body” (Dan Smith). “I hold Trotskyist views but the 
ILP comes first” (Sketherway [sic]). Nowhere in Britain was the ILP more 
militant or regarded with more respect by the Workers’ (Auld).317 
 
The votes cast were (for expulsion/against expulsion): 
Dan Smith 80 - 19 
Ken Sketheway 78 - 19 
Alex Auld 60 - 31 
Jack Johnston 67 - 26 
Dror Binah 57 - 46318 
 
The CPGB reporter attributed Binah’s narrow vote to the fact that he “eschewed 
politics and made a strong emotional appeal”. Earlier, two North Birmingham ILP 
Trotskyists, Peter Kinnear and Bruno Schneider, has escaped expulsion by a similar 
 
316 LSE Archive ILP 4/1945/1 Letter from Percy [Williams] to Francis Johnson, 1 March 1945 
317 Labour History Archive CP/CENT/ORG/12/1 Progress Report 10 April 1945 
318 Ibid These figures are identical to those in a manuscript note on the conference programme at 
Glasgow City Archives TD 956/18/1.4a (Maxton Papers) 
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ploy, and John McNair allegedly told Binah that he would be readmitted to the ILP 
after two months.319  The relatively narrow margin of the vote to expel Alex Auld 
may have been in recognition of his long service to the ILP. The CPGB also rejoiced 
in the damage done to British Trotskyism: “…this Easter Blackpool conference 
witnessed a severe setback to RCP’s hope of using the ILP as a means of getting into 
the Labour Party. The attacks [by the ILP leadership] are linked up with the move of 
the ILP itself to affiliate to the Labour party… The extent of the blow to the RCP can 
be gauged [sic] from the fact that Smith, Sketheway and Binah formed the National 
Secretariat for work within the ILP.”320 
 
A sop to Laski? 
Expelled from the ILP, Smith and his comrades immediately came out openly as 
members of the Revolutionary Communist Party. In a front-page statement in the 
June 1945 edition of the RCP paper Socialist Appeal, the five expelled claimed that 
the expulsion was based on slanders “in order that Laski could give a ‘favourable’ 
report to the Labour Party Executive…”.  
 
We were won to the Trotskyists-Fourth Internationalist position at various 
dates inside the I.L.P. We were won to that policy because the test of history 
confirmed the programme of the Fourth International; confirmed its analysis of 
national and international events; confirmed in particular its criticisms of the 
leadership of the I.L.P. and its associated bodies on the plane of international 
political and organisational collaboration. We were won to that position 
because the Fourth International is the only international party of the working 
class which has maintained its principles steadfastly in the course of the 
present war. We have never hidden our conversion to the Trotskyist position, 
but have fought to the best of our ability to explain these ideas inside the I.L.P. 
and win support for them… 
 
The expulsions can only be properly understood if taken in conjunction with 
the general development of the Party. Since the disaffiliation from the Labour 
Party in 1932 the I.L.P. has rocketed from left to right without clear 
international or national perspectives and policies. In the last few months, 
disillusioned because of the failure of the I.L.P. to make appreciable headway 
and grow as they expected it to, the leadership has travelled rapidly to the 
right. In travelling to the right it is and was prepared to chop off its left wing, 
no matter how bureaucratically. There were a series of Trotskyist resolutions 
on the agenda of the Conference from the North East Division, including one 
which proposed the affiliation of the I.L.P. to the Fourth International. These 
 
319 Labour History Archive CP/CENT/ORG/12/1 Progress Report 10 April 1945 
320 Ibid Progress Report 10 April 1945 
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had to be expunged from the agenda as a gesture to the leadership of the 
Labour Party; it was a demonstration that Brockway and Co. were really going 
to capitulate as fully as the Labour leaders wanted them to…. Everything was 
to be subordinated to the success of the I.L.P. quest for affiliation to the Labour 
Party. Although we were also advocating affiliation of the I.L.P. to the Labour 
Party and had pursued a consistent policy in this respect, unlike the leadership 
of the Party, we wanted our critical attitude towards Transport House to be 
fully elaborated in the discussions on affiliation… Fearful that this would 
antagonise the leadership of the Labour Party and jeopardise entry into the 
Labour Party, and incapable of putting up a vigorous opposition to the Labour 
leaders, Brockway and McNair had to get rid of us.321 
 
The question of Trotskyists had arisen in the talks between Brockway - as Political 
Secretary of the ILP - and Harold Laski, acting Chairman of the Labour Party, in 
December 1944. Brockway wrote to NAC members reporting on the discussions: 
“The second ground of criticism was the allegation that the party was “Trotskyist”. I 
told Laski that the “Trotskyists” were only a fraction of the Party and he accepted 
this and did not consider that the difficulty would be serious.”322 To interpret this 
passage as giving the green light for a purge of Trotskyists seems perverse; it could 
somewhat more plausibly be taken as meaning that Laski was unconcerned about the 
activities of the Trotskyist group. Further evidence that Fenner Brockway had not 
pre-planned the expulsion may be inferred from a letter from Brockway to Smith 
apologising for having destroyed material sent by Smith for a proposed ‘north 
eastern edition’, presumably of New Leader: “I really am very sorry, but after the 
expulsion business I destroyed the material… I ought to have sent it back to you, but 
I suppose I was in a ruthless mood that afternoon.”323 Had he engineered the affair, 
he would scarcely have reacted with anger and surprise to its outcome. 
 
Inside the RCP 
The years 1942-45 saw the Workers’’ International League and its successor, the 
Revolutionary Communist Party, flourish. It was expanding its influence in industry, 
 
321 Socialist Appeal vol 7 no 7 June 1945 ‘Expelled I.L.P.ers Join R.C.P.’ Smith had, as noted above, 
voted against NAC moves to approach the Labour Party with a view to reaffiliation. 
322 Labour History Archive CP/CENT/ORG/12/1 Progress Report 10 April 1945. This is a CPGB 
document, transcribing an RCP document circulated at the Blackpool Conference, which transcribed 
Brockway’s letter of 29 December 1944 to NAC members. I have not seen the original, and so cannot 
be sure that it is an accurate version, or whether changes have been made, by accident or design. 
However, Smith & Co. quoted this passage in their Socialist Appeal statement of June 1945, and 
would hardly have done so had this laid them open to charges of falsification. 
323 Hull University Archives DJH/23/13 Letter, Fenner Brockway to Dan Smith, 29 August 1945 
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its membership was growing, and, with wealthy supporters, it was able to sustain a 
fortnightly newspaper and an expensive establishment: by November 1944, 12 full-
time staff - including one in Newcastle, Heaton Lee - and one part-timer. By then, 
the party had also acquired a Newcastle office, at Ridley Place in the city centre.324 
Earlier that year the WIL, under pressure from the International Secretariat of the 
Fourth International, had agreed to hold a unification conference with its rival 
groups. Unlike 1938, WIL was now strong and its rivals weak and divided, and the 
‘Fusion Conference’ of March 1944 saw the WIL merge with the RSL to form the 
Revolutionary Communist Party. Its leadership was dominated by WILers- Jock 
Haston became General Secretary, Ted Grant remained at the helm of Socialist 
Appeal, and the WIL ‘theoretical organ’, Workers’’ International News, remained 
the theoretical organ of the new body. Former WILers had a clear majority on the 
RCP ruling bodies.325 In the north east, the RCP was expanding: it had two branches, 
a weekly speakers class, and a weekly study circle “in conjunction with the I.L.P.”326 
Smith may still have been keeping a low profile as far as the RCP was concerned 
(vide Bill Landles’ non-recollection of Dan’s role in the RCP prior to April 1945 
above), but the ex-Communist strike leader Bill Davy had been won over to the 
Fourth, and was on the stump for the RCP, addressing, for example, an AEU branch 
in Walker: “a very hostile audience of between 80 and 100 were tremendously 
impressed”, and later the AEU District Committee were given “the trouncing of their 
lives” by the young agitator.327 Attempts were being made to infiltrate the YCL, 
although, commented Lee, “They are all very young and particularly immature”; of 
the adult party, “to all intents and purposes, the C.P. has gone ‘underground’”328 
 
By early 1945, just prior to the ILP conference, Jock Haston and his comrades were 
bullish about future prospects. “The old spirit of apathy and demoralisation among 
the Workers’ is ended for the next period. We are entering the period of new 
revolutionary waves with an enthusiastic and optimistic party, which for the first 
time faces our enemies as a united fighting force.”329 Dan Smith and his fellow 
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ILPers were entering, or ‘coming out’ in, a party at its peak. It was united - the years 
1944-1947 was the sole period of the history of the British Trotskyist movement 
when it was united under one banner - and it confidently expected the immediate and 
culminating crisis of capitalism, to be followed by world revolution. However, both 
in the national RCP and in its Tyneside branch, fissures would begin to appear at this 
most hopeful of times. 
 
In the national party, these took the form of increasingly sharp debates about 
strategy, instigated by Gerry Healy. As capitalism did not enter its final crisis upon 
the end of the war, Haston and his supporters began to re-examine their outlook, and 
reached a position that the post-war world might be experiencing a temporary 
economic boom of a very few years’ duration. Healy, backed by the International 
Secretariat of the Fourth International (ISFI), held on to the catastrophist view that 
collapse and revolution was imminent. There was, in this view, no time to build an 
independent working class revolutionary party; the urgent need was for the RCP to 
adopt a policy of entrism into the Labour Party, the only party capable of attracting 
the loyalty of the working masses. Another debate, along similar fault lines, 
addressed the party’s policy on mass unemployment. Haston and his ‘Majority’ 
believed that, in the event of mass redundancies, the party should press, through the 
trade unions, for a policy of ‘nons first’ - that non-union members should be laid off 
first, in order to maintain a disciplined, unionised core in industry. Healy and his 
supporters attacked this policy as one of dividing the working class. Eventually, in 
1947, the ISFI promoted a deal whereby the RCP would split into two groups. Healy 
led his ‘Minority’ into the Labour Party, where it formed ‘The Club’, a deep-entry 
group increasingly paranoid in its character. Haston, Grant and the residual RCP 
carried on for another two years as an open party before they decided to liquidate the 
party and follow Healy into the Labour Party and into The Club. There, Healy took 
delight in isolating and expelling his former adversaries. 
 
This divide was mirrored in the Tyneside group (as, indeed, in other ‘locals’ around 
the country). The extent to which this was doctrinally-inspired in Newcastle is 
unclear. The influx of new members to the Tyneside RCP in April 1945 was recalled 
by Bill Landles as bringing a change to the atmosphere of the group:  
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I didn’t know at the time that these people existed in the ILP because what we 
had was a group of people who worked in the factories, they were actual 
working class industrial proletariat. Now, the group that were in the ILP, I’m 
not denigrating them at all, they were what we would have called normally 
‘petty bourgeois’, they were normally sort of middle class people, and certainly 
they would be better off… they had better jobs and so on. And when we joined 
together… it was quite noticeable that there was a difference.330 
 
The divide was not, however, between the ‘open’ RCPers and the ILPers who joined 
them. It was largely between Dan Smith, who identified as a member of the Healy’s 
‘Minority’ faction, and the ‘Majority’ led by the branch secretary, Dror Binah. The 
clash between the two men appears to have been more than political.  
 
…there was a great deal of personal animosity between Dan and Dror Binah. 
What the base of that was I don’t know but in one meeting it erupted - because 
they used to argue in the meetings - and …Dan Smith, his face was absolutely 
red with rage and he yelled at Dror Binah, ‘You don’t even know how to treat 
your bloody wife’. Now, I’ll never forget that because I was absolutely 
shocked that these comrades, who were supposed to be Marxists and 
philosophers and what not, descending to that level. And what it was about I 
have no idea, but it was very personal. I don’t think it was political at all…331 
 
The immediate tasks were electoral. Smith may have assisted in the RCP campaign 
at the Neath by-election of May 1945 (where, in one of last by-elections to take place 
in the electoral truce, Jock Haston stood as an RCP candidate against a Labour 
candidate).332 Members would have been active in the 1945 General Election 
campaign, albeit aware of party policy: “It should never be forgotten that our 
‘support’ for the Labour Party is the same as a rope ‘supports a man who has been 
hanged.’”333  Alex Auld worked full-time for the Labour Party during the campaign. 
In the autumn of 1945, the RCP again stood against Labour, with Herbie Bell, who 
had resigned from the ILP in protest at the purge of Trotskyists, standing as RCP 
candidate for the Buddle Ward of Wallsend Borough Council in the November 1945 
municipal elections; the 20-year-old Bill Landles was his agent. They secured 265 
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332 TDS Archive disc 4A. Dan mentions Neath as a campaign in which he was involved, although 
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votes, and “…the amount of propaganda work done was terrific”334  
 
What temporary unity this activity may have brought about was certainly exhausted 
by the end of 1946. On 6 December 1946 Arthur Ross, the RCP National Treasurer, 
wrote to all branches explaining the party’s “grave” financial situation attempting to 
stimulate fund-raising. The letter to the Newcastle branch had a manuscript 
postscript: “Newcastle. I understand that some of your comrades are in business on 
their own. While they are earning their living in this way they must make a generous 
payment by way of income levy. Please try to get your average up! AR”335 This, and 
a subsequent branch decision to recommend an income levy on members who ran 
their own businesses, provoked a furious reaction. Alex Auld chose to interpret it as 
a personal slight and submitted a resignation ‘letter’ scrawled on a torn-off calendar 
sheet: “I herewith resign my membership of the R.C.P., because of the fact that, in 
my view, the Branch decision of the ‘Branch Capitalists,’ is not just.”336 Other 
‘minority’ members, Smith, George Brown, and Evelyn Shiel, threatened to follow 
him. On 27 December - in a doleful echo of Smith’s career in the ILP - the branch 
wrote to the Political Bureau in London requesting that “a leading comrade” be sent 
as soon as possible to conduct an inquiry.337 
 
The ‘Branch capitalists’ were Smith, Auld and Evelyn Shiels. Smith had begun a 
painting and decorating company at some point in 1945, in partnership with an old 
friend named Bill Nicholls. At this early stage it appears to have been very much a 
‘two-men-and-a-barrow’ type of undertaking. Auld may have been working as a self-
employed newspaper canvasser, a frequent job choice among left wing radicals, who 
were often blacklisted by conventional employers.338 Shiels’ undertaking is 
unknown. Jack Rawling appears to have escaped condemnation on this score, 
although (with Smith as partner) he had established the Luxor Café in Wallsend, also 
in 1945.339 RCPers were supposed, where possible, to work in industry, to ‘go where 
 
334 Socialist Appeal Supplement Mid-November 1945 
335 Hull University Archives DJH/15F/27/1 
336 Hull University Archives DJH/15F/27/2 
337 Hull University Archives DJH/15F/27/3 
338 This was pointed out by Wicks, H, Keeping My Head: The Memoirs of a British Bolshevik 
(London 1992)  
339 I am grateful to Chris Butterworth, Jack Rawling’s daughter, for information on her parents’ career 
and for sight of the Deed of Association for the Luxor. 
85 
 
the Workers’ go’. “Comrades in business or other petty bourgeois jobs should feel it 
part of their Communist duty to pay cash into the Party in accordance with their 
income.”340  
 
Prior to Tearse’s visit to Newcastle in January 1947, the four dissenters wrote to the 
Political Bureau protesting that they had been subject to “a persistent attack” by 
Binah, which, “while not conducted on a political basis was motivated by decision 
[sic] to support the minority resolution on the Labour Party. The atmosphere in the 
Newcastle branch had degenerated to such an extent that we were compelled to press 
for a national enquiry… However, at the first branch meeting after this decision, the 
whole of the business dealt with a continuation of the discussion on the matters to be 
submitted to the enquiry… As this has been the sole business of the branch for 
months, we have decided to resign and leave the playing at politics to those desirous 
of playing…”341 Gerry Healy later claimed that the four had come over to the 
minority prior to the RCP’s September 1946 Conference. “Naturally they incurred 
the most severe factional hostility from the majority and some of its supporters in the 
Newcastle branch, which led to a situation where the comrades resigned because of 
the intense factional provocation.”342 He quoted a letter from Smith, in which Smith 
states that Auld’s resignation was against the advice of the local minority. 
 
We decided no matter what happened we must maintain a level keel and carry 
on - the following three meetings however were spent on attacking us as 
degenerates - and my decision to walk out was taken after a ‘document’ by 
Binah, and devoted mainly to a gutter attack on me, was tabled. It is absolutely 
impossible in our opinion to carry on any kind of work in such an atmosphere - 
the effect of all this dirt was really breaking up our branch - and knocking hell 
out of the morale of all the comrades.343 
 
Healy was making use of the affair to support his own attacks on the RCP 
leadership, “a regime which systematically violates the elementary principles of 
 
340 Hull University Archives DJH 15F/27/5 Letter, Arthur Ross to Dror Binah, 2 January 1947 
341 Hull University Archives DJH 15B/82 Document issued by the RCP July 1947 ‘For Information’ 
regarding Healy’s statement to the ISFI that minority supporters were being victimised and citing 
Newcastle and Liverpool as examples. This document reproduces the Newcastle minority group’s 
statement. 
342 Hull University Archives DJH/15A/38a Internal Bulletin Special 1947 Conference Number. ‘The 
Crisis in the Revolutionary Communist Party. By the E.C. [Executive Committee] of the Entrist [i.e. 
Minority] Faction’ 
343 Ibid, quoting letter (n.d.) from Dan Smith to Gerry Healy 
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democracy in the service of a political line which departs more and more from the 
traditional line of orthodox Trotskyism and contradicts the needs and interests of the 
party and the class.”344 In this he was successful, in that ISFI authorised the splitting 
of the British Section into two at a special conference on 11 October 1947, with 
Healy leading his entrist faction, about eighty-strong, into Labour.345 
 
What the ‘gutter attack’ complained of by Smith consisted of is unknown, but it may 
have borne some similarity to the complaints made against the minority faction in a 
letter from Dror Binah to Party HQ on 7 January 1947.346 This accused the minority 
of a “failure… to understand the responsibilities involved in being members of a 
Bolshevik organisation… In the case of the Newcastle branch the minority makes 
full use of its rights but falls short of fulfilling its obligations.” Among the failings 
attributed to minority members were: 
*  failure to participate in a mass showing in Jarrow to sell Socialist Appeal, after 
Herbie Bell had been assaulted by Communists while selling the paper there. Of the 
minority, only Alex Auld turned up. 
* failure to attend study circle meetings. Not one person from the minority attended.  
 
“The comrades justify their absence by saying that they are engaged in other 
Party activities yet Comrade Smith, for instance, found time to spend five 
days in London to conduct discussions with comrade Healy at the expense of 
normal branch activities which he missed by his absence without being 
granted leave, and two of the comrades of the minority are known to have 
attended a public meeting of the Secular Society, and one an informal 
discussion circle of the Labour Party without any direction from the branch. 
The only conclusion we can come to is that the comrades are deliberately 
sabotaging the organised branch effort and their claim to be concerned about 
serious political discussion and inner Party education is mere hypocracy 
[sic].”347 
 
* poor sales performance for Socialist Appeal: “With the exception of one week 
 
344 Ibid 
345 Bornstein & Richardson op cit p195. The figure for the minority faction is from Lotz, C & 
Feldman, P, Gerry Healy: A Revolutionary Life (London 1994) p 211. This hagiographic work does 
not mention the Newcastle affair at all; its only reference to Dan Smith is to accuse him of being the 
“most notorious supporter” of the “Haston clique”, active in undermining a grass roots Workers’’ 
movement in the Royal Ordnance Factories in 1942, and describing him as a member of the WIL 
Central Committee (p205). I have seen no evidence that Smith was on the WIL CC. 
346 Hull University Archives DJH/15F/27/7 Dror Binah to [Party Centre: addressed ‘Dear Comrade’, 7 
January 1947 
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during Municipal elections Comrades Smith and Atkinson [Marshall Atkinson] have 
not sold a single paper for many months.”348 
* poor TU work. “Comrade Smith, who is industrial organiser often uses his 
industrial work as an excuse to justify inactivity in other spheres. However the 
hollowness of this excuse is demonstrated by the following…” - failure to attend the 
Trades Council of which he was member, failure to attend a branch meeting at which 
he had been appointed to lead a discussion on industrial perspectives, and failure to 
supply industrial members with copies of model resolutions supplied by Party 
Centre. 
 
Binah continued his indictment by blaming the bad atmosphere on the minority: “It 
is quite an understandable position that comrades who struggle against terrific 
odds… to maintain a certain standard of activity in the branch feel a certain amount 
of resentment towards others who evade their basic responsibilities as Party 
members and particularly if the latter never miss an opportunity to criticise the Party 
organisationally and politically… and now these comrades are trying to utilise the 
unhealthy atmosphere… as an excuse to justify their inactivity”  The minority 
claimed that the branch was run as an autocracy, persecuting members to whom they 
object. “This kind of slander has been directed in particular against Comrade Binah 
who in the last branch meeting was subjected to a vile personal attack by Comrade 
Smith who accused him of being mainly responsible for the ill feeling in the 
branch.”349 
 
A motion had been passed censuring Smith who, although Chairman and industrial 
organiser, had been absent from two branch meetings and one EC meeting and 
“haughtily refused” to explain his absence, and resolutions passed urging adherence 
to party rules, especially regarding payment of dues. This last, on 2 December 1946, 
infuriated Auld, who threatened to resign should issues of the same kind be brought 
up. He did so a few days later, after Ross’ circular from Head Office had arrived and 
 
348 A list had been drawn up showing SA sales for the period November 1945-November 1946. Herbie 
Bell came top, with 3,154 sales to his credit, Dror and Grace Binah second, with 2,352. Dan Smith 
sold just 17, the lowest of all branch members listed, and Marshall Atkinson 22. Hull University 
Archives DJH/15F/27/16 
349 This cannot have been the incident recalled above by Bill Landles, as he was conscripted into the 
RAF shortly after the Wallsend municipal election in 1945 and was not present at the implosion of the 
Newcastle RPC. 
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after a branch debate calling for an income levy on members in business, proposed 
by Ken Sketheway. When this was passed, reported Binah, Auld walked out and 
resigned “on the grounds that he opposed the resolution. This was a glaring example 
of the comrades’ attitude to Bolshevik discipline. The other comrades of the minority 
instead of demonstrating their loyalty to the Party by repudiating strongly Com. 
Auld’s action tried to justify it… and opposed his expulsion… Instead they came out 
with fresh attacks on supporters of the resolution and particularly on Comrade Binah 
whom they accused of having indirectly, by misinformation influenced the Centre’s 
decision to levy the business comrades as a preconceived manouvre [sic] directed to 
drive Comrade Auld and others out of the organisation. This is the height of 
disloyalty.”350 
 
Before Tearse was able to visit Newcastle Smith submitted a letter of resignation 
from the RCP on behalf of himself, Alex Auld, George Brown and Evelyn Shiels - a 
letter which Tearse, writing to Smith to make arrangements for the inquiry, described 
as one of “determined haste”, a cause of surprise and disappointment.351 
 
Tearse arrived in Newcastle on 11 January 1947 and met Smith, Auld, Brown and 
Shiels in a group. They described the Branch statement on the situation sent by 
Binah as ‘rubbish’, but refused to discuss it further. Tearse recorded in his Report: 
“At the same time I asked these comrades… to draw up a statement of what they 
considered the position to be of the branch, local activity etc. over the past period 
and which I pointed out would be treated as seriously as the statement of any other 
comrades. This they refused to do, and persisted in their refusal despite an endless 
number of requests from myself during the whole time I was in Newcastle.”352 They 
maintained the line that Binah was behind a persecution of ‘minority’ members, 
being “not fit to be in any responsible position in the Party”, “incapable of defending 
his political ideas” and “had not a political idea in his head”. The other members 
who supported Binah were “dupes”. “This characterisation of “dupes” they gave to 
 
350 Hull University Archives DJH/15F/27/7 Dror Binah to [Party Centre: addressed ‘Dear Comrade’, 7 
January 1947 
351 Hull University Archives DJH/15F/27/11(ii) Letter, Roy Tearse to Dan Smith, 10 January 1947. 
This was a reply to DJH/15F/27/10 Letter, Dan Smith to Roy Tearse, 9 January 1947, announcing the 
resignation of the four. 
352 Hull University Archives DJH/15F/27/15 Report of Investigation into the situation in the 
Newcastle Branch. 31 January 1947 
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all other comrades excepting themselves. The attacks they claimed were directed 
particularly against D.S. [Dan Smith]”353 The four told Tearse that they would not 
re-enter the party if Binah remained in the branch - or even if the branch were split in 
two. They also refused - despite being invited by Tearse - to attend a branch meeting 
that Tearse had arranged. 
 
The other members repudiated the claims of the four, as did Marshall Atkinson, the 
sole minority supporter who had not resigned. 
 
They had found that the work of the comrades in business, for the Party, had 
steadily deteriorated over the past year. In particular this related to D.S. [Dan 
Smith] They looked upon D.S’s position with a certain seriousness because 
when D.S. originally went into business some eighteen months ago he had 
informed the branch that this would enable him to give half his time during 
each week to Party work. This in fact had not been the case and he was today 
giving far less time to the Party than when he worked for an employer. This 
had not even been compensated by increased financial commitments during 
this period.354 
 
Tearse examined branch records and found the allegations of the minority members 
to be “completely unfounded”, and that the majority members’ statements on the 
deterioration of work - and in particular of work done by Smith - were “substantially 
correct”. Some of the allegations by the majority members didn’t justify an inquiry 
as they could be levelled at some majority members also; but the minority failure to 
attend the Jarrow demonstration despite a central office instruction “shows an anti-
Party attitude of the worst form”. He found that members who had left the party over 
the past two years had not done so because of Binah or the conflict, but for personal 
reasons, and that the four most recent recruits were brought in by majority members. 
Tearse’s conclusions were damning for his old friend Dan Smith and his supporters: 
 
My general conclusion is that whilst one cannot deny that there has been a 
clash of personalities in the branch the basic reason for the degeneration that 
has taken place has been the altered sociological composition of the branch 
resulting from the fact that certain members have taken up businesses on their 
own…. Also a study of the record added to the statements of all the comrades, 
both majority and minority, leads me to a position where I find the allegations 
of the minority comrades substantially incorrect and the statements of the other 
 
353 Ibid 
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comrades substantially correct. Another point worthy of note is that throughout 
the whole course of the Inquiry the four minority comrades demonstrated an 
attitude of non-co-operation and in the discussions with me and in their attitude 
towards attending the Inquiry etc. maintained a factional discipline. The 
majority comrades met me individually and assisted me to the full in any 
requests I made upon them to conduct the Inquiry.355 
 
The outcome cannot have been in much doubt, especially since the RCP Constitution 
did not permit members to resign (attempting to resign was an offence punishable by 
expulsion). Tearse reported to the Central Committee in February that Smith & Co. 
“had been disrupting the work of the party… and not acting as loyal members” while 
Binah, an alternate member of the Central Committee, said that the Branch “had now 
learned that Smith had been in the Labour Party for at least two weeks before leaving 
the RCP without informing us and was attempting to get our members to leave the 
Party and join the LP.”356 The CC voted to endorse Tearse’s report by 12 votes to 2 
(Gerry Healy and John Goffe), and Binah moved that “In view of the fact that these 
comrades had been well known Trotskyists on the Tyne as public propagandists and 
could do considerable damage to the Party as L.P. members… we endorse the 
expulsions and make a public statement in the press.” Healy proposed that an attempt 
be made to win them back, but a suggestion that he be sent to Newcastle to do so 
was defeated, while expulsion was carried by 12 votes to 2 (Healy and Goffe). Healy 
then again sought CC approval to go to Newcastle. This was refused. “Comrade 
 
355 Ibid. DJH15F/27/13 consists of notes presumably taken by Tearse during the Inquiry, in which, 
inter alia, branch members comment on Dan’s attitude. ‘T.G.’ [Tommy Green] for example 
commented: “Since early days knew D.S.; left industry and no longer faced with industrial struggles 
and his inferior political position does not help him to make up his industrial loss since he took up 
business”. J.K. [John Kennedy]: “D.S. views very tempting but always struck me about D.S.’s debates 
- puts point of view - but on thinking about it - persons political opinion is very often subject of 
outlook in life. D.S. point of view changed since became remote from industry.” Kennedy added, re. 
the Trades Council meeting, “disappointed to find he was not going - gave reason that of one of 
demoralisation. When he made this statement he may have been mentally upset but thought it strange 
thing for a comrade with his abilities.” 
356 Hull University Archives DJH/15B/76 Report of Central Committee 15-16 February 1947. The 
allegation that Smith had secretly entered the Labour Party was subsequently withdrawn. However, in 
a ‘Postscript to Newcastle Inquiry’ dated 16 March 1947, Roy Tearse stated: “…I find that the 
following is the correct position: before resigning from the Party D.S. [Dan Smith] had invited M.A. 
[Marshall Atkinson] (who supports the minority political perspectives) to attend a meeting, attended 
by G.B. A.A. E.S. [Brown, Auld, Shiel] & D.S. at which they intended to discuss and decide upon the 
question of leaving the R.C.P. and joining the L.P. In extending this invitation D.S. also suggested to 
M.A. the idea of persuading another member J.K. [John Kennedy] to join the L.P. also. Also for some 
considerable time D.S. had intimated to M.A. that he was considering leaving the Party. M.A. refused 
to act upon the suggestions of D.S….” Hull University Archives DJH/15F/27/15. 
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Healy announced nevertheless that he was going to Newcastle.”357 Following his 
visit, the four wrote contritely to Haston on 23 February expressing a wish to reapply 
for membership. “In doing so we recognise fully the seriousness of our mistake in 
resigning from the Party and pledge ourselves to do everything possible to carry out 
its perspectives and assist in building it up.”358 The Central Committee on 31 May/1 
June 1947 decided to accept this, on the basis of six months’ probation from the date 
of renewed activity in the local branch. “Three comrades have been reaccepted. Dan 
Smith has made no effort to contact the branch or undertake activity for the Party. 
The local Branch has therefore rejected his reapplication.”359 Smith’s career as a 
Trotskyist was over. 
 
Discussion 
To the uninitiated, writing a history of the British Trotskyist movement, or even of a 
small portion of its activities, is riddled with difficulties, not least the need to be 
aware of the political stance of other commentators and historians who may not only 
wish to support their own cause but - consciously or unconsciously - undermine that 
of their opponents. “Much of the historical work produced within the various 
Trotskyist groups is seriously compromised” is the verdict not just of Alan Johnson, 
but also of the doyens of this school of internal history, Al Richardson and Sam 
Bornstein.360 There is a danger, also, that non-Trotskyists approach the internal 
machinations of the movement with ridicule or contempt: “much that is produced 
from outside the movement is either vitiated by incomprehension or else exhibits a 
kind of contemporaneous equivalent of the ‘condescension‘ which, in another 
context, E.P.Thompson criticised. Even the ‘poor deluded followers‘ of Gerry Healy 
 
357 Hull University Archives DJH/15F/27/15 Report of Investigation into the situation in the 
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Dan Smith within the party and the faction could have been important to the success of failure or 
failure of Healy’s plans. In an interview towards the end of his life, Smith claimed that “Healy… one 
of the polarised guys, was a man that I couldn’t get on with.” TDS Archive disc 7B 
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deserve better.”361 Thus Richard Croucher, for example, can make a value judgement 
in writing from an orthodox Communist perspective of the “bizarre politics” of the 
Trotskyists.362 ‘Mainstream’ writers and historians can also let value judgements slip 
into their writing, as in Andy McSmith’s choice of chapter title, ‘The Long Trudge 
of Ted Grant’, while John Callaghan can write of “nonsense” being “authentic 
Trotskyist doctrine” and of the “doctrinal gibberish” propagated by ISFI.363 Those of 
us without the talents of a Crick or a Callaghan should take care to avoid the 
temptation to rush to judgement. In many ways it is much easier to be faced with the 
works of Mickie Shaw, Ted Grant, or Corinna Lotz: at least one knows where one 
stands.  All of this caution applies equally to Dan Smith, with the added 
complication that his subsequent career and fall have influenced the historical record 
and historical memories of the man; at least, the presentation of such memories (and 
not least in the presentation of such memories by Smith himself). It is not just in 
Trotskyist memoirs and quasi-official biographies that people seek to distance 
themselves from him364. Smith, too, distanced himself in memory from the 
Trotskyist movement, presenting it almost as a youthful aberration, barely 
mentioning it in his published autobiography, and glossing over the events of the 
period in the recorded interviews of the T Dan Smith Archive. 
 
Yet the period treated in this attempt at a chapter is not one of extreme youth for its 
principal. Smith was 24 years old in 1939; in 1947 he was 32; this was a period of 
mature action and an important part of his career and not a piece of juvenilia. It 
cannot be treated separately from his later career; the Dan Smith who worked in the 
ILP and RCP was the same man who forged his way in the Labour Party and in 
business. 
 
From the narrative of his actions that it has been possible to piece together, we are 
left with two major questions. To what extent does Dan’s political activity in the 
period between 1939 and 1947 reflect or contradict established historical views of 
left-wing politics at that time; and to what extent does it show continuity with and 
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causation for his later career? 
 
In partial answer to the first question, Smith’s career is useful in showing the 
mechanisms of Trotskyist infiltration of the Independent Labour Party, the north-east 
division of which was ‘a shell’ almost waiting to be taken over by energetic 
politicians wanting a ready-made vehicle to promote their views.365 Albeit slightly 
complicated by the fact that Smith wasn’t a Trotskyist entrist, but seems to have 
converted very rapidly once he was an ILP member, it is, depending on one’s 
personal viewpoint, an instruction manual or a cautionary tale on how a party as 
open and democratic as the ILP can come close to being taken over by a particularist 
group at odds with the party’s broader ethos.366 His expulsion, although presented by 
the Trotskyist left as a coup to make the ILP more palatable to the Labour Party, 
seems equally likely to have been a reaction against the aggression, dogmatism and 
disruptive nature of the Trotskyist faction: the dislike that Smith and his No. 2 
Division comrades inspired seems to be due more to their alleged bullying and 
insulting of others than to any doctrinal differences. Barney Markson, for example, 
was capable of pursuing a leftist line, yet was pushed out because he was not ‘one of 
us‘; and had Smith and his colleagues left their former pacifist allies in peace they 
may have come closer to their goals. Once in the RCP, it is not hard to imagine 
Smith becoming bored. He was chairman of the Newcastle branch, but, unlike his 
nemesis, Binah, he wasn’t a member of the Central Committee, and although he had 
been friendly with Haston and Tearse, they were a long way off and Smith was no 
longer at the top table, as he had been in the ILP. The building of a business and 
impending raising of a family would have occupied more of his attention, the more 
so as the RCP was not about to fulfill the high hopes of growth in numbers and 
influence mooted in 1945, and nor did the revolution seem imminent. It seems odd 
that such a realist as he later turned out to be should side with the catastrophist Gerry 
Healy in the majority-minority debate. Possibly he saw entry to the Labour Party as 
the best political solution at the time, irrespective of whether or not the revolution 
was imminent, and one that Healy offered sooner than Haston, while entry as part of 
 
365 I am grateful to Dr Gidon Cohen for the ‘shell’ analogy. 
366 It did not seem to have learned the lesson of the mid-1930s, when the Revolutionary Policy 
Committee almost achieved that feat on behalf of the CPGB, and, indeed, Harry Wicks suggests that 
Walter Padley, the London Divisional Organiser, welcomed Trotskyists entering the ILP c.1940 as a 
counterweight to the Communists: Wicks op cit p188 
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an organised group offered a prospect of greater influence than entry alone. Late in 
life Smith claimed that the Trotskyists “were so sectarian and so primitive, it seemed 
to me, and I used to say so.”367 There is no corroborative evidence that he did voice 
such disillusionment at the time, other than in his plans to join Labour in 1946, but 
arguably it would not have been out of character for him to have felt so. He would 
not have been alone.368 
 
What of the relevance of this period for Smith’s own career? One might argue that it 
was a ‘false start’: eight wasted years in which he could have been doing something 
more useful for himself and for society than pursuing a career in two dying parties 
which had no impact in the real world.  
 
Or, like David Byrne, we can see Smith using his Trotskyist experience as a badge of 
honour in the Labour movement and as a useful training ground for the businessman, 
a “trajectory [that] was not all that unusual… I do not think that Dan’s opposition to 
the War, which kept him out of it, was a post [sic] adopted so that he could build up 
a good business during and immediately afterwards while others were fighting 
fascism, but that is in effect what he did and how his business interests 
developed.”369 
 
Or one could compare the Dan Smith meeting with his friends at the Socialist Café 
in 1939, with the Dan Smith emerging from the RCP in 1947. The first was an 
untested young man, occasionally employed, educating himself through reading and 
discussion and evening classes, of passionate socialist views but still finding out 
what exactly socialism involved and how best to achieve it. By 1947 he is confident 
and experienced. He has become an accomplished orator, someone who can hold a 
crowd, who can dominate a meeting, who can form and articulate a vision and 
persuade others of it. He has demonstrated guile, no small amount of ruthlessness, 
and a capacity for hard work.  Within three years of joining, the journeyman painter, 
 
367 TDS Archive disc 7B. This doesn’t, however, square with a statement earlier in the same interview 
that “the ideological conflicts were of a very high level, and Ted Grant was a remarkably talented 
philosophic socialist.” 
368 cf Haston’s disillusioned retirement from the field in 1950. Callaghan, J, British Trotskyism: 
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369 Byrne (1994) op cit p 20.  It was, however, not Smith’s initial opposition to the war that kept him 
out of it but his partial deafness. ‘Post’ is probably a typo for ‘pose’. 
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recipient of just an elementary education, had become a member of the ruling 
council of a famous political party (albeit one in terminal decline), and was in the 
process of shaking that party up so much that it had eventually to purge him from its 
ranks. He has the confidence in his own judgement to turn his back on Trotskyism, 
and to make his own way in the world - to quote David Byrne again, “he was not one 
to confuse status within sect with power in the real world. He had to become a 
reformist if he wanted the latter, and become a reformist he did…”370.  
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Chapter 3: Preparing for Power 1945-1958 
By the mid 1940s Smith was no longer a young man, turning thirty in May 1945.. It 
may be appropriate at this point – a point where he moves from fringe politics into 
mainstream politics - to reflect on his political trajectory. In his early years, insofar 
as autobiographical writings and testimony can be relied on, he had passed through 
several different phases. He had imbued the Marxism of his father and the Christian 
Socialism of his mother, been moved by the struggle in Spain while himself 
experiencing the struggles of employment and unemployment. In the late 1930s he 
came to reject war as a solution for international problems, and became a ‘fervent’ 
pacifist. His pacifism led him into the left wing socialism of the ILP, and from there 
he was drawn into the revolutionary socialism of the Worker’s International 
League/Revolutionary Communist Party. It was a long and sometimes disjointed 
journey for a youth and young man eager to make a mark, but perhaps not an 
unusual one – some of his political colleagues made similar journeys. He was to 
make a further change in the 1945-50 period: from the revolutionary socialism of the 
RCP, which in 1945 was anticipating the imminent collapse of capitalism, to the 
democratic socialism of the Labour Party in 1950. That process is documented and 
explained, as far as possible, below, but ultimately it may not be capable of 
satisfactory explanation given the nature of the information available, very little of 
which is contemporary. What is clear is that he deliberately turned his back on 
Trotskyism and moved into mainstream politics (he would not be the only Trotskyist 
or ILPer to do that, and some moved much further to the right) and that after a period 
of political inactivity he once again entered the lists. The Labour Party he entered in 
1950 was very different to the party of the pre-war years. Nationally, Labour in 1950 
had been in government for ten years (exclusively so for five) and had solid 
achievements to its name, for all that Smith was to decry its want of vision (see 
below). Locally, if rather less remarkably, it had tasted power in Newcastle. Smith 
was about to join a movement which offers him a real prospect of making a 
difference.  
 
He was also joining a party that was about to experience a serious split between left 
and right, between so-called ‘Bevanite’ left wing of the party, and the centre-right 
subsequently identified with Hugh Gaitskell. This split, triggered by a dispute about 
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NHS charges and leading to the resignation from government of Heath Secretary 
Aneurin Bevan on 20 April 1951, led to the Labour Party appearing divided; a 
compromise manifesto lacking in vision was agreed for the impending general 
election in October 1951, which Labour lost, entering thirteen years of opposition.371 
The divide between Bevanites and their opponents, later dubbed ‘Gaitskellites’, was 
to continue for the next five years, with arguments on defence (including nuclear 
disarmament), foreign and colonial policy to the fore.372 Yet although characterised 
by much personal vituperation, the split did not lead to clear domestic political 
alternatives. Bevan’s In Place of Fear of 1952 was not “a systematic analysis of a 
socialist position” according to Morgan “Bevan himself, it became clear, was hardly 
a Bevanite.”373 Bevan was to enter the shadow cabinet in 1956 as shadow Colonial 
Secretary and then shadow Foreign Secretary; in October 1957 at the Labour Party 
Conference he was alienate many of his supporters by attacking the policies of 
unilateralist disarmers within the party as “an emotional spasm” .374  
 
 
“An ordinary human being” 
The end of the war saw Smith, according to his own recollections, tired and 
disillusioned. The victory of the Labour Party at the 1945 General Election roused no 
enthusiasm in him: rather, “I was disillusioned at a time when everybody else was 
euphoric, even Ada was euphoric… because I felt that we’d missed a historic 
opportunity and historic opportunities didn’t recur.”375 In his 1970 autobiography 
Smith explains that the missed opportunity was to help rebuild a new Europe. “Here 
we had a Europe, razed in many places to the ground, presenting new opportunities, 
and if ever there was a time for Britain to go into Europe and give a lead, it was in 
those radical days in 1945.”376 But he believed that the Labour government, despite 
major achievements in health and other fields, was frittering away “the tremendous 
spiritual energy of the British people” on issues like ration levels.377 Smith believed 
that he knew the true feelings of the people better than the Labour movement, and its 
 
371 Morgan, Kenneth O, The People’s Peace. British History 1945-1990 (Oxford 1992) pp100-105 
372 Ibid pp137-139 
373 Ibid p104 
374 Hennessy, Peter, Having It So Good. Britain in the Fifties (London 2007) p523 
375 TDS Archive disk 16B. The nature of the historic event was unspecified. 
376 Smith, T Dan op cit p23 
377 Ibid  
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leadership, inferring from ILP by-election campaign successes during the war years 
(when the main parties observed the political truce) that people “were sick to death 
of living in slums…[they] did not want to go back to the kind of society they had left 
behind in 1939, and that if the war was to yield anything at all, then it had to be the 
beginnings of a new society.”378 Dismayed by the failure of the Labour leadership to 
see and seize the opportunities that he could see, Smith recalled, he dropped out of 
political activity. “I spent the next five [sic] years reading and thinking... the three 
years from 1947 until I went into local politics I spent purely as an ordinary human 
being studying the political form.”379 Part of his change in direction appears to be 
due to Ada Smith, who gave him a form of ultimatum: “It was against such 
background discussion that I conceded to the wishes of my wife, who determined 
that, if she were to have children, then it was her desire that they would have me as a 
father and she would have me as a husband and that I would not seek to ‘emulate’ 
many of the self-styled revolutionaries she had met, who seemed to see marriage as a 
joke and a hindrance in the ‘march towards socialism.’380 Smith was settling down. 
He and Ada were now living in rooms in a multi-occupancy house in the Newcastle 
district of Spital Tongues, and they soon began a family: their first child, Gillian, 
was born in December 1947.381 Smith was also starting the first in a long series of 
business ventures. He initially became a partner with RCP comrades Jack and Daisy 
Rawling, briefly running the Luxor Café in Wallsend. Subsequently (or possibly 
simultaneously; the dates of his association with the Rawlings are uncertain) he 
began working as a self-employed signwriter. In 1947, after a chance meeting with a 
former trade union colleague and painter Bill Nichol, Smith and Nichol formed a 
partnership which became Smiths Decorators, the core of his business interests for 
the next decade.382 Nichol had recently lost his wife to tuberculosis and had thrown 
himself into political and educational work with the NCLC, “and so, naturally 
perhaps, proceeded to woo me back into active politics.”383 
 
378 Ibid 
379 Amber Transcript of interview with TDS by Steve Trafford [nd but possibly 1984]. For  
380 Amber TDS unpublished autobiography p41. “I happily agreed to the most important personal 
decision in my life” (p42) 
381 The house was 13 Belle Grove Terrace, part of a terrace of Victorian town houses overlooking 
Castle Leazes Moor. By 1945, local electoral registers show that Smith’s parents, Robert and Ada, 
had also moved there from Wallsend. On the childrens’ birth dates, Foote Wood op cit p298. Gillian 
was followed by Jocelyn (April 1952) and Clifford (December 1956). 
382 Amber TDS unpublished autobiography p48 
383 Ibid p48 
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In reality, Smith’s holiday from active politics was probably extremely short. The 
previous chapter details his involvement with the RCP which ended in the spring of 
1947, at which point he was already considering joining the Labour Party, whether 
as an adherent of Healy’s minority faction or idependently. In September 1947 he 
officially applied to join the Labour Party.384 Subsequently he was adopted onto the 
party’s Municipal Panel for potential council candidates, a move which provoked a 
protest by the Westgate ward party, whose secretary sent the secretary of the 
Newcastle City Labour Party a resolution “That the City Party Executive look further 
into the case of Mr D Smith… as his inclusion on the Municipal Panel does not seem 
to be in order.”385 At roughly the same time, Smith joined the Newcastle General 
branch of the Clerical and Administrative Workers’’ Union (CAWU), almost 
certainly at the suggestion of Arthur Blenkinsop, Labour MP for Newcastle East. His 
Newcastle East constituency party, although largely right wing, was “tolerant of 
dissenters” and Smith, Ken Sketheway and Ted Fletcher were to obtain council seats 
there.386 Blenkinsop was a member of the CAWU Newcastle General branch, which 
acted as a ‘holding pen’ for members whose workplace would not support its own 
branch, and also had a number of ‘political’ members such as Blenkinsop and 
Emmanuel Shinwell (Clement Attlee was also a CAWU member).387 Blenkinsop 
was instrumental in persuading Smith to stand for the council.388 This time Dan 
Smith defied his wife (he stood “against my instinct and my express wish”, she 
wrote), and on his thirty-fifth birthday – 11 May 1950 - was elected as councillor for 
 
384 TWAM Acc 608 Box 1266 TDS to Newcastle City Labour Party, received 25 September 1947. 
Smith requests an application form and adds “I am at present very busy but would be pleased to give 
you any help you need in the November elections. I have quite a wide experience in public speaking 
and have at different times been on the Newcastle Trades Council E.C. and on the National I.L.P. and 
at present lecturing for the N.C.L.C.” 
385 Ibid J A Ridley (Secretary, Westgate Ward LP) to Secretary, Newcastle City LP, no date. The 
nature of the problem and the action taken (if any) is not recorded. Smith recorded in his published 
memoir that “…I was not welcomed into the Labour Party with fanfares of trumpets; I went in, looked 
upon by the older members and some of the younger ones, as a sort of devil incarnate who would not 
accept party discipline.” (Smith, T D, An Autobiography (Newcastle 1970) p 30) 
386 Charlton, J, Don’t You Hear the H-Bomb’s Thunder? Youth & politics on Tyneside in the late 
‘fifties and early ‘sixties (Pontypool 2009) p 40 
387 Creaby, J, Geordie Clerks Unite! A Centenary History of the Newcastle & Gateshead Branch of 
the Clerks’ Union 1908-2008 (Newcastle 2008), pp 38, 33, 49 (note 25). On Smith’s membership, 
Creaby cites the then branch secretary Ian Black. Smith’s decision to join the CAWU may have 
predated (and been intended to smooth the way towards) his joining the Municipal Panel, or may have 
been intended to overcome the problem raised by the Westgate ward party. 
388 Smith, T Dan op cit pp28-33 
100 
 
Walker ward, a safe Labour seat in Newcastle’s East End.389 Walker may have been 
a safe seat – an area of shipyards and associated industries along the riverside, with a 
good deal of slum housing adjacent, and a large interwar council estate further inland 
– but Newcastle City Council was politically quite volatile. It had been won by 
Labour for the first time in the municipal elections of November 1945, then lost in 
1949 to the Progressive Party, a self-defined ‘non-political’ group composed largely 
of Conservatives and Liberals.390 Smith was to enter a council Labour Group facing 
a further eight years in opposition. 
 
The Progressives 
 
In his varied recollections, Smith speaks noticeably more favourably of his 
Progressive opponents than of his Labour Party colleagues. “Many of them had quite 
a lot of ability and if you took them man for man I would say they far outweighed as 
individuals the people of the Labour side with one or two exceptions.”391 Among the 
figures he admired were John Chapman, Cuthbert Carrick, Robert Parker, William 
McKeag “who play acted Winston Churchill and was highly competent as a debater” 
and A Charlton Curry, “and so the standard of debate surprised… and impressed 
me… it let me see that it was necessary to understand their business if you were 
going to translate attacks on slum houses and property and the city centre… I was 
perceptive enough to see that they had these abilities and qualities and that if you 
didn’t do your homework they could trip you up. It mightn’t have been obvious to 
your colleagues but it was obvious to you.”392 Of his Labour colleagues, by contrast, 
“…I sat at the back of a hall listening to them talking and I thought Oh God! What 
the hell am I getting myself into here? They hadn’t a clue… as to what they should 
be doing in a city like Newcastle which was… a capital city of a declining region. So 
 
389 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3913 Ada Smith memoir ‘Once more without feeling’ p 8. Smith was 
selected for the Walker seat despite competition from a large number of experienced Labour 
councillors ousted in the 1949 municipal elections; Blenkinsop’s support may have been of help to 
him. 
390 Evening Chronicle 13 May 1949 p1 
391 TDS Archive disk 9A 
392 Ibid. Chapman ran a prominent Newcastle furniture shop; Carrick was an accountant; Robert 
Parker one of the founders of the major Newcastle estate and property agency Storey Sons & Parker. 
William McKeag (d.1972) was National Liberal MP for Durham 1931-35 and went on to achieve 
ultimate office as chairman of Newcastle United FC. Aaron Charlton Curry (1887-1957) was National 
Liberal MP for Bishop Auckland 1931-35, first defeating and then losing to Hugh Dalton. On 
McKeag, Todd op cit p 98 
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twenty years work I thought, maybe, and we can use this as a base in order to 
radicalise and bring into revolutionary perspective what the labour movement should 
be doing in Britain.”393 
 
Smith’s memories may give an undeservedly positive impression of the 
Progressives, for all the quality of individual members, for its governance of 
Newcastle during the 1940s and 1950s was marked by a series of corruption 
scandals, division and ultimately disintegration. 
 
In 1943 two senior Progressive aldermen and former Lord Mayors were tried for 
corruptly procuring Admiralty contracts for their dry dock and shipbuilding company 
(one, Sir Arthur Monro Sutherland, was acquitted; Alderman Robert Dalglish and an 
Admiralty official were gaoled).394 The following year, the Home Secretary ordered 
an inquiry into the running of fire and civil defence services in Newcastle, in which 
it was revealed, among other matters, that a city fire engine had been sold for £15 to 
a scrap company run by the  chairman of the Watch Committee, Cllr Embleton; that 
Embleton’s men had also, when meant to be “removing rubbish” at the Fire Brigade 
HQ, removed and cut up for scrap a fire pump, and that Embleton, along with family 
members and friends, had stabled their horses at public expense at the police stables. 
More seriously, Embleton’s company had bought a boat at auction which the Fire 
Brigade had sought to acquire as a fire boat but subsequently failed to bid for. 
Embleton had stated that he would make the vessel available to the Fire Brigade 
when needed, but at the time of the fiercest air raids on Newcastle the boat was some 
distance downriver, working for Embleton’s company, and never brought into 
service. Further allegations involved the use of ARP and police personnel, premises 
and supplies for private purposes. Despite the nature of the inquiry’s findings, the 
Watch Committee voted by 5 to 4 that no change be made in civil defence 
arrangements, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that both Embleton and 
Crawley, the Chief Constable also in charge of the fire brigade, were induced to 
resign. Neither man, nor anyone else associated with the events, was prosecuted.395 
 
393 Amber: Transcript of interview with TDS by Steve Trafford, Amber Films, Tape 1 Side 2 pp 2-3 
394 The Times 25 May 1943 p 2; 26 May 1943 p2; 21 July 1943 p 2; 26 July 1943 p 2. 
395 Newcastle-upon-Tyne Inquiry (1944 Cmd 6522); Armstrong, C, Tyneside in the Second World War 
(Chichester 2007) pp 68-73.It is perhaps indicative of the fractious nature of the Progressives and the 
feebleness of Newcastle Labour that the attack on Embleton was led by his Progressive colleague 
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Further disquiet was occasioned in 1952, when it emerged that the Housing 
Committee had irregularly approved an open-ended contract for consulting engineers 
Brian Colquhoun and Partners to work on the council’s Longbenton housing scheme 
for fees estimated at up to £150,000, even though the City Engineer’s Department 
was well able to have carried out the work at a fraction of the price.396 The 
subsequent lengthy debates on the matter saw Progressive representatives speaking 
out against the Housing Committee chairman, Alderman William Temple, and 
voting against the Progressive leadership, while the Progressive leader, Charlton 
Curry, protested that “[e]ver since this job was started there has been some evil 
genius at work creating an atmosphere which has so vitiated the climate in which we 
live in this Chamber that it has become quite impossible for many individuals and 
the majority Party… to do its best work.”397 
 
A Newcastle Labour Party report states that the Progressive Party was founded in the 
1930s, though its genesis can be traced to the influence of the Economic Union 
(Newcastle and Northumberland) (not to be confused with the Economic League), an 
organisation founded in 1923 “for the protection of ratepayers”, and perhaps even 
further back to the influence of the London Municipal Society, founded in  1894.398 
The Economic Union (Newcastle and Northumberland) sought to bring Liberals and 
Conservatives together and to elect persons “who would exclude party politics from 
local administration” in the face of Labour’s post-1918 surge in support.399 As a 
result, “Newcastle City Council no longer knows any party distinction in its 
membership, other than Labour on the one hand and Anti-Socialist on the other.”400 
Already in the early 1920s a ‘Business Group’ of anti-Labour councillors controlled 
 
William McKeag. This was not the only time that Embleton’s misuse of public resources in wartime 
came to public attention. 
396 Proceedings of Newcastle Council 18 June 1952 (pp154-161); 28 July 1952 (pp 258-280); 17 
December 1952 (pp 651-688) ; 7 January 1953 (pp 723-747); 4 March 1953 (pp 896-933) ; 6 January 
1954 (pp 698-709); 3 February 1954 (pp 780-784); 16 June 1954 (pp74-78);1 September 1954 (pp 
252-264; 274-285) 
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the council, although this was to dissolve in mid-decade.401 The Progressive Party 
was part of an interwar trend for the formation of local anti-Labour alliances 
characterised by names such as Progressive, Moderate, Citizens’, Municipal Alliance 
and Ratepayers.402 In the north east, Gateshead, Wallsend and Blyth all had Rent and 
Ratepayers’ Associations; Middlesbrough the Civic Association; South Shields, 
Ratepayers.403 
 
The Progressive Party existed solely in order to elect members to Newcastle City 
Council, but individual membership was encouraged, and by the 1950s the party had 
approximately 800 members. It was run by an executive committee of six 
councillors, six non-councillors, and four officers from either category, which would 
select candidates for its panel. Four district sub-committees would then select 
candidates on the panel for individual wards. According to a local Labour Party 
report, the Progressives’ ability “to maintain its position as a catch-all for Liberals 
and independents as well as Conservatives is probably largely due to careful, 
diplomatic handling of panel and candidate selection. The Progressive Party first of 
all avoids making enemies by very rarely rejecting anyone for the panel. Secondly… 
the selection committees usually check informally to make sure that the proposed 
candidates are at least reasonably acceptable to the Conservative constituency 
associations…” As an election machine, though, it barely existed: “Each candidate is 
left largely to fend for himself, though records of helpers and supporters are usually 
made available to them by the Constituency Conservative Association.”404 
 
 
401 Todd op cit p 96 
402 Gyford, Leach, et al op cit p 13 
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The Progressive alliance began to break down in 1951, when Leigh Criddle, a former 
Progressive councillor, retained his seat standing as a Conservative.405 In 1955 two 
Conservatives stood for Newcastle seats; by 1956 there were three Conservative 
councillors.406 In October 1956 the Newcastle Central Conservatives decided to 
support their own candidates in the six wards in that constituency, its agent, Norman 
Welch, describing the Progressive Party as “a nebulous body” from whom they were 
now divorced.407 Two years later the Northern Counties Area urged “effective and 
efficient support for all Conservative candidates in view of the tremendous 
importance of local government elections.”408 Finally, in November 1958 Newcastle 
Tories withdrew their support from Progressive candidates and formed a joint 
committee of the four constituency associations to select and assist ward candidates, 
a decision supposedly prompted by the Labour Party policy on comprehensive 
education in the city.409  
 
Like the Progressives, the Conservative Party in Newcastle was prone to 
factionalism and splits, particularly in its Newcastle North association, whose bitter 
infighting throughout the 1940s and early 1950s was chronicled by the local MP 
Cuthbert Headlam in his diaries.410 This, according to Headlam, was due initially to 
the arrogance of his predecessor as Newcastle North MP, Sir Nicholas Grattan-
Doyle, in attempting to install his son as Conservative candidate when he resigned in 
April 1940. A rebel Conservative Association proposed Headlam as their candidate, 
and he defeated Howard Grattan-Doyle at the subsequent by-election.411 The 
divisions exposed by this incident did not readily heal, and Headlam suspected 
Alderman William Temple (“…an unpleasant piece of work, and not a person in 
 
405 Evening Chronicle 11 May 1951  
406 Ibid 11 May 1955 p 21; 11 May 1956 p 9 
407 The Journal & North Mail 24 October 1956 p 5 
408 Ibid 2 June 1958 p 7 
409 Ibid 4 November 1958 p 3 
410 Sir Cuthbert Headlam (1876-1964) was Conservative MP for Barnard Castle (1924-1929, 1931-
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whom one can put much trust”), who was to be a senior postwar Progressive 
alderman, of stirring up trouble.412  
 
The Labour Group and City Labour Party 
Smith was initially unimpressed by his Labour colleagues: 
 
I remember going to the first group meeting. Strangely enough, my new 
colleagues were not discussing what they were going to do tomorrow; they 
were discussing what they should have done yesterday. I remember one very 
dear lady, Alderman Mrs Taylor, saying to me, ‘Well, Councillor Smith, if you 
take my advice you’ll serve an apprenticeship. You will listen and say little 
and then when you’ve got experience you’ll be able to take a more active part 
in council proceedings.’ I was quite flabbergasted… I thought, ‘Well good 
gracious, has this woman lived as long as this and not known all the things that 
I’ve been active for in the Labour movement?’413  
 
This first meeting saw Edward Short stand for election as Labour Group leader 
against the long-time leader, the “ageing” and (apparently) “complacent” James 
Clydesdale.414 Smith supported Short (a friend from pre-war days) but was surprised 
to find that  
 
politics played no part in choosing this candidate. There was no discussion on 
the political attitudes we would be pursuing in the coming year or about the 
policies we would be advocating in opposition. There was a noticeable attitude 
of arrogant ‘superiority’ displayed by those councillors who had already 
served… They believed that if you were in a council minority ‘you could not 
do much about it.’ Having always been in a very small political minority, I 
knew for certain just how foolish such a belief was.415 
 
 
412 Headlam quote of August 1944 in ibid p 30. Temple was behind an attempt to deselect Headlam in 
1949-50, and may have been involved in a similar attempt in 1945. 
413 Smith, T Dan op cit p 34 
414 Todd op cit p99. Alderman Clydesdale was the ‘grand old man’ of the local Labour Group. Blind 
from the age of eight, he had participated in the National League of the Blind marches of 1920 (which 
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the National Protest March: The National League of the Blind’s Marches to London, 1920 & 1936’, 
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Smith’s suspicions of many of his new colleagues were, he felt, reciprocated. “The 
combination of those who wanted to give me help and advice, and those who 
positively disliked me, made for a difficult situation.”416 The level of dislike felt for 
him by many in the Labour group – whether as an ex-ILPer, a suspected Trotskyist, 
or a brash upstart – was felt by the intuitive Ada Smith. Attending a municipal ‘do’, 
she “was all too aware of the…nervous animosity that was in the air. As soon as 
possible I made my escape and, in the safety of our home, I turned to Dan and said 
“Turn around… I’ll pull the knives out of your back. They hate you… I will never 
go there again.”417 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to make too much of Smith’s isolation at this period. He 
clearly had sufficient support within the Labour group to be elected deputy leader by 
1954.418 Short’s resignation of the group leadership to run for Parliament (he was 
elected MP for Newcastle Central in 1951) however had enabled the old guard led by 
Clydesdale to regain the group leadership by 1952; he was replaced in 1954 by 
another right-wing Labour councillor, Frank Russell, a former policeman.419 
 
After his election in 1950, Smith failed to be appointed to any of the major council 
committees and was consigned initially to the backwater of the Libraries 
Committee.420 Here he was able to see the effects of the council’s niggardly spending 
on culture: the recent Housing and Local Government Act allowed a 6d rate for 
encouraging cultural activities; in Newcastle a penny rate would produce £10,000; in 
1952 Newcastle council allocated £645 to cultural societies.421 At the same time, 
Smiths Decorators were bidding for library painting contracts, and his companies’ 
work for the council was to become a source of much whispering and rumour-
mongering about Smith over the years. Library Committee minutes indicate that 
Smith (who was in any case a member of the minority party on the council and in the 
committee) always left committee meetings when tenders involving his own firms 
 
416 Smith, T Dan, op cit p34 
417 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3913 Ada Smith memoir ‘Once more without feeling’ p 9 
418 Smith is described as deputy leader in Evening Chronicle, 6 May 1954 p18; following the 
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The Journal, 25 May 1954. 
420 TWAM MD.NC/133/9 Libraries Committee minutes 1949-1952 
421 Amber: TDS Unpublished Autobiography p60 
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came up; on one occasion, prior to withdrawing, he told the committee that Smith’s 
Decorators could not guarantee to complete the work in the specified time. The 
contract was given to another firm.422 A Conservative councillor was later to say 
“Dan would always declare his interest whenever he was tendering. People on the 
Tory side were doing it too. Dan painted a lot of council houses. It was fair. 
Whoever submitted the best tender got the job.”423 
 
In line with efforts by many Labour groups to make meetings more accessible to 
working people, Smith for the first time in 1953 attempted to change Library 
Committee meeting times from 3pm to 6.30pm; and he was successful in securing 
the abolition of a sub-committee of Painting and Furnishings, having “expressed his 
concern at the increasing tendencies of committees… dealing with what he 
considered to be matters of routine administration.”424 
 
Work more to Smith’s taste and ambition came in 1952 with his appointment to the 
city’s Health Committee.425 This committee shared responsibility for slum clearance 
in the city with the Housing and Housing Management committees, and Smith was 
member of a ‘Joint Committee as to Slum Clearance.’426 He was also appointed to 
the Insanitary Property, the Smokeless Zones and the Public Abattoir sub-
committees.427 The aim may have been to keep Smith out of the way – he believed 
so – but the experiences of these committees gave him the material to make a name 
for himself campaigning on housing and environmental issues. On committee, as in 
Council, he railed at the Progressives’ slum clearance policies and the work of the 
Housing Committee chairman, William Kirkup, who outside the Town Hall acted as 
accountant for Dan Smith’s growing list of decorating companies. In December 1953 
he proposed an amendment to the Medical Officer of Health’s report, to read “That 
this Council… recognizes that the work of the Health Committee has been hindered 
 
422 TWAM MD.NC/133/10 Libraries Committee minutes 1953-55, meeting of 18 July 1952. Minutes 
of other committees likewise record Smith’s withdrawal when contracts for which he had tendered 
were discussed 
423 Northern Echo, 9 July 1971, quoting Ian Bransom. 
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by the past failure of the Housing Committee to build the number and type of houses 
considered necessary to solve the basic problem of bad housing in the City, creating 
conditions which are not conducive to good health.”428 This was defeated, but Smith 
was able to gain some victories: instigating proceedings against the North Eastern 
Electricity Board over air pollution caused for west Newcastle by the Dunston power 
station in Blaydon; having a timetable for the demolition of insanitary property 
drawn up and consultation instigated with the Housing Management Committee over 
rehousing the people affected; the vetinary officer to report on present and future 
slaughtering facilities.429 By 1955 he was urging that the demolition programme 
timetable be publicised.430 In 1958, in a move again prefiguring the policy to be 
adopted when Labour came to power, he suggested the provision of improvement 
grants for houses with a guaranteed life of ten to fifteen years or more.431 
 
The City Labour Party 
An important new ally of Dan Smith was the Newcastle City Labour Party secretary, 
Joe Eagles, appointed in 1951.432 Smith had a good impression of Eagles, who was 
“a rare fellow because he had vision and organisational ability… I always admired 
him because I felt he was a man of principle.”433 Eagles was able to encourage Smith 
when, during long years in opposition, he felt frustrated by events. “If it had not been 
for him continually cranking me up, I would not have had the guts to battle through 
the council and through my own group, because it is no secret that I was not only 
being shot at from the front, but from the back as well.”434  
 
The two men were to work closely on developing and executing policies for the 
Labour Party in the city, particularly after Smith was elected Chairman of the City 
Party, which, he recalled, took place in 1953.435 The City Party had previously not 
 
428 Ibid, meeting of 14 December 1953 
429 Ibid, meetings of 11 January 1954, 10 May 1954, 12 July 1954 
430 TWAM MD.NC/98/32 Health Committee minutes 1954-1956, meeting of 12 December 1955 
431 TWAM MD.NC/112 Joint Sub Committee as to Rehousing, meeting of 10 January 1958 
432 TWAM Acc 608 Box 1268. Edward Joseph Eagles had been LP organiser in Workington since 
1948. He was appointed secretary of the Newcastle City LP as of 1 January 1951 
433 Smith, T Dan op cit p 33 
434 Ibid p 35 
435 Ibid p 36; he states that he served for three years. Whether his period as chairman actually did last 
from 1953 to 1956 is uncertain as Smith’s published and unpublished recollections tend not to be 
fully accurate as to dates. For example, on p 33 of An Autobiography Smith claims that his election to 
the council in 1950 coincided with Labour’s loss of control when that defeat in fact took place in 
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been seen as particularly important in municipal affairs, as Jack Johnston was to 
recall: “The city party representing… the four constituencies used to plough on its 
own track and the group used to go in its own track, and often the group used to take 
decisions that the city party was not very keen about; but we had managed… to get 
the City Labour Party to control the group or to try and control the group…”436 This 
initial insignificance of the City Party was similar, perhaps, to the situation in 
Nottingham, where it exercised a “perfunctory authority” and shared a right-wing 
political stance with the Labour group.437 In Newcastle, though, control of the City 
Party was to become a political weapon. Influence over the City Party was important 
not least because its executive committee controlled the municipal panel, the 
approved list of Labour candidates for council from which individual ward parties 
would make their selections. Smith and his allies in the City Party sought to 
rejuvenate the local Labour group as a preliminary to regaining power, and the 
process of doing so was as likely to lose as to win him friends: “I... was almost hated 
because I knocked people from… getting on to the panel, the Collins and people like 
that couldn’t get on the panel in my time. I was looking for people who showed … 
ability…”438  
 
The ill-feeling seems to have reached a climax with the resignation of Councillor 
Mary Shaw from the City Party executive committee in March 1956, telling Eagles 
that “I no longer find myself willing to serve under the Chairmanship of Coun. 
Smith. I view with distaste many of his actions and do not feel that I can give of my 
best to help my party under his Chairmanship.”439 She had earlier written to Smith: 
 
... I can no longer continue to serve under… a man for whom I have such a 
feeling of disgust and loathing. No one was more pleased than myself to 
welcome you into our ranks even though many members warned me of your 
history (the apprentices strikes etc) and I put everything aside and honoured 
 
1949. Similarly, in his recollections he refers often to becoming Labour group leader in 1960, rather 
than the correct date of 1959; and occasionally of resigning the group (and council) leadership in 1964 
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Party in the Evening Chronicle 11 May 1954 p3 and The Journal of 25 May 1954. 
436 Amber Transcript of interview with Jack Johnston 
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439 TWAM Acc 608 Box 1269 
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and respected you. But from the first year I have watched you hound, witch 
hunt and get rid of decent people who helped to make my party great, and 
under your leadership a man was killed twelve months before he died…I  
should, I suppose, feeling as I do that you are destroying my party, stay and 
fight you but I am so filled with disgust and disappointment that I can find no 
enthusiasm to be ever in your company.440 
 
Under threat of deselection, Ward was induced to apologise for her accusations.441 
 
Not all took deselection well. Some complained to Transport House; Byker 
councillor Wesley Oliver, on being informed of his removal from the panel, 
immediately resigned from the Labour Party and went on to stand against it as an 
independent.442 Oliver had supported Russell for Group leader after Edward Short’s 
resignation.443 Issues of undemocratic practices were also raised. In 1954 Frank 
Verbeek, a long-standing Labour activist, threatened to resign from the party 
claiming that Jack Johnston, the former ILPer expelled with Smith in 1945 and now 
vice-chairman of the City LP, had miscounted a vote on a resolution and repeatedly 
refused a recount, and had allowed an ineligible delegate to cast a vote.444 
 
This is not to suggest that Newcastle Labour Party was exceptionally fractious. Such 
arguments are a staple of local political life, and arise as much from personalities, 
ethnicity, religion or parochialism as from points of ideology or principle. However, 
a theme of Labour Party history in the mid twentieth century is conflict between ‘Old 
Guard’ members and councillors, and ‘Young Turks’. This is described by Gyford in 
terms of the situation following the major municipal losses suffered by Labour in 
1967-68 and subsequently the local government reorganisation of 1974-75, opening 
 
440 Ibid, Mary Shaw to TDS, 21 January 1956. The meaning of the reference to ‘a man killed twelve 
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442 Ibid. A L Williams, Labour Party National Agent to Joe Eagles 30 October 1953 wrote of two 
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local parties to younger, more radical members concerned with the environment, 
open government and a “more managerial approach to local decision making”; but it 
would seem appropriate to see Newcastle’s 1950s experience in the same light, with 
new party members attempting to reinvigorate and politicise a staid and conservative 
group.445 
 
Smith’s attempts to create a cadre of energetic and forward-thinking councillors and 
candidates saw a number of his former left-wing comrades join the council. Jack 
Johnston was elected as a Labour councillor at a by-election in December 1954, Ken 
Sketheway, of the ILP and RCP, was returned at the May 1957 municipal 
elections.446 Another keen supporter was the AEU convenor at Vickers’ armaments 
factory (the major employer in west Newcastle), Roy Hadwin, elected in May 
1954.447 They formed the core of what has been described as Smith’s ‘Praetorian 
Guard’.448 More influential, perhaps, and destined to leave local politics for 
Westminster, was Ted Fletcher, a former fighter with the ILP contingent in the 
Spanish Civil War and subsequently organiser for the ILP’s Midlands Division. 
Smith claimed to have identified a job for Fletcher, who in 1949 was appointed 
North East Area Organiser for the CAWU as well as becoming a member of the 
Newcastle General Branch. He was elected to the city council in 1952 and served 
until 1964, when he was elected MP for Darlington.449 
 
This was almost certainly not a consciously entrist tactic. Of the ‘Praetorian Guard’ 
only Sketheway remained an avowed Trotskyist.450 Smith had abandoned Trotskyist 
revolutionary politics; Johnston never joined the RCP after his expulsion from the 
ILP; Hadwin was never in the RCP. Nor did they work together as a clique: “…we 
did not work… consciously as a group; it was not necessary. If an issue came up and 
 
445 Gyford, J, The Politics of Local Socialism (London 1985) pp 25-28 
446 Proceedings of Newcastle Council 1954-55 List of the Council, 1961-62 List of the Council 
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TDS Archive disk 14B, Smith states his CAWU contacts got Fletcher the job. “Ted was a very good 
politician, excellent, first class material. He degenerated, by the time he went to Parliament he was not 
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it was my branch meeting I would see a resolution got through to the City Labour 
Party and… I could be sure of somebody seconding, not necessarily Dan or 
somebody like that [but] some other people were sympathetic…”451 Ken Sketheway 
recalled the activity in these years as a continuation of their wartime association: it 
“renewed the collective activities which we had had in the past; in other words we 
more or less came together again in a different situation… It was only informal in 
the sense that we were all members of the general management committee of the 
City Labour Party and in most cases… of the executive committee… there wasn’t 
any real need for discussion outside of that… We had been associated with each 
other for such a comparatively lengthy period that virtually we instinctively knew 
each other and what to do, why to do it and how to do it.”452 
 
“Smith was the architect, he had the ideas, he was a natural leader” recalled Roy 
Hadwin. “He just gave you that feeling that you should do something, that his ideas 
were right, and he made you conjure up… ideas. It made your brain work, you know, 
he forced it on you, and I believe in collective leadership, well Dan had the knack of 
giving you collective leadership but still being the leader…”453 
 
But Smith’s support came from more than just a coterie of 1940s comrades. Other 
councillors and party members became trusted associates, including Nobby Bell, 
John Huddart, Ann Wynne-Jones, Peggy Murray and Doris Starkey, “a very good 
politically conscious group of people, many of whom had a good sound traditional 
socialist approach.”454 Other important figures on the City Party executive included 
Rowland Scott-Batey from the left-wing Newcastle North CLP, who chaired the City 
Party before Smith and afterwards; Gladys Robson, “a veteran of the women’s 
suffrage movement and pre-war trade union activism” and Peggy Murray, “an old 
thirties left-winger.”455 
 
As propaganda activity, the City Party continued to hold Sunday evening soap box 
meetings in the Bigg Market; it relaunched the May Day celebrations as a large 
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march and rally, and published its own newspaper, the Northern Star between 1951 
and 1954. Described by John Charlton as a “Bevanite monthly newspaper”, it 
“featured discussion round nationalisation, NATO, Test Ban Treaties and German 
re-armament.”456 
 
Policies for the election manifesto required the endorsement of the City Party, and 
following acceptance, would be discussed at branch meetings when delegates to the 
City Party reported back to ward parties and other institutions. Falling attendances at 
branch meetings didn’t worry Smith: “Even though attendances were dropping, an 
important group of citizens knew what you were aiming to achieve.”457 Smith 
claimed that wards were encouraged to make policy suggestions: “such ideas were 
always welcomed and if they had merit, were adopted.”458 The City Labour Party 
executive created policy working groups on “every activity in the political spectrum” 
including issues such as German re-armament. But Smith insisted on a disciplined 
approach to discussion: “…as Chairman I insisted on written submissions from 
groups or individuals on any subject or aspect of a subject. This prevented ‘off the 
cuff’ time wasting.”459 Draft policies were widely circulated, recipients including 
staff at King’s College and local further education institutions, “much to the 
annoyance of many other Labour Party members”.460 The working groups addressed 
numerous issues which were to become council policy after Labour secured control 
in 1958; for example, in 1956 Jessie Scott-Batey and Gladys Robson visited 
Coventry to examine its comprehensive schools with a view to reforming secondary 
education in Newcastle.461 
Smith’s energy in pushing the housing question in committee and in council led to 
the City Labour Party publishing a manifesto concentrating entirely on housing in 
advance of the critical 1955 municipal elections, where Labour needed to win just 
one council seat to gain control. Peril in a City! subtitled The Appalling Story of 
Newcastle’s Housing Tragedy – and Labour’s Solution was a sixteen-page brochure 
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describing the problems of housing and land shortages in Newcastle and pledging a 
more energetic programme of replacement, including the construction of high-rise 
flats and the building of a new satellite town. Copious tables and statistics 
accompanied the programme. It was, perhaps, too detailed, the message being 
diluted rather than enhanced by the mass of material; and Labour failed to win the 
one seat it needed.462 
 
Smith’s ambitions grew: “I had a deepening conviction, shared with Joe Eagles… 
who I greatly respected for his ability and vision, that, by concentrating on local and 
regional policies, we could carry through Newcastle City Council given the political 
power, the changing of the face of democratic representative Government in Britain 
and far abroad.” 463 By the time of the 1958 election, “… we had a group of highly 
active and competent councillors and candidates who had already absorbed the kind 
of spirit which had been injected into our municipal and political work.” 464 
 
However, relations between the City Labour Party and the Labour group on the 
council remained strained, as the group, according to Smith, “still saw itself as a law 
unto itself and above the decisions of the City Party whose interference it resented. I 
saw this attitude of theirs as being undemocratic and believed that the role of the 
Council Group was to direct the professional council officers towards implementing 
seriously considered party policies. In this way I could see a live democracy at 
work.”465 Relations between city party and group in Newcastle were echoing the 
conflicts in the national Labour Party between National Conference and the NEC on 
the one hand, and the Parliamentary Labour Party on the other, over who should 
ultimately determine policy.466 The role of city parties was one of the aspects of the 
party’s administration considered by the ‘Sub Committee on Party Organisation’ 
chaired by Harold Wilson, whose report (which famously described the party as 
being “at the penny-farthing stage in a jet-propelled era”) expressed itself extremely 
disturbed at the state of city parties, where over-centralisation associated with 
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council activities was “inimical to good constituency organisation.” The extreme 
case was Leicester, where “for all practical purposes there are virtually no 
constituency parties in being”, and the committee believed that Preston South would 
have been held at the 1955 general election and Preston North gained “if we had had 
an active CLP organisation there instead of a costly and top-heavy Borough Party.” 
Such overt preference for parliamentary over municipal success may not have 
seemed particularly relevant in Newcastle, where in 1955 the city council had been 
finely poised between Labour and the Progressive Party whereas two, possibly three 
of the four parliamentary seats could be considered safe for Labour (and Newcastle 
North a safe Tory seat, so long as the party could be relied upon to run only one 
candidate).467 
 
City parties were also blamed for bleeding CLPs of funds, several parties failing to 
share any affiliation fees with the CLPs under their umbrella (here the Newcastle 
City Labour Party set a shining example, its apportioning of 50% of its affiliation 
revenues to the four Newcastle CLPs being the most generous of any city party 
examined). The report concluded that “In general (Birmingham being the one 
exception) the stress on the parties has led to a progressive withering-away of the 
CLPs. In general our efficiency as a machine for fighting parliamentary elections is 
sacrificed to municipal electoral considerations. Moreover, the concern of City 
Parties with the day-to-day work of Council Groups can lead to as much harm as 
good, as in Liverpool.” It recommended that city parties be reorganised on a federal 
basis, with resources provided by the CLPs, although the report, hailed by Richard 
Crossman as “a really sensational document” and by Attlee as “Absolutely first rate” 
was to remain according to Ben Pimlott “a monument to what should have 
happened, rather than what did.”468  
 
467 Labour had expressed high hopes of capturing Newcastle City Council at the May 1955 poll, by 
which time the Labour Party had one councillor more than the Progressives, and needed just one seat 
gained to dominate the impending aldermanic elections and gain control. However, they lost two seats 
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known whether or not the constitution of the Newcastle City Labour Party was revised on the lines 
suggested. The city party itself was wound up in 1975: TWAM Acc 608, Letter, Doris Starkey to 
members, Executive Committee 12 December 1975 re meeting to be held on 18 December 1975, 
“The only item of business is the winding up of the City Party.” 
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The Liverpool reference could as easily have read ‘Newcastle.’ In June 1954 the City 
Party, after considering a motion to recommend withdrawal of the whip, censured 
the recently-elected Labour Group leader, Cllr Frank Russell, and his predecessor, 
Alderman Clydesdale “for speaking against and failing to vote for, the policy of the 
group in the City Council.”469 Russell and Clydesdale had failed to support Labour 
policy on demands for an inquiry into the Longbenton housing estate allegations 
described above, and despite the controversy following the council meeting on 5 
May, Frank Russell was elected leader later that month and Dan Smith replaced as 
deputy leader by Bennie Russell.470 
 
Ward organisation in the city was weak. A 1954 report found that while “all wards 
and sections are functioning… ward meetings are still poorly attended, and consist in 
the main of women members, who seem to prefer a cup of tea and a chat with each 
other, and consequently emphasis is on the social side. This has the unfortunate 
result of keeping the men away.”471 Was this the “dilapidated, almost atavistic 
character” which “permeated branch life on the 1950s left” identified by Lawrence 
Black, a party whose organisation “erred towards the improvised and decrepit”?472 
Individual membership of the City LP was rising in the early 1950s, from 2,614 in 
1951 to 3,592 in 1954, not inconsistent with national trends which saw Labour Party 
individual membership peak in 1952.473 
 
Smith’s papers contain barely any evidence for activity in his own council ward 
Labour Party at Walker. Of course, this is not evidence that he neglected such 
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activity, and he was chairman of the City Party’s organisation committee; but it can 
fairly be taken as an indication that he looked upon such work without any great 
enthusiasm. Membership in Walker ward suffered a slump in 1953 from 200 in 1952 
to 128, although this can partly be accounted for problems with recruiting collectors 
for membership dues; and perhaps also by the safety of the seat: Smith was returned 
unopposed in 1953.474 Understandably, attention was focussed on wards perceived as 
marginal, with the Organisation Committee, chaired by Smith, in one report urging 
strengthening of the ward organisation in the partly middle-class Walkergate and 
Kenton wards; and in 1953 instructing the party organisers to concentrate their 
activity on Elswick, Westgate and St Nicholas wards.475 
Bevanite but anti-Bevan? 
For much of the 1950s Dan Smith and the City Labour Party appeared to follow a 
left-wing policy which could broadly be described as Bevanite. MPs and other 
invited speakers were largely from the left of the Labour Party: in 1952-53 these 
included Tom Driberg, Ellis Smith, Ian Mikardo, Michael Foot, Fred Mulley, Dick 
Crossman, Barbara Castle, Fenner Brockway, Pat Barclay as well as the Guyanese 
leader Cheddi Jagan and the South African trades unionist Solly Sache.476 
 
Consistent with Radhika Desai’s view that “the Bevanite lack of concrete proposals 
for domestic reform was matched by its emphasis on questions of foreign policy”, 
the Newcastle party campaigned actively on overseas issues – protesting against a 
visit by the Japanese Crown Prince Akihito to Newcastle in 1953, and against 
German rearmament, including passing a resolution critical of Clement Attlee’s 1954 
party political broadcast on the issue.477 On the rearmament issue, the party was not 
above resorting to apocalyptic scaremongering on its leaflets: “Twelve divisions will 
soon become sixty or more… Atomic artillery will become part of their equipment… 
The SS men will drop the pretence of being democratic once they are armed… 
German rearmament is the road to World War III” and concluding with a chilling 
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“They are out for revenge”478 Following the British government dispatching troops 
to British Guiana in 1953, the City Party protested at this action, although, under 
pressure from the Labour Party to deny a shared platform to Cheddi Jagan of the 
(Guyanese) People’s Progressive Party, it withdrew its joint sponsorship of a public 
meeting which was subsequently run by the Congress of Peoples Against 
Imperialism alone (in practice, leading to Smith wearing one organisational hat 
rather than two).479    
 
In 1955 Smith addressed the Labour Party Conference in Margate in support of a 
resolution urging the abolition of national service and pointing out some of the 
absurdities of the practice: “A boilermaker is called up and serves two years, and if a 
war breaks out he is not called up. Can anyone imagine anything more insane, more 
ridiculous than that? The same thing applied to other important industries.”480  
 
There is no evidence for any formal Bevanite organisation in Newcastle – if any 
were needed. Mark Jenkins argues against what he describes as “the popularly held 
prejudice of Bevanism as a poorly organised, ‘academic’ movement”, suggesting 
instead that tight organisation “is neither necessarily desirable from the point of view 
of programmatic clarification, nor is it a guarantee of political success”, and that 
Bevanism should not be abstracted from the organisations “of which it was an 
integral part”, the Labour Party and trade unions.481 For Jenkins, “[t]he Bevanites 
were organised – too well organised some thought” although “never a party: it was 
an organised current within a party.”482 He poses the question “how did the 
Bevanites achieve so much with such economy [of] organisation?”, finding the 
answer in the use of existing party machinery by “a mass current rooted in the ready-
organised party mass”483 This mass party basis was able to flourish while the 
parliamentary Bevanite group disintegrated, in the form of “increased Brains Trust 
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activity in 1953 followed by a drive into the unions in… 1954.”484 The Brains Trusts 
were organised by Tribune on the model of the popular radio show, and involved 
teams of Bevanite MPs and allied luminaries performing for audiences throughout 
the country, eventually covering most constituencies. One in Newcastle on 22 
February 1953 included John Baird, Harold Davies, Michael Foot, Ian Mikardo and 
Lord Faringdon; another on 24 January 1958 comprised Ian Mikardo, Harold Davies, 
Hugh Delargy, Sir Leslie Plummer “with Ted Short”.485 The argument that such 
events, few and far between (even if the author, or Tribune, missed out any), 
constitute “mass work and propaganda [flourishing] as never before”, and indeed 
Jenkins’ overall thesis about the definable organised ‘mass current’ is open to 
debate.486 Campbell takes a more sceptical view, citing the sometimes hyperbolic 
reactions of Bevan’s adversaries and quoting Driberg’s view that, far from being a 
‘party within a party’ the Bevanites were ‘The Smoking Room within the Smoking 
Room.’ Far from being a sophisticated organisation, argues Campbell, “the 
Bevanites were in reality still not much more than a group of congenial friends … all 
good talkers and heavy drinkers who enjoyed one another’s company” without whips 
or plots.487 Nevertheless, Jim Griffiths, MP for Llanelli and a self-defined 
‘reconciler’ saw the Bevanite-Revisionist conflict extending beyond the 
Parliamentary Party: “These divisions were reflected in the constituency parties, and 
the activists in all the constituencies were disillusioned and disheartened by the 
endless wranglings; many of them gave up active participation in the work of the 
party.”488 Little of the recorded activity in Newcastle appears to have been concerned 
with domestic or economic affairs (even national service was primarily an issue of 
foreign and defence policy) 
 
Such left-wing organisation as took place in the Newcastle Labour Party occurred 
later, associated with the Victory for Socialism campaign. A VFS group was formed 
in June 1958, its convenor Ken Sketheway. Perhaps unsurprisingly, VFS, which had 
been revived by former Bevanites including Ian Mikardo, was largely taken over by 
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Trotskyists.489 Sketheway was also associated with a further body formed in 1959, 
the Tyneside Left Club, “a club on Tyneside where people of the left could meet and 
discuss the problems of the Socialist movement.”490 This formed around a nucleus of 
non-CP shop stewards from Vickers and Parsons, as well as Labour Party Young 
Socialists, and according to John Charlton “provided a new forum for committed 
Marxists who did not have to defend Washington or Moscow and were strongly 
interested in the idea of Workers’’ control.” It lasted for around two years.491 I have 
seen no evidence that Smith was associated with either. 
 
For all that he would describe himself as a left-winger, Smith’s view of Bevan was a 
jaundiced one. He had come to know Bevan during the 1940s – Bevan was a 
supporter of the Anti Labour Law Victims Defence Committee set up to support the 
four convicted Trotskyists in 1944 – and “became an admirer of his and this 
continued…into the post war period.”492 However, Smith’s later assessment of 
Bevan as a minister and afterwards was not flattering:  
 
Nye Bevan… never had any time for local government and didn’t understand 
the social problems…Nye Bevan hadn’t any idea of the housing 
[problems]… only a handful on the left of MPs did and they didn’t 
understand it organisationally…[W]hen Bevan set up the Health Service and 
took it out of local authority care, he not only destroyed a fundamental 
element of local democracy, but he took it away from other aspects of public 
health.493 
 
Smith also found himself in conflict with Bevan over housing policy, recalling an 
argument at a meeting at St Pancras Town Hall where Smith had claimed that the 
building professions were inadequate to cope with mass housing construction: “… it 
was a good speech and it was absolutely relevant although no-one took any notice 
including Nye Bevan who before that when he separated housing from health, this 
was the beginning of the degeneration of the health service…”494 
 
489 Mikardo, I, Back-Bencher (London 1988) p 109 
490 Tribune 13 June 1958, 27 November 1959 
491 Charlton, op cit p 19. By autumn 1961 the club “contained the core of what was to become the 
International Socialists.”  
492 Author’s collection: transcript of interview with TDS by Sam Bornstein (1985) p 11, with 
manuscript amendment by TDS 
493 TDS Archive disk 13B. Smith was to recall ‘haranguing’ Bevan at a Newcastle May Day meeting 
[TDS Archive Disk 14B] 
494 TDS Archive disk 20A 
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Science, managerialism and revisionism 
An appreciation of developments in science and technology and the influence of CP 
Snow’s concept of the ‘Two Cultures’ appears to have been a factor in Smith’s move 
away from conventional Marxist ideology. In 1985 he told Trotskyist historian Sam 
Bornstein that during his membership of the RCP he been interested in the impact of 
science on the labour movement, and he attributed this interest to the influence of a 
group of science writers including Maurice Goldsmith of Reynolds’ News, Ritchie 
Calder and other with whom he kept in contact. From these discussion he came to 
believe that what they told him about science,  computers, the splitting of the atom 
“makes obsolete the commanding heights of the economy, completely transforms the 
world. Here is the labour movement talking about nationalisation of the pits…”495 
 
In an autobiographical note Smith states he met the science writers Ritchie Calder 
and Maurice Goldsmith through his acquaintance with Douglas Machray, editor of 
the Daily Herald.496 On a different occasion he was to write that “Politically I 
developed an interest in science & technologies and the ‘Two Cultures’ which have 
guided me ever since and motivate me more so today. The potential of the computer 
& the splitting of the atom have never been assessed outside of their strategic war 
potential – their application to democracy and the social sciences are my constant 
challenge.”497 
 
 
495 Author’s collection: transcript of interview with TDS by Sam Bornstein (1985) p 12.  
496 Author’s collection: TDS autobiographical note drawn up for Ray Challinor. Machray was editor 
of the Daily Herald 1957-1960, though Smith’s acquaintance with him may predate that. The left-
wing writer H N Brailsford died in 1958. Peter Ritchie Calder (1906-1982) was a journalist, writer 
and academic who had founded the Association of British Science Writers in 1949. He became a Life 
Peer in 1966. See Williams, Trevor I, ‘Calder, Peter Ritchie, Baron Ritchie-Calder, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/30891 accessed 17 January 2020.  Maurice 
Goldsmith (1913-1997) was a social scientist and science writer and journalist, and founder of the 
Science of Science Foundation (later the Science Policy Foundation).  CP Snow was to describe him 
as “one of those characters, far too rare in any society, who act as a creative influence. Most people 
don’t know the innumerable things he has started all over the field of science, as a labour of love quite 
unrecognised by society” (The Times 8 March 1997). I began to gain an appreciation of Goldsmith’s 
importance to the development of Dan Smith’s thinking from material which came into my 
possession at a late stage of drafting this thesis. The relationship between the two men, and the effects 
this had on Smith’s thoughts and actions, would merit further study. 
497 Author’s collection: TDS autobiographical note drawn up for Diane Jamieson, Bloodaxe Books. 
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As well as losing faith in the transformative effects of nationalisation of ‘the 
commanding heights’, Smith began by the mid 1950s to have views on national 
prosperity not dissimilar to those that were to be advocated by Anthony Crosland. 
 
Around about 1955 I had also become aware again because of my contacts 
with [Maurice [Goldsmith] on] the science policy that we were by this time 
creating the wealth on such a scale that we no longer had a problem.498 Today 
with 135 billion pounds with 56 million people we don’t have a problem. 
Similarly we had in fact achieved by the mid-fifties the wherewithal to have a 
just, fair, socialist system. It became a matter of distribution, not the creation. 
There is no problem of creating wealth… I then argued and I still argue, that 
the application of the modern computer, the modern technology to the 
distribution of resources is an essential arm of Socialism. There can be no 
libertarian Socialism without the mastery of modern technology.499 
 
This belief in the sufficiency of wealth is key to Smith’s view of a future society and 
offers an explanation for his readiness, indeed willingness, to see a future city and 
region no longer tied to its traditional staple industries. His growing interest in 
science and technology fuelled a confidence, that was to reach a peak during his 
period as chairman of the Peterlee Development Corporation (Chapter 6 below), that 
a new society based on technological innovation was within reach. 
 
In interviews conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Smith refers on several 
occasions to the influence that James Burnham and his work The Managerial 
Revolution had on his thinking.  
 
There is no conflict in my mind that socialism is synonymous with the utmost 
effectiveness in management… [Burnham] argued that by superior 
management you could achieve objectives irrespective of the philosophy. He 
didn’t argue that but that was the logic of his argument… the debates within 
the movement were about this potential for management arising from the 
computer. Our vision of the computer… it was a scale of operative engineering 
that passed our comprehension… Those of us that thought we understood it 
therefore recognized the strength of the argument of Burnham and CA 
Smith…500 
 
 
498 The original transcript reads ‘…my contacts with Morrison the science policy…’. This makes little 
sense; whereas Maurice Goldsmith (who was to be founder of the Science of Science Foundation, 
later the Science Policy Foundation) was a major intellectual influence on Smith. I believe that 
‘Morrison’ is a misinterpretation by the transcriber of the words ‘Maurice on’. 
499 Author’s collection: transcript of interview with TDS by Sam Bornstein (1985) pp15-16 
500 TDS Archive disk 16A 
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And in another discussion: 
 
I would say what you’re talking about in the simplest terms is like Burnham’s 
Managerial Revolution, can you by introducing management techniques avoid 
the necessity of getting rid of capitalism, can you proceed by managerial 
methods to socialism, that’s what you’re saying really. Without going into it, 
Burnham’s Managerial Revolution, although it’s out of date, is that 
technique.501 
 
Burnham was an academic philosophy teacher and, from the early 1930s to 1940, a 
leading American Trotskyist.502 Having passed through a number of Trotskyist 
groups over six years, and having very recently formed a new group, the Workers’ 
Party, Burnham was to abruptly abandon both Trotskyism and Marxism in 1940, 
claiming that of the beliefs held by Marxists “there is virtually none of which I 
accept in its traditional form. I regard these beliefs as either false or obsolete or 
meaningless…”.503 In 1941 The Managerial Revolution was published, containing 
both a theoretical attack on the Marxist revolutionary thesis, and arguing that while 
capitalist society was moribund, there was no inevitability that it would be replaced 
by socialism.504 The disappearance of capitalist property rights was not in itself 
sufficient to bring about socialism; in Russia, where such rights were largely 
abolished, the trends “has been toward neither capitalism nor socialism, but towards 
managerial society, the type of society now in the process of replacing capitalist 
society on a world scale.”505 Instead, the world was in a state of transition from 
capitalist or bourgeois society to “a type of society which we shall call managerial” 
in which power would rest increasingly with a technocratic managerial elite.506 
Burnham’s ideas were not uniquely new – among other predecessors, in 1932 Berle 
 
501 TDS Archive disk 37B 
502 Le Blanc, P, ‘From Revolutionary Intellectual to Conservative Master-Thinker. The Anti-
Democratic Odyssey of James Burnham’, Left History (1995) pp51-53, 58-59. Beginning in the 
Young Communist League at New York University, Burnham was to break with ‘Stalinism’ and was 
a founder in 1934 of the American Workers’ Party. This merged with the Communist League of 
America, led by Max Schachtman and  James P Cannon, to create the Workers’ Party of the United 
States. The WPUS, after a brief sojourn within the Socialist Party, was re-established as the Socialist 
Workers’ Party in 1938. Burnham was a member of the SWP’s Political Committee. 1n 1939-40, 
following the Nazi-Soviet Pact and outbreak of the the Russo-Finnish War, Burnham and Schachtman 
began to argue that the Soviet Union was not a ‘degenerated Workers’’ state’ but a new type of 
society, ‘bureaucratic collectivism’, and the two split from the SWP to create the Workers’ Party. 
503 Ibid p59 
504 Burnham, J, The Managerial Revolution (Harmondsworth 1962) pp 46-47 
505 Ibid pp 54-55 
506 Ibid pp 73-142 
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and Means had drawn attention to the separation of functions between ownership and 
control of private companies; and Tomlinson traces the idea of a divorce between 
ownership and control to Das Kapital.507 Burnham was to argue against Berle and 
Means, somewhat casuistically, that “the concept of ‘the separation of ownership and 
control’ has no sociological or historical meaning. Ownership means control; if there 
is no control, then there is no ownership.”508 
 
It is highly unlikely that Smith would have openly expressed admiration for 
Burnham – even had he felt it - in the years immediately after the publication of The 
Managerial Revolution. The acceptable line for a Trotskyist would have been that 
laid down by his WIL and RCP colleague Ted Grant, who wrote of  “…the cowards 
and renegades from the labour movement, ex-‘Marxists’ such as James Burnham in 
the United States and CA Smith in Britain, and the whole tribe of petit bourgeois 
intellectuals and sceptics who have regarded the proletariat and the struggle for 
socialism with irony and scepticism. This short sighted professional rabble regarded 
the outward varnish of fascism as the development of a new form of society with a 
new ruling class, neither bourgeois nor proletarian!”509 The Labour left, too – or that 
part of it that read Tribune – had seen Burnham’s views excoriated by Austen Albu 
(“…many truths, half-truths and a spate of statements based on selected facts and 
unsupported by any references”) and later by George Orwell, who claimed that 
“Where Burnham and his followers are wrong is in trying to spread the idea that 
totalitarianism is unavoidable and that we must therefore do nothing to oppose it.”510 
 
507 Tomlinson, J, ‘The Labour Party and the Capitalist Firm, c.1950-1970, The Historical Journal vol 
47 no 3 (2004) p 690, citing Berle, A, & Means, G, The modern corporation and private property 
(New York 1932). Burnham also acknowledges the influence of Berle and Means in The Managerial 
Revolution pp 87-93. Le Blanc op cit p 65 lists Max Nomad and Selig Perlman as having similar ideas 
before Burnham published The Managerial Revolution, quotes a work by Nomad also naming 
Michael Bakunuin, and Waclaw Machajski, and quotes Burnham stating that elements in his thesis 
had been treated by Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, Berle & Means, “the romantic anarchist, 
Makhaisky, and the eccentric ex-Trotskyist Bruno Rizzi…” 
508 Burnham op cit p91 
509 Grant, T, ‘The Italian Revolution’ (1943) reproduced in www.revolutionaryhistory.co.uk 
510 Albu’s review in Tribune 14 August 1942 [ http://archive.tribunemagazine.co.uk/article/14th-
august-1942/12/the-power-of-the-executive-the-managerial accessed 11 August 2011]; Orwell’s essay 
in Tribune 14 January 1944 p 11. On 24 March 1944 Burnham responded that he had never said 
totalitarianism was unavoidable, merely probable.  Austen Albu - for all that he was unimpressed by 
The Managerial Revolution, was a keen managerialist, Deputy Director of the British Institute of 
Management and closely involved (with Ian Mikardo) in the Society of Socialist Managers and 
Technicians in the late 1940s (Anthony Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan. The politics of 
productivity and the marketing of management science (Manchester 1987) p 242). Mikardo worked as 
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As well as through his own reading of Burnham’s work, Smith was influenced by the 
former ILP chairman CA Smith.511 CA Smith too espoused Burnhamite 
managerialism from an early stage, writing in 1944: 
 
[T]he next age will not be one of either simple capitalism or old-fashioned 
Socialism or even Fascism, but one of economic totalitarianism ruled by a 
techno-bureaucracy. Developments from Britain to Germany and from USA to 
Russia confirm this thesis, which will soon be a commonplace to political 
theoreticians.... The Party seems unaware that in the age-long struggle for 
‘Bread and Freedom’ the emphasis (despite temporary appearances to the 
contrary) is shifting from bread to freedom. This necessitates a new ideology, 
new slogans, new policies – and, I think, new men.512 
 
Burnham’s prognostications on the course of the Second World War were to be 
overtaken by events, but his identification and typologising of a new managerial 
‘class’ was to be extremely influential in the following decades, not least upon the 
thinking of many in the Labour Party. One American author was to observe in 1950 
that “The thesis of Burnham’s Managerial Revolution seems to have been taken over 
by Labour spokesmen and Labour theoreticians, lock, stock and barrel.”513 Richard 
Crossman in 1950 noted that “We went on talking about economic power, and did 
 
a management consultant before and after his election to Parliament in 1945: Ian Mikardo, Back-
Bencher (London 1988) pp 49-57 et seq. 
511 Author’s collection: TDS autobiographical note drawn up for Ray Challinor: “Converging interests 
with Dr CA Smith supporting for a while (as I recall) Burnham’s ‘Managerial Revolution’. Dan Smith 
had formerly, in his early days in the ILP, been an outspoken critic of C A Smith, as outlined in the 
previous chapter. 
512 Working Class Movement Library, Between Ourselves [ILP Internal Bulletin] May 1944 pp 13-15 
‘Letter from CA Smith’, published on his resignation from the ILP. Smith had resigned the 
Chairmanship of the ILP at the 1941 Easter Conference, before the publication of The Managerial 
Revolution – to which his 1944 article clearly refers - in Great Britain (1942; though it was published 
in the United States in 1941). C.A. Smith was to defend Burnham against attack in the columns of 
Left magazine; and Dr Ray Challinor commented that “Dr C A Smith’s move to the right, in several 
respects, resembled James Burnham’s…Both began their political journey as a response to the Russo-
Finnish war, regarded Russia as a growing menace, and had an overall perspective on how the world 
was developing - Burnham believing it was growing into a managerial society, Smith believing there 
was a danger state capitalism might reign supreme. Definitely, Smith was greatly influenced by 
Burnham…” (Challinor, R, ‘Charles Arthur Smith (1896-1985), Thinker and Writer’, North East 
Labour History vol 27 (1993) pp 41-47). C.A. Smith joined Common Wealth in 1944 after his 
resignation from the ILP and succeeded Sir Richard Acland as chairman in 1945. Thereafter, as the 
Cold War grew in intensity, he adopted an increasingly hard-line anti-Communist and right-wing 
stance. 
513 Carew, A, Labour under the Marshall Plan. The politics of productivity and the marketing of 
management science (Manchester 1987) pp 242, 274 note 42, quoting Brady, R A, Crisis in Britain 
(Cambridge 195) p 563; Tomlinson, J, ‘The Labour Party and the Capitalist Firm, c.1950-1970, The 
Historical Journal vol 47 no 3 (2004) p 691 
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not notice, until Burnham wrote about it, the growth of managerial society, the 
separation of ownership from individual power, and, equally, the growth of a state 
apparatus which has a power of its own.”514 
 
The seduction of Labour intellectuals was to gather pace in the early 1950s. James 
Burnham was one of the early influences on the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an 
organisation for anti-Communist intellectuals covertly funded by the CIA. While 
Burnham was to “drift away” from the CCF, disillusioned by its preference for 
employing ‘non-communist left’ rather than right-wing thinkers to lead its anti-
Soviet efforts, the organisation itself was subsequently to draw on the enthusiastic 
participation of leading Labour Party revisionists, including Hugh Gaitskell, Denis 
Healey, Roy Jenkins and Anthony Crosland.515 Crosland was “the Congress’s most 
active collaborator within this group [of revisionists]… [who] from about 1953 on… 
performed a number of tasks on behalf of the CCF” , and, suggests Wilford, was 
influenced in his writing of The Future of Socialism by the ideas of Daniel Bell and 
other American intellectuals present at the ‘Future of Freedom’ conference in Milan 
in 1955, which he had helped to plan.516 One key argument which emerged from the 
CCF deliberations was that of the end of ideology. According to Radhika Desai: 
“Political issues in western democracies in the post-war, welfarist, Keynesian, 
affluent era were now largely technical ones which would be resolved by experts and 
intellectuals in progressive directions without the need for mass participation, or any 
political polarisation of opinion, around them” and this belief “encouraged a cult of 
‘expertise’ which was also not unpalatable to the revisionists.” 517  
 
 
514 Tomlinson, J, ‘The Labour Party and the Capitalist Firm, c.1950-1970, The Historical Journal vol 
47 no 3 (2004) p 691 quoting Crossman, R H S, Socialist values in a changing civilization, Fabian 
tract 286 (London 1950) p 8. 
515 Wilford, H, ‘’Unwitting Assets?’: British Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom’, 
Twentieth Century British History vol 11 no 1 (2000) pp 45-46, 49-51 
516 Ibid pp 50-51. “… Bell also speculated that the managerial revolution might be challenged by the 
substitution of some real thought about the labour process for the fashionable human relations values 
of the age – in effect reopening the study of the technology of work and challenging the accepted 
notion of ‘efficiency’. But, of course, in an age of Marshall Plan productivity campaigning there was 
never any question of efficiency yielding to wider social values: efficiency was exactly what the 
proponents of managerialism were preoccupied with. Indeed, the whole thrust of Bell’s writing was to 
show how an unquestioned acceptance of the ideal of efficiency underlay the technical and social 
organization of industry.” (Carew, A, Labour under the Marshall Plan. The politics of productivity 
and the marketing of management science (Manchester 1987) p 246) 
517 Desai op cit pp 82, 83. The End of Ideology was the title chosen by Daniel Bell for his 1960 book.  
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Crosland denounced the politics of The Managerial Revolution in his chapter in New 
Fabian Essays (1952), but did not effectively dispute Burnham’s points about 
ownership and control.518According to Crosland, Burnham’s arguments could be 
rebutted by (inter alia) examining his failed prophesies and that the ‘managers’ “are 
too much divided in their political loyalties to wish to carry out a managerial 
revolution… Burnham provided a brilliant (though often exaggerated analysis of the 
transfer of power within industry from the owning to the managing class. But this 
alone does not add up to the managerial state as he conceived it, and I do not believe 
in the advent of this state unless… capitalism fails to transform itself, or be 
transformed, and lurches instead into increasingly violent crises of the sort which 
Marx expected, but which Burnham’s managers might more profitably exploit.”519 
Crosland’s own formulation, ‘statism’, an amalgam of predominantly capitalist 
economy, socialistic welfare provision, and an expanded and expanding role for the 
state, appeared to him to be a more likely outcome.520 Nevertheless, his discussion of 
the “Inevitable Transformation of Capitalism” into “a quite different system” clearly 
owes much to Burnham, and his assertion that “decision-making and economic 
control have passed to the new class of (largely) non-owning managers. The 
propertied class has thus lost its traditional capitalist function – the exploitation with 
its own capital of the techniques of production – and as the function disappears, so 
the power slips away” reads like an extract from The Managerial Revolution.521 
 
While Crosland may have been attempting to distance himself from Burnham (who 
by the 1950s was reinventing himself as a McCarthyite and conservative thinker), 
the perspective of socialism that he was to develop in the years following the demise 
of the Attlee government certainly owed much to Burnham and his predecessors.522 
Like Burnham, Crosland did not come up with original concepts, but, in New Fabian 
Essays and much more so in The Future of Socialism (1956), produced brilliant 
syntheses of what became known as ‘revisionist’ ideology, influenced by the 
 
518 Tomlinson op cit  p 691 
519 Crosland, A, ‘The Transition from Capitalism’ in R H S Crossman, R H S, (ed) New Fabian 
Essays (London 1952) pp 48-49 
520 Ibid pp 38-45, 49; Jefferys, K, Anthony Crosland (London 1999) p 44 
521 Crosland (1952) op cit pp 34-38 
522 Le Blanc op cit pp75-76 
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writings of Eduard Bernstein and Evan Durbin among others.523  In The Future of 
Socialism, Crosland developed his ideas, arguing against the necessity for a Labour 
programme reliant upon extending nationalisation and stressing instead that the 
party, “since 1951, furiously searching for its lost soul” should look beyond the “old 
dreams”, many of which were “dead or realised”, and return to the “basic aspirations, 
the underlying moral values” of socialism.524 These he saw as rooted in a striving 
towards equality, to be brought about by improvements in educational opportunities, 
enhanced welfare provisions and redistributive taxation.525  
 
The attractions of revisionist ideology for Dan Smith might not be immediately 
apparent. While it would be unfair to say that they betrayed the influence of The 
Boltons rather more than of Bolton, some of the ideas expressed by Crosland do 
show a certain metropolitan bias: “… certainty and simplicity are gone; and 
everything has become complicated and ambiguous. Instead of glaring and 
conspicuous evils, squalor and injustice and distressed areas, we have to fuss about 
the balance of payments, and incentives, and higher productivity; and the socialist 
finds himself pinioned by a new and unforeseen reality.”526 Discussion of ‘new 
consumerism’ and the ‘affluent worker’ focussed on the south east, yet there was 
squalor enough in the slums of the Scotswood Road and Shieldfield, and in the 
blighted landscapes of the Great North Coalfield.527 The ‘distressed areas’ were not 
only in the very recent past but threatened to return to blight the immediate future of 
the north east as well.528  
 
However, for a man who had abandoned the dogmatic Marxist formulations of 
Trotskyism, the intellectual challenges posed by both Burnham and Crosland must 
 
523 Crosland (2006) pp24, 72-73; Nuttall, J, ‘’Psychological Socialist’; ‘Militant Moderate’: Evan 
Durbin and the Politics of Synthesis’, Labour History Review vol 68 no 2 (2003) pp 235-252.  
524 Crosland (2006) op cit pp 51, 73, 77 
525 Ibid; Jefferys (1999) op cit pp 57-59 
526 Crosland (2006) op cit p 73. Crosland lived in 19 The Boltons, a very well-heeled address in the 
Brompton area of London. 
527 Jefferys, K, Politics and the People. A History of British Democracy since 1918 (London 2007) p 
125 
528 Aneurin Bevan was to claim that only the rearmament programme had saved the north east from 
serious unemployment in the early 1950s. Labour Party, Report of the 51st Annual Conference, 1952 p 
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have been stimulating to Smith.529 The postwar period has been described as “the 
apogee of the role of the traditional intellectual, the manifestation of which in Britain 
was the influence on the British Labour Party, and through it on British society, of 
the ‘revisionists’.”530 Radhika Desai’s account of revisionist intellectuals in this 
period argues that neither the left wing of the Labour Party nor the ‘New Left’ that 
emerged after 1956 displayed any intellectual vitality. The ‘Labourism’ of the 
traditional trade-unionist right of the party was defined not by ideology or 
philosophy but a “set of impulses” among which “unintellectualism” loomed very 
large, while Bevanism, portrayed as the opposing current to Revisionism, provided a 
“particularly stunted” intellectual challenge, with few proposals for domestic reform 
and a concentration on foreign policy issues.531 Bevan himself decried the need for 
reassessment of socialism, and, as the Bevanites lost ground in the Parliamentary 
Labour Party “there was only a negligible intellectual challenge to the revisionist 
case.” 532 Martin Francis, however, argues that to describe The Future of Socialism 
as ‘right wing’ is simplistic, and that “many of its assumptions were shared by a 
range of opinion within the party, including ‘left wing’ figures such as Crossman.”533 
Crossman, indeed, was to describe Crosland’s proposals as “…far more 
revolutionary in their effects than an electoral promise to nationalise ICI and most of 
engineering… they are diabolically and cunningly left-wing…”534 
 
One can only surmise exactly which parts of the revisionist programme might have 
appealed to Smith. That it represented a rising intellectual tide and was imbued with 
a sense of modernity would have enthused him: his impatience with the timid and 
rearward-looking nature of the Newcastle Labour Group might indicate that, just as 
in 1940 he had embraced revolutionary socialism as a panacea. He was a reader of 
the revisionist house journal Socialist Commentary.535 The technocratic impulses of 
 
529 I have so far come across no references to The Future of Socialism in Smith’s archive papers, 
published writing or recorded interviews. Nevertheless I believe it inconceivable that he would not 
have been at the very least acquainted with the substance of Crosland’s arguments. 
530 Desai op cit, p27 
531 Ibid pp72, 99-102 
532 Jefferys, K, The Labour Party since 1945 (Basingstoke 1993) p 46. Jefferys describes the 
“Bevanite left” as “devoid of new thinking” (ibid.) 
533 Francis, M, ‘Mr Gaitskell’s Ganymede? Re-assessing Crosland’s The Future of Socialism’, 
Contemporary British History vol 11 no 2 (1997) p 61 
534 Ibid p 62. 
535 Personal papers of T Dan Smith in the author’s possession include a number of copies of Socialist 
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revisionism – as Desai commented, “modernisation rather than traditional socialism 
became central to their vision,” - were also increasingly compatible with Smith’s 
own views, as will be touched upon in later chapters.536 That Crosland’s programme 
assumed continued economic growth ad infinitum would fit comfortably with 
Smith’s belief, stated above, that “there is no problem of creating wealth.” 
 
Smith’s opinion of Hugh Gaitskell was coloured by a mixture of admiration and 
fundamental disagreement. “I was fighting with Gaitskell all the time on ninety-nine 
issues out of a hundred, apart from the inner city problem where we were absolutely 
line to line with him” he was to recall.537 Another interview Smith expressed 
something approaching identification with the Gaitskell camp: “…by the time I 
moved through the Gaitskell position, Gaitskell was on my side, on the home front… 
he knew that I knew that inside and therefore he was very concerned that we worked 
well together with his, Jenkins’ group… I was concerned because unlike Nye 
Bevan… Gaitskell had a deep urban understanding.”538 
 
He was in 1971 to write that: 
 
I believe the days of the 50s and 60s in Newcastle were an important phase in 
the development of socialism in practice, controlling both the bureaucracy and 
technocracy involved in urban planning… Ironically Hugh Gaitskell was the 
only leading member of the Party who saw the full significance of our 
attempts, even though he counted us among his opponents, alas Harold Wilson 
never did and still does not understand. This is because, changing society 
without revolution in an advanced capitalist society [requires] an 
understanding and control of an extremely complex system, even Karl Marx 
would boggle at it.539 
 
Revisionism was also seen as being pro-European, and in favour of membership of 
the European Economic Community, its stance being “a central element of 
[revisionist] outlook” according to Desai, in contrast to the opposition of much of the 
Labour Party, “the Left because of Britain’s links with the Commonwealth, the right 
because of the ‘special relationship’ with the United States.”540 This is a problematic 
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assertion given the opposition of Gaitskell to membership, expressed most 
histrionically in his “the end of a thousand years of history” Brighton Conference 
speech of 1962.541 Nevertheless, despite the opposition of Gaitskell and the cooler 
scepticism of Anthony Crosland, enthusiasm for membership of the EEC was most 
closely associated with the revisionist, social democratic wing of the Labour Party. It 
was an enthusiasm shared in full measure by Dan Smith; albeit that Smith was to 
claim his pro-Europeanism throughout represented his socialist internationalism: 
Of course [the Common Market] is a purely capitalist economic concept, and 
as such we have no control over the inevitable drift towards monopoly, which 
now takes over ‘nationalism’ and correctly argues, for incorrect reasons that 
‘nationalism’ is out of date.542 
 
The ‘correct’ reason, he now argued, was that the scale of problems and 
opportunities facing the world were such that nationalism was an inadequate 
solution:  
…capitalism has become so complicated and technology so much more 
complex than the human brain, that the scale of change exceeds the economic 
and human resources of any one country to progress society at an adequate 
pace. This is a qualitative and quantitative change which is a completely new 
phase in history.543 
 
This is a different (but not necessarily contradictory) argument to that Smith 
advances in his 1970 autobiography, where he claimed that it was the chance to 
rebuild a shattered Europe after 1945 that was a great (but lost) opportunity.544 
 
Smith was active on the North East Committee of the British Council of the 
European Movement in the mid and late 1960s, serving as joint chairman with the 
former Newcastle Conservative leader Brigadier Ian Bransom.545 
 
541 Haseler op cit pp227-236; Williams, P M, Hugh Gaitskell (Oxford 1982) pp 406-408 
542 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3861 TDS to Joe Eagles 30 August 1971 
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we supported the establishment of independent African states. In fact, not one of the separate African 
states can develop modern science or technology in any significant way. Therefore our simple 
objective, solely by the developments of technology, has doomed African nationalism to an economic 
backwardness which is incompatible with our socialist objectives.” He advocated that the African 
nations should be encouraged to form a continental federation. 
544 Smith, T Dan op cit p23 
545 TWAM DF/TDS boxes 3863, 3877, 3911, 3980 
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Perhaps most importantly, major aspects of Crosland’s programme were not wholly 
reliant upon actions taken by central government. In the postwar period, educational 
provision, from infant schooling to further and higher education, became an 
increasingly important duty of local government. The same applied to social welfare 
and housing policies, and, if councils were so minded, to arts and culture. The kind 
of ‘revisionism’ Crosland advocated offered ample opportunities for change at the 
local levels and as such would have appealed to Dan Smith and others like him. In a 
much-quoted passage at the conclusion of The Future of Socialism, Crosland calls 
for a change in social attitudes in Britain: 
…much could be done to make Britain a more colourful and civilised country 
to live in. We need not only higher exports and old-age pensions, but more 
open-air cafes, brighter and gayer streets at night, later closing-hours for public 
houses, more local repertory theatres, better and more hospitable hoteliers and 
restauranteurs, brighter and cleaner eating houses, more riverside cafes, more 
pleasure gardens on the Battersea model, more murals and pictures in public 
spaces, better designs for furniture and pottery and womens’ clothes, statues in 
the centre of new housing-estates, better-designed street-lamps and telephone 
kiosks, and so on ad infinitum.546 
 
As the next chapter will attempt to demonstrate, this list, alongside ‘harder’ issues 
such as education and welfare, encompasses many of the changes that Smith was to 
bring about (or seek to bring about) during his leadership of Newcastle City Council. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
546 Crosland (2006) pp 402-403 
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Chapter 4: Dan’s Castle: Newcastle 1958-1966 
 
Kings once ruled their kingdom from a castle. Today that king is a man 
called Smith, and his castle is a town called Newcastle.547 
 
Labour and housing 
 
 On 8 May 1958 the Labour Party regained control of Newcastle City Council after 
nine years in opposition, part of a national swing towards the party in that year’s 
municipal elections.548 At the annual meeting of the Labour Group, Smith was 
elected deputy leader – to his chagrin, jointly with Alderman Bill Lewcock, formerly 
Labour Party regional organiser.549 
 
Smith was elected chairman of the Housing Committee, and immediately began the 
programme prepared in opposition. “I saw myself… with a mandate to change the 
system. I began on day one to propose new policies for slum clearance, anti-eviction, 
old people, design and layout.”550 On appointment he went to see George Kenyon, 
the City Architect, ordering him to “tear up” the plans for the “appalling houses” 
being built at that time by the city.551 These included the huge estate at Longbenton 
(outside the city boundaries) as well as housing at North Kenton and slum clearance 
schemes along Scotswood Road. North Kenton was among the last ‘green field’ sites 
within the city that could be exploited, and was developed 1953-59. The estate was 
“singularly unimpressive to look at… untidy, windswept and drab… the groupings 
of buildings… convey a feeling of desolation.”552 The 1,910 dwellings were 
 
547 Opening words of Dan’s Castle (BBC Television 1965) 
548 Newcastle Journal 9 May 1958 p1. Labour won three seats, giving them a majority of one 
councillor over the Progressive Party and Conservative Party councillors. That enabled Labour to 
unseat six Progressive aldermen at the triennial aldermanic elections, securing their control of the 
council. 
549 Amber, TDS unpublished autobiography p61. Smith had also stood for group Leader. “The group 
wanted a particular person as Deputy Leader and decided, in order to get him, to elect two Deputy 
Leaders that year.” Lewcock was married to another prominent Newcastle politician, the redoubtable 
former suffragette Connie Lewcock. On Bill Lewcock, obituary in Report of the Fifty-Ninth Annual 
Conference of the Labour Party (1960) pp 52-53; on Connie Lewcock, Jones, E R, ‘Connie the Rebel: 
Connie Lewcock (1894-1980) in Bulletin of the NE Group for the Study of Labour History 15 (1981) 
pp 55-58 
550 Amber, TDS unpublished autobiography p 65 
551 Amber, TDS unpublished autobiography p 61 
552 Blowers, A T, ‘Council Housing. The Social Implications of Layout and Design in an Urban 
Fringe Estate’, Town Planning Review vol 41 no 1 (1970) pp 80-92 
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provided in two- and three storey houses and maisonettes and flats, as well as a large 
number of “incredibly ugly” five-storey point blocks which “dominate and depress 
the neighbourhoods in which they are found.”553 To make matters worse, older 
people were housed in ground floor flats in the multi-storey blocks, very often with 
young families directly above them and consequent problems of disturbance.554 
Worse still were the developments along Scotswood Road, including the Noble 
Street flats, which became a byword for poor design and conditions. The cramped, 
barrack-like blocks (which were opened under Smith’s chairmanship) provided him 
with a convenient stick to beat the Progressives and their housing record. These, 
rather than any of the housing schemes for which Dan Smith was responsible, were 
Newcastle’s Pruitt-Igoe, demolished to near-universal satisfaction after less than two 
decades of use.555 
 
His attempts to secure cross- departmental co-operation were welcomed by many 
officers, but also met resistance, and Kenyon in particular resented Smith’s forays 
into what he regarded as his own fiefdom.556 Nevertheless, Smith was able to secure 
an initial housing policy within three months, for discussion within the Group and 
Party, prepared, he recalled,  “because I had cut across the [housing] committee’s 
delegated powers and got support from the many officers who wanted to see good 
policies vigorously applied”, and through the hard work of Smith himself and, in 
particular, his fellow councillor Ken Sketheway.557 Smith believed the housing 
problem was acute as there had been no long-term assessment of need, relative to 
those on the housing list, living in rooms, in slums, in sound properties in slum areas, 
facing eviction, or homeless. Initial steps included rationalising the housing waiting 
list, to ensure that it was accurate and up to date, and, more controversially, to 
suspend rehousing of people on the list. A halt was placed on evictions of tenants 
unable to pay rent, and social measures introduced to deal with ‘problem families’ 
and vulnerable tenants.558 While the list had been suspended to allow for an 
accelerated slum clearance programme, everyone on the list was given a date when 
 
553 Ibid 
554 Ibid 
555 Evening Chronicle 15 August 1978 p9. Cllr Walter Wilson commented “This is one of the greatest 
days of my life. These flats were dreadful monstrosities.”  
556 Amber, TDS unpublished autobiography p 65 
557 Amber, TDS unpublished autobiography p 65;  
558 Amber, transcript of interview with TDS 
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they might expect to be rehoused, albeit that that might be several years in the 
future.559 This eased pressure of enquiries on the Housing Department – Smith 
claimed that enquiries fell from 27,000 per year to 9,000 after the first slum 
clearance programme was published.560 In addition, the extreme shortage of building 
land within the city boundaries led to a change in policy: from low- and medium-rise 
housing to the construction of tower blocks.561 
 
Smith told the Town Planning Institute in May 1960 “We have published our 
programme, and are working to a plan of which all the slum dwellers are aware, 
either through their elected representatives or by meetings held in the affected 
areas.”562 A meeting to inform clergy of all denominations was held in the Town 
Hall, and discussions were held with the local British Medical Association to enable 
doctors to plan for population movements. “Surely one of the most important human 
problems confronting the modern town or city is that of redeveloping slumland – it is 
not sufficient simply to re-house people; they must be taken into the confidence of 
the local authority and prepared for the problems they will face in their new 
environment.”563 
 
This involved massaging the public mood through a stream of publicity: exhibitions, 
publications, public meetings, encouraging those in under-occupied houses to move, 
and “generally getting people to accept that next year’s houses are better than this 
year’s and are worth paying more rent for.” 564 
 
Housing construction increased rapidly: in 1958, the local Labour Party claimed, 
only 880 dwellings were under construction by the council; by 1962 the figure was 
2,566; the aim was to complete 2,143 in 1962, 1,951 in 1963 and 2,182 in 1964, at 
which date the city would be rid of slums.565 
 
559 Amber, transcript of interview with TDS; Amber, transcript of interview with Ken Sketheway 
560 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3835 Paper given by TDS to RIBA Housing Conference, 3 April 1962 
561 The two factors did not necessarily go hand in hand: Birmingham, probably the most successful 
English city in expanding its boundaries in the twentieth century pre-1974 also had the largest number 
of tower blocks. 
562 Smith, T D, ‘Development Problems of a Regional Capital’, paper reads at 34th Spring Meeting of 
the Town Planning Institute, 26 May 1960 
563 Ibid 
564 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3835 Paper given by TDS to RIBA Housing Conference, 3 April 1962 
565 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3842 Draft Newcastle Labour Party election leaflet (1962) 
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Smith was to express his satisfaction at the outcome of his policies in verse: to 
celebrate the Cruddas Park housing development with a long poem entitled Ode to 
the Road: 
 
From Cruddas Park to Rye Hill 
We are determined, have the will 
These horrid slums we shall erase 
With surgeon’s knife and then replace566 
 
Operation Revitalise 
The housing programme was not restricted to a tabula rasa programme of demolition 
and rebuilding by the council. Other housing providers were encouraged: Smith 
addressed a meeting of local Quakers encouraging the Society of Friends to consider 
providing social housing.567 And an aspect of the programme in which he took great 
pride was ‘Operation Revitalise’, an initiative to restore housing in the Rye Hill area, 
west of the city centre, where houses built in the mid-nineteenth century for the local 
commercial middle class had degenerated to become houses in multiple occupation, 
with flats and rooms rented to some of the poorest in the city, increasingly including 
Commonwealth immigrants, and with multiple environmental, health and social 
problems, including crime and prostitution.568 The plan was to encourage owners to 
maintain their properties, to buy and demolish some properties to provide additional 
local amenities, and to use powers of compulsion to deal with recalcitrant owners. 
Smith told a Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) conference in April 1962 
that “[t]he twilight area can only be successfully dealt with if the methods used are 
seen to be fair to all with a limited number of rules. The Local Authority by taking 
over by compulsory purchase all the badly tenanted occupied houses that can be 
saved and modernized as part of an overall comprehensive plan for the area.” 569 
However, bad landlords, owner occupiers or bad tenants “whose presence in the 
vicinity is in fact like a cancer in the neighbourhood should not be tolerated. I 
believe that the Authority should have the power to impose upon whichever is the 
 
566 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3841 ‘Ode to the Road’ – the road being Scotswood Road. Only the opening 
four lines are quoted. 
567 I am grateful to Mrs Joan Robson for this information 
568 Davies op cit 
569 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3835 Paper given by TDS to RIBA Housing Conference, 3 April 1962.   
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culprit compulsory purchase powers in the general good.”570 These words, largely 
overlooked, bear a similarity to those of Wilfred Burns on slum clearance where 
Burns described slum-dwellers as “almost a separate race of people” and spoke of 
the “devastating effect” on communities adding that “…one might argue, this is a 
good thing when we are dealing with people who have no initiative or civic pride. 
The task, surely, is to break up such groupings even though the people seem to be 
satisfied with their miserable environment and seem to enjoy an extrovert social life 
in their own locality.”571 Burns’ words were widely taken to indicate an overarching 
contempt for the working class in Newcastle: they were intoned at the start and the 
conclusion of the Amber collective’s 1983 film Byker even though the Byker Wall 
housing project was carefully designed and and implemented in order to preserve the 
existing community as much as possible.572 Burns may have been referring only to 
the most socially and environmentally-challenged areas such as the Rye Hill-George 
Street area; nevertheless, his words epitomise a technocratic arrogance in housing 
redevelopment policies which may not be completely unjustified. 
 
‘Operation Revitalise’, however well-intentioned, proved to be a complete disaster, 
for reasons unforeseen at the time of its initiation but comprehensively documented 
by Jon Gower Davies in The Evangelistic Bureaucrat. The project was doomed by 
delays and by a failure to properly involve the local communities. Properties 
acquired by the council were bricked up in order to preserve the structures for 
renovation when circumstances allowed, but this policy led to a further decline in the 
environment (so-called ‘planning blight’). The moment for revitalisation never 
arrived, and eventually it was decided to raze the district and build from scratch.573 
 
Planning Newcastle 
Before considering the developments of the 1960s, it is important to locate these in 
both the wider historical context of planning and development in Newcastle, and in 
the context or national urban redevelopment practice since 1945. Since the planned 
 
570 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3835 Paper given by TDS to RIBA Housing Conference, 3 April 1962.  
571 Burns, W, New Towns for Old. The Technique of Urban Renewal (London 1963) pp 93-94 
572 Drage, Michael, ‘Byker: Surprising the Colleagues for 35 Years, a Social History of Ralph 
Erskine’s Arkitektkontor AB in Newcastle’ in Harwood, Elain and Powers, Alan (eds), Housing the 
Twentieth Century Nation: Twentieth Century Architecture 9 (London 2008) pp147-162 
573 Davies op cit 
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creation of a new town centre by the developer Richard Grainger in the 1830s, the 
further development of central Newcastle had taken place in piecemeal fashion, and 
its shortcomings were becoming manifest by the early twentieth century. Two key 
issues were the need for improved municipal buildings – the Town Hall, located on 
the Bigg Market, had long been perceived as inadequate for the city’s needs – and 
for improved north-south communications in the centre through a road parallel to 
Northumberland Street, a formerly residential thoroughfare which since the 1890s 
had become Newcastle’s prime shopping street. As early as 1906 the architect James 
Cackett had incorporated both wants in a plan presented to the Northern 
Architectural Association; in 1925 Cackett’s partner R Burns Dick drew up plans for 
the future development of the city culminating in a beaux-arts civic centre to be built 
on Exhibition Park.574 Neither scheme, with the exception of Cackett’s extended 
Market Street, was implemented. However, the new high level bridge envisaged by 
both men did come about in the form of the New Tyne Bridge. This had been under 
consideration since 1883 but only in the 1920s, when money from central 
government was made available for schemes to relieve unemployment, was action 
take. Parliamentary powers were obtained in 1924, and the new bridge officially 
opened on 10 October 1928.575 Although rapidly becoming an iconic image 
signifying Newcastle and Tyneside, and although fulfilling a genuine need for a new 
river crossing, the bridge was a disaster for Newcastle, precipitating traffic and 
planning problems that were to affect the city’s development to the present day. The 
site chosen was one of three proposed in 1922 by the North and South Tyneside Joint 
Town Planning Committee (a joint committee of Tyneside planning authorities), but 
the only one linking the centres of Gateshead and Newcastle.576 It served to pour 
increasing levels of motor traffic into the medieval and nineteenth-century streets of 
central Newcastle. Pilgrim Street and Northumberland Street, both medieval in 
 
574 Cackett, J T, Inaugural Address to the Northern Architectural Association, 22 November 1905 
(Newcastle upon Tyne 1906), Burns Dick, R, Suggested Plan for Future Development (Newcastle 
upon Tyne c.1925). Cackett’s plan envisaged a new high-level bridge linking Gateshead to Newcastle 
and two new streets relieving congestion on Northumberland Street; a new town hall would occupy 
the block formed by Market Street, Pilgrim Street, New Bridge Street and a new street. Burns Dick’s 
plan is not dissimilar to that of Cackett, but providing for many more new roads, some focusing on a 
semi-circus opposite the Central Station, and a civic centre on Exhibition Park, approached by a broad 
avenue from Barras Bridge. 
575 Manders, F, & Potts, R, Crossing the Tyne (Newcastle upon Tyne 2001) pp71-75 
576 Ibid p72. The other proposed bridge sites were at Scotswood, on the western edge of Newcastle, 
and between Bill Quay and Walker, east of the city. The report also posited a tunnel between North 
Shields and South Shields. 
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origin and the latter crowded with shoppers, formed part of the A1.577 There were no 
viable alternative routes north or south through the city, which by the late 1950s was 
choked by traffic congestion. 
 
As well as participating in the joint planning committee and, in 1936, reaching a 
decision to build a new civic centre at Barras Bridge, at the northern end of the city 
centre, the city council also secured the passing of the Newcastle-upon-Tyne 
Corporation Act 1926.578 According to Cherry & Penny this was “[t]he most 
ambitious” of the local acts obtained by “[a] few among the more energetic city 
corporations” enabling them to carry out town planning schemes in existing city 
centres.579 Nevertheless “the experiment was not a happy one” and barely anything 
was achieved in Newcastle between the wars.580 This may have been just as well, as 
proposals given serious consideration by the council in the 1930s included the 
opening of a new road through the late Georgian Eldon Square, and the extension of 
Market Street westwards, potentially involving the demolition of a large part of the 
indoor market designed by John Dobson.581 
 
The enthusiasm for replanning the city centre gathered pace during the war years. In 
February 1943 Cllr William Temple, chairman of the town planning sub-committee, 
promised the construction at Barras Bridge of “an academic and civic centre 
unrivalled throughout the country “, the “dignified, massive façade of the new Town 
Hall” facing the buildings of Kings College, with the Hancock Museum to the north 
overlooking “a grand open space, greater in area than Trafalgar Square in London, 
 
577 Designation of road numbers was one of the first actions of the Ministry of Transport, formed in 
1919: Hands, S, Road Signs (Princes Risborough 2002) pp7-8 
578 Faulkner, T E, ‘Conservation and Renewal in Newcastle upon Tyne’ in Faulkner, T E (ed), 
Northumbrian Panorama. Studies in the History and Culture of North East England (London 1996) p 
133 
579 Cherry, G & Penny, L, Holford: a study in architecture, planning and civic design (London 1986) 
p113, p273 notes 45 & 46.  
580 Ibid p 113. The council introduced measures to progressively widen city streets by imposing new 
building lines for redeveloped sites. A few fragments can be discerned today: buildings along the east 
side of Pilgrim Street between Worswick Street and New Bridge Street, and Powdene House at the 
corner of Bigg Market and Pudding Chare display the new building line. 
581 Eldon Square, by John Dobson and Thomas Oliver 1825-1831; the Grainger Market by John 
Dobson 1835. Both were developed by Richard Grainger (McCombie, G, Newcastle and Gateshead 
(Pevsner Architectural Guide, London 2009) pp 17, 154, 158-159). The purpose of the road through 
Eldon Square was to exploit for commercial purposes backlands in the Blackett Street-
Northumberland Street-Percy Street triangle, which development scheme was discussed at length by 
Council, eg Proceedings of Newcastle Council 20 January 1937, 16 November 1938, 7 December 
1938, 18 January 1939, 1 February 1939, 22 February 1939, 7 June 1939, 19 July 1939. 
140 
 
on to the new buildings of the reconstructed Haymarket triangle to the south.”582 The 
local press responded positively to this activity, the Evening Chronicle declaring 
“Nobody can shirk the fact that post-war reconstruction will be badly needed in 
Newcastle, which in spite of its noted architects, simply does not show signs of 
careful planning. Quite candidly our city is lop-sided, good and presentable buildings 
lying side by side with antiquated property… Damage inflicted by enemy action may 
play its part in determining priorities when rebuilding starts in earnest in this 
country.”583 In fact, Newcastle suffered relatively lightly from air raids, and there 
was very little damage in the city centre.584 This did not stop Temple and his sub-
committee, and the City Engineer Percy Parr, from publishing the first 
comprehensive plan for Newcastle in 1945.585 That Parr was a road engineer 
becomes evident in the plan’s preface:  
 
From the public point of view the convenience of roads and streets is rightly 
considered of paramount importance, for through them runs the life-blood of 
the city, and it is essential that development in that direction should not be of  
a haphazard nature but according to a planned programme. Prosperity after 
the war will depend to a large extent upon roads and road transport, and 
every effort should be made to improve these vital communications…”586  
 
The plan made provision for a web of widened and new roads across and around the 
city (including what was to be built in the 1990s as the Western by-pass), much-
needed amenities for an authority that in 1945 did not possess a single yard of dual-
carriageway road.587 It also nodded to modern planning doctrine in proposing the 
categorisation of city districts as 33 separate ‘communities’ – in effect, 
 
582 Newcastle Journal and North Mail 22 February 1943 p 2. The Hancock Museum (now the Great 
North Museum) is a neoclassical building of 1878 on raised ground at the junction of Barras Bridge, 
Claremont Road and the Great North Road.  The council had in 1939 appointed HR Collins and AEO 
Geens of Bournemouth, designers of Romford (now Havering) Town Hall, architects of the new 
Newcastle Town Hall; the designs were for a long, low stripped-down neoclassical structure topped 
by a high central tower (Evening Chronicle 15 February 1959). 
583 Evening Chronicle 25 March 1943 p2 
584 Craig Armstrong disagrees with Angus Calder’s assertion that Newcastle (alongside Leeds and 
Bradford) “had few scars to show” (Armstrong, C, Tyneside in the Second World War (Chichester 
2007) pp 103-112; Angus Calder, The People’s War. Britain 1939-1945 (London 1971) p 254); but 
the most badly damaged areas on Tyneside lay downriver from Newcastle, and the city centre 
suffered very little bomb damage. Such damaged areas as existed in the centre and inner districts did 
not play a major part in reconstruction plans – notably the New Bridge Street goods station, 
devastated in a raid on 1 September 1941, and not fully redeveloped until the 1980s. 
585 Plan, Newcastle upon Tyne 1945. Report of the Town Planning Sub-Committee (Newcastle upon 
Tyne 1945) 
586 Ibid p 9 
587 Ibid pp 33-46 
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neighbourhood units, a concept pioneered by the American planning theorist 
Clarence Perry in the mid 1920s and subsequently refined by planner Clarence Stein 
in his proposals for Radburn, New Jersey.588  There was, however, very little that 
was progressive about Parr’s plans for the city centre. Within the girdle of a ring 
road surrounding the central area, galloping megalomania seems to have taken hold, 
envisaging that most of the city centre, including large parts of the 1830s Grainger 
developments, be demolished, replaced by numerous broad new streets constructed 
to a vaguely beaux-arts pattern.589 A conceptual illustration of what the late twentieth 
century city might have looked like showed a dystopia of roads punctuated by 
Muscovite-looking wedding-cake towers.590  
 
The economics of the post-war period, the introduction of new planning law and, as 
time was to prove, the capabilities of Parr’s department prevented most of the city 
centre plan from coming to pass, although certain aspects of it, most notably the 
route of the eastern section of the central ring road and the concept of an 
‘educational centre’ east of College Street, were to influence subsequent plans.591 
But much of it resembles a fantasia, and it is open to argument how much of the city 
centre elements were meant seriously as a plan, rather than as an overblown 
 
588 Hall, P Cities of Tomorrow. An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the 
Twentieth Century (3rd edition Oxford 2002) pp 130-136. Perry’s concept of the ‘neighbourhood unit’ 
was of a residential area based upon the catchment of a local school, self-contained for everyday 
purposes, with church and local shops. Stein, in his plans for Radburn, New Jersey, and other 
proposed new settlements introduced separation of pedestrian routes from vehicular through-routes. 
The ‘Radburn system’ was showcased in early postwar British new towns, and became a staple of 
post war planning in the United Kingdom, with new estates built within looping distributor roads, 
houses approached by pedestrian ways, and motor vehicles led by short local roads to ‘garage courts’. 
The garage courts were to prove an unpopular and transient phenomenon, and modern (now almost 
exclusively privately-developed) estates show a modified form of the Radburn system, with 
peripheral roads containing intertwined knots of wiggly cul-de-sacs, with each house having its own 
garage or hard stand. 
589 See maps appended to the 1945 plan. Some historic buildings – the medieval churches, St Thomas’ 
Church, the Hancock Museum, some of Kings College, might have survived; much of the Grainger 
developments would have been lost, including the indoor market (John Dobson, 1835). Grey’s 
Monument, Newcastle’s Piccadilly Circus-cum-Trafalgar Square, would have been transformed into a 
traffic roundabout at the junction of two dual- and three single-carriageway roads. 
590 Plan, Newcastle upon Tyne 1945. Report of the Town Planning Sub-Committee (Newcastle upon 
Tyne 1945) 
591 Byrne, D, ‘The Reconstruction of Newcastle. Planning since 1945’ in Colls, R, & Lancaster, B 
(eds), Newcastle upon Tyne. A Modern History (Chichester 2001) argues (p345) that “the themes 
identified in it dominated city planning for the next thirty years and continue to be important today”, a 
statement partly true although Parr’s trafficism was very different to the engineering solutions 
proposed by Wilfred Burns and Derek Bradshaw in the 1960s. 
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statement of intent.592 Larkham and Lilley argue that many, perhaps most post-war 
redevelopment plans should be seen as “subverse place promotion; evidence of 
implicit civic boosterism, rivalry and competition”. These plans “provided local 
authorities with a means to publicize to a wide audience (certainly national, and 
sometimes international) the perceived benefits that their new proposals could have 
for residents and businesses alike.”593 This would certainly apply to the Newcastle 
plan, produced as an illustrated booklet and sold to the public for 2s 6d.594 It was 
intended to show not just the benefits for residents and commerce, but also the 
progressive ethos, ambitions and vision of the city.595 
 
The wartime period saw the dawn of what has been called ‘the golden age of 
planning’, ushered in by what Helen Meller has described as “an almost mystical 
belief that somehow planning would provide all the answers.”596 The Attlee 
government for the first time made land use planning a universal legal requirement, 
imposed on county and county borough councils by the 1947 Town and Country 
Planning Act. The development plan produced by Percy Parr and Newcastle City 
Council in 1951 (and approved by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in 
1953) was a much less flamboyant document than the 1945 plan, focusing on an 
improved road network, the construction of 12,000 dwellings over a twenty-year 
period and some industrial development in the north-west of the city area.597 The 
proposals for the city centre were much less radical than the 1945 plan, but included 
a new ring road (making use of existing streets for most of its southern and western 
sections), and zoning of the centre into eight discrete areas, including a University 
 
592 This was not apparent to all at the time: The Surveyor and Municipal and County Engineer, 30 
November 1945 commented that “So far as the non-resident can judge, these proposals appear 
restrained and strictly practical in outlook… The extravagant hopes and wishes which so often seem 
to go with town planning enthusiasm are noticeably absent…” 
593 Larkham, P J, & Lilley, K D, ‘Plans, planners and city images: place promotion and civic 
boosterism in British reconstruction planning’, Urban History vol 30 no 2 (2003) pp183-205. 
Larkham and Lilley studied 87 plans published between 1941 and 1952; the peak year for publication 
was 1945 with 24 plans, including that for Newcastle. 
594 Evening Chronicle 18 October 1945 p3 
595 “Some may be incredulous that such proposals are advanced seriously. Yet the plan, as a plan, is 
far-sighted and courageous. It must not be dismissed as a counsel of perfection, devoid of practical 
value. In effect, the planners invite the citizens to look ahead, not to next year, or even to the next 
decade; but, possibly, to the next century. They propose virtually to re-make the city, beautiful and 
efficient.” – Newcastle Journal and North Mail, 18 October 1945 p3 
596 Meller, H, Towns, plans and society in modern Britain (Cambridge 1997) p67. 
597 Newcastle City Council, 1951 Development Plan. Written Analysis (1951); David Byrne (2001) op 
cit p245 
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Zone to enable Kings College to expand, and an Education Zone “to be used for 
technical colleges and administrative offices for educational purposes.”598 
 
Following the adoption of the development plan, such planning activity as took place 
in Newcastle in the 1950s focused on two particular areas: the road junction at the 
northern end of the Tyne Bridge approach, where Pilgrim Street, Mosley Street, City 
Road and the Bridge approach met to create one of the city’s worst traffic 
bottlenecks; and the issue of a new street to relieve Northumberland Street. 
 
The Pilgrim Street junction was subject to a plan to build a surface level roundabout 
which would also give access to the proposed inner ring road. In order to construct 
the roundabout as proposed, two scheduled historic monuments would need to be 
demolished: the Holy Jesus Hospital, an almshouse of 1681 incorporating a sixteenth 
century tower, and the Royal Arcade, a fine classical arcade designed by John 
Dobson for Richard Grainger and opened in 1832.599 Charlton Curry, proposing the 
report, could not bring himself to say the word ‘demolition’, stating obliquely that “I 
hope [members] realise all the implications”; seconding, James Clydesdale admitted 
“it is a very regrettable thing to do, but we are up against the inevitable.”600 The 
report was approved without debate. 
 
By the end of the decade three proposals had been drawn up, very similar in form, 
each showing a surface level roundabout overlooked by one or more tall commercial 
buildings, and with car parking and restaurant/leisure facilities in the central ‘well’ 
 
598 Newcastle City Council, 1951 Development Plan. Written Analysis (1951) pp 28-36. The zones 
were: (1) Residential Zone, proposing an ultimate residential population of 2,000 compared with the 
1951 figure of 6,340; (2) Shops Zone, where floor space would be increased by 22%; (3) Office Zone, 
allowing for a 3% increase over 1939; (4) Wholesale Warehouse Zone; (5) Light Industrial Zone; (6) 
Education Zone; (7) University Zone; (8) Public Buildings, comprising the new Town Hall to be built 
at Barras Bridge, an area of “places of public resort, cinemas and hotels” along Westgate Road in the 
south west of the centre, and three bus stations, two of which to be developed on new sites. 
599 McCombie, G, Newcastle and Gateshead (Pevsner Architectural Guide, London 2009) pp 146, 
148-149.  The Arcade, while a fine addition to the city’s townscape, was badly situated from a 
commercial point of view. Grainger’s redevelopment of the town centre diminished the importance of 
Pilgrim Street, besides which the arcade led onto steep slopes and the poverty-stricken alleys and 
yards of All Saints parish. It rapidly lost any fashionable cachet it might have possessed, and as noted 
earlier was home in the early and mid twentieth century to the Socialist Café, where Dan Smith 
gained much of his revolutionary education. 
600 Proceedings of Newcastle Council 1951-1952 p 86, 30 May 1951. 
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of the roundabout. All three cases involved the demolition of the Royal Arcade and 
Holy Jesus Hospital. 
 
Smith’s role was to tear up these plans and commission Wilfred Burns and Derek 
Bradshaw, newly appointed as Chief Planning Officer and City Engineer 
respectively, to come up with a more suitable replacement. This was the Swan House 
Roundabout: a split-level junction allowing a new urban motorway to pass 
uninterruptedly north from the Tyne Bridge underneath a roundabout, with a major 
new office building on top of the roundabout, and the Royal Arcade interior and 
façade rebuilt (after dismantling) and replaced almost on its original site, and facing 
down Mosley Street as before.601 
 
Although requiring the demolition of no historic buildings, the planning of a new 
street east of and parallel to Northumberland Street excited more controversy. In 
1951 this street was put to the council as “not designed to take a very great volume 
of traffic” but as “a compromise between the idea of prohibiting public vehicles in 
shopping streets, which did hold at one time in town planning circles, and diffusing 
bus traffic in alternative directions… we are not arguing that this will be a serious 
contribution to the traffic problem [sic], but… it will meet the need for an increased 
shopping centre.”602 The City Development Plan in 1954 stated that “It is proposed 
to re-develop the area east of Northumberland Street primarily for shopping purposes 
and to provide a new shopping street between New Bridge Street and St Mary’s 
Place.603 The proposal was subsequently deleted from the Development Plan by the 
Minister for Housing and Local Government because, as a shopping street rather 
than a major traffic artery it ought not form part of the Plan.604 Concentration on 
plans for this eastward extension of the central shopping area diverted attention from 
 
601 Rebuilding the original was considered too expensive by the post-1967 Conservative 
administration, and a two-thirds scale imitation of the arcade interior was instead installed within 
Swan House – it can be seen inside the Fat Buddha restaurant.  As for the façade: the popular belief is 
that reference numbers to allow reconstruction were chalked onto the stones during dismantling, only 
to be washed off as the stones were stored out of doors. Some can now be seen in Heaton Park. 
602 Proceedings of Newcastle Council 1951-1952 p110, 6 June 1951, quoting Alderman A C Curry. 
603 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3835 City and County of Newcastle Development Plan 1954 p12, with first 
call on scarce resources. 
604 Proceedings of Newcastle Council 1952-1953 pp972-975, 18 March 1953. The council 
subsequently proposed a Comprehensive Development Area to encompass the proposed road, 
construction of which would have destroyed part of the Dobson-designed St Mary’s Place 
(Proceedings 1953-1954 pp421-424, 21 October 1953) 
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development of the Blackett Street-Percy Street-Northumberland Street ‘triangle’ 
where, commented one councillor, “behind those nice facades of stone we have 
nothing but rabbit warrens and broken-down stables that are bringing no money at 
all”605  
 
Postwar urban redevelopment 
For much of the immediate postwar period, urban redevelopment concentrated on the 
reconstruction of blitzed cities. Major plans had been drawn up for cities such as 
Coventry, Hull, Plymouth and these and other heavily bombed towns, together with 
the new towns designated from 1946, were the priority.606 A requirement for 
building licences for development to take place, coupled with rising land prices, 
made major development uncongenial for many local authorities, although 
Birmingham was active in clearing lines in preparation for its ambitious road 
plans.607 With the ending of building licence controls in 1954, private developers 
were freed from onerous constraints, and London experienced an ‘office boom’ that 
lasted from 1955 to 1965, with particular intensity in the period to 1960, and this 
effect spread outward to other centres.608  
 
A key factor affecting city development plans was traffic. The number of road 
vehicles in Britain doubled, from just under five millions to nearly ten; how to deal 
with traffic became a pressing issue. The British Road Federation held an exhibition 
showing examples of road projects and expressways around the world; of the British 
examples, only Birmingham was planning roads with grade-separated junctions.609 
Birmingham had large plans, including an inner ring road first suggested in 1917 and 
approved by the Corporation in 1943, the road plans having been drawn up by the 
energetic and influential City Engineer Herbert Manzoni, appointed in 1935.610 
 
605 Proceedings of Newcastle Council 1951-1952 p 82, 30 May 1951, quoting Cllr Arthur Grey 
606 Halliday, John, City Centre Redevelopment (London 1973) pp8-9 
607 Ibid p9; Ravetz, Alison, Remaking Cities (London 1980) pp64-66. Urban land prices were rising 
because ‘betterment’ provisions introduced by the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, a 100% tax 
on rises in land values, which was widely expected to stifle the private market in land, were abolished 
by the Conservative government in 1952.  
608 Halliday, op cit p10 
609 Ibid p11 
610 Borg, N, ‘Birmingham’ in Halliday op cit, pp 39, 51-57 
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Construction began in 1956.611 Birmingham’s plans differed substantially in kind 
from those to be introduced in Newcastle in the 1960s: city centre redevelopment 
was given low priority by comparison with road building, infrastructure and housing 
projects.612 This deliberate avoidance of development planning was intended to make 
the city more attractive for private sector developers.613 This attitude was made 
obvious when the city’s Bull Ring Centre was built 1961-64: the corporation’s 
Public Works Department, headed by Manzoni, helped the developers to maximise 
the floor space available; the city architect was not consulted about the scheme.614 
The Birmingham plan bears superficial similarity to that introduced in Newcastle in 
1961, but Manzoni’s inner ring road was not a full urban motorway, completely 
segregated from other users and uses, but a road where frontage development was 
permitted.615 Other developments prefigure the Newcastle plans: one might consider 
the unbuilt hypothetical scheme by Chamberlain, Powell & Bon in 1958 for the 
redevelopment of Boston Manor in west London, an untidy suburban district, as 
‘New Boston’, an urban centre redeveloped around a transport hub, with high density 
housing and a triple-deck centre featuring parking, retail, and roof gardens.616 The 
plans for a new town at Hook in Hampshire by the London County Council involved 
a town centre based on the principle of vertical separation of traffic and 
pedestrians.617 Vallingsby in Sweden, built from the mid-1950s, was a new town 
near Stockholm, with a pedestrian town centre built on a deck above a railway 
station: an influential design, and the town much visited by planners. In inner 
London a major, if unloved, development of offices, shops and homes took place in 
the Elephant & Castle district, around a major traffic interchange, which sought to 
create ‘the Piccadilly Circus of south London’; and in the City of London major 
rebuilding took place: the multi-level, traffic-segregated Barbican development, built 
around and on a 12 acre pedestrian level and incorporating a school and arts centre. 
 
611 Harwood, Elain ‘White Light/White Heat: Rebuilding England’s Provincial Towns and Cities in 
the Sixties’, in Harwood, Elain & Powers, Alan, (eds) The Sixties: life: style: architecture. Twentieth 
Century Architecture 6 (London 2002) p62 
612 Gold, John R, The Experience of Modernism. Modern architects and the future city 1928-1953 
(London 1997) p82 
613 Ibid 
614 Harwood (2002) op cit p62 
615 Ibid 
616 Ibid pp98-99 
617 London County Council, The Planning of a New Town (London 1961) pp53-65; Gold op cit 
pp151-155 
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South of the Barbican, a new road was built (initially Route XI, now London Wall) 
lined by office buildings, crossed by pedestrian bridges linking the housing to a 
proposed network of pedestrian ways.618 
These schemes and plans, all widely admired in their day, share one common factor: 
none involved the comprehensive redevelopment of a major, existing urban centre. 
Hook and Vallingsby were greenfield sites; New Boston a suburban area; Elephant 
and Castle a densely built-up, but relatively small and peripheral site; the Barbican 
and surroundings a heavily bomb-damaged area. Birmingham encouraged the 
speculator, and, apart from roads, paid little attention to municipal planned 
redevelopment of its centre. The developments in Newcastle were to draw on these 
and many other precedents, but were to be applied to a very different urban 
environment. 
 Enter Burns 
It was Smith’s undoubted charisma and organisational ability that led to Newcastle 
adopting a pioneering city redevelopment plan, the first of a ‘new wave’ of city 
centre plans in the United Kingdom. In 1960 Smith turned his attention to the city 
centre. He saw the need to revitalise the city of Newcastle as not just for the city’s 
own benefit; rather, for too long Newcastle had been, in his words, “the dying heart 
of a decaying region”. Instead, the rebuilding of the city should act as a catalyst for 
regional development, and attract new industries - and the people to run those 
industries - to the north. In 1960 he told the Town Planning Institute “[w]e must 
develop an inspirational role… to change the economic climate in the area and to 
ensure that such a new environment will draw to the city the best planners, engineers 
and architects…[and] create a city and region which would have a compelling 
interest to forward looking industrialists to come North.”619 The limited city 
development plan, drawn up in 1951 by the city engineer, was discarded; the 
engineer retired, and Smith took the opportunity to create one of the first 
independent town planning departments in any British town or city. The man chosen 
 
618 Gold op cit pp84-86; Esher, Lionel, A Broken Wave. The Rebuilding of England 1940-1980 
(Harmondsworth 1983) pp114-119; Bor, Walter, The Making of Cities (London 1972) pp97-100, 128-
129. 
619  Smith, T D, ‘Development Problems of a Regional Capital’, Journal of the Town Planning 
Institute July-August 1960 (typescript of article). 
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to run the new department was Wilfred Burns.620 
 
Burns had made his name in Coventry, working first on suburban shopping precincts 
and then, under Arthur Ling, on the city centre redevelopment.621 He spent two years 
as deputy planning officer in Surrey, an area covering the outer suburban fringes of 
south London, before being appointed by Newcastle.622 There, he had extensive 
powers - equal in rank with other chief officers of the council - and he was able to 
build up a new department from the nine staff dedicated to planning under the old 
regime to 83 by 1966.623 He moved very rapidly: taking up his post in November 
1960, by April 1961 he and his team had drawn up an outline city centre plan. The 
full statutory development plan review was submitted to the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government for approval in 1963.624 
 
The plan launched by Wilfred Burns and Dan Smith with such enthusiasm in 1961 
differed greatly from the earlier generation of central area plans, most of which had 
dealt either with reconstruction of bomb-damaged cities - Coventry, Plymouth, Hull 
and others - or with the development of new towns on more-or-less virgin sites. 
Newcastle had been spared large-scale aerial bombardment; its problems lay in 
severe congestion and in a largely outworn stock of buildings. With only limited 
cultural, recreational and educational facilities, it did not meet what Smith would 
have regarded as the criteria for a thriving regional capital; rather, as one journalist 
was to describe it in 1962, “Newcastle looks like a bewildered old dowager stuck on 
a mad, raucous fairground roundabout, losing her dignity fast, and waiting for a latter 
day Grainger or Dobson to rescue her.”625 
 
620 Smith, T Dan op cit pp 57-58 
621 I am grateful to Dr Bill Lancaster for this information, based upon an interview he conducted with 
Donald Gibson (transcript lost). 
622 Cherry, G E, ‘Wilfred Burns, 1923-1984’ in Town Planning Review 55(4) (1984) pp 506-511; The 
Times 6 January 1984 p12. 
623 Barke, M, ‘Newcastle/Tyneside 1890-1980’ in Gordon, G, (ed) Regional Cities in the UK 1890-
1980 (London 1986) p141 
624 The Town and Country Planning Act required planning authorities to draw up a development plan, 
and to submit revisions of the plan at five-year intervals. Newcastle’s original statutory development 
plan, completed in 1951, was approved by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government in 1953. 
However, the City Engineer’s Department - responsible for planning up to late 1960 - proved 
incapable of meeting the deadline for the first five-yearly review. Wilfred Burns’ 1963 plan was, 
therefore, the first development plan review undertaken by the city. 
625  Bean, D, ‘Bringing Plans to Newcastle’, Time and Tide 8 February 1962 p22. The developer 
Richard Grainger was responsible for the building of Newcastle’s neo-classical centre in the 1830s; 
the architect John Dobson designed many of the buildings erected in consequence. 
149 
 
 
The plan was intended to change all that. In some respects it resembles the preceding 
generation of central plans, building upon some of the key elements in the 
government’s Advisory Handbook on the Redevelopment of Central Areas: zoning, 
tightly drawn inner ring roads, pedestrian precincts.626 But even where the plan 
echoed parts of the 1951 plan - in the line of the central ring road, for example - it 
went far further and envisaged the application of new technological and engineering 
skills to create a very different city. The 1961 plan provided for the encirclement of 
the central area by a network of urban motorways, linking the centre to city suburbs 
and beyond. Initially, there were intended to be three north-south motorways and two 
east-west motorways, forming a rough triangle. The proposals for the southernmost 
east-west road were dropped, leaving an A-shaped network, the crossbar of the ‘A’ 
being a motorway link that would burrow beneath the commercial core of the city.627 
 
Within the motorway box a distributor road would ring the city, giving access to car 
parks, bus stops, and local distribution routes. Separation of pedestrians from 
vehicular traffic would be achieved over substantial parts of the city centre not by 
horizontal segregation, of the kind well known from redevelopment schemes in 
Rotterdam and Coventry, but by vertical segregation: the creation of a series of 
pedestrian decks built over distribution and access roads for local businesses, and 
spanning parts of the proposed motorway system. The plan also provided for the 
preservation of much of the city’s architectural and townscape heritage in the form 
of ‘preservation areas’, forerunners of the ‘conservation areas’ established nationally 
under a 1967 act of Parliament.628 The ambition was to build upon Newcastle’s 
historical past and its traditions of ‘sociability’ in order to recreate - or more 
accurately, to create, a version of the imagined past: a quasi-medieval, walkable 
city.629 The whole was nicknamed ‘the Brasilia of the North’, a phrase now indelibly 
linked with Dan Smith but actually coined by Councillor Doris Starkey, at her 
 
626 Ministry of Town and Country Planning, Advisory Handbook on the Redevelopment of Central 
Areas (London 1947) 
627 Burns (1967) op cit p23 
628 Ibid p32; Pendlebury op cit pp115-141. This aspect of the plan remains relatively unknown, and 
Smith is lambasted in popular myth as wanting to destroy everything old in the city, with statements 
such as “T Dan Smith wanted to demolish Grainger Town because it was out-of-date and backward 
looking” (The Journal, 16 December 2005) hitherto going unchallenged.  
629 On the sociable city and Newcastle tradition, Lancaster, B, ‘Sociability and the City’ in Colls & 
Lancaster op cit. 
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inauguration as Lord Mayor of the city in 1960. To the architect Basil Spence, the 
plan was “the most adventurous ever created in this country.”630 
 
The changes to be brought about by the plan, Smith argued: 
 
meant that we could have a multi-level city; we could take the traffic out of 
the city, and fashion a ring around the inner city. In a sense we were creating 
a modern city wall. When Newcastle was finished, one would be able to 
come in under gateways at Pilgrim Street and the Great North Road, 
Claremont Road and the West Road… Every entrance to Newcastle was to 
provide the sense of coming into a modern enclosed city. Once it is 
completed, that is what will happen. It will be possible within this 
redeveloped centre, for pedestrians to wander from offices to shops, to 
university, to library, to civic centre, and to have an active, alive community, 
able to walk and talk and dally without the threat of being run over.631 
 
The major influences on the Newcastle plan are far from straightforward. Burns did 
not acknowledge any influences in either the development plan review itself or his 
1967 book describing the project.632 Smith was to criticise Burns on a similar count: 
“…I have always thought that Burns could have been more generous to his 
professional colleagues who worked with him, and without whom we never could 
have succeeded. He could well have afforded to indicate that the re-building of 
Newcastle was not a one-man band, or a one-profession band.”633 It perhaps is not all 
that surprising to learn that city planners - ‘master planners’ as they were wont to 
describe themselves - could be rather prima donna-ish at times; and Dan Smith was 
himself not immune from attempting to grab some glory, claiming to have drawn up 
the initial plans on which the 1961 plan was based634 
 
It is clear that large elements of the plan are developments of the original 1951 
development plan: the route of the eastern section of the inner ring road (built in the 
early 1970s as the Central Motorway East), the location of the new Redheugh Bridge 
 
630 Gold op cit p116 
631 Smith, T Dan, op cit p51. Although much of the plan remains unexecuted, ‘gateway’ structures 
were erected at  the southern (Pilgrim Street), north-western (Claremont Road) and northern (Great 
North Road) entrances to the city centre. 
632 Burns op cit 
633 Smith, T Dan op cit p58 
634 Amber Films (Newcastle), transcript of interview with T Dan Smith tape 8 p14: “Newcastle.. The 
basic approach…was my own. I mean I didn’t pinch it off Burns, I did the first drawings for 
Newcastle and you can talk to the people… that got them from me…” 
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west of the city centre (opened in 1980), the development of an education precinct 
on the north-east side of the city centre (now the University of Northumbria). More 
difficult to identify are other possible influences on Burns’ thinking. He had worked 
briefly for Leeds corporation - and Leeds was just about the only provincial city to 
carry out any meaningful central area redevelopment between the wars - and 
subsequently at Coventry.635 There, the architect-planner Donald Gibson held a low 
opinion of Burns’ talents, keeping him engaged on suburban shopping centres rather 
than the central area; but when Gibson was replaced by Arthur Ling, Burn’s star 
rose.636 Influential as Coventry was, its ‘precincts’ were well-known enough to have 
been adopted by Newcastle’s city engineer for the 1951 plan’s education precinct; 
while the city’s pioneering pedestrian precincts likewise were standard practice by 
the time Burns came to Newcastle.637 
 
However, some teasing references occur in Burns’ earlier published work. In New 
Towns for Old, published in 1963 and so written during his early years at Newcastle, 
he refers to the Smithsons’ 1958 competition entry for Berlin as “throwing up some 
new ideas.” 
 
It was based on planning for traffic at the street level with pedestrians at a 
higher level. The pedestrian ways were not parallel; they narrowed and 
broadened out, and they had junctions at differing angles and were not related 
in orientation to the vehicular streets below.638 
 
Burns also praises multilevel developments in Rochester (New York) and 
Philadelphia, the former - Midtown Plaza - designed by the Austrian-American 
architect and planner Victor Gruen.639 And, while lauding Coventry as the 
“outstanding achievement” for its (horizontal) separation of pedestrians and vehicles, 
he continues: “In America, the outstanding plan is surely that for Forth Worth, by 
Victor Gruen, which separates pedestrians and vehicles in the vertical rather than the 
 
635 Bateman, M, ‘Leeds: a study in regional supremacy’ in Gordon, G (ed), Regional Cities in the UK 
1890-1980 pp 99-115 
636 I am grateful to Dr Bill Lancaster for this information, based upon an interview he conducted with 
Donald Gibson (transcript lost). 
637 Newcastle City Council, 1951 Development Plan. Written Analysis (1951); Ward, Stephen V., 
Planning and Urban Change (2nd ed London 2004) p131 
638 Burns, W, New Towns for Old (London 1963) p 46 
639 Ibid pp 47-48 
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horizontal plane.” It is clear that Burns had known of Gruen and the Fort Worth plan 
before he came to Newcastle; in British Shopping Centres (1959) he writes that “the 
published plans for Forth Worth show that this superhuman city of the future is, 
perhaps, not very far away.”640 
 
The Fort Worth plan of Victor Gruen, unexecuted and now largely forgotten, was a 
significant and previously unacknowledged influence on Wilfred Burns’ Newcastle 
plan. Gruen is recalled in the main as one of the fathers of the shopping mall.641 
Fleeing Vienna after the 1938 Anschluss, he worked on Norman Bel Geddes’ 
modernistic Futurama exhibit at the New York World’s Fair of 1939, a vision of a 
prosperous 1960 United States tied together by motorways, its cities models of 
pedestrian-vehicular segregation.642 He went on to design department stores, and 
shopping centres of increasing size and complexity, culminating in America’s first 
‘regional’ shopping mall, Northland, near Detroit, which opened in 1954.643  
 
Although such large malls are now viewed as the keystones of ‘edge cities’, Gruen’s 
ambition was to recreate a form of urbanity familiar from his upbringing in Vienna, 
evoking the market squares of European cities.644 He went on to address America’s 
declining city centres, seeking to apply the principles behind malls to downtown 
areas, and in 1956 produced A Greater Fort Worth Tomorrow. This plan envisaged 
Fort Worth’s central business district surrounded by a motorway ring road, exits 
feeding into large car parks. The area within the ring would be entirely 
pedestrianised, with no building more than c.180 metres (600 feet) from the nearest 
car park. Service roads. The plan was greeted with some enthusiasm, not least by 
 
640 Burns, W, British Shopping Centres (London 1959) p 100. The earliest reference by Burns to 
Gruen that I have seen is in The Surveyor and Municipal and County Engineer 116 (3408) 17 August 
1957 p 863, where he cites approvingly Gruen’s views on the necessity of a compact central 
commercial area. 
641 Two biographical studies have focussed attention on his career and legacy: Hardwick, M J, Mall 
Maker: Victor Gruen, Architect of an American Dream (Philadelphia 2004) and Wall, A, Victor 
Gruen: From Urban Shop to New City (Barcelona 2005) 
642  Hardwick op cit pp18-19. On Bel Geddes, see for example Innes, C, Designing Modern America: 
Broadway to Main Street (New Haven 2005). Film of the Futurama exhibit, a huge display around 
which viewers would be transported in moving seats, can be seen on Youtube at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74cO9X4NMb4&feature=related and 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WU7dT2Hld-c&NR=1 (both accessed 28 May 2010). Bel Geddes 
used the term motorway rather than freeway, and indeed wrote a book called Magic Motorways. 
643 Hardwick op cit pp125-126. 
644 Gillette Jr, H, ‘The Evolution of the Planned Shopping Center in Suburb and City’, Journal of the 
American Planning Association 51 (4) (1985) p 451 
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Jane Jacobs who described it as “excellent… One of the beauties of the Fort Worth 
plan is that it works with existing buildings and this is a positive virtue not just a cost 
saving expedient.”645 Two years after the launch of the plan, Grady Clay counted 88 
cities “working on, or tentatively considering” versions of it.646 
 
Fort Worth was not the only contemporary experimentation with the idea of vertical 
segregation. In Britain, for example, the Barbican development in central London 
was, in the words of Lionel Esher, “a scaled down ville radieuse” with decks 
separating pedestrians from traffic; the 1960 Elephant and Castle scheme in south 
London is accorded a line drawing in New Towns for Old, while in 1959 a group of 
Bristol architects proposed pedestrian decks and piazzas spanning the city’s ring 
road.647 In Sweden, the centre of the new town of Vallingby near Stockholm was 
built, in part, on a pedestrian deck on top of a rapid transit rail station.648 Burns also 
mentions the “great scheme” which is an “accomplished fact” of a segregated 
development in Caracas, with “through traffic flow roads, with shops, restaurants 
and pedestrian ways above these roads, and thirty-storey office blocks towering over 
all…”, a clear reference to Cipriano Dominguez’s Centro Simon Bolivar 
development of 1942-49 which, according to Valerie Fraser, “marked a completely 
new approach to the city; indeed, it was designed to be a city in itself, and in some 
ways prefigures Brasilia.”649 None of these matched the scale of the Fort Worth plan, 
and while the Barbican and Vallingby schemes had the luxury of clean slate planning 
- a severely bombed area and a satellite new town respectively, Fort Worth 
represented an attempt to transform an existing, built up, congested city centre. 
 
The similarities of Fort Worth and Newcastle are more than suggestive. Both plans 
were attempts to rebuild, re-form, existing central areas. Both saw the existing 
infrastructure as congested and outmoded. Both saw the solution in the 
 
645 Hardwick op cit p166; Wall op cit pp125-126; Jacobs, J, ‘Downtown is for People’ in The Editors 
of Fortune (eds) The Exploding Metropolis (Garden City NY 1958) p 146 
646 Clay, G, ‘Plenty of Action in the Square’, Journal of Architectural Education 13 (2) (1958) p31. 
The Fort Worth plan remained on paper, its acceptance hampered by conflicts of business interests. 
647 Esher op cit pp114-119; Burns, W, New Towns for Old pp 189, 31 
648 Gold, J R, The Practice of Modernism p99 
649 Burns, W,New Towns for Old p199; Fraser, V, Building the New World: Studies in the Modern 
Architecture of Latin America (London 2000) pp 110-113; Lejeune, J-F (ed), Cruelty & Utopia: cities 
and landscapes of Latin America (New York 2003) pp 242-244. Cipriano Dominguez had been a 
student of Le Corbusier. 
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counterintuitive use of motorway construction to enable pedestrianisation. Both 
Gruen and Burns had an appreciation of townscape that was historically aware and 
very different to the Corbusian tradition, seeking enclosure and sociable space rather 
than the grand vistas of a Plan Voisin or Ville Radieuse. The 1961 Newcastle plan - 
motorway belt, inner distributor ring feeding into strategically-sited car parks, 
pedestrianised centre with extensive use of pedestrian decks - bears an 
unmistakeable resemblance in its essentials to Gruen’s 1956 plan. 
 
The Fort Worth plan was abandoned while Burns’ plan for Newcastle was 
implemented, in part, and Dan Smith’s broader aspirations for the city also partially 
put into effect, with major implications for the modern city. This brings us to the role 
of politics and power in urban transformation. The social scientist Andrew Blowers 
describes how “one of the more prevalent myths is that planning and politics are 
related but separate activities” and that (environmental) planning is fundamentally a 
’weak’ discipline: “[it] appears to possess freedom, but in fact has little power. It 
reacts to initiatives from other agencies but it is not capable of determining outcomes 
without their co-operation… Environmental planning continues to reflect and 
maintain the prevailing values and pattern of power.”650 Fort Worth in the late 1950s 
was a city with a weak municipal planning department and a political ‘power 
vacuum’ at the top; vested interests combined to impede and defeat the plan.651 
 
In Newcastle, by contrast, Smith was able to identify, capture and wield power with 
some panache; to Kenneth Galley, successor to Wilfred Burns as City Planning 
Officer, Smith had “a vision of the sort of city he wanted and a clear understanding 
of the relationship between political and physical objectives.”652 On achieving 
power, he sought to create the machinery to put the policies formed in opposition 
into effect. He created a powerful planning department under a tough and effective 
leader, Wilfred Burns; he pushed acceptance of the development plan through the 
council against opposition; he appointed the country’s first ‘city manager’ - chief 
executive in modern parlance - to streamline the archaic local government structure 
and make the council more efficient; he instituted a council policy of purchasing 
 
650 Blowers, A, The Limits of Power. The Politics of Local Planning Policy (Oxford 1980) p2 
651 Wall op cit pp133-134 
652 Galley op cit p209 
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land in the city centre as it became available to strengthen its hand in negotiation 
with the private sector, to lessen the need for controversial compulsory purchase 
procedures, and to maximise the power held by the city council in determining the 
future shape of the city. At every stage Dan Smith was also waging a major public 
relations campaign, seeking to win over the general public, fellow councillors of all 
parties, local commercial interests, leading figures at the city’s university, senior 
civil servants and government ministers to the cause of urban renewal in Newcastle 
and regional renewal in the north east. It is clear that Smith possessed intelligence, 
energy and powers of leadership, to a high degree. It is significant that although he 
resigned his leadership of Newcastle council in 1965 and the Labour Party lost 
control to the Conservative Party two years later, his erstwhile political opponents 
carried through his development proposals with relatively little change.653 Even 
though Smith was no longer at the helm, in six years of leadership he had 
transformed the political and administrative environment of the city. In doing so he 
was, of course, affected by and able to take advantage of external factors, most 
notably a renewed government interest, from about 1962 onwards, in regional 
policy.654 But if the debate about urban transformation is to consider the balance 
between structure and agency in bringing about change, the history of the ‘New 
Brasilia’ on the River Tyne shows that the impact that individuals can have remains 
a potent historical force. 
 
While Smith was keen to bring architectural big names to Newcastle, the plan 
inadvertently served to deprive the city of some local talent. The Northern Gas Board 
had intended to build its new headquarters in the city, but the delay occasioned by 
Burns’ revision of the development plan led it to decide on a site at the new town of 
Killingworth, just north-east of the city, where the modernist practice of Ryder and 
Yates eventually built a series of highly distinguished buildings for the Gas Board 
and the local authority.655 
 
653 Ibid 
654 Exemplified by Lord Hailsham’s appointment as Minister with special responsibility for the North 
of England in 1963, which in turn gave rise to England’s first comprehensive regional economic 
development plan: The North East. A programme for regional development and growth (Cmnd. 2206) 
(1963) 
655 Carroll, R, Ryder and Yates (London 2009) pp 64-65. Killingworth was not an ‘official’ New 
Town designated under the 1946 Act, but was developed by Northumberland County Council under 
the 1952 Town Development Act. Gordon Ryder was a north-easterner who had trained (alongside 
Peter Smithson) at Kings College, Newcastle, and later taught there (where one of his students was 
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Opposition 
The city development plan provoked little initial opposition, in the council chamber 
or in the columns of the local press. The first organised community opposition group 
was the Citizens’ Defence Movement, formed in June 1962 by residents of the 
Sandyford area of the city concerned at the impact of the education precinct 
development, on which work was due to start in March 1963.656 The CDM was led 
by a language school proprietor, Professor M Martin-Moran, and in October 1962 it 
published a manifesto entitled Newcastle-upon-Tyne, The City Under Sentence of 
Death, addressed to property owners, local associations “and headmasters and staffs 
of grammar schools” arguing that the council’s schemes were spreading “fear, terror 
and insecurity” among residents and calling for a referendum on planning policy.657 
Smith  attributed the opposition to “a core of ill-advised folk” and challenged 
Martin-Moran to stand in the May 1963 municipal elections.658 
 
Criticism of the redevelopment plans on their impact on the city centre was also 
expressed by Lyall Wilkes, a historian, barrister and, later, judge, who had served as 
Labour MP for Central Newcastle between 1945 and 1951, in an article in North 
East Arts Review, published by the North East Association for the Arts (NEEA).659 
Smith wrote an angry defence of the plans: the  city centre would not be dead in the 
evenings but “a thriving, living city with students and other people living in it. Alive, 
 
Alison Gill (Smithson); Peter Yates studied under Le Corbusier in Paris. Until recently most of their 
Killingworth buildings were intact, contributing to the atmosphere of what Owen Hatherley describes 
as “a deeply strange place, where the remnants of a suburban Modernism coexist with the familiar 
limbo of spec homes and malls.” (Hatherley op cit pp170-171). Amberley Court, part of the Citadel 
town centre megastructure (itself a development which led Elain Harwood to describe Killingworth as 
“the forgotten English Cumbernauld”) has been significantly altered, truncated and reclad, and both 
Stephenson House and Norgas house have been demolished (Harwood (2002) op cit p69. Ryder and 
Yates were to build in central Newcastle eventually, most notably MEA House (1974) on the east side 
of the centre, and the Salvation Army Men’s Palace (1974) on City Road. 
656 Evening Chronicle 19 October 1962, 6 September 1962 
657 Evening Chronicle 19 October 1962 Martin Moran was a former artillery officer in the Spanish 
Republican army during the Spanish Civil War: Evening Chronicle 2 May 1963 p8. 
658 Evening Chronicle 22 October 1962. Martin-Moran’s CDM did put up a number of candidates in 
the elections of 1963, to minimal effect. 
659 NEEA was the first regional arts association in Britain, and Smith had been a significant figure in 
its establishment. See Vall, N, Cultural Region. North East England 1945-2000 (Manchester 2011) pp 
97-118 
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a centre for the arts, for the theatre, for shops. And we want to live in it after six 
o’clock” 660 
 
But organised opposition did not emerge until 1971, when a group called Save Our 
City from Environmental Mess (SOCEM) was formed to campaign against 
motorway construction and other aspects of the redevelopment plans.661 In April 
1972 the group campaigned unsuccessfully against the removal of trees in Brandling 
and Exhibition Parks to facilitate construction of the Central Motorway East.662 It 
remained in existence long after the motorway plans had fallen into abeyance, and at 
least until 1981.663 But it was largely factors outside the control of pressure groups or 
indeed Newcastle council that determined the extent to which the ambitious 1961-63 
plans were implemented or not, and these factors only came into play long after 
Smith’s departure from the council. 
 
In the 1960s, however, criticism of the plans was muted and marginal. Comment in 
the media – the local and national press as well as specialist publications – was 
generally positive, concentrating on the progressive nature of the proposals, typified 
by this article in the Sunday Times lamenting the slow progress: 
 
The trouble is that a great deal is still on paper, working its slow way through 
the yawning mills of planning permission and Ministry consent. So there are 
probably more people in Scandinavia and Tokyo and New York than there 
are on Tyneside who appreciate that the completion of Newcastle’s £179 
million redevelopment scheme promises to make it one of the finest and most 
imaginative modern cities in Europe.664 
 
The Regional capital 
 
660 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3835TDS’ reply to Lyall Wilkes’ article, sent by Mrs Boyd to Arthur 
Blenkinsop, (NEEA secretary) 11 December 1962. Percy Street was to a considerable extent to be 
replaced by the proposed (but ultimately unbuilt) Central Motorway West. 
661 The earliest newspaper reference to the group that I have found is the Newcastle Journal of 9 
December 1971, p8, referring to the group campaigning against the demolition of Broadcasting House 
and the Burgogne’s public house. 
662 Members added whitewash crosses to trees in an attempt to confuse workers as to which were to 
be removed, but plans for protesters to climb and sit in threatened trees were forestalled by the cutting 
down of the threatened trees early on 20 April. Newcastle Evening Chronicle 10 April 1972 p3, 20 
April 1972 p11 
663 1981 is the latest date for SOCEM material in Newcastle City Library. 
664 Wilshaw, P, ‘Home Rule for the Regions’, The Sunday Times 27 October 1963 p15. Spence’s 
library has been demolished and replaced in recent years; lesser talents than those of Jacobsen 
designed the Eldon Square shopping centre; and Burns came from Coventry via Surrey. 
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Smith’s plans for Newcastle were not intended to benefit the city alone. He believed 
that the development of a vibrant regional capital was vital for the prosperity and 
development of the region as a whole. But economic prosperity was not enough: the 
regional capital should be attractive and influential on a whole range of measures: 
industrial and economic, but also in terms of culture, education, and what might be 
called ‘liveability’: the kind of city hymned by Crosland, friendly, informal, with 
theatres, riverside cafes, bright lights, attractive shops.665 
 
Even before the first version of Burns’ plan had been drawn up, Smith was urging 
the creation of a new type of city to draw employers and prosperity to the North 
East, telling the Town Planning institute in May 1960 that: 
 
“The industrialist must understand that there are other factors than solely 
industrial ones which make a region attractive to industry... unless the region 
can make itself attractive to the key people necessary to the success of new 
industry, they would hesitate to come north…. We must develop an 
inspirational role in the region and seek to ensure the co-operation of all 
important organizations together with ‘the man in the street’, to change the 
economic climate in the area and to ensure that such a new environment will 
draw to the city the best planners, engineers, and architects to supplement 
those who are already here, and then by their renewed efforts I feel sure they 
would in turn create a city and region which would have a compelling 
interest to forward-looking industrialists to come north. The heart of the 
region is starting to beat more rapidly now and the region can look forward to 
a fuller life.”666  
 
In short, to make Newcastle a city which would be attractive to middle-class 
technocrats, whose arrival would then stimulate further economic development and 
encourage more immigration from the south. One ultimate effect would be to move 
the region away from being an area based upon the traditional heavy and extractive 
industries upon which its prosperity had been traditionally based, and whose 
disappearance Smith foresaw: “Newcastle… has to play its full part in seeking to 
create a new long-term pattern of industry within the region which would be based 
on stimulation wherever possible of existing industry, but above all on preparing for 
the inevitable decline of existing industries.”667 
 
665 Crosland (2006) op cit pp402-403 
666 Smith, T D, ‘Development Problems of a Regional Capital’, paper read at 34th Spring Meeting of 
the Town Planning Institute, 26 May 1960. 
667 Ibid. My italics. 
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Cultural capital 
Another significant step was the formation of the North East Association for the 
Arts. Smith saw art and culture as being central to his vision for the Newcastle of the 
future, writing that “I look forward to the time when everyday experience of life in 
Newcastle will be enormously stimulating – and will include a full cultural life.” 668 
Interviewed in the 1980s, he recalled that “the city vision was to make Newcastle a 
regional capital, and the philosophic background to that was the arts, Northern Arts, 
which became the prototype for the rest, sport, and so on.”669 His vision was not one 
of art for art’s sake; rather, he envisioned art as a key element in how society should 
develop, alongside and in partnership with science and technology; as he wrote to 
Bloodaxe Books, “Politically I developed an interest in science & technologies and 
the ‘Two Cultures’ which have guided me ever since and motivate me more so 
today.”670 
Art could also support his vision of a vibrant regional capital: writing of the 
proposed 1961 exhibition promoting the city and its industrial and commercial 
potential, he wrote that the event would show what the council could do “by helpful 
patronage to encourage the use of sculpture, murals, painting and landscaping in its 
various developments”; ‘The Arts’ could show the role they could play in attracting 
industry to the area and encouraging existing enterprises to remain.671 
Smith was personally interested in the arts (his hobbies included painting and 
playing the piano). He was a member of the ‘Novocastrian Group’, a small group 
(limited to fifteen members) formed in January 1961, its members representing “all 
forms of art in the North East, and dedicated to a positive policy of stimulating 
 
668 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3835 Draft transcript of article entitled ‘Newcastle Remade. An Interview 
with Dan Smith’ (n.d.) 
669 Amber, transcript of taped interview of Smith by Murray Martin, Tape 1003 (nd). 
670 Author’s collection, TDS autobiographical note drawn up for Diane Jamieson, Bloodaxe Books 
(nd) 
671 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3837 ‘Report by Chairman of Housing Committee [TDS] regarding the 
Proposed Exhibition to be held in the Spring of 1961’ (n d) 
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artistic development in all forms of the Arts and City and Town Centre 
development…”672 Smith’s fellow members included the jazz musician Ian Carr (a 
member of the Emcee Five, and the group’s founder and secretary) as well as Sid 
Chaplin, Scott Dobson, and Ted Fletcher. The group was not just a talking shop – it 
commited itself to provide early funding of “up to” £40 for a film to be associated 
with the Scotswood Road Exhibition of the following year (which became the 
Blaydon Races Centenary Festival, referred to below). The film was called 
Flowering City, the shooting script written by Sid Chaplin, “a story line about two 
young people, without dialogue and commentary”.673 
 
Smith was active in promoting the arts in the work done by the city council. He 
wrote of plans to co-ordinate cultural activities, archives and the Laing Art Gallery 
and to appoint an Art Director: “The first city to make such an appointment with 
such adequate terms of reference. A city of the people for the people. Built for today 
and tomorrow’s age of leisure… My colleagues will make the city a living art 
gallery, the city streets a permanent exhibition of architecture, of landscape, of 
sculpture… so that the future generations will visit the city if for no other reason 
than to see our city treasures.”674  
He wrote of his sadness that the burdens of adulthood stripped from children their 
joy in painting, music, dance and play, but “in the age of automation these pressures 
will be… replaced by the appreciation of the things that add up to human happiness, 
so that the benefits of leisure will be the creation of a new quality in society.”675 
These views are idealistic, even utopian (and a far cry from the portrait of a hard-
nosed city boss), and an examination of some aspects of his efforts to create the 
‘living art gallery’ show failures and false starts, but they also show successes that 
have ramifications to the present.  
 
 
672 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3862 ‘Novocastrian Group’ (n d) 
673 Ibid 18 June 1961 Ian Carr to TDS on the £40; Flowering City shooting script. The storyline is that 
a male student catches sight of a female shop worker in Fenwicks and follows her round Newcastle all 
day, at a distance, before standing outside her modern Cruddas Park flat looking longingly up at her 
window. It is unclear whether the film was made. 
674 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3853 TDS to Cllr Theresa Russell (n d) 
675 Ibid. Never a stranger to hyperbole, he continued: “Just as we talk of the glories of Rome and 
Venice and Athens, we can in this city, if we apply ourselves with sympathy and diligence, together 
with the people, be the first modern city to extend the fields of culture to the ordinary man and create 
a new glory that history will say – ‘The Greatness that is Newcastle’.” 
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Smith was to attempt to place culture at the heart of the region in his support of the 
North East Association for the Arts (NEEA).  Support for the arts had become a 
feature of post-war government policy, not least by the creation of the Arts Council 
of Great Britain, a public sector organisation, in 1946 (it emerged from the wartime 
Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts), and the 1948 Local 
Government Act which allowed local authorities to levy a 6d rate for culture; and 
this support was to be given greater prominence by the creation in 1964 of the post 
of Minister for the Arts.676 In the North East the idea of a regional arts body was 
being mooted in the early 1950s, particularly by Lord Eustace Percy; in 1959 Charles 
Bosanquet, the rector of King’s College, Newcastle, contacted Smith to suggest such 
a development. 677 Smith recalled travelling the country to canvass ideas on the form 
such a body should take. He persuaded the 1960 Lord Mayor, Gladys Robson, to 
support the idea in her year of office, and also won the backing of Ted Fletcher, then 
chair of Newcastle City Council’s Finance Committee.678 A conference of interested 
parties was organised, and from this emerged NEEA in 1961, its first acting 
secretary (until 1964) being Arthur Blenkinsop, a former Newcastle Labour MP and, 
according to Vall, fitting the “character type of left-leaning cultural improver and 
politician that emerged during the inter-war years.” 679 The Association’s 
membership was diverse, by 1963 including 50 local authorities, 40 trades unions, 30 
industrial representatives, 40 other organisations and 700 individuals, a coalition 
formed in no small part through the efforts of Blenkinsop making use of his political 
contacts.680 
 
In 1964 the Arts Council asked NEEA to extend its reach to cover the counties of 
Cumberland, Westmoreland and the North Riding of Yorkshire as well as 
Northumberland and Durham; this took place in 1967 and the organisation’s name 
was changed to Northern Arts Association.681 Subsequently adopted as the Arts 
 
676 Vall (2011) op cit pp10, 102; Marwick, A, British Society since 1945 (4th ed London 2003) p38. 
The first Arts Minister was Jennie Lee. 
677 Smith, T Dan op cit p70 
678 Ibid pp70-71 
679 Vall (2011) op cit pp11, 100-101. Blenkinsop (1911-79) had been MP for Newcastle East 1945-59; 
became a Newcastle councillor in 1961 and MP for South Shields 1964-79. 
680 Ibid pp 101-102 
681 Ibid p100 
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Council’s regional agency, NEEA/NAA provided a template for the development of 
other regional arts organisations.682 
 
NEEA was seen as a pioneer in regional arts promotion, and Labour Party 
representatives such as Smith and Blenkinsop were key to its early success, but it 
should be noted that in Newcastle the council had established a Special Committee 
for the Encouragement of Cultural Activities in 1950, when the Progressive Party 
controlled the council; and the Progressives were still in power in 1956 when 
Michael Hall sought council support in establishing the Sinfonia Orchestra (first 
performance in 1958) – from 1959 the Northern Sinfonia, from 2013 the Royal 
Northern Sinfonia.683 
 
In the mid 1960s there was a possibility that Newcastle Corporation would 
municipalise the Sinfonia. It was losing money: in 1964 it was costing around 
£85,000 a year and its income was £25,000. It received £20,000 from the Arts 
Council and £30,000 from NEEA leaving a shortfall of £10,000. City Treasurer 
Frank Ireland laid out three options: for the city to subsidise the orchestra; to wind it 
up; to take it over. “The crux of the matter… should the Sinfonia be retained as a 
musical symbol in the North East?” Ireland told Smith. “If the answer is yes then the 
first alternative is the one to apply.” 684 Clearly the answer was yes, though the idea 
of a takeover continued; in 1965 the Sinfonia’s leader, Boris Brott, wrote to Smith 
that “I was glad to hear from Tom Bergman that the take-over of the orchestra by the 
city seems to be going ahead smoothly.”685 Nothing appears to have come of this. 
 
Smith saw promotion of the theatre as part of the civic responsibility, and in his 
autobiography mentions discussions with the actor and director John Neville, who 
was seeking to leave London, and with Adrian Cairns, at that time at Tyne-Tees 
Television; with Cairns he was forming tentative plans for a municipal theatre.686 
 
682 Ibid p9 
683 Ibid pp99-100; http://www.sagegateshead.com/news-and-blogs/press-releases/queen-honours-
royal-northern-sinfonia accessed 9 December 2019 
684 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3914 F Ireland to TDS, 12 November 1964 
685 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3914 Boris Brott to TDS, 12 March 1965 
686 Smith, T Dan op cit p69; TWAM DF/TDS Box 3878 28 May 1961, Cairns to TDS, 29 August 
1961 TDS to Cairns, 19 September 1961 TDS to Cairns, arranging a meeting with Wilfred Burns; 14 
February 1963 Arthur Blenkinsop to Burns on plans for civic theatre. 
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The council did acquire some of the city’s fading theatres: Smith records the 
purchase of the Palace Theatre and the Empire Theatre, for commercial rather than 
artistic purposes. 687  
 
A civic arts policy could be “an opportunity and a danger”, Smith was to write in 
1970. “Instead of creating a liberal arts movement we could easily have councillors 
dancing about forbidding this and that because they did not like it, or because they 
sensed that it was too avant-garde.”688 This did not imply that he was laissez-faire 
about facilities, in 1965 stating that “…it would have to be recognised that the siting 
of theatres and arts centres would have to be limited and concentrated into centres – 
Tyneside, Wearside, Teesside and Carlisle.”689 Artistic liberty was still to be subject 
to scientific planning. 
 
In 1965 Smith became a board member of the Flora Robson Playhouse in 
Newcastle.690 This was a somewhat old fashioned repertory theatre; in 1965 
journalist Philip Norman contrasted it brutally with the People’s Theatre. The 
People’s, wrote Norman, “prove [sic] you can be highbrow and cosy, jolly and 
instructive, studious and pleased with yourself. The Flora Robson makes you think 
of Agatha Christie and ‘coaches welcome’ signs.” By 1965 the Flora Robson 
Playhouse was threatened by a new road scheme (it was demolished in 1972); the 
scheme, commented Norman, “will be the killing bottle for second class rep steadily 
losing money. How frayed some of the acting is.”691 It had nevertheless received 
support from Newcastle council, it being agreed in 1963 that the council would make 
a grant of £5,000 (subject to the Arts Council of Great Britain matching that 
 
687 Smith, T Dan, op cit p69. The Empire site on Newgate Street was used for part of the Newgate 
Shopping Centre, itself subsequently demolished and the site redeveloped. 
688 Ibid p70 
689 Northern Echo 13 April 1965. Speech by TDS at the opening of Eston Civic Hall. 
690 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3838 Julian Herington, Managing Director of Flora Robson Playhouse, to 
TDS expressing pleasure that he has agreed to join board 29 July 1965 
691 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3877, newspaper article by Philip Norman dated 16 December 1965, paper 
or origin unknown. He went on, somewhat misogynistically, “…How they do courtesy to Women’s 
Institutes when they pick a play. Ungracious words, most of them, descended directly from sitting 
with batteries of old ladies, crinkling dry-cleaning bags.” 
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amount).692 A subsequent company based at the Flora Robson was to move to the 
newly-opened University Theatre in 1970.693 
 
Art could also be incorporated into more functional developments. “As an antidote to 
the poverty of ideas in 1958, I tried hard to introduce artists as catalysts in the 
creation of our urban houses and landscapes” he wrote in 1970.694 He was to unable 
to persuade the city architects to involve artists in the design process (an idea which 
was to be put into effect in Peterlee), but was able to bring about the installation of 
sculptures in some of the more major housing developments undertaken by the 
council.695 
 
On the 9th June 1962 the centenary of the of the events celebrated in the Tyneside 
anthem The Blaydon Races with a city festival and a recreation of the song’s coach 
journey from Balmbra’s music hall on the Cloth Market to the site of the races in 
Blaydon – the coach “Gannin alang the Scotswood Road to see the Blaydon 
Races”.696 The route passed the new housing development at Cruddas Park, one of 
the most visible achievements of Smith’s early years as council leader. 
 
The day’s activities involved bringing the guest of honour, Labour Party leader Hugh 
Gaitskell, to conduct the formal opening of The Willows at Cruddas. The function 
had three parts, wrote Smith in a briefing note: the sculpture, the landscape, and the 
opening of the flats. Gaitskell would be introduced to Kenneth Ford, the sculptor 
who won the competition to design an artwork for the development; would unveil 
the work, then walk through the newly landscaped site which would be part of “the 
new Green Belt walk into Newcastle”.697 
 
 
692 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3877 Report to Group on the Policy for the Theatre, circulated by TDS to 
councillors 10 June 1963. It is unclear whether that group was a council or a Labour Group body. 
693 Renamed Newcastle Playhouse in the 1980s and Northern Stage in 2006. 
https://www.northernstage.co.uk/mission-vision-values accessed 22 January 2020. 
694 Smith, T D, T Dan Smith: An Autobiography (Newcastle 1970) p60 
695 Ibid pp60-61 
696 Lancaster, B, ‘Sociability and the City’ in Colls & Lancaster op cit pp319-320. Geordie 
Ridley,‘The Blaydon Races’ (1862) 
697 TWAM DF/TDS Archive Box3979, ‘Notes for Mr Gaitskell for the Opening of the Scotswood 
Flats’ (n.d.). The sculpture was removed on safety grounds in 1975 (DF/TDS Box 3987 Evening 
Chronicle 11 April 1975) 
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Public art figured prominently in Smith’s ideas. Sculpture was also a feature of the 
Shieldfield flats development, and at Swan House, where a sculpture was placed to 
commemorate Sir Joseph Swan (1828-1914), the North Eastern inventor of the 
incandescent light bulb. In his autobiography Smith recounts how Sir Kenneth Swan, 
Sir Joseph’s son, wanted a memorial showing a swan in flight, to which Smith 
responded by urging a more modern, illuminated sculpture.698  
 
The Cultural Activities Committee sponsored various events: a report of February 
1965 refers to a film festival, continued support to NEAA, the sponsorship of 
orchestral concerts, and an impending arts festival, in conjunction with the 
University Arts Society, involving music of various kinds, drama, films, exhibitions 
and lectures.699 It did, however, in 1965 refuse support to the Morden Tower poetry 
venue run by Connie and Tom Pickard.700 
 
Smith also favoured the incorporation of public art into the Civic Centre under 
construction in Newcastle in the early 1960s. This on occasion led to controversy, as 
in March 1965 when he was attacked in council for reserving £87,000 for works of 
art. The building, he told councillors, “will be as great in the 20th and 21st centuries 
as are the buildings in such places as Florence, Venice and Rome.” Of the £87,000, 
he commented: “This amount represents two hours of ‘Z-Cars’. What we are 
creating will last 100 years.” 701 Art at the Civic Centre included sculptures of the 
River God Tyne and Swans in Flight, both by David Wynne, sculpted seahorse heads 
atop the tower by J R M McCheyne, glass screens by John Hutton, tapestry in the 
banqueting hall by John Piper, murals in the marriage suite by Elizabeth Wise and in 
the rates hall by Victor Pasmore.702  
 
698 Smith, T Dan, op cit p52. The process was very long-drawn out, a memorial being suggested in 
1961 and finally unveiled in 1969. TWAM DF/TDS Box 3837: 8 November 1961 TDS to Mr Craig, 
AEI; 18 December TDS to Lord Mayor (Henry Russell) stating that he has guarantors for £10,000 and 
suggesting the creation of a committee and fund for the project; 20 November 1962 Notes of 
Proposed Swan Memorial meeting, suggesting “an illuminated fountain, possibly with a statue of Sir 
Joseph Swan as a centre-piece”. Usherwood, P, Beach, J, & Morris, C, Public Sculpture of North-East 
England (Liverpool 2000) p134 
699 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3980 ‘Report on Progress and Municipal Policy’ (February 1965): an 
internal Labour Party report, though whether for the Labour Group or the City Labour Party is 
unclear. 
700 Vall, Natasha, Cities in Decline? A Comparative History of Malmo and Newcastle after 1945 
(Malmo 2007) p117 
701 Evening Chronicle 4 March 1965 p3. Z-Cars was a popular television drama about the police. 
702 Usherwood et al op cit pp93-95 
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Another scheme, suggested by Smith, was to create ‘artists colonies’ around the city. 
The first proposal was to convert disused Quayside buildings into studio and living 
accommodation for half a dozen artists; the public would be able to access the 
studios and see artists at work, and informal and formal exhibitions of their work 
could be held. He estimated the expenditure as “petty cash” – three or four thousand 
pounds, and argued that the scheme would help attract industry to the North East by 
creating an attractive quality of life: “Why do people go to Paris?”703 The suggestion 
sparked criticism, one arts lecturer pointing out that similar schemes had failed in 
north Wales and New York, and that artists didn’t like being told where to go and hat 
to do.704 The proposal appears to have been abandoned. 
 
Smith’s views on the importance of art were shared by Wilfred Burns, who in 1964 
wrote “In the City Centre, and perhaps in the city as a whole, the aim should be to 
get the most varies collection of artistic expressions… Richness and variety are the 
important features and the sculptures often need to be sited so that they are come 
upon accidentally, and as a part of the total artistic adventure known as civic 
design.”705  
 
The arts also formed part of his vision for the region as a whole. Challenge of the 
Changing North, the study published by the Northern Economic Planning Council in 
1966, stresses the importance of art to “an acceptable standard of living” but also a 
lack of new and properly equipped buildings; attention was paid to music, theatre, 
and film theatres, and the possibility of an arts festival similar to the Edinburgh 
Festival was raised. The study urged more work in planning, research and 
development of the arts to take place, in co-operation with other arts associations and 
economic planning councils.706 
 
 
703 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3982, ‘Council studios urged in ‘Left Bank’ scheme’, Daily Mail 27 July 
1964.   
704 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3982, ‘Newcastle’s Culture Plan the Wrong Sort of Patronage, say Local 
Painters’, Newcastle Journal 28 July 1964 
705 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3836 Note by Wilfred Burns 14 December 1964 
706 Northern Economic Planning Council, Challenge of the Changing North (London 1966) p46 
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Smith was later to use art and culture as a cornerstone of his efforts to develop a 
science campus at Peterlee while he was chairman of the Peterlee Development 
Corporation from 1968-70 (a period covered in detail in chapter 6). A key 
component of his concept for Peterlee was an Arts and Humanities Centre, to be 
developed with input from a variety of bodies including the Northern Arts 
Association; the centre would be, according to the NAA’s director Sandy Dunbar 
“something like a cross between the Institute of Contemporary Arts and the 
Bauhaus.”707 
 
The city and the region 
 
Newcastle’s influence was not to be solely within its own boundaries. Smith took 
pains to form cross-boundary coalitions: Newcastle was a prime mover in creating 
the regional group of authorities to run Newcastle Airport, which opened a new 
terminal building in 1967: vital for conveying an up-to-date image for the North East 
and paid for by the consortium of  Newcastle, Gateshead,  Tynemouth, Sunderland, 
South Shields county boroughs and the counties of Durham and Northumberland.708 
Similar co-operation between authorities led to the formation of the Tyneside 
Passenger Transport Authority, which came into being on 1 January 1970. 
 
Another expression of this desire to build coalitions came in 1963, when Smith for a 
time expressed interest in the formation of a North Regional Zoological Society and 
the establishment of a zoo in the grounds of Brancepeth Castle in County Durham, 
under the auspices of local authorities and the University of Durham.709 
 
But Smith failed in the logical extension of this attitude, which would have seen the 
Tyneside local authorities merged into one council for the conurbation, within a 
broader northern region. 
 
 
707 The Guardian, 5 August 1968. John Ardill,‘Total Research the aim of Peterlee Plan’ 
708 Newcastle Journal 17 February 1967 p11. The quoted words are by Airport director James Denyer. 
709 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3837 Note by TDS entitled ‘Proposed North Regional Zoological Society’ 
17 July 1963 in which he stated that Hugh Casson [1910-99, architect and designer] had promised his 
co-operation; TDS to Lord Mayor (Ald Henry Simm) 19 August 1963  
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 Responding to a 1963 Boundary Commission proposal for a two-tier county of 
Tyneside, encompassing four lower-tier borough authorities (for Newcastle, 
Gateshead, North Shields and South Shields), Smith criticised the Commission’s 
tendency to “think in isolation in old local government terms”, and while continuing 
to press for a unitary Tyneside authority he argued at the same time for more 
fundamental changes: 
“[M]y feeling is that we should forget about area reviews of local 
government boundaries and concentrate now on the wider issue of a regional 
local government unit to undertake responsibility for all the major features 
which the commission recommend their proposed Tyneside County Council 
should undertake. I think that planning should also be done on a regional 
basis. If the Government is going to go in for greater decentralization, it 
means, from a regional point of view that at last we shall be getting things 
right at the top. A regional local government organization is now needed so 
that we shall get things right at the other end.”710 
 
In 1970 in hindsight he commented “I applied all the energy and influence that I had 
in an attempt to get Tyneside Unification approved. After all, we had Teesside 
Unification, and I felt that if we could get both Tyne and Tees in the forefront 
nationally, we could lead the country and really forge ahead in advance of local 
government reform, and show what the devolution of power could yield.”711 
However, the decision regarding Tyneside was placed on hold pending the 
deliberations of the Royal Commission on Local Government in England (of which 
Smith was a member – see chapter 5). Newcastle’s representations on Tyneside 
unification, viewed with some suspicion by the other authorities, continued after 
Smith’s resignation as leader of the Labour group in 1965; and one of the tasks of 
the new Principal City Officer Frank Harris (see below) was to present the city’s 
case to a 1966 public inquiry, a job he handled badly.712 
 
Harris: the man from Ford 
 
710 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3843 Northern Echo 17 July 1963 
711 Smith, T Dan op cit pp83-84. The County Borough of Teesside was created in 1968 by a merger of 
local authorities. 
712 Elliott, J, ‘The Harris Experiment in Newcastle upon Tyne’, Public Administration 49 (2) (1971) p 
157. Harris responded poorly to cross examination by counsel for the other local authorities, who in 
his closing speech claimed that Harris’ comments on local government in the area was “insulting to us 
and our intelligence” 
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A further initiative was to review the role of the Town Clerk. In 1963 Smith713 wrote 
“My own view is that the Town Clerk’s Department should be completely re-
organised and that responsibility should be divided into the major work of the 
Department, being purely legal in character, and that the Town Clerk himself should 
have a legal qualification, but should also have qualifications in administration. 
Administrative ability being the major factor in the decision of appointment.” 
Change was necessary in order to carry out the developments proposed for the city: 
“…without the right appointment in this post, then most of our policies, in my view, 
will fall short of achievement. It is the lack of strong central co-ordination in the 
Corporation which is the major factor for the present frustrations that occur in many 
directions, and we must have an Officer who has the respect by his ability and 
authority, of his brother officers.”714 
 
The changes proposed would divide responsibility between the Town Clerk, who 
would deal with legal issues, and a new position of Principal City Officer (PCO), 
later amended to City Manager, who would head the city council’s administrative 
structure (a role which nowadays would be called chief executive or CEO).  The 
manager was expected to control the running of the council, and it was hoped that 
the appointment would allow the administrative machinery to be streamlined, with 
the cumbersome structure of committees and sub committees being reduced  as the 
PCO took on such work, allowing committees to focus on policy matters rather than 
the minutiae of administration.715  
 
The plan was approved of by the Conservative opposition, Alderman Arthur Grey 
commenting that “We believe this is an experiment which should be tried.”716 A 
special council committee chaired by Cllr Doris Starkey (and with Smith as a 
member) was set up to define the roles and recruit for the posts, and – probably also 
another innovation in local government circles – appointed an occupational 
 
713 Probably. The document cited does not have a named author, but is in Smith’s papers, is annotated 
in his hand, and the writing style is Smith’s. 
714 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3848 Note on Town Clerk (manuscript addition in Smith’s hand: ‘Original 
note, 1963’). The year may or may not be correct, but this note would appear to be the catalyst for the 
ensuing changes. 
715 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3834 Joint Sub-committee of representatives of the Finance and 
Establishment Committees, Appointment of Town Clerk (nd but circulated 16 October 1964) 
716 Newcastle Journal 1 October 1964 
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psychologist, William Isbister, to oversee the recruitment process.717 Isbister’s first 
task was to draw up a job description for the post of City Manager, based on the 
premise that “Local Government is now Big Business.” The incumbent should, 
wrote Isbister,  
 
…act as a ‘practical thinker’ as well as a ‘forward thinker’. Here, as a result 
of this thinking, we anticipate the P.C.O. being in a position to dictate rather 
than follow trends; to anticipate, advance or even initiate new legislation; to 
foresee the new policies which any new legislation may require; to foresee 
possible ‘snags’ before they arise, and before most others do. Because of his 
[sic] unique situation, with time and the position to take the broad, sweeping 
view, to act as a guide, philosopher and friend, both to his Chief Officer 
colleagues and those of near status, and to the Elected Members… They must 
come to regard him as someone to whom they may turn for objective 
advice…718 
 
The Chief Officers were not amused: “We do not accept the starting premise that 
‘Local Government is big business.’ Local Government is primarily a service to the 
ratepayers and its operation we suggest cannot be compared with… ‘big business’ 
which has essentially and primarily a profit motive.” 719And guerrilla warfare was 
resorted to, leading Isbister to complain that the chief officers were tinkering with 
the job description. “The phrases and words which I used… were measured 
deliberately and generally chosen with tremendous care and precision. Any proposal 
to change them therefore is no light weight matter but one of intellectual integrity as 
well as some significance.”720 
 
Advertisement for the post began in February 1965.721 71 applications were received, 
and among those shortlisted was Wilfred Burns – who had earlier considered leaving 
Newcastle for the post of city planning officer in Liverpool.722 Burns failed to get the 
post because, according to Smith, “I knew that Evelyn Sharp wanted him as Chief 
 
717 William Leonard Thompson Isbister (?1923-2012) 
718 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3834 Job description by W Isbister, January 1965 
719 Ibid Report of Chief Officers on the Job Description, February 1965 
720 Ibid Isbister to Doris Starkey, 15 February 1965. He went on: “Much change is painful… and I 
have no doubt that these changes we propose will be so. This, therefore, is a time for courage and 
maybe for some greatness.” 
721 The Surveyor and Municipal Engineer 6 February 1965 
722 Evening Chronicle 18 September 1962. The Liverpool job offered a salary of £5,000 compared 
with £3,500 at Newcastle, but Burns, though shortlisted, withdrew his application “Because I felt I 
would be happier due to the greater scope at Newcastle.” 
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Planner [at MHLG] and when she said to me ‘Don’t appoint him as City Manager’ 
he wasn’t appointed. He would have made the City Manager because he had all the 
qualities that were necessary…”.723  
 
The successful applicant was W Frank Harris, product planning manager for the 
Ford Motor Company. Harris was, according to Isbister, “The one candidate 
recommended… He has a firmness and decisiveness, coupled with a slight streak of 
ruthlessness, additional qualities which are considered very desirable in the 
tremendous job which faces the new Principal Officer. He is certainly very able and 
emotionally tough… A person who knows he is ‘good’, yet with sufficient social 
awareness not to let this belief cut across his relationship with others…. There is no 
evidence of emotional instability.”724 
 
The appointment caused a media stir, with The Times profiling Harris as ‘Man in the 
News’,  
Mr W Frank Harris… is described by the man who has been the driving force 
behind this appointment as ‘an efficient democrat’ By this, Councillor Dan 
Smith… means someone who recognises that there is an art gallery as well as 
an architect and a medical officer of health as well as an engineer. Mr Harris 
is said to have the right approach to life, with wide vision and outstanding 
ability… Unlike city managers in the United States, he will not be put in 
charge of the budget nor will he be the boss of the local council. The office of 
the town clerk will remain within that of the city manager, but there will be a 
separate legal department, in charge of a chief officer, which will take over 
the legal work normally undertaken by the town clerk.725 
 
The ‘efficient democrat’ was hired for £9,500 a year on a seven year contract, 
terminable after two years by either side.726 This was, according to The Surveyor, 
“one of the most interesting developments in local government administration in 
many years”, although Newcastle had been pipped to the post by Basildon UDC, 
which had redesignated its Town Clerk as Chief Executive Officer on 1 June 
1965.727  
 
723 TDS Archive Disk 18A 
724 TWAM DF/TDS 680/44 Note by the Occupational Psychologist Adviser April 1965 
725 The Times 6 July 1965 p7 
726 The Times 6 July 1965 p7. 
727 The Surveyor and Municipal Engineer 10 July 1965 p17. Not only was Basildon much smaller in 
size and population than Newcastle it was, as an urban district council, not a planning authority, and 
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“The creation of a new ‘supremo’ post of this kind goes against all British Local 
Government tradition.” “Why should a change be necessary?... Do the chief officers 
need a leader of this kind?” mused The Surveyor. Its conclusion was (perhaps 
unsurprisingly) No: the system might be creaking, and Newcastle’s decision “seems 
logical against this backcloth”, but the tendency to create new departments outside 
the fiefdoms of the engineer and surveyor were going in the wrong direction. “Is it 
reasonable to expect any single person to contain such diverse knowledge?”728 
 
Yet by March 1966 Harris had proposed reducing the council’s 37 committees to 
eight, and after long internal discussions the Parliamentary and General Purposes 
Committee in July 1967 produced a plan which could reduce the number to eleven, 
and which aimed at streamlining procedures, in particular urging brevity in agendas, 
reports and meetings.729 It was not long before Smith’s man began to display a 
Smith-like impatience: in January 1968 he was seeking (unsuccessfully) the post of 
director general of the Greater London Council, and in 1969 he left the council to 
return to the automotive sector as financial controller for Massey-Ferguson, this 
being he stated “a normal career step” influenced by Newcastle’s inability to offer a 
salary commensurate with what he could get in the private sector.730 Summing up his 
Newcastle experience, he said that “Newcastle is an example of how a local 
authority should organise itself; an example of courage in the way it abandoned 
previous ideas, for instance, the drastic reduction in committees.” But he criticised 
the continuing slowness of the committee system: “This is why I can foresee local 
government by executive. At Newcastle, I would personally rather have been at the 
disposal of the electorate.”731 
 
The ‘Harris Experiment’ could be described as having shaken up the administration 
of Newcastle. “Officers were stimulated to re-think their functions and procedures. A 
 
most development activity in its boundaries was carried out not by the council but by the new town 
development corporation. 
728 Ibid pp17-18 
729 The Surveyor and Municipal Engineer 1 July 1967 p16. It went on to comment “More power to his 
elbow” 
730 The Times 20 January 1968 p8, 23 April 1969 p25; The Municipal and Public Services Journal 25 
April 1969 p1031. 
731 The Municipal and Public Services Journal 25 April 1969 p1031. 
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climate of opinion was created whereby it was possible to introduce and experiment 
with new methods… The corporation became more adventurous; it took more risks 
in an effort to get things moving.”732 But, argues Elliott, the experiment was 
hampered by the role and powers of the post not being made clear; and the new post 
of Principal City Officer was shoehorned into an unaltered administrative system. In 
addition, little attention was given to the relationship of the PCO with other chief 
officers: as Elliott commented, “There was a contradiction in [the council’s] 
approach in wanting to have a strong executive officer, yet also trying to protect the 
powers of the individual chief officers.”733 
 
Elliott places the blame for confusion on the political leadership of the council, and 
the failure of councillors to evaluate and monitor the position and the work of the 
PCO. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this failure drew in part from the 
weakened central political leadership of the council after Smith’s resignation as 
Labour Group leader in 1965 (and from the council in 1966). Two one-year Labour 
group leaders, followed by the loss of control in 1967 to the Conservative Party did 
not provide a stable platform to evaluate Harris’ work, even had the leadership 
shared Smith’s enthusiasm for the changes and possessed his authority to adjudicate 
on any confusion about what the City Officer’s role should be. Smith’s own views 
were quite clear, telling the Sunday Times in 1965:  
 
What we were looking for was a new type of manager in local government. I 
like to think of him as an ‘implementation planner’, as novel in his ways as 
the ‘physical planner’ ten years ago. He is the man who understands the 
priorities and commercial complexities involved in translating plans into 
realities.... Most important of all is the fact that he will not be a first among 
equals like other Town Clerks. He will be the boss. 
 
The Sunday Times journalist seems to have hit the mark with the comment that 
“Perhaps most important will be the loss of the regular patronage of Mr Smith.”734 
 
Harris’ departure spelled the start of decline for the experiment in administration. He 
was succeeded by a local government insider, Newcastle’s City Treasurer Frank 
 
732 Elliott (1971) op cit p154 
733 Ibid pp 160-161 
734 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3843 Sunday Times 4 July 1965. My italics. 
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Ireland, as head of a trio of leading officers, with City Engineer Derek Bradshaw and 
Burns’ successor as Chief Planning Officer, Kenneth Galley.735 Ireland retired in 
1973 and was replaced by Derek Bradshaw, but Bradshaw retired for health reasons 
shortly after his appointment and was replaced by the third member of the troika, 
Galley. 736  
 
Just as the concept of recruiting widely for the post of City Manager was replaced by 
a return to something akin to Buggin’s turn, so too the concept of a united 
administration under clear leadership began to crumble. This is recorded in David 
Green’s Power and Party in an English City which describes the creation of power 
centres in the “symbiotic relationship” of committee chairmen and their departmental 
chief officers; the Labour Party’s own advice to local authority members was that the 
concentration of power in a few hands in local councils “will lead to a narrowing of 
political vision, unimaginative policy making, and ill-considered decisions.”737 
Suspicion of strong, perhaps over-dominant leadership, which had led to a reaction 
against Smith’s style of governance, gave way to weaker political leadership and 
something of a return to departmental satrapies. 
 
The ‘Harris Experiment’ melted away.738 That can perhaps be explained by the lack 
of a strong advocate for Harris’ role. In the absence of Smith, his successors could 
not, or did not want to stop a slide back into old ways. In attempting to create strong 
leadership to carry forward his plans, he had created a structure which lacked strong 
foundations. 
 
The ‘New Brasilia’ project also ground to a halt. Key elements of the plan had been 
executed: the new Civic Centre; a new library; the Education Precinct bringing the 
city’s tertiary colleges together (to be consolidated into Newcastle upon Tyne 
Polytechnic in 1969 and Northumbria University in 1992) ; Eldon Square shopping 
 
735 The Journal 30 July 1969 p13 
736 The Journal 28 June 1973 p7, 13 March 1974 p8 
737 Green, D G, Power and Party in an English City. An Account of Single Party Rule (London 1981) 
pp 65-74; 98-104 
738 Indeed, appeared to have been largely forgotten over the ensuing quarter century. In 1997, while 
working as a freelance journalist on local government issues, I interviewed Newcastle City Council’s 
newly-appointed chief executive officer Kevin Lavery: that Lavery had come from Price Waterhouse 
rather than from within the local government arena was presented as a huge innovation. 
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centre; the creation of John Dobson Street to enable (eventually) pedestrianisation of 
Northumberland Street; the  building of the Central Motorway East between 1972 
and 1975 to take much through traffic out of the city centre; a new library; and other 
achievements. Kings College had in the same period transformed itself into the 
University of Newcastle and embarked upon a major building programme, including 
by 1970 the University Theatre. But much was left undone. Smith’s aspirations for 
St James’ Park to be rebuilt and become an arena serving the whole city came to 
nothing.739 The vision of a traffic-segregated walkable city, with pedestrian decks 
linking shops, restaurants, galleries, offices, flats, pubs, even churches, while 
vehicular traffic moved below and out of sight, hardly began. Fragments of what was 
planned can be seen spanning John Dobson Street, but having been built in isolation, 
rather than as part of a large network, they lacked the most vital asset – people – and 
present a forlorn appearance. Elsewhere in the city, columns with no apparent 
purpose attached to buildings, a bank where the banking hall is on the first floor, 
accessible by escalator, and a door-opening leading to a precipitous drop remain as 
evidence of the split-level city.740 After the Central Motorway East, no more of the 
planned urban motorway network was built. Three, or perhaps four, reasons suffice. 
The 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequent economic downturn led to the drying up 
of funding for major projects such as urban motorways. The 1972 Local Government 
Act led to Newcastle losing its strategic planning powers in 1974 to the new 
Metropolitan County of Tyne and Wear, which had a very different vision for 
Newcastle, and one which no longer included motorways. The city began to fall out 
of love with grand scheme urban planning, with the growth of civic opposition to 
large scale demolitions. And the city had lost its most vocal and effective champion 
of grand-style planning in the person of Dan Smith – but even had he remained 
leader of Newcastle City Council, it is unlikely that he could have surmounted those 
obstacles.  
 
Conclusions 
 
739 Smith, T Dan op cit p73 
740 For columns, see for example the rear of the Primark building off Northumberland Road; the 
former Barclays Bank on Northumberland Street close to Haymarket Metro was designed for access 
at first floor level; the doorway to nowhere is visible overlooking the New Bridge Street-John Dobson 
Street junction, south of the City Library. 
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Smith’s own leadership has been praised and decried. For Elliott, writing of 
Newcastle, “None of the Labour Group leaders during the 1950s and 1960s gave a 
strong lead in policy matters. Smith was the exception and took the initiative and 
gave the political thrust in several areas which was necessary for successful policy 
making. He utilized the position but did not abuse it and retained the support of the 
Group and the Executive.”741 In addition to his leadership of the Labour group, 
Smith occupied a number of important committee chairs at various times. “The way 
he moved from one chairmanship to another was a sign of his concern to get things 
done. He saw himself as something of a catalyst exerting the political drive to push 
through important policies. A leader should not get bogged down in the 
administrative system; he should be able to concentrate on policy areas where there 
really was a need for action. This is what Smith did.”742  
 
A contrasting view of Smith’s role in early 1960s Newcastle is that of David Byrne: 
“There was no political vision of any kind set against the technical vision of the 
planners.” Smith, according to Byrne, was “as much an elite futurist as the planners. 
He did not have their technical background but his Trotskyist training had given him 
a belief in an expert elite and he was happy to transfer the identification of that elite 
… to architects and planners.”743 This is partly true, in terms of Smith’s admiration 
for and identification with the professional town planners and architects such as 
Burns (and, indeed, Poulson); but, as is argued in chapter 3, Smith’s views had 
undergone a major political shift since his Trotskyist days and his vision remained 
very much a political one. And it is misleading to claim, as Byrne did, that Smith 
was merely “the evangelistic bureaucrats’ leading groupie of the ‘60s”. 
Contemporary views were rather more complimentary, as with this description of 
Dan Smith as: 
 
now the dominant lay figure in the modern planning world, accepted by the 
leading experts as an equal. One of the leading figures in that new and now 
very respectable field… told me recently: ‘Not only is he head and shoulders 
above every lay figure, he is also miles in advance of many of the 
professionals too’… He is not only on the wavelength of modern thinking 
 
741 Elliott, J, ‘T Dan Smith in Newcastle-upon-Tyne’, Local Government Studies 1(2) April 1975 p 35   
742 Ibid p37 
743 Byrne, D, ‘The Reconstruction of Newcastle. Planning since 1945’ in Colls, R, & Lancaster, B 
(eds), Newcastle upon Tyne. A Modern History (Chichester 2001) pp 349-50 
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about planning: he is also one of the powerful modern transmitters and is 
now internationally known… An astute, and, I think, a ruthless politician, he 
has, from the beginning, realized that policies do not get carried out because 
they are good: power is essential. 744  
 
In the period 1958-1965 Smith was able to wield power to address problems he had 
identified during the long years in opposition. He introduced measures to streamline 
the city’s administrative structure, and in creating a powerful and independent 
planning department, and in recruiting Wilfred Burns to head that department, he 
transformed attitudes towards planning in Newcastle and brought about a complete 
change in the national perception of the city. Believing that the changes he had made 
would enable the plans for the city to be carried forward, in 1965 he resigned the 
leadership of the Labour group (and a year later, left the council) to become 
Chairman of the Northern Economic Planning Council, seeking to transfer the 
leadership he had given Newcastle to the North of England. In doing so, he was to 
exchange power for the chimera of power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
744 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3835 Northern Echo 27 November 1963 ‘What Newcastle Thinks Today’ 
by T L Little 
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Chapter 5: “A sort of regional prime minister” 
 
Dan Smith is economic overlord of the north of England… and he’s vowed to pull a 
depressed and old-fashioned region up by its bootstraps and thrust it into the 
twentieth century.745 
 
Origins of regionalist thinking 
Smith stated he was first drawn to ideas of regional self-government during the 
closing years of the war, in relation to debate about the future of the health 
services.746 His earliest exposure to regionalist ideas is unknown.747  
 
 Regionalism in England first emerged from the academic discipline of geography 
rather than from any great political impetus to change; in the early twentieth century 
the focus was on nationalism, typified by the Irish Question (and, to a lesser extent, 
Welsh disestablishmentarianism). Insofar as England was concerned, the Fabian 
Society raised question of regionalism in 1905 in a series of broadsides on ‘The New 
Heptarchy’, while the question was touched by Lloyd George’s ‘Home Rule all 
round’ proposals which, as articulated by Winston Churchill in a speech in 
September 1912, included national parliaments for the four home countries and 
English regional assemblies.748 The fons et origo of British regional studies was the 
geographer Patrick Geddes, whose concept of the ‘valley section’, a discrete 
geographical area encompassing mountain and forest, arable plain and seashore, 
interdependent villages, towns and cities, paved the way for individual regional 
studies. Geddes, a major influence on the nascent town and country planning 
 
745 “A sort of regional prime minister”: Eversley, D, ‘The Trouble with Regional Planning’, New 
Society 10 August 1967 p188 (his description of the role of Economic Planning Council chairman); 
Northern Region Film and Television Archive, The Pacemakers (Central Office of Information, 
1969). This film was one of a series made by the COI for distribution to foreign and Commonwealth 
broadcasters, profiling creative people in modern Britain. 
746 TDS to Anthony Seldon, 6 December 1988; Author’s collection. 
747 He may or may not, in reading and discussing the work of H G Wells with his father, have come 
across Wells’ views on local government and regionalism as expressed in Wells, H G, Anticipations 
of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought (1901; repr 
Mineola NY 1999) pp35, 57 and ‘A Paper on Administrative Areas read before the Fabian Society’ in 
Mankind in the Making (1903; repr Fairfield, IA 2006) pp278-289 
748 Lipman, V D, Local Government Areas 1834-1945 (Oxford 1949) pp 272-273; Burgess, M, ‘The 
Roots of British Federalism’ in Garside, P L, & Hebbert, M (eds), British Regionalism 1900-2000 
(London 1989) pp 34-35; Tomaney, J, ‘Anglo-Scottish Relations: A Borderland Perspective’ in 
Miller, W D (ed), Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1900 to Devolution and Beyond. Proceedings of the 
British Academy vol 128 (Oxford 2005) pp 231-248 
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movement, believed in the interconnectedness of cities and their hinterland regions, 
and that they could not be independently understood.749 
 
Geddes was vague on the issue of regional boundaries; not so C B Fawcett, whose 
Provinces of England, first published in 1919, identified two reasons for the 
devolution of parliamentary power to regional assemblies (that the national 
parliament was overworked, and demand in some parts of Britain for local 
autonomy). Fawcett believed that self-government, analogous to that of a Canadian 
province, should be extended to Wales, Scotland, and to England divided into eleven 
regions. The English regional boundaries did not follow traditional county 
boundaries, but were determined by geographical and social factors (for example, 
where possible maintaining economic and social units, and following uplands and 
watersheds rather than rivers).750 Fawcett was a north-countryman (from Staindrop 
in Co Durham), and he believed that his proposed Northern province was “a region 
distinct from any other part of England, a distinctness which is strongly aided and 
emphasized by its relative remoteness from the capital”751 with Newcastle an 
undisputed regional capital.  
 
Between the wars, “progress in advancing the cause of regional planning was largely 
limited to extending an awareness of the possibilities”, until the later 1930s when 
attempts were made to bring about a sub-regional union of the Tyneside 
conurbation.752 
 
In the north, the provincial idea was articulated, perhaps surprisingly, from a 
traditionalist and conservative viewpoint. In an introduction to a volume of essays 
edited by the former (and future) Conservative MP Cuthbert Headlam and published 
in 1939, Lord Eustace Percy, citing Bishop Creighton’s view that “English history is 
at bottom, a provincial history”, wrote that “To-day, when we are beginning to 
realize that our existing units of local administration can no longer meet all our local 
 
749 Massey, D, ‘Regional Planning 1909-1939: ‘The Experimental Era’’ in Garside & Hebbert op cit 
p62; Welter, V, biopolis: Patrick Geddes and the City of Life (Cambridge Mass 2002) pp18-19, 64-
66, 70-76; Hall (2002) op cit, pp143-156 
750 Fawcett, C B, Provinces of England (1919; revised ed London 1961) 
751 Ibid p75 
752 Hardy, D, ‘Regionalism in Interwar Britain: The Role of the Town and Country Planning 
Association’ in Garside & Hebbert op cit p87 
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needs, it is good to be reminded once again that there are larger units, marked out by 
geography and by history, which deserve some share of the local patriotism which 
we have hitherto devoted to county and municipality…The time may come when this 
Northern Province will find in a regional council the solution of some of those social 
problems which have baffled our statesmanship during recent years.”753 
 
The outbreak of war in 1939 saw the imposition of emergency regional 
administrative structures on Britain, designed to preserve the machinery of 
government in the event of an enemy invasion (a similar system had been briefly 
brought into play during the 1926 General Strike).754 Area Boards to assist war 
production were established in each civil defence region, comprising employer and 
trade union representatives, and civil servants (often the Regional Controller or 
equivalent of appropriate ministries and public bodies), and some single-industry 
committees were also established.755 However, the wide unpopularity of the 
Regional Commissioners, derided as Gauleiters, the absence of a strong political will 
to reform the pre-war local government structure, and the lack of a consensus on 
what form a replacement structure should take, together acted against any progress 
on the question.756 Those in favour of retaining a regional structure included a group 
of Conservatives headed by Cuthbert Headlam MP, who argued that it was “highly 
desirable that some kind of regional organization should be maintained.”757 
Nevertheless, the centralising impetus of the postwar Attlee government, combined 
 
753 Headlam, C (ed), The Three Northern Counties of England (Gateshead 1939) pp xi-xii; Tomaney 
op cit pp240-241. Percy had been Minister of Health and President of the Board of Education but 
sought unsuccessfully to be appointed a minister for the North East by Baldwin (p241) 
754 Lipman op cit pp278-279 
755 Smith, B C, Advising Ministers. A Case-Study of the South West Economic Planning Council 
(London 1969) pp 20-21 
756 Owen, J, ‘Regionalism and Local Government Reform 1900-1960’, Garside & Hebbert op cit 
pp49-52. The Northern Commissioner, Sir Arthur Lambert, a former Lord Mayor of Newcastle, was 
not at all in the Gauleiter mould, if Cuthbert Headlam’s opinion of him was at all reliable: “…Sir 
Arthur Lambert, whose futility strikes me more and more each time I meet him. Pray God that he may 
never be called upon to act.” (Hall op cit p256) 
757 Headlam, C (ed), Some Proposals for Constitutional Reform. Being the Recommendations of a 
Group of Conservatives (London 1946) p 133. The group of eleven authors included 4 MPs 
(Headlam, Viscountess Davidson, KWM Pickthorn and Charles Taylor), Viscount Castlereagh, G 
Kitson Clark, Maj Gen G P Dawnay, Miss A Headlam-Morley, Douglas Jerrold, Lord Phillimore, and 
Viscount Ridley. 
181 
 
with strenuous opposition to change from the established local authorities, meant 
that there was little effective pressure for change after the end of the war.758 
 
Such regional structures as existed were forced into retreat by the Conservative 
governments of the early and mid 1950s, with regional offices of many ministries 
(including the Ministry of Housing and Local Government) being closed.759 The 
Area Boards continued under the aegis of the Board of Trade in the form of Regional 
Boards for Industry. Although they were reduced to a purely advisory role in 1953, 
this role was maintained until taken over by the newly-formed regional Economic 
Planning Councils in 1965.760 
 
Hailsham and the North East 
The early 1960s saw a change in attitude towards regional structures. This was 
attributed by Brian Smith to “a mounting volume of arguments” from bodies such as 
the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) and the Town and Country 
Planning Association (the NEDC, a creation of the Macmillan Government in 1962, 
advocated the redistribution of industry on a regional basis).761 As likely a reason, 
however, was the re-emergence of economic problems in those areas that had been 
worst-affected before the war, and the determination of Harold Macmillan, Prime 
Minister from 1957 to 1963, to tackle them. A growing tendency towards 
interventionism in the last years of the 1950s was sealed by the installation of 
Reginald Maudling at the Board of Trade in 1959; and in January 1963 Lord 
Hailsham, then Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science, was given 
special ministerial responsibility for the North East.762 The North East was an area in 
which Macmillan, a former MP for Stockton on Tees, held a sentimental interest, and 
by the early sixies was again suffering unemployment rates twice the national 
 
758 Owen op cit, pp51-54; Garside, P L, ‘The Failure of Regionalism in 1940s Britain: A 
Reexamination of Regional Plans, the Regional Idea and the Structure of Government’, Garside & 
Hebbert op cit pp98-114 
759 Smith, B C op cit p33 
760 Ringe, A, Rollings, N & Middleton, R, Economic Policy under the Conservatives, 1951-64 
(London 2004) p187; Smith, B C op cit pp23-25. 
761 Smith, B C op cit p34; Mather, J, ‘Labour and the English Regions: Centralised Devolution?’ 
Contemporary British History 14 (3) (2000) p13 
762 Ringe et al op cit pp191-195 
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average.763  Sporting a cloth cap, Hailsham first arrived in the region for an extended 
visit on 4 February 1963. He was to report to the Cabinet that “The tour… was an 
immense success; I was personally greeted with warmth amounting to 
enthusiasm.”764 This did not take account of hostile comments from many Labour 
Party representatives, including Smith, who was, among other things, to pour scorn 
on Hailsham’s plans to encourage tourism in the region.765 Smith’s negative 
comments contrast with opinions about Hailsham that he was to express seven years 
later. “He had a remarkable good mind, and there was no Labour Party equivalent of 
that,” Smith was to recall.766 In his 1970 autobiography he praised Hailsham 
fulsomely: 
It is interesting that a man like Hailsham came north, and with his perceptive 
mind which could range right across the board, grasped immediately the main 
problems. During a series of visits he made an impact which was quite 
fundamental. His call was for a concentration on investment, in jobs and 
communications, and for the implementation of a growth area policy… He 
realized the worthwhileness of recreation… he also appreciated the arts as a 
regional catalyst. For the first time I was able to see a liberal-minded 
Conservative, with a knife-keen mind, operating on problems in a region 
where such problems had defied solution from the thirties up to 1963… It was 
the beginning of national recognition that man does not live by job alone; 
certainly this was a pronounced feature of Hailsham’s approach. He 
appreciated the necessity for changing a backward region such as ours into an 
advanced region, and sowing within the policy field the seeds of our own 
growth, rather than having to be continually dependent on outside aid. I think 
therefore that his contribution is to be measured not in terms of millions of 
pounds invested in motorways, but rather as a crucial step forward in regional 
thinking on the broadest possible front.767 
 
 
763 Hudson, R, Wrecking a Region. State Policies, Party Politics and Regional Change in North East 
England (London 1989) p 80 
764 TNA CAB/129/112 Visit to the North-East of England, 4th-8th February, 1963. Report by the Lord 
President of the Council and Minister for Science 
765 Northern Echo 21 February 1963: ‘“Who did Lord Hailsham think he was kidding by suggesting 
the North-East could become a ‘play-land’”? asked Newcastle’s Coun. Dan Smith last night. “The 
North-East is a good place to work in, the Mediterranean’s the place to have holidays,” the councillor 
went on. “Does Lord Hailsham think people will come from Los Angeles or Paris to the Lido of 
Trimdon Grange or something?”’ Smith’s words here contradicted his own efforts to promote tourism 
in the north-east, not to mention his own fondness for likening the Newcastle of the future to the great 
cities of the Italian renaissance. 
766 TDS Archive disc 20A 
767 Smith, T Dan, op cit pp78-79 
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Smith believed, or came to believe also that his views had some influence on 
Hailsham.768 It is however doubtful that Hailsham reciprocated Smith’s admiration. 
Reporting to Cabinet after his February 1963 trip Hailsham wrote that “This is a 
region which is sadly lacking in local leadership of the right quality.”769 The landed 
aristocracy concerned itself with rural affairs, not industry. The industrialists kept 
out of local government. The North East Development Council had “practically no 
industrial backing” and “little insight into the real problems of industry” and “suffers 
from a tendency towards political exhibitionism.”770 Local government elected 
representatives were not mentioned at all. Hailsham concluded that “There would be 
a place for a ‘Brecon’-type figure for the North-East and resident there, if the right 
man could be found. But this must await further decisions on Government 
organisation.”771 
Hailsham’s final comment above gives a tantalising hint of possible regional 
structural developments had the Conservatives won the 1964 election. He believed 
that the national government was over-centralised, and was in favour of regional 
planning, and a measure (at least) of regional devolution in England, in part as a 
result of his spell as ‘Minister for the North’. While he viewed “large nominated 
boards” as a step back from democratic control, he came to feel that “a pattern of 
regional governments taking over many of the functions of central government and 
their regional offices, and many of the duties of functional area boards and joint 
police authorities” might lead to a local government reorganisation far more 
decentralised than that of 1974.772 
 
Hailsham’s efforts in the North culminated in the publication of the White Paper The 
North East. A programme for regional development and growth – ‘the Hailsham 
 
768 TDS Archive disk 20A: “When Hailsham came… [he] was very responsive to the line that I was 
putting then, and put even more so today, that science had to have a significant part in the new 
structure…” 
769 TNA CAB/129/112 Visit to the North-East of England, 4th-8th February, 1963. Report by the Lord 
President of the Council and Minister for Science. 
770 Ibid. 
771 Ibid. Lord Brecon (1905-1976) was David Lewis, a Welsh quarry owner and director of Television 
Wales and West plucked from “complete obscurity” to become Minister of State for Welsh Affairs in 
1957; he was raised to the peerage the same year, and served until 1964. (The Times 11 October 1976 
p 15) 
772 Hailsham, Lord, The Dilemma of Democracy (London 1978) pp 180-181; On the Constitution 
(London 1992) pp86-87 
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Report’ - in November 1963.773 This announced that efforts to revive the regional 
economy would concentrate on a ‘growth zone’ comprising Tyneside, Teesside and 
county Durham east of the Great North Road (A1). Among other measures, 
incentives were offered to businesses to relocate or expand in the North East; 
investment in new roads was increased; the new towns at Peterlee and Aycliffe were 
to be enlarged and a further new town created at Washington; investment in town 
centre redevelopment was to be accelerated; and investment in housing, education, 
tourism and the arts increased. To co-ordinate the government’s work in the region 
regional offices of ministries (existing and newly-ordained) were to be brought 
together in a single building in Newcastle.774 
 
Byrne and Benneworth see the Hailsham Report as one of two “key reports” “whose 
role in ‘re-placing’ the North East within a national imagination cannot be over-
emphasized” (the other was Challenge of the Changing North, discussed below).775 
These were both drawn up at a time when regional planning was “coming into vogue 
and the decline of North Eastern industry had not played through to its climax”, but 
they drove, it is argued, the emergence of a ‘branch-plant’ economy marked by 
external control and underinvestment, together with a massive expansion in female 
employment, replacing the traditional ‘carboniferous capitalism’ of the region, the 
nexus of coal, steel, shipbuilding and engineering industries which had developed 
over the previous 150-200 years.776  
 
Robinson sees Hailsham as having had a significant impact on Smith. “The views of 
T Dan Smith may be considered an extension of Hailsham’s ideas, while it is clear 
that the wide acceptance of Smith’s ambitious - even visionary - proposals owes 
 
773 The North East. A programme for regional development and growth. Cmnd 2206 (London 1963) 
774  The North East. A programme for regional development and growth. Cmnd 2206 (London 1963) 
pp 5-7, 40-41. The ‘mini-Whitehall’ was established at Wellbar House, a new, speculatively-built 
office block on Gallowgate, in Newcastle city centre. Wellbar House was demolished in 2007. 
775 Byrne & Benneworth op cit pp110-111 
776 Ibid. The significance attributed to the two reports is highly debatable, not least because Byrne and 
Benneworth trace the emergence of the branch-plant economy to the inter-war period; Hailsham came 
late to the game. While the Hailsham Report had lasting infrastructure effects, most notably in the 
region’s road network and the creation of Washington New Town, Challenge of the Changing North 
may have marked the structural transformation of the NE economy and formalised Dan Smith’s 
aspirations for economic modernisation, but it would be hard to find evidence that it ‘drove’ anything 
at all, being published after the July1966 collapse of the Labour Government’s economic and regional 
policy. 
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much to the groundwork laid by Hailsham in 1963.”777 It is certainly true that 
Conservative politicians carried out much of the preliminary work for regional 
reforms often seen solely as the legacy of the Wilson government, and created a 
political climate in which such reforms could be carried out. It is true also that 
Hailsham’s proposals for infrastructure development shaped the north-east for 
decades to come (indeed, the motorway and major road proposals advanced by the 
report still form the basis, largely unaltered, for the region’s road network).778 
However while Smith undoubtedly admired Hailsham, his views on the future 
direction of the Northern region and the means of achieving regional transformation 
were already well-formed and articulated long before Hailsham became ‘Minister for 
the North East’. Smith was widely perceived as a political figure who had revitalized 
the idea of regional planning, one planning professional telling the Northern Echo 
that “For a decade regional planning had passed out of parlance until he rediscovered 
it. For the first time the professional felt that here was somebody on their 
wavelength. He became the catalyst for a lot of constructive thinking.”779 When the 
Architect’s Journal named Smith as one of its ‘Men of the Year’ of 1960 it was “For 
being a town councillor who sees the advantages of regional planning, new towns 
and comprehensive redevelopment and gets them into effect.”780 A form of 
regionalist agenda had been publicly aired in Smith’s paper Development Problems 
of a Regional Capital in May 1960, as noted in the previous chapter. 
The Buchanan Report 
As noted in the previous chapter, Smith had been appointed by the Conservative 
Minister of Transport, Ernest Marples, despite local opposition, to the steering 
committee for Colin Buchanan’s working group which produced the study Traffic in 
 
777 Robinson, J F F, Peterlee: A Study of New Town Development (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Durham 1978) p215 
778 The North East. A programme for regional development and growth. Cmnd 2206 (London 1963) 
779 Northern Echo 9 July 1971 
780 Architects’ Journal 19 January 1961 pp 78, 87-88. The architectural historian Gillian Darley 
believes that this plaudit for Smith was instigated by the architectural critic Ian Nairn, an admirer of 
the city of Newcastle and a staff writer for AJ (Gillian Darley, Thomas Sharp Memorial Lecture, 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 18 October 2012). Smith was to return the compliment by 
selecting The Italian Townscape by Ivor de Wolfe (pen-name of Hubert de Cronin Hastings, 
proprietor and editor of AJ) as his ‘Desert Island Discs’ book (his luxury item was a block of stone) 
(Broadcast 18 March 1968; http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/features/desert-island-
discs/castaway/d2e03039#p009y21z . Accessed 13 January 2013) 
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Towns. 781 Smith was impressed by the quality of minds he encountered on the 
steering committee, chaired by Geoffrey Crowther, who was to become an important 
contact and whose company, Trust House, was selected to run the proposed 
Jacobsen-designed hotel in Eldon Square, Newcastle. Other members included 
William Holford, whom Smith had first encountered when he was a young painter 
on the Team Valley Trading Estate in Gateshead, Henry Wells, C H Pollard and the 
engineer O A Kerensky, son of the Russian bourgeois revolutionary leader.782  
 
While Buchanan’s working group outlined radical alternative solutions – including 
massive infrastructure investment - to the problems of increasing traffic loads, the 
steering committee, whose brief eight-page report prefaced Traffic in Towns, came 
up with an equally radical proposition: the first serious post-war proposal for a 
regional planning structure. Reflecting on the major issues of urban planning and 
reconstruction posited by Buchanan’s conclusions, the committee highlighted the 
disjointed and ineffective nature of existing planning arrangements. It urged a policy 
comprising four stages: a statement of national objectives; the delineation of ‘urban 
regions’; the creation of detailed plans for redevelopment; and the execution of the 
plans.783 Such a policy would require a new administrative machinery which “should 
take the form of a number of Regional Development Agencies, one for each 
recognisable ‘urban region’ (and not therefore necessarily covering the whole 
country). The mandate to the Regional Development Agency should be to oversee 
the whole programme of urban modernisation in its region, in the sense of seeing 
that it got done, but not to take over those parts of the whole that are already being 
effectively done… by the existing authorities.” The RDA should have “far reaching 
legal powers” and be the channel for development grants. “We envisage the Agency 
 
781 TDS Archive disk 14B. “That caused hell in the ranks of the Tories. Elliott and them were bloody 
foaming, they did what they could to stop me going, and I nearly didn’t go on it….” ‘Elliott’: (Robert) 
William Elliott (Lord Elliott of Morpeth) (1920-2011), Conservative MP for Newcastle North 1957-
1983. 
782 Henry Wells (d. 1971) was a chartered surveyor and deputy chairman of the Commission for New 
Towns (later, as Sir Henry, Chairman of the Commission and of the Land Commission); Sir (Charles) 
Herbert Pollard was a former City Treasurer of Hull and an expert on municipal finance. Apart from 
his illustrious parentage, Oleg Kerensky (1905-1984) achieved some renown as one of the two chief 
designers of the Dome of Discovery at the 1951 Festival of Britain. 
783 Traffic in Towns. A study of the long term problems of traffic in urban areas (London 1963), 
‘Report of the Steering Group’ (unpaginated), paragraphs 43-47 
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being appointed by a Minister… and organising itself on business lines, acting 
through a General Manager rather than a series of committees.”784  
 
Such a model was clearly based on the New Town corporations, and presumably 
drew on the experience of Henry Wells at the CNT and as a former chairman of the 
Hemel Hempstead Development Corporation, but applied on a much wider scale, 
and in its advocacy of regionalist solutions the committee may well have been 
influenced by Smith.785 Not that the government was eager to adopt such a course. 
The Surveyor records that at the launch of the Buchanan Report, “The politicians, 
particularly the Minister of Transport, seemed rather apprehensive that they were 
acting as midwives to a child which could easily get out of hand”.  As for the 
Crowther committee’s suggestion of RDAs, Marples and Sir Keith Joseph, Minister 
for Housing and Local Government “said that it was not proposed to implement this 
suggestion at present, and Mr Marples emphasised that he hoped that local 
government reorganisation would produce organisations capable of applying the 
Buchanan principles to their towns and cities – ‘if not then the Government will try 
something else.’”786 The government was not alone in its reservations about the 
RDA proposals; there was ‘far from unanimity’ when they were discussed at a 
conference on ‘People and Cities’ organised by the TPI and the British Road 
Federation shortly afterwards.787 Smith, unsurprisingly, defended the committee’s 
stance, arguing a need for regional agencies to oversee major services such as 
transport, industry and education as a whole and not as separate issues, adding 
 
I believe we should go further and develop the existing local government 
machine with its democratic structure and tradition to allow it to operate over a 
sufficiently large regional area to achieve the necessary efficiency.788 
 
 
784 Ibid paragraphs 49-50 
785 This is supposition; such minutes relating to the Crowther Committee that I have seen do not 
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786 The Surveyor and Municipal Engineer 30 November 1963 pp1495-1496. The ‘something else’ 
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787 Traffic Engineering and Control 5(9) January 1964 pp551-553. Another critic of the proposal was 
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36) 
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At the Town Planning Institute’s conference in July 1964 he went further, stressing 
the extreme urgency of a regional structure and national plan, and a focus on 
understanding what a national plan was to consist of.: 
 
Without a National Plan there cannot be adequate planning of any kind, for 
motor cars, education, or any other services… … I suggest we must have a 
recognition of what is meant by a national plan. If we do not get this definition 
right, then events will overtake us so rapidly that not only will our cities choke, 
but our national economy will choke.789 
 
Alluding to a previous speaker’s criticisms of the Crowther Report and likening the 
absence of planning to a recent outbreak of typhoid in Aberdeen, he continued: 
 
We have now to examine the situation of city centres and industrial location 
and a national plan just as urgently as the medical officer in Aberdeen a couple 
of weeks ago had to examine the typhoid outbreak. He did not call a committee 
together to discuss the democratic rights of typhoid bacteria. He took action…  
 
The time has passed for discussion. Whichever government we have, we must 
have a national plan. The first job it must do is to set a boundary commission, 
to investigate … how some form of regional structure, involving all regional 
services and related to a national plan, can be instituted as quickly as 
possible.790 
 
Conservative precedent 
The Conservative government of the early 1960s did hold out the promise of a kind 
of revolution in regional administration, foreshadowing that which was to occur 
under the post-1964 Labour government. The catalyst for the proposed changes was 
Edward Heath, who by 1963 was planning major reforms, as reported in the Sunday 
Times: “Under Heath, if present plans mature, Britain will be administratively split 
into large coherent sectors, broadly on the lines of the National Health Service or 
Civil Defence Regions. In each of these a regional capital will be nominated and a 
regional development committee set up to combine and co-ordinate industry, 
 
789 Journal of the Town Planning Institute 50 (7) (1964) p 316. 
790 Ibid. The final paragraph of Smith’s response to the addresses by Professor Mackenzie and Sir 
Richard Nugent refers to “not just the boundaries we have known… the services we have known.” It 
may be that the word ‘known’ is an erroneous transcription of ‘now’, which would seem a more 
normal thing to say in the context. 
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housing, transport, energy and planning for the whole area” and staffed by “senior 
officials of energy and imagination.”791  
 
These new bodies would work “with a new regional body, embracing local 
authorities, universities, development corporations, and a whole section of industrial, 
commercial, financial and social organisations.”792 Heath’s super-department was 
described by Campbell as being “a precursor of the Department of Economic 
Affairs.”793 Regional policy was a core responsibility, and Heath’s belief in 
interventionism spanned party lines. “An expanding economy requires a more even 
distribution of economic activity throughout the country. This is the only way to 
obtain consistent expansion without congestion, without shortages, without inflation 
and without the waste of unused resources” he told the House of Commons upon the 
publication of Hailsham’s White Paper on the North.794 This extended from the 
economic to the political, Heath telling Richard Crossman “I’ve just spent five years 
going round England and I can’t tell you how they all hate central government… 
Regionalism is the great thing. We’ve got to concede this to people if we want to 
endear ourselves to them.”795 The regional changes brought about by Labour after 
the 1964 election took place in “a similar political climate”, and the Conservatives, 
had they won, had also promised expanded regional policy provision.796 
 
The Department of Economic Affairs and the Regional Economic Planning 
Councils 
The Regional Economic Planning Councils (and the Regional Economic Planning 
Boards, which the Councils shadowed) were the child of the Department of 
Economic Affairs (DEA), arguably founded as a vehicle for George Brown in 
1964.797 Along with the Ministry of Technology (Mintech), the DEA was to 
 
791 TWAM TDS Archive box 3835. ‘Home Rule for the Regions?’, Peter Wilsher, Sunday Times 27 
October 1963 p15. 
792 TWAM TDS Archive box 3835. ‘Home Rule for the Regions?’, Peter Wilsher, Sunday Times 27 
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encourage growth: “The DEA was intended to prove that it was Labour, the Party of 
planning, that really knew how to plan.”798 Its foundation sought to strengthen 
economic policy which many in the Labour Party felt “was too much subordinated to 
the financial considerations of the Treasury.”799 Nevertheless, the lines of 
demarcation between the DEA and the Treasury were ill-drawn – a ‘Concordat’ 
drawn up by the Brown and the DEA to formalise relations was never formally 
accepted by either James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Harold Wilson 
- although Edmund Dell, who served as Under Secretary of State at the DEA 1967-
68, summed Wilson’s views on the issue: “The DEA… was the department for 
promoting ‘socialism’, and the Treasury the department for managing capitalism.”800 
A different view is taken by Janet Mather, who, interpreting Labour history in the 
light of conflicting centralising and pluralistic strands in the Fabian tradition, saw 
Wilson’s approach to state polity as centralist and ‘statist’, in opposition to the 
devolutionist sympathies of Brown and William Rodgers.801 “The failure of Wilson’s 
enterprise necessitated the downfall of Brown’s and Rodgers’s ambition. This meant 
that the dichotomy between the two strands of Labour thought was never exposed in 
the 1960s.”802  
 
The key weapon of the DEA in promoting growth was to be the National Plan; 
through this, Britain would be able to emulate the French economic miracle. The 
Economic Planning Boards and Councils were established to provide regional 
surveys and plans which would inform the national effort (initially, the EPBs were 
intended to prepare the regional plans, but in March 1966 responsibility was 
transferred to the EPCs. This was the last time the Councils would be given anything 
of consequence to do).803 The naming of the new Councils was sensitive. Brown 
wanted to call them Planning Councils, but the word ‘Economic’ was added to sooth 
the fears of local authorities (grouped together in consultative regional planning 
 
of Brown and Callaghan simultaneously. However, Ben Pimlott stresses Harold Wilson’s 
commitment to planning and his belief that Brown’s National Plan could have worked, had it not been 
for external factors: Pimlott (1993) op cit pp 360-364 
798 Dell, E, A Strange Eventful History. Democratic Socialism in Britain (London 2000) p 336 
799 Brown, G, In My Way (Harmondsworth 1972) p87 
800 Ibid, p 92; Dell op cit p337 
801 Mather op cit p11 
802 Ibid p12 
803 Pearce, D C, ‘The Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Council 1965-1979’, Garside L, 
& Hebbert op cit, p129 
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councils), anxious lest the new bodies trespass on their land-use planning 
responsibilities. The word ‘Economic’, Brown believed, would “leave enough 
ambiguity… for our scheme to go ahead without too much fuss. My hope was that, 
as time went on, the connection between planning for the economic development of 
an area and planning for its physical development would become so obvious that the 
two would naturally fuse.”804  
 
Legend has it that Smith spent the night of the 1964 General Election, and some time 
afterwards, waiting for the telephone call from Harold Wilson offering him a Cabinet 
post.805 That call never came, and it was not until some weeks later that he was 
sounded out by William Rodgers, who explained the proposed regional system and 
“said that in my view the key man in each region would be the chairman of the 
council. I put it to him that for this reason the obvious place for him in a region 
would be as chairman… I added, however, that an alternative might be if there was a 
place for him at the centre, ie outside the North-East.”806 This took place before 
nominations for the post of chairman were formally invited: the names of five other 
men were put forward, but none as given serious consideration.807 Membership of 
the first tranche of regional councils was decided upon in February 1965, Brown 
refusing to allow local authorities to nominate members so that the new bodies 
would develop a character of their own, rather than being assemblies of local 
delegates.808 Rodgers, who carried out the spadework, reported to George Brown that 
 
804 Brown op cit pp102-103  
805 I am grateful to John Charlton, who as a young Labour Party activist spent some time with Smith 
on the election evening, and was able to confirm this. 
806 TNA EW7/134 WT Rodgers to First Secretary [George Brown], 18 November [1964].  In advising 
Smith that the post of chairman was unpaid, Rodgers also proffered the unfortunate advice that “it 
might not be in his best long-term interest to give up all his present personal responsibilities. He 
implied that this was his view also.” 
807 TNA EW7/134 Miss B R Williams to Mr Emanuel 23 November 1967. The five other nominees 
(and nominating bodies) were Sir H Mullens (Federation of British Industries), J H Robson (Lord 
Chancellor), J H Harper (TUC), Sir N Garow (County Councils Association) and Andrew 
Cunningham (CCA). Williams noted that Cunningham “is currently a member of the Northern 
Council but neither Council nor Board Chairman favours his retention in view of his antagonistic 
attitude.”  
808 Brown op cit p102. “I refused to have nominations or appointments from the existing local 
authorities for the new regional planning councils because I’d seen what happened when this sort of 
thing was done in the past – it would have been the Treasury’s list of the good and the great all over 
again. Also I didn’t want the new councils to represent local authorities – I wanted them to have a 
character of their own.” Recommendations were accepted from the local authority associations, “but 
[I] insisted on retaining the right to decide who should be appointed… We worked out elaborate 
formulas which varied for each council – so many local government people, so many industrialists, so 
many trade unionists, and so many totally non-representative people.” 
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“there is every prospect of having excellent councils in the North and North West” 
(and, rather more tepidly, “I am reasonably satisfied that the Council for the West 
Midlands will do a useful job.”)809 
 
Smith had claimed that he was approached by George Brown for assistance in setting 
up the DEA shortly after the 1964 election. They met at the Carlton Tower Hotel the 
week after the election: “George having been too busy and had a drink or two…  the 
discussion was about the DEA, setting up the DEA and what I wanted to do… and at 
the end of it George said to me, ‘I want you to go into Whitehall on Monday 
morning and take steps to set the Department up’ and I was troubled… I thought 
how the hell do I do that and I was genuinely upset.”810 Brown’s drunken promises 
did not materialise in a job for Smith. 
 
Brown’s announcement that Smith was to chair the Northern Economic Planning 
Council brought some criticism, most notably from Edward Heath, who described 
Smith as “a controversial figure” and quoted him as saying that “The democratic 
vote is no way to get the sort of changes that we need in the North.”811 Nor was the 
structure universally popular – a former mayor of Middlesbrough commenting that 
“We are witnessing the birth pangs of a new form of government – regional 
government by little Soviets.”812 The government was concerned not to alarm local 
government, with William Rodgers, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at 
the DEA, reassuring them that “Regional government has no place in our 
vocabulary.” Smith was to advance a different agenda, describing local authorities as 
“the modern counterpart of feudal barons” and voicing the hope that the Economic 
 
809 Ibid p 103; TNA EW7/194 WT Rodgers to First Secretary [George Brown] 10 February 1965. 
810 TDS Archive disk 19A. Ada Smith was also recorded in the conversation, commenting that Brown 
“was a little bit tipsy, I suppose. He was very ebullient.” I have found no evidence that Smith was 
actively involved in the establishment of the DEA, prior to his appointment as Chairman of the 
Northern Economic Planning Council. 
811 The Times 26 February 1965 p 12. Smith claimed he was misquoted and had said that democracy 
alone was not enough. 
812 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3836. Yorkshire Post, 20 January 1966. Sir William Crosthwaite, five 
times Mayor of Middlesbrough went on: “Keep a sharp eye on those regional economic planning 
councils because they could well be developed into some form of regional government.” He had 
opposed the wartime regional framework: “I opposed it then and often sidestepped it. I made it clear 
that at the end of hostilities I would bitterly oppose its continuation or extension. It is altogether 
wrong.” 
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Planning Councils were the first step towards elected regional governments.813 His 
view was shared by George Brown, who was to write that “I wanted these councils 
to be not only consultative bodies, but also embryos of something that could become 
a new form of regional government. This was all anticipating the Maud Report on 
Local Government, but I was quite sure even then that local government would have 
to be reorganized and take on a new character.”814 
 
The new Northern Economic Planning Council covered a large area of northern 
England, comprising the geographical counties of Northumberland, Durham, 
Cumberland, Westmorland and the North Riding, extending from the North Sea to 
the Irish Sea, and from Berwick upon Tweed to the northern fringes of York. At its 
launch in March 1965, Rodgers was also careful to scotch any impression of the new 
regional structure as a panacea, saying it would be a “great mistake for anyone to 
believe that in weeks or months they could cure problems which had accumulated in 
over 100 years of industrial decline”.815 The creation of the regional Economic 
Planning Councils was not a question of separatism, or of North versus London, nor 
even “competitive co-existence between regions, but of choosing regions which are 
effective from a planning point of view and seeing what contribution they can make 
to our overall economic plan.”816 The three main aims of the EPCs, according to 
George Brown, were to assist in formulating a National Plan; to advise on steps for 
carrying out the regional plan; and to advise government on the regional effects of 
national economic policies.817 However even at this inaugural stage Dan Smith was 
envisaging a wider role for the Councils: “This job is going to require both economic 
and physical planning. It will plan for the long term prosperity of the North-East 
[sic].”818 
 
 
813 The Observer 6 December 1964. Rodgers was, however, as enthusiastic about the regionalist 
project as Brown, and was later (1980) to confirm that there was an intention that the new machinery 
would lead ultimately to elected regional councils (Mather, J, ‘Labour and the English Regions: 
Centralised Devolution?’ Contemporary British History 14 (3) (2000) p 17) 
814 Brown op cit p102. From the context it is almost certain that Brown is referring to the Royal 
Commission on Local Government in England, chaired by Lord Redcliffe-Maud (Sir John Maud) 
1966-69, rather than the earlier Committee on the Management of Local Government, chaired by Sir 
John Maud 1965-67. 
815 Sunderland Echo 20 March 1965 
816 Ibid 
817 North Daily Mail 19 March 1965 
818 Ibid 
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Early in his chairmanship, Smith was to voice considerable support for the new 
regional structures in a broadcast for BBC radio. One of the most important points 
about the new Economic Planning Councils, he said, was the links they provided 
between government thinking at a national level and regional perspectives. These 
links would give the regions “for the first time” a voice in the formulation and 
review of the anticipated National Plan; and, he continued, “[a] Britain which can 
harness the qualities available within its Regions will begin to build, at all levels, 
interest in the formulation of National Policy.”819 
 
By September 1965, Smith stated that the North “was well in front of other regions 
and… had made more progress in five months that he had thought possible.”820 His 
early optimism is reflected in his responses to a DEA study on Cumberland and 
Westmorland, which recommended long-term improvements in the sub-region such 
as a barrage across the Solway and the designation of the Carlisle/Solway area as an 
economic growth point. The report’s anticipation of the developments as taking 
place in the 1980s or 90s was denounced by Smith as “too far in the future. To speak 
of 1980 or 1990 is like getting to the moon. We need much more operative dates. We 
shall certainly attempt to improve on those given and I am certain that long before 
then the kind of development outlined is going to take place.”821 
 
Similarly, his reaction in January 1966 to the announcement of a five-year 
programme of pit closures by the National Coal Board displayed an optimistic belief 
in the power of economic planning. Addressing the planned closure of 45 collieries 
with the anticipated loss of 30,300 job in the north east, Smith commented “There 
are at present 21,000 jobs in the pipeline for the North-East and the average number 
of new male jobs is running at 11,000 a year… With these new jobs and the NCB’s 
 
819 TNA EW7/282, transcript of broadcast ‘Planning for Tomorrow’s People’ by TDS, broadcast 
Saturday 15 May 1965 
820 Yorkshire Post 4 September 1965. His confident claims followed an NEPC meeting in which a 
working party had been set up to prepare a response to the National Ports Council’s recommendations 
with regard to the Tyne and the Tees, but also to prepare a long term  regional ports policy: “…it 
means that in the future, instead of the National Ports Council telling us how to run our ports, we will 
have a policy of our own which is much better than having to react to other people’s policies. 
821 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3836 Daily Telegraph 11 January 1966. No such developments ever 
took place. 
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re-deployment methods, I believe the problem in this part of the world can be 
effectively dealt with. There is no crisis here.”822 
 
Early initiatives were also taken in public transport. A study group was set up by the 
NEPC to examine the feasibility of an integrated public transport system on 
Tyneside, with the possibility of extension to the entire region. A similar initiative in 
1948 had failed as a result of opposition from individual municipal undertakings and 
the Northern General Transport Company. The Northern Echo commented that 
“[t]he position is entirely different today when the regional tide is flowing very 
strongly and regional administrative apparatus exists within the framework of a 
national plan.”823 
 
1966 July measures 
The General Election of March 1966 provided a safe majority for the Labour 
government which might have permitted it to press ahead with more vigorous 
regional policies. Already, though, signs of retrenchment may have been visible. 
Responsibility for drawing up regional studies (to feed into the National Plan) was 
transferred from the Economic Planning Boards to the EPCs.824 The government had 
committed itself to the former, once approved; but reports by the Councils, according 
to Mather, “were clearly intended to be less official – and thus not binding upon 
government. This suggests that less than two years after the launching of the scheme 
the government was beginning to distance itself from it.”825 Economic problems, 
particularly those relating to the stability of the pound, rapidly brought any surviving 
honeymoon period to an end. Brown referred to “repeated doses of vast deflation” 
forced on the government by the Treasury, and recalled “I started to feel that the 
Prime Minister had never really intended to allow the DEA the degree of freedom 
from Treasury control which was imperative if our ideas were to be carried out.”826 
Brown’s urging of devaluation of the pound was ignored with the institution of the 
 
822 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3836, Yorkshire Post 11 January 1966 
823 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3836, Northern Echo 11 February 1966. The initiative ultimately gave 
rise to the formation of the Tyneside Passenger Transport Executive, prototype for the passenger 
transport executives for the post-1974 metropolitan county councils including the Tyne and Wear 
PTE, and the organisation that began the process that resulted in the creation of the Tyne and Wear 
Metro system.  
824 Mather op cit pp 18-19 
825 Ibid 
826 Brown op cit p104 
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deflationary ‘July Measures’ (July 1966), and although the First Secretary made one 
of his many threats to resign over the issue (and was persuaded to stay), his policy of 
planned growth, with its regional dimensions, was effectively dead. 827 Brown 
remained at the head of the DEA for another year, before taking up the role of 
Foreign Secretary, being replaced by Michael Stewart. The main champion in 
government for an active regional policy, and Smith’s closest friend in government, 
had abandoned the field. “The DEA… effectively came to an end when I left,” 
claimed Brown. “Although it lingered on for a bit under other Ministers… it was 
never again of much significance in Whitehall.”828 
 
Challenging of the Changing North 
In October 1966 the Northern Economic Planning Council published its magnum 
opus, Challenge of the Changing North, a survey-cum-plan designed to feed 
information into the defunct National Plan, addressing issues of population, 
employment, industry, manpower, environment, housing, communications, 
construction, education, leisure, tourism and health and welfare.829 This was 
“prepared hurriedly” (largely by NEPB staff), and much of its content based on 
outdated information – figures relating to coal mining collated before the NCB 
closure programme of 1965 was announced, and much of it prepared before the July 
1966 deflationary measures.830 Hudson points out the more ambitious “intentions” of 
Challenge over the Hailsham plan: a concentration on “quality” of growth, the need 
for R&D and white collar employment, higher productivity, and the importance of 
moving “from an excessive concentration on heavy industries with a declining need 
for labour… towards a more diversified, better balanced and more resilient 
economy” without examining too closely how these desirable outcomes were to be 
attained.831 “It was not considered what would happen if the state lacked the required 
 
827 Ibid, pp 106-108; Morgan op cit pp262-266 
828 Brown op cit p109. “When the Prime Minister finally killed it [in 1969]… there wasn’t much left 
to kill.” Although Brown’s own departure for the more prestigious, if largely decorative, role of 
Foreign Secretary had arguably hastened the decline of the DEA, he was unrepentant: “Everybody in 
the Department knew how hard I had fought… and realized, I think, that having been defeated I 
should have let them down more by staying at the DEA than by going.” 
829 Northern Economic Planning Council, Challenge of the Changing North (London 1966). The 
NEPC was the first EPC to publish a regional study. 
830 Hudson op cit pp 88-89 
831 Ibid, pp 88-89; Northern Economic Planning Council, Challenge of the Changing North (London 
1966) p 53. Smith had been actively engaged in Newcastle in projects to encourage progress of the 
kind highlighted as desirable in Challenge of the Changing North; and he was to do so again as 
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powers and resources.”832 Even had Challenge provided the most detailed feasibility 
studies and implementation plans, however, it would have made little difference to 
the document’s reception, given the change in national economic and political 
circumstances.  
 
In November 1966 Smith had written to the First Secretary proposing a meeting 
between NEPC members and ministers from all departments affected by 
recommendations in Challenge of the Changing North. A meeting was arranged with 
Stewart for 12 January, Smith being accompanied by NEPC member Sir Sadler 
Forster who, wrote NEPB Chairman Jim Robertson, “is usually a restraining 
influence in the Council, who endeavours to keep the Council from overstepping its 
terms of reference and from involving itself in unprofitable activities.”833  
 
Nevertheless, the Newcastle DEA office warned Whitehall that both Smith and his 
council members were increasingly disillusioned. NEPC was “not content” that its 
recommendations be discussed in isolation with  individual ministers and 
departments but should be seen  as part of comprehensive and interdisciplinary 
process of regional development. The proposal for a Technological University on 
Teesside was cited, which NEPC members considered should not just be seen as a 
means of producing more scientists and technologists,  but also take account of  “the 
need of Tees-side for a higher educational centre to enhance the cultural (in the 
widest sense) environment there and to make it more attractive to the type of person 
whom the region is seeking to attract from the south.”834 
 
The DEA was concerned to preserve its role as the link between the EPCs and 
central government, but that to reject the Northern request “would cause the Council 
sharp dissatisfaction and it may be thought best to concentrate on the practical 
considerations.” Reluctance to allow the NEPC to meet ministers en masse was seen 
 
chairman of the Peterlee Development Corporation. At Newcastle City Council and at Peterlee 
Development Corporation he had power; at the NEPC he did not. 
832 Ibid p89 
833 TNA EW7/644 Brief for meeting of 12 January 1967 between the First Secretary [Michael 
Stewart] and TDS. Forster was chairman of the English Industrial Estates Corporation which oversaw, 
inter alia, and had its headquarters at, the Team Valley Trading Estate in Gateshead. 
834 TNA EW7/644 Brief for meeting of 12 January 1967 between the First Secretary [Michael 
Stewart] and TDS 
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by Smith, if not by some other NEPC members, as showing a lack of enthusiasm for 
regionalism “as he sees it” and he was disappointed by the lack of attention some 
ministers were giving to considerations of regional development policy and in 
particular at the lack of consultation from the Ministry of Fuel and Power about 
North Sea Gas. “He also feels, and the feeling is strongly shared by his Council as a 
whole, that Regional Councils are not sufficiently consulted in the formative stages 
of policy.”835 
 
Smith was, the DEA briefing continued, showing “a marked degree of 
disillusionment and disappointment” about the way regional planning policy was 
developing, and the role of the Planning Councils, and was hinting at resignation 
(“although one should not take this too seriously”) if a change did not take place 
within a year or eighteen months.836 
 
Robertson and the Newcastle DEA were clearly concerned that the EPCs might be 
exceeding their remits. Robertson wrote that the NEPC was “all at sea” following the 
completion of Challenge of the Changing North even though Smith had given its 
various working groups “ambitious, though sometimes ill-defined” tasks.837 He 
urged the Department to speed up the production of guidelines for the councils “and 
to give them clear directions about what is and (equally important) what is not 
expected from Councils. It would be desirable for this to be given a considerable 
degree of precision…”838 
 
Smith was able to persuade Michael Stewart in January 1967 that the NEPC should 
meet ministers collectively rather than individually to discuss Challenge of the 
 
835 TNA EW7/644 Brief for meeting of 12 January 1967 between the First Secretary [Michael 
Stewart] and TDS 
836 Ibid. The attitude of some Ministers also caused resentment. Smith was “nettled… considerably” 
by the words used by Arthur Greenwood in rejecting the idea of joint ministerial/council meetings, 
and Anthony Crosland, pressed by Smith on the Teesside university issue, “more or less said that it 
was nothing to do with the Planning Council.” (TNA EW7/644 JG Robertson to AW Peterson, 15 
December 1966) 
837 TNA EW7/644 JG Robertson to AW Peterson, 15 December 1966. One such task was the setting 
up of a working group to examine the impact of Britain joining the EEC on the region (TNA EW4/65 
NEPC press release, 5 December 1966) 
838 TNA EW7/644 Brief for meeting of 12 January 1967 between the First Secretary [Michael 
Stewart] and TDS 
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Changing North. This new procedure “could lead to real results in comprehensive 
regional planning.”839 
 
Nevertheless, the Government response to Challenge was to be a disappointment, 
with First Secretary Michael Stewart writing that “I am sure your Council will agree 
that a great deal of further collection of data is needed in order that your Council can 
assess… the economic future of the region as a whole”, preparatory to the production 
of a “general planning strategy”. Stewart went on to stress the region’s economic 
strengths, including the highest per capita for manufacturing industry, and the 
highest percentage of scientists and technologists in the workforce of any region 
outside the south east. The need to give priority to balance of payments placed limits 
on public investment, and proposals for a Teesside university – which Stewart had 
told the House of Commons on 24 February 1965 might be an exception to the 
moratorium on creating new universities – were now “in cold storage”.840  
 
Broader regional planning interests shared Smith’s gloom. If anything, the North 
Regional Planning Committee, an advisory body comprising local authority 
members and officers which had always looked upon the NEPC with some suspicion 
suspecting it (quite rightly) of wishing to trespass on its physical planning remit, 
expressed the greater outrage at a joint meeting in September 1967. The Planning 
Committee voiced “deep disappointment at the attitude displayed by the Government 
in both the reply to the Regional Study and the meeting with Mr P Shore. It 
concerned them that the Government were not prepared to devolve any power to the 
regions and were also so far unable to give any indication of the future levels of 
population, industry and investment to be expected in the region.” They believed that 
 
839 TNA EW4/65: Briefing note for First Secretary’s visit to Newcastle 2 June 1967; NEPC press 
release, 6 February 1967 
840 TNA EW4/65 draft letter from Michael Stewart to TDS attached to TL Beagley to J G Robertson 
23 February 1967. The strength of manufacturing output was attributed to the concentration of 
capital-intensive industries such as steel and chemicals in the region. The 1961 census found that the 
North had 13 qualified scientists and technologists per 1,000 employees, equalling the figure for the 
south east. Greater detail was given in TNA EW7/673 E Martindale (Mintech) to RJ Monk (DEA) 8 
February 1967. Martindale stated that the North had 13.2 qualified scientists and technologists per 
100 employees, compared with a Great Britain average of 10.8, and higher than all but two standard 
regions (neither of which was London and the SE). The North had faster than average growth in the 
leading four of the six ‘manufacturing orders’, including engineering, electrical goods and metal 
goods. “It is suggested” commented Martindale “that the NEPC might be invited to undertake a more 
detailed study in support of their belief that the Region’s industry is seriously deficient in the newer 
technologies.” 
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“long-term regional planning could not take place in this situation” and that dialogue 
between the region and the centre was “now destroyed.” The government’s 
commitments to new towns in the SE and Midlands, and the mooting of growth areas 
on Severnside, Humberside and Tayside led the Committee to feel that the North 
“seemed to be completely ignored or regarded as no more than a reservoir of 
manpower available to feed more prosperous regions.”841 
 
Smith attempted to soothe this anger, refusing to accept that dialogue with central 
government had finished and stating that “it must continue if the region was to have 
any future at all”. The NEPC shared the concern of the Planning Committee about 
investment in growth areas and “determined to press for major growth points such as 
Teesside and Solway in Northern Region.” 
 
Disillusionment 
At meetings with Stewart in January and April 1967, Smith expressed concern about 
the future of the Council and a growing sense of frustration, which he said was 
shared by his colleagues, at a perceived lack of consultation by Government, and by 
the tendency of some departments to pay little attention to regional considerations. 
Particular issues of concern included Teesside university deferral and the 
London/Teesside air licence being allocated to Luton rather than Heathrow; while 
uncertainty about the objectives “and general usefulness” of the council  made it 
difficult for the NEPC to get whole-hearted co-operation from local planning 
authorities in drawing up a regional strategy.842 
 
Smith was anxious to press ahead with a comprehensive regional plan (but not “his 
more responsible members”, it was noted), but following the meeting with ministers, 
on 18 April 1967, agreement was reached on a work programme for the NEPC on a 
development strategy dealing with industrial and population growth, 
communications and environmental improvement. The main aim was to plan to 
offset the decline of the older industries in the North East and to ensure that 
 
841 TNA EW7/673 Minutes of Link Meeting between NEPC and North Regional Planning Council 19 
September 1967. Peter Shore had taken ministerial responsibility for the DEA in August 1967. 
842 TNA EW4/65: Briefing note for First Secretary’s visit to Newcastle 2 June 1967 
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Teesside, which had a survey and plan already in progress, did not get out of balance 
with the rest of the region.” 843  
 
The April meeting had been seen by DEA officials very much as an exercise in both 
placating and restraining Smith: Stewart was warned that the answers agreed upon 
by the various departments to the NEPC complaints “may not be regarded as 
particularly satisfactory” and he was advised to begin – after flattering words of 
appreciation and reiteration of government commitment to regional planning – by 
starting with the most favourable responses.844 This was to be followed by a series of 
obfuscations and refusals, culminating in the conclusion, to be put “gently”, that the 
government had other issues to consider as well as the North and that “the Region 
has to do all that is humanly possible to help itself, and that it has to look to means of 
making its own contribution to national prosperity (as well as asking for its share of 
the cake).”845 
 
However hopefully Smith might have taken on the role of NEPC chairman in 1965, 
by mid-1967 he was demoralised by the task and rethinking his ideas. In May he told 
a conference of the Town Planning Institute that the regional economic planning 
councils had made little impact on investment policies and that faults in the decision-
making process were worsening regional imbalances. EPCs should exert pressure to 
change this process and to bring about the linkage of regional economic, physical 
and financial planning. 846  
 
 A few weeks later, he gave a remarkable interview to the Newcastle-based 
newspaper The Journal in which he virtually admitted the impossibility of the task 
he had taken on. “The scale of the job is beyond the scope of regional thinking… 
 
843 Ibid 
844 TNA EW7/664 Draft briefing note for meeting of First Secretary and other ministers with 
Chairman of the Northern Council and other representatives of the Northern Council, 18 April 1967. 
Attached to minute by PBM James (main recipients unnamed), 14 April 1967. The three favourable 
responses to be given were: a £50,000 capital grant for Carlisle Airport, the establishment of a rural 
development board in the North, and the acceptance by government as a reasonable basis for planning 
of an aim of 29,000 new dwellings a year by 1970 in the region. 
845 TNA EW7/664 Draft briefing note for meeting of First Secretary and other ministers with 
Chairman of the Northern Council and other representatives of the Northern Council, 18 April 1967. 
Attached to minute by PBM James (main recipents unnamed), 14 April 1967. 
846 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3842. ‘Policies for regional planning’: paper given by TDS to TPI 
Conference, 23 May 1967 
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The centre of power is Whitehall. That is where all the major decisions are taken. I 
firmly believe the job of regional planning could be done better in London.”847  
 
It may be that on accepting appointment as chairman of the Peterlee and Aycliffe 
Development Corporations he might have been prepared to stand down as chairman 
of the NEPC.848 This was not, however, required of him – a curious decision, 
perhaps, given that Smith was now the chief spokesman both for the region as a 
whole and for one of its new town corporations. 
 
In September 1967, stung by the decision of the National Coal Board to close a 
colliery in West Cumberland without consulting the NEPC, Smith threatened to 
resign his position, and in doing so won a short reprieve for the pit. He also voiced 
his wider complaints publicly and at length in an article in the Sunday Times, 
claiming that the conflicting decisions of government departments, nationalised 
industries and private companies were preventing “meaningful planning” in the 
regions by the EPCs and EPBs, and stating that “If the Government… does not 
rapidly take steps to enable the planning councils to start planning, I for one will not 
be prepared to continue as chairman of one.” 849 
 
Government, he wrote, would give the regions “raw materials” – notably financial 
incentives to encourage industry to move to areas of high unemployment; it would 
then be up to the regions, after studying economic and social trends, to plan the best 
use of those raw materials for the benefit of the regional and national economy. 
While some ministries – notably Transport, the Home Office and the Board of Trade 
– were supportive of regional views and regional policy, others were not. The record 
of the Ministry of Fuel and Power “was dismal”, while the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government was frustrating the efforts of the Board of Trade to encourage the 
movement of industry away from London and the South East.850  
 
 
847 The Journal 21 July 1967 
848 TNA EW7/134 AW Peterson to Mr Winkett, 17 July 1967, refers to TDS’s request for a meeting 
with the First Secretary (Peter Shore) to discuss whether the Peterlee chairmanship was compatible 
with chairing the NEPC. This was after Smith had accepted the Peterlee post. 
849 Smith, T D, ‘The unforgiveable waste’, Sunday Times 17 September 1967. 
850 Ibid 
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“I think that with Harold Wilson directly in charge regional planning has a good 
chance of becoming a vital part of the Government’s economic machinery.” He 
recommended that Wilson should do three things at once: 
- require EPCs and EPBs to produce within a year reports stating short-term 
industrial problems, in particular caused by contraction of traditional industries 
-  the Government should consult with industry and EPCs to question whether the 
contraction is justifiable, and, if not, to list alternative action 
- if contraction is found to be justifiable, the government, in consultation with EPCs, 
should increase investment in the worst-hit areas.851 
 
“If the job of a chairman of a regional economic planning council is to watch 
development in the South-East and Midlands proceeding without thought for the 
poorer areas, particularly the North… then it is not the job I understood it to be when 
I took it on – and I would certainly not want to keep it.”852 
 
Smith appreciated the inevitability of running down much of the coal industry in the 
north but at a meeting with ministers in September 1967 had called for “better 
publicity and public relations to put the fuel policy over to the miners”; constantly 
changing estimates, and the planning of nuclear in place of coal-fired power stations 
“had all led to confusion and loss of confidence in the industry.”853 
 
He was also frustrated by continued industrial development being permitted in the 
South East and East Anglia, and as well as his Sunday Times article spoke on the 
issue in two talks on the BBC Third Programme. According to a note by MHLG 
officials, “Two themes clearly lie behind all his ideas on this subject. The first is that 
the Government only has one significant policy, the regional policy of giving priority 
to development areas and that this must be pursued to the exclusion of any other 
policy. The second is that the Government can, and ought to be able to, direct the 
distribution of industry. Both these beliefs are fallacious.”854 The note pointed out 
 
851 Ibid 
852 Ibid 
853 TNA EW7/664 Note of Meeting held by Secretary of State for Economic Affairs [Peter Shore] 
with Chairmen of the Economic Planning Councils and Boards 8 November 1967 
854 TNA EW7/1188 Brief for Minister’s Meeting with Mr Dan Smith. Note by MHLG (n.d.) The brief 
went on to list the benefits available to development areas and defended in detail the policy towards 
industry in the London satellite towns, while arguing, perhaps disingenuously, that “even though the 
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the necessity for overspill towns to relieve overcrowding in London, adding, 
tellingly, that “In blunt terms there might well be more votes lost over a failure of the 
Government’s housing policy than over a failure of the regional development 
policies.”855 
 
His discontent also led him to attempt to rewrite the role of the planning councils. 
On 19 October 1967 he wrote to all the EPC chairmen that while the work of the 
EPCs would continue while the Government considered the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on Local Government in England, and during the time taken to 
implement any recommendations, and that “we may even continue in existence after 
local government has been reformed”, nevertheless “the time may have come to look 
at the proposals for certain modifications. I would be pleased to have your views on 
this or other associated matters.”856 If he had expected to lead a group of chairmen 
clamouring for reform and greater power with one voice, he was to be disappointed.  
 
Most compatible with Smith’s own aspirations were his fellow north of England 
chairmen, Charles Carter of the North West EPC and Roger Stevens of the Yorkshire 
and Humberside EPC, with whom he had worked on airport policy. Carter sought the 
presentation to EPCs of a consolidated budget for all Government-assisted projects, 
with councils having the power to propose major switches within and between 
programmes, reporting to the Cabinet secretariat, “and the joint proposals of 
Councils would then become a basis for the reconsideration of the balance of 
national powers in the cabinet… the presentation of programmes in this way would 
ensure that the Council was regarded as having teeth. I see little future in the present 
arrangements for tinkering with programmes after their main details have been 
settled elsewhere.”  He also wanted spending departments to have regular meetings 
with EPC chairmen, which would prevent departments from failing to notify them of 
 
movement of a firm from London to a new town is clearly in pursuance of a government policy that 
firm will not be granted an i.d.c. to establish itself in the new town unless the Board of Trade is 
satisfied that it cannot divert the firm to a development area. Even in this context the Government 
does in fact pursue its policy of giving priority to development areas.” 
855 TNA EW7/1188 Brief for Minister’s Meeting with Mr Dan Smith. Note by MHLG (n.d.) 
856 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3869 TDS to Economic Planning Council Chairmen 19 October 1967, 
copied to Peter Shore, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, whose 
response, if any, to this usurping of his role is not recorded in this file. 
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matters of regional importance.857 Stevens complained that councils were under 
pressure to engage in short term activities which diverted them from their main tasks 
of medium- and long-term planning, and that as the role of councils in relation to the 
National Plan, and even regional plans, “had been overtaken by events… we are 
much more concerned with priorities of expenditure and strategy than was expected 
when we were set up. Perhaps this calls for some review of our Charters…”858  
 
Other chairmen were more resigned or more Panglossian, although the South East 
chairman, Maurice Hackett, responded that he was unaware of any proposals or 
modifications “that are of great significance at present, and suggest that you might 
let us have a paper so that we can see what you have in mind”, following this up with 
a barely-veiled dig at Smith, who had been vocal in his protests at expansionist 
policies for the south-east by the Greater London Council and SEEPC: “The one 
thing I think we should avoid as much as possible is looking over our shoulder at 
every other region’s proposal. I am sure we have quite enough to settle the varying 
but important difficulties that are by no means common to each region.”859 
 
“A triumph for Dan Smith” 
Meeting members of the NEPC and NEPB on 13 October 1967, the Prime Minister 
said that a re-examination of regional policies was taking place in DEA and that the 
government’s aim was “reflation on a selective, regional basis” with favourable 
consideration being given to public investment in construction in development areas, 
and special consideration to road schemes in such areas. He also announced that Fred 
Lee, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, would assume special responsibility 
within DEA for the Northern Region, working through existing machinery. He 
would visit more often and for longer periods than London-based ministers and be 
able to meet deputations from regional organisations on the spot.860 Lee was a long-
term Wilson loyalist (he had stood for Deputy Leader of the Labour Party when 
Wilson challenged Gaitskell for the leadership), although scarcely a leading figure in 
 
857 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3869 Charles Carter to TDS 16 October 1967 (this date may have been 
mistakenly typed on Carter’s letter, which is clearly a response to Smith’s letter of 19 October). 
858 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3869 Roger Stevens to TDS 2 November 1967 
859 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3839 Maurice Hackett to TDS, 25 October 1967 
860 TNA EW7/673 Note of meeting between Prime Minister and Members of NEPB, 13 October 1967 
(TDS was also present) 
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the cabinet on the model of Lord Hailsham four years previously. In addition, the 
PM announced that arrangements for consultation with planning council chairmen on 
closure of steel plant would be made, similar to those relating to pit closures. 
 
An experimental project on industrialised building was to be set up in the Northern 
Region, to produce building components for the construction of factories, hospitals, 
etc. The PM had asked Smith to investigate the best system in consultation with the 
Ministry of Public Buildings and Works and the National Building Agency.861 The 
PM also suggested that the NEPC draw up a land reclamation programme, with 
assistance from MHLG, to be submitted to the government with a request  for 
whatever assistance might be required. 862 
 
Wilson’s visit to the North “was a triumph for Dan Smith” commented The 
Guardian. “It was he who pegged away so steadily for a building component 
industry for the north… His threat to resign over Harrington Colliery was on a 
principle that economic planning councils should be consulted beforehand. He got 
that today, and more…. Mr Smith has been calling for more roadbuilding in the 
North to open the region and provide more work. He got that, too.” 863 Not all papers 
were as impressed, the Sunday Times referring to a region “unthrilled by Mr 
Wilson’s Rabbit” and that his visit held out no promise of action to help the region’s 
miners or 55,000 unemployed. Of the Prime Minister’s offerings, “All this was 
enough to convince Dan Smith that regional planning had been ‘relaunched’. Others 
were more sceptical.” 864 
 
By the third anniversary of the NEPC’s establishment, Smith, persuaded to take 
stock for the Financial Times, argued that while it was idle to pretend that all was 
success, there had been considerable progress. “The concept of regionalism is now 
accepted both within the region and in Whitehall” he claimed. “The argument is no 
 
861 Smith had long been pressing for such a development to be undertaken. 
862 TNA EW7/673 Note of meeting between Prime Minister and Members of NEPB, 13 October 1967 
(TDS was also present) 
863 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3836 The Guardian 14 October 1967 
864 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3836 Sunday Times 15 October 1967. The ‘rabbit’ that Wilson pulled 
from his hat – shown in a cartoon by Gerald Scarfe - was “the rotund and jolly shape of Mr Fred Lee”, 
while the sceptics included Andrew Cunningham, who “summed up the plain man’s view of the 
situation… ‘What we want is work’.”  
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longer whether regional organisation should exist… this is accepted and the debate 
now revolves around such questions as the type of regional institution needed… The 
Northern Economic Planning Council can claim that its pioneering efforts, for it was 
first in the field, represent a major contribution in this direction.” 865 
 
His list of achievements included aiding the establishment of tourist organisations 
for the individual Northern counties, assisting in the formation of Northern Arts, and 
the making of successful recommendations on agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
“These achievements may seem small and insignificant… but they are not, they are 
the first manifestations of the growing awareness in the region of the need for 
regional unity. The old parochialism of the North is rapidly dying and the Council 
has been partly instrumental in hastening this demise by repeatedly providing a 
regional focus which has risen above understandable sectional interests.” Regional 
interests should not be paramount, but it was important that they should be taken into 
account in setting policy, Smith argued. The Council accepted the run-down of older 
industries “and we do not argue that these industries should be maintained simply to 
provide employment. What disturbs the Council is the lack of determination shown 
in providing alternative employment, the vacillation demonstrated when positive 
rather than negative … decisions are required.” Expansion in the prosperous South 
East and West Midlands was desirable, but not at the expense of those in the less 
prosperous regions.866 
 
His early optimism about the employment situation had evaporated completely by 
mid 1968, and at a  meeting with the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Peter 
Shore) in June he stated that more employment was needed to offset the decline of 
the old staple industries and that EPCs needed clearer guidance on how far broader 
economic policies fell within their remit, so that they could work in consultation 
with the TUC and CBI. Public expenditure at regional level was beyond the scope of 
central planning, he argued: the EPCs should be involved in this. 867 
 
865 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3843, TDS: ‘The Region as Part of a Larger Planning Unit’, Financial 
Times 6 May 1968 p13 
866 Ibid 
867 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3838, Note of Meeting held by Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
with Chairmen of EPCs, 12 June 1968 
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Among the later undertakings of the NEPC under Smith’s chairmanship was the 
1969 report Northern Region. An Outline of Strategy of Development to 1981. Peter 
Shore thanked Smith fulsomely – “One often hears the argument that reports like this 
get one absolutely nowhere. People say, ‘The Government will just shelve it – 
another load of paper for the Whitehall pigeon-holes. As far as I am concerned this is 
nonsense” and reiterating that the DEA needed “not only the basic raw material – the 
facts – but also the interpretation of them and the ‘regional feel’ that only an 
Economic Planning Council can give.”868 The document was criticised by the North 
Regional Planning Committee, representing local authorities, as being “an 
examination of trends only and not a strategy. The strategy does not adopt a 
questioning, probing attitude and this, in the Committee’s opinion, is what Regional 
Councils were supposed to be for.”869 The strategy, like Challenge of the Changing 
North, made few concessions to changing circumstances, but repeated advocacy of a 
growth point strategy and further public expenditure as stimulants for growth – 
although the timescale for this to be achieved was steadily pushed back. According 
to Hudson, “As the desired goals retreated in parallel with the present, the policy 
response was more of the same; that the conception of policy might be inappropriate 
was never placed on the agenda.”870 
Edward Heath, then Leader of the Opposition, visited Wellbar House on 17 January 
1969 for meetings with the NEPB and with Smith. It would appear that Heath’s 
enthusiasm for regionalism had not diminished, as Smith told Jim Robertson 
afterwards that “he had expressed to Mr Heath his preference for a Council with 
some control over finances… It was of course recognised in our [NEPB] discussion 
with Mr Heath that inability to determine expenditure was an inevitable feature of a 
non-elected body. One further point raised in this part of the discussion was the 
suggestion (from Mr Heath) that a mixed body, part elected (local authority) and part 
nominated (industrialists and independents), might secure the advantages of both 
systems.” Smith had expressed to Heath a preference for a body nominated by local 
authorities which might itself nominate industrialists and others.871 
 
868 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3838 Peter Shore to TDS, 1 April 1969 
869 TWAM TDS Archive Box 3838. Press Statement on NEPC Document ‘Outline Strategy’ by North 
Regional Planning Committee, 2 April 1969 
870 Hudson op cit pp89-90 
871 TNA EW7/1232 JG Robertson to Mr Heaton, 17 January 1969, Visit of Mr Edward Heath, MP 
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Conclusions on EPCs 
George Brown’s (possibly partial) assessment of the EPCs was that “It would be said 
now [1971] that most of the Economic Planning Councils have done extremely good 
work, and are unlikely to be dropped. Part of the problem in setting them up was to 
make sure that the work they put in and the advice they gave was in fact used in 
Whitehall. This was a struggle, because not all departments were as pleased with the 
idea as we ourselves were… but somehow things worked out.”872 The regional 
machinery had been “cumbersome and ill-defined”, but waiting for the ideal 
arrangement would have meant action never took place. “We accepted all the 
disabilities in order to get our ideas off the ground.”873 
 
Was Dan Smith’s sometimes confrontational and high-profile role 
counterproductive? Diana Pearce describes the Yorkshire & Humberside EPC as 
“less critical of the national government of the day than some of the other Councils 
and its more pragmatic line perhaps enabled it to claim Ministers’ ears more 
effectively, on some occasions.”874 Smith’s more publicity-conscious role enabled 
him to win some tactical victories, but in the end neither victory nor defeat made 
much difference. Even when the regional experiment was at its peak, commented 
Hardie, “The Government took a good deal less notice than the Councils would like 
– partly at least because the sum of the demands of all the Councils in the country far 
exceeded the capacity of the Government to meet them.”875  
 
Overall the DEA experiment of the National Plan and its regional outriders was a 
failure. Woodward argues that while the July Measures were overtly responsible for 
the failure, there were deeper reasons, in that there was only a limited commitment to 
planning and hence only a limited potential for planning: “It is difficult… to 
establish the credibility of a plan, while in mixed economies only a small proportion 
 
872 Brown op cit p103 
873 Ibid p 103 
874 Pearce, D C op cit 
875 Hardie, J, ‘Regional Policy’ in Beckerman, W (ed), The Labour Government’s Economic Record 
1964-1970 (London 1972) p 239 
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of decision-makers are directly influenced by official plans. The possibility of 
successful domestic planning is also limited in a world in which countries are highly 
interdependent.”876 For Dell, consistent with his thesis arguing the inevitability of the 
failure of Labour’s socialist experiment, the National Plan itself was “an exercise in 
make-believe, which fostered fantasies about the potential performance of the British 
economy”, while the DEA had no idea of how to foster growth and “the sheer 
irrationality of George Brown’s approach to policy undermined the hopes for the 
DEA.”877 In the end, according to Dell, “it was not proximity to the Treasury that 
doomed the DEA, simply the lack of any definable purpose other than as a vehicle 
for Brown’s enthusiasms. The DEA was bound to fail because of the nature of its 
mission. The management of capitalism was bound to win precedence over the 
promotion of socialism.”878 
 
The corollary to the failure of the DEA, the failure of Labour’s regional policy, was 
also predictable, according to Mather. Excessively conventional in form, the policy 
“ran on contemporary tramlines of economic and political thought, concentrating 
particularly upon regional economic regeneration within a national framework. It 
gave little thought to popularising its regional policy. Had it done so, the government 
might have paid some attention to establishing elected assemblies.”879 It is tempting, 
on reading this analysis, to see Smith as a potential saviour for the regional 
experiment. Certainly, he did his best to raise awareness of the new regional bodies 
and their potential, and the flexibility of vision to countenance reforms that broke 
through political and administrative traditions. He had argued for an expansion of the 
planning council role, to make the councils more relevant and more accountable to 
the people they served, but was caught in a situation where his powers were limited 
to his persuasive abilities.  
 
 
876 Woodward, N ‘Labour’s Economic Performance, 1964-70’ in Cooper, R, Fielding, S, & Tiratsoo, 
N (eds), The Wilson Governments 1964-1970 (London 1993) pp 86-87. He continues, “The 
conclusion would seem to be… that economic planning did possibly have a role to play in the 1960s, 
and that it is a pity that it was not given a greater opportunity to prove its value. But it must be 
doubted, even if it had received the necessary support from the Wilson Government, whether it would 
have transformed Britain’s growth prospects.” 
877 Dell op cit, pp322, 341 
878 Ibid, p 343 
879 Mather op cit p22 
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He was to conclude, some years later: “We got [regional planning], it was no 
insignificant achievement. It failed totally, but that doesn’t matter, it was a battle 
worth fighting and it was bound to fail because the people in it, I mean the ministers, 
didn’t know what the hell it was, Harold Wilson didn’t know what it was either. I 
used to despair privately, but of course publicly didn’t despair. I went on cheering 
for a couple of years, anyway.”880 
 
Labour Party Regional Policy 
Smith made some further contribution to the regional debate in leading the Labour 
Party’s review of regional policy in the later 1960s. He was invited to join the 
Labour Party’s Advisory Committee on Local and Regional Government in late 
1966, and the following year appointed chairman of the Party’s Study Group on 
Regional Planning Policy, established on 20 June 1967.881 This drew up a sizeable 
report which, published in 1970, surveyed progress on regional issues to date and 
made recommendations on economic and fiscal as well as structural mechanisms.882 
As well as development area status, policies on industrial location, regional 
employment premiums and other controls and incentives to regional development, 
the report examined policy on new towns and on the interrelationship between 
central, regional and local planning. It drew attention to the lion’s share of new jobs 
created in new towns being secured by the ring of towns around London, and 
recommended that less prosperous regions should be given priority in the new towns 
programme.883 The report stressed the critical importance of the region as being “the 
level of interaction… at which coherent patterns become discernible and the co-
ordination of different policies rewarding.”884 
 
 
880 TDS Archive disk 20A 
881 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3862 Terry Pitt, Research Secretary, Labour Party to TDS 24 November 
1966 and Smith’s reply 1 December 1966 (in which Smith also sought, unsuccessfully, appointment 
to the LP committee dealing with prices, incomes and productivity “as I have some ideas which I 
think can be of help”. 
882 Labour Party, Regional Planning Policy. Report of a Study Group (London 1970). This was not a 
policy document formally endorsed by the NEC but was published “as a basis for further discussion 
of the most effective methods of carrying forward the Labour Government’s policies for regional 
development… the NEC believes that it will be a valuable stimulus to constructive thought in this 
important field.” (p 3: Introduction by Harry Nicholas, General Secretary) 
883 Ibid pp 83-94 
884 Ibid pp95-98 
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The Report was published in summer 1970, after the general election of 18 June 
which made its contents irrelevant for the then foreseeable future, and after Smith’s 
arrest in January 1970 on corruption charges (addressed in chapter 7). The study 
group secretary, Peter Downey, had the “disagreeable task” of telling Smith that his 
name had been omitted from the list of those responsible for the report: “I think that 
the report, and much of its content, still reflects the lines on which you set us 
thinking… and I hope that you are happy with it… I hope that you will be able to 
forgive the Party for its traditional over cautiousness!”885 Smith, understandably, was 
neither happy nor conciliatory: “I certainly will not forgive the Party for an action 
which smacks more of totalitarianism than Socialism; re-writing history is something 
I always have and always will oppose.”886 
 
 The Royal Commission on Local Government in England 
Smith promoted regional thinking in other areas of activity. In 1966 he was 
appointed to the Royal Commission on Local Government in England, chaired by Sir 
John Maud (in 1967 created Lord Redcliffe-Maud). Again his appointment was not 
without controversy. Among those opposing was the council of his native Wallsend: 
“We believe that Mr Smith is the wrong person to sit on what will be a sort of 
judicial body. He believes in regional government…He is entitled to hold his views 
but it does not mean to say that regional government is best just because Dan Smith 
says so…”887  The Commission had been established at the instigation of Richard 
Crossman. According to Lord Kennet, then a junior minister at the MHLG, 
Crossman had “one great overriding reason… to settle the running warfare between 
the counties and county boroughs” and was interested in planning to the exclusion of 
other local issues such as education and health. 888 This had been a matter of concern 
to Smith, who recalled that on joining the Commission he found that “the future of 
the health service was not on the Commission’s agenda whereas I saw it as the 
essential core of a devolved provincial/local authority structure.”889 
 
885 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3858 Peter Downey to TDS 27 July 1970 
886 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3858 TDS to Peter Downey 30 July 1970 
887 TWAM TDS Archive box 3836, The Journal 7 July 1966 quoting Cllr Paul Chute, chairman of 
General Purposes Committee, Wallsend Borough Council. 
888 ‘Symposium: Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission: Twenty Years On’, Contemporary Record 2 (6) 
Summer 1989 p 32 
889 ‘Symposium: Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission: Twenty Years On’, Contemporary Record 3 (1) 
Autumn 1989 p 36 
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Disappointed by the submission of the DEA to the Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England, which he felt ignored the role of regional administrative 
bodies, Smith made his own submission in December 1966. In some respects the 
Regional Councils he envisaged were modelled on the Economic Planning Councils, 
being appointed by the responsible minister and members drawn from local 
government, private and public enterprises, trades unions, academia and elsewhere; 
yet while “I do not believe that such a Council could be elected in the immediate 
future… I am sure it would prove in a real sense to be responsible to its region even 
though not directly elected. It is from the regional level that so much of central 
government must continue to operate, and… it must be possible for central 
government to meet local government and industry at the intermediate regional level, 
where conflicting demands on resources can be examined more thoroughly.”890 
 
The regional councils – to be mirrored by regional boards of civil servants – would 
be beefed-up versions of the existing EPCs, giving advice on regional implications 
of economic policy and expenditure, a “function… already nascent in some regions”. 
More specifically, the proposed regional machinery should be capable of reviewing 
variables in population development proposals; should produce strategic regional 
plans “which would go far beyond the present inadequate method of determining 
strategic objectives”; give attention to land use, agriculture, forestry and natural 
resources; review manpower supply and demand forecasts; and survey 
environmental conditions including housing, retail, leisure, health, education and 
culture. “Fundamental” to the planning process would be transportation, investment 
in which would require more critical appraisal at all levels.891 
 
Smith was not alone in his views, shared by, among others, The Economist and the 
Liberal Party; while the Labour MP John Mackintosh argued for powerful, directly 
elected regional governments, headed by the equivalent of US state governors, with 
wide powers and responsibilities.892 
 
890 TNA EW7/664 ‘Regions – The Job to be Done’, paper by TDS dated 29 December 1966, 
submitted to the Royal Commission on Local Government in England, RCP (66) 64 
891 Ibid 
892 Mackintosh, J P, The Devolution of Power. Local Democracy, Regionalism and Nationalism 
(Harmondsworth 1968) 
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The Commission’s Report, published in June 1969, proposed completely redrawing 
the local government map of England (excluding Greater London, which had been 
subject to its own reform in 1965). The patchwork of county boroughs, county 
councils, municipal boroughs, urban districts and rural districts was to be replaced by 
a system of 58 unitary authorities covering most of the country, with a two-tier 
system proposed for the West Midlands, Merseyside and Greater Manchester.893 
Overlying the 61 new authorities, as well as Greater London, would be eight 
provincial councils. These would devise regional development strategies, and, while 
“rooted in local government… should work in closest touch with central 
government.” They would replace the regional EPCs.894  
 
The proposed provinces broadly mirrored the pattern of the Economic Planning 
Councils, although in northern England Yorkshire province lost much of the Parts of 
Lindsey to the East Midlands, and gained most of the North Riding, and the North 
West province gained Westmorland and Cumberland. The Northern EPC area was to 
lose much of its territory to its neighbours and be reconstituted around its ‘Three 
Rivers’ nucleus as the North East province, consisting of Northumberland, Durham 
and an area of North Yorkshire extending as far as Whitby.895 
 
The Commission intended that the provincial councils be elected from the 
membership of the new local authorities, “thus establishing an organic link between 
the strategic and operational levels of local government.”896 The councils’ principal 
role would be to create and maintain a strategic plan which would address issues 
including population change and movement, location of growth points, land use, 
major industrial developments, transport, regional cultural and sporting facilities, and 
higher education priorities and location. Unlike the EPCs, which were purely 
advisory, the provincial councils would have certain powers – the plans, once 
 
893 Royal Commission on Local Government in England, Report (Cmnd 4040) (London 1969). In the 
three two-tier ‘metropolitan’ areas, the West Midlands area would have seven second tier authorities, 
Merseyside four, and ‘SELNEC’ (Greater Manchester area) nine.  
The Report also provided for elected local councils to represent cities, towns and villages within the 
unitary areas, with a right to be consulted and some limited powers  
894 Royal Commission on Local Government in England, Report (Cmnd 4040) (London 1969) p74 
895 As per map on Royal Commission on Local Government in England, Report (Cmnd 4040) 
(London 1969) p 176; detailed maps were included in a supplement to the Report. 
896 Ibid p115 
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approved, would be binding on local authorities and they would have some powers 
of funding – and they would have their own staff.897  
 
Much of this mirrors the proposals put by Smith to the Commission, and while 
records of the discussions of Commission members do not appear to have been 
retained, one may suppose that Smith had no small influence on the content of the 
relevant parts of the Report. At the time of his 1974 trial, Redcliffe-Maud wrote to 
the court describing Smith as “an excellent colleague… on the Royal Commission he 
gave good public service without reward.”898 
 
All of this work - the Commission sat for three years, produced the longest Royal 
Commission report yet written at that time, and cost an unprecedented £378,851 - 
came to nothing.899 Its implementation was delayed while Harold Wilson set in train 
the Royal Commission on the Constitution (the Crowther, later Kilbrandon 
Commission), a step announced even before the Redcliffe-Maud Commission had 
reported. Despite Wilson’s move being a reaction to resurgent Scottish and Welsh 
nationalism, this gave rise to much suspicion of his motives: did he not like 
Redcliffe-Maud’s conclusions; did he fear reactions to the proposals; did he fear the 
reactions of Whitehall?900 Smith himself believed that the two commissions in 
tandem were proof of Wilson’s “determination to initiate major devolved 
reforms.”901 In the event, Redcliffe-Maud was shunted into the sidings; Labour lost 
the 1970 election, and the Kilbrandon Commission reported in 1973 in favour, as far 
as England was concerned, of a system of powerless advisory councils (a minority 
report advising elected regional councils on the lines of Redcliffe-Maud), to 
governmental apathy.902 The incoming Conservative government in the meantime 
had authorised a reorganisation of local government which paid little heed to 
 
897 Ibid pp109-117 
898 Tomkinson, M & Gillard, M, Nothing to Declare. The Political Corruptions of John Poulson 
(London 1980) note 21 
899 ‘Symposium: Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission: Twenty Years On’, Contemporary Record 2 (6) 
Summer 1989 p31 
900 Much of the speculation summarised in New Society, 7 November 1968, p663. New Society posited 
a decision in favour of large city-regions provoking a Dan Smith minority report, and consequent 
embarrassment for the government: “If they are faced with this prospect, it is understandable that they 
are setting up another commission.” 
901 TDS to Anthony Seldon, no date but almost certainly February 1989. Author’s collection. 
902 Brian Hogwood, B, & Keating, M, Regional Government in England (Oxford 1982) pp 243-244 
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Redcliffe-Maud. The idea of two-tier conurbation authorities (now ‘metropolitan 
county councils’ was extended to cover Tyne and Wear, West and South Yorkshire, 
but in the rest of the country the idea of unitary authorities was dropped and the two-
tier county/district system retained, with some remodelling. In 1986, the 
metropolitan county councils were themselves abolished and England left with a 
system the diametric opposite of that proposed by the Redcliffe-Maud Commission. 
With George Jones, perhaps, “we can label [the Redcliffe-Maud Report] a disastrous 
failure”903 Smith took a different, and somewhat self-congratulatory, retrospective 
view: “I do believe that the 1970 election, had Wilson carried on… I think that 
legislation would have been passed and it would have led to democratically elected 
provincial authorities… What is certain… is that provincialism’s march forward 
ended when I was arrested.”904 
 
Conclusions 
The period between 1965 and 1970 in Smith’s career should have been dominated by 
his tenure of the chair of the Northern Economic Planning Council. Yet this was an 
episode which he passed over with relatively little comment in his published and 
unpublished memoirs, and one which left him increasingly frustrated and bored. For 
all that he would appear bullish in interviews, it is hard to escape the belief that his 
true feelings were those expressed to The Journal in July 1967, that “The scale of the 
job is beyond the scope of regional thinking… I firmly believe the job of regional 
planning could be done better in London.”905 In a candid letter to his friend and 
political associate Joe Eagles, written in 1971, he remarked that “I spent six years in 
Wellbar House [headquarters of the NEPC] and the most important objective in 
those years, for me, was to master technological methods, that could be applied to 
urban problems. I succeeded sufficiently to enable me to see how inadequate and 
outmoded are our present attempts … The role of the city, and region, is, I am 
certain, the scale of socialist planning for the next 20/40 years and the region is not 
necessarily a national concept, indeed, I would go further and state cannot be a 
national concept.”906 As he became increasingly disenchanted with his work at the 
 
903 ‘Symposium: Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission: Twenty Years On’, Contemporary Record 2 (6) 
Summer 1989 p31 
904 TDS Archive disk 9A 
905 The Journal 21 July 1967 
906 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3861 TDS to Joe Eagles 30 August 1971 
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Planning Council, his attentions turned elsewhere: to his growing business interests, 
to the Royal Commission on Local Government in England, to his work on regional 
policy for the Labour Party, and, perhaps, most significantly, to a new post obtained 
in 1968, Chairman of the Aycliffe and Peterlee Development Corporation. It was in 
these latter fields, rather than in the machinery of 1964-65 soon abandoned by its 
creators, that Smith sought to advance his regionalist ideas; and especially at 
Peterlee, where he sought to combine his views on regionalism, education, science 
and the arts into a workable model for regional regeneration. 
 
Smith’s own significance as a regional leader is open to debate. John Tomaney 
argues that Smith’s views and actions as a flag-bearer marked a transition from 
‘bourgeois regionalism’ to Labourist regionalism’, reflecting the decline of the 
landed and coal-owning elite of former times and the dominance by mid-century of 
the Labour Party. 907  
 
However, regionalism was still a minority interest in the Labour Party, and was 
strongly identified with Dan Smith. His gaoling in 1974, argues Tomaney, together 
with the suspicions of regionalism held by the emerging New Left, were damaging 
blows.908 
 
This is a sharply contrasted picture which draws to a considerable extent on Smith’s 
remarkable capacity for self-promotion and promotion of ideas (which undoubtedly 
led to his being regarded as a, if not the, key regionalist apologist of the period). 
However, Tomaney’s positioning of Smith as modern and Labourist against the 
declining, landed and Tory old regionalism of Percy and Headlam ignores the 
emergence of a rival modern regionalism in the Conservative Party: that personified 
in Hailsham, and, potentially more importantly, in Heath. Newcastle was far from 
being a Labour hegemonic base for Smith; but his regionalist ideals were shared to a 
significant extent by his main Conservative rival, Alderman Arthur Grey. Indeed, it 
was a Conservative cabinet minister, Ernest Marples, who in appointing Smith to the 
Crowther Committee gave him his first opportunity to make the first call for 
 
907 Tomaney op cit p244 
908 Ibid, pp 244-245 
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regional, popularly accountable administrative councils in a government-sanctioned 
report.  
 
This ‘political continuity’ was expressed, in a somewhat different form and with 
overtly ideological underpinning, by the Rowntree Research Unit, whose authors 
argued that successive regional bodies in the North drew on a socially coherent and 
only slowly changing core or people, exemplified in the figure of Viscount Ridley.909 
Smith was seen similarly as a member of a group “which represents a unified elite 
within the North East”; regional policy itself had as its aim “repression of a spatial or 
social lack of homogeneity in the North-East”, persuading the population to act on 
‘regional’ rather than on “area, industry, party, or interest basis”, while regional 
problems are interpreted as being “no more than a geographical constellation of 
social-structural problems” requiring social-structural solutions rather than a 
geographically-based regime of grants and incentives.910 Smith’s relationship with 
capitalism will be treated in other chapters, but his advocacy of regional democratic 
structures as a means to bring about profound social and economic reform would 
make him a strange bedfellow for the One Nationism of Lord Ridley. 
 
Smith also emerged in a climate favourable to regionalism. Mather draws attention 
to “a culmination of events” giving rise to “Labour’s experiment” in regionalism: the 
1950s survival of regional ministry structures, Conservative initiatives in the late 50s 
and early 60s, calls for regionalism in the media and by political groups such as the 
Fabian Society, and the formation of ad hoc organisations such as regional industrial 
development associations (Smith played his part in this, as leader of Newcastle 
Council and as a prominent Labour propagandist).911 But to argue that an individual 
might only flourish given certain historical circumstances should not mean that the 
individual’s contribution need be discounted.  
 
 
909 Cousins, J M, Davis, R L, Paddon, M J & Waton, A (Rowntree Research Unit), ‘Aspects of 
Contradiction in Regional Policy: The Case of North-East England’, Regional Studies 8 (1974) p142. 
The Fourth Viscount Ridley (1925-2012) was a major Northumberland landowner and inter alia 
chairman of Northumberland County Council (1967-79), Chancellor of Newcastle University, 
chairman of the Northern Rock Building Society, and Lord Steward of the [Royal] Household. 
910 Ibid, pp142-143 
911 Mather op cit pp13-15 
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What is clear is that in abandoning his leadership of Newcastle City Council for the 
chairmanship of the NEPC Smith had backed the wrong horse. He had given up a 
position of power – which had in turn brought him great influence and a multiplicity 
of contacts – for a simulacrum of power, a position with no power and only 
declining influence. From the start the Councils were in a weak position, its 
members appointed, not elected, “indebted to central government and distrusted by 
local government. Resting uneasily somewhere between the two, they were unable to 
obtain the active support of either.”912 Such influence as the councils had relied on 
the condescension or otherwise of ministers. They were to lose their relevance with 
the emasculation of regional policy and the effective death of the National Plan in 
July 1966, and eked out a shadowy existence, half forgotten, until dissolved in one of 
the first moves of the Thatcher government in 1979. Smith was able to make some 
headlines and gain some victories: the brief respite for Harrington colliery; the 
securing of Fred Lee as Minister for the North. But these were victories in 
appearance only, and Smith knew it. His frustration and boredom with the NEPC 
became manifest, and he turned his creative energies to other fields, still believing in 
Harold Wilson’s ability to deliver constitutional reform, and, at Peterlee, finding a 
new arena to synthesize his visions and create a new type of new town as a new 
route to regional regeneration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
912 Ibid, p 20 
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Chapter 6: This other Eden: Peterlee 1962-1970 
 
 
Farewell to Squalor 
 
Peterlee lies close to the North Sea coast of County Durham, roughly midway 
between the ports of Sunderland and Hartlepool. The new town, located in the 
‘concealed coalfield’ of east Durham, was quite unlike the other settlements founded 
following the passing of the New Towns Act of 1946. Unusually, it had been lobbied 
for by its ‘host’ local authority, Easington Rural District Council, whose architect 
and surveyor C W Clarke first proposed a new town for the area in 1938, and equally 
unusually, it was to be a ‘centripetal’ rather than ‘centrifugal’ town, an example of 
concentration rather than dispersal of settlement.913 The intention was to improve 
conditions for local mining communities.  
 
The new town of Peterlee was designated under the New Towns Act in January 
1948. It was intended to provide accommodation for 30,000 people, mainly drawn 
from the villages of Easington RD, to provide recreation and shopping facilities for 
the district, and employment opportunities for local women. Its early years had seen 
a number of difficulties: the failure of the first planner, the modernist architect 
Berthold Lubetkin, to get his plan past Coal Board opposition; the bankruptcy of a 
major housebuilding contractor; criticism of the dull environment being created.914 
 
Much of this criticism came from the General Manager of the Development 
Corporation, Arthur Vivian Williams (1909-1993).915 Williams had worked for 
Holborn and Finchley boroughs, before becoming town clerk of Bilston (Staffs) in 
 
913 Boyes, D, An Exercise in Gracious Living: The North East New Towns 1947-1988 (Unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Durham 2007) p18; Allan, J, ‘Lubetkin and Peterlee’ in Deckker, T (ed), 
The Modern City Revisited (London 2000) p105. Peterlee is sometimes written of as the only new 
town to be actively canvassed for by its local authority, but Deanna Walker states that Billericay RDC 
and the county boroughs of West Ham and East Ham lobbied the government for the creation of what 
became Basildon new town: Walker, D, Basildon Plotlands. The Londoners’ Rural Retreat 
(Chichester 2001) p22 
914 Boyes, op cit p35.On Lubetkin, see Allan, J, ‘Lubetkin, Berthold Romanovitch (1901-1990)’, 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Jan 2007 
[http://www.oxford.com/view/article 40675, accessed 31 Aug 2010] 
915 Obituary of Williams in The Times, 23 November 1993, a fine example of de mortuis nil nisi 
bonum. 
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1941 and of the County Borough of Dudley in 1946. Williams was a man of 
substantial energy and intelligence, an active Labour Party member, and an admirer 
of the American urban theorist Lewis Mumford. According to the socialist architect 
and planner Sir Charles Reilly, “I think he is unique. I have never before met a man 
with such fine sociological ideals, such administrative capacity and such quick 
decision.”916 He was, though, “extremely aggressive and difficult to work with” 
(Elain Harwood), and according to Smith, “a man of considerable intellect, 
undoubted ability and entirely abrasive. He was unable to communicate at any level 
with local administrators, and even less with local councillors, who were important 
to his work as well as being numerous amongst his Board members”917  Complaints 
about Williams to Whitehall, including one from an Aycliffe housing manager about 
his “tyranny”, came to nothing. 918 This may be because, as his former assistant Tom 
Toward believes, he was a university friend of Richard Crossman; what is clear is 
that he was shielded by the MHLG’s formidable Permanent Secretary Dame Evelyn 
Sharp.919 
 
Unusually active in the planning field for a Town Clerk, Williams brought a touch of 
the avant garde to his authorities.920 While it was important that building should 
 
916 From a letter to Clough Williams-Ellis, 23 August 1946, cited in Larkham, P J, ‘People, planning 
and place. The roles of client and consultant in reconstructing post-war Bilston and Dudley’, Town 
Planning Review 77 (5) (2006) p561 
917 Harwood, E, ‘Neurath, Riley and Bilston, Pasmore and Peterlee’ in Harwood, E, and Powers, A 
(eds), Housing the Twentieth Century Nation: Twentieth Century Architecture 9 (London 2008) p85; 
Amber TDS Unpublished Autobiography p 161  
918 TNA HLG 115/995 R N Winter (DoE) to Mr Fairclough, 20 September 1972, refers to the 
‘tyranny’ accusation. 
919 Interview with Tom Toward, 14 September 2010; TNA HLG 115/995 R N Winter (DoE) to Mr 
Gilbert, 7 September 1972, repeats a litany of complaints and responses: “Robinson (Aycliffe 
chairman) told Joseph that Williams needs a firm financial controlling hand… Sharp - Williams is 
good GM [General Manager]… Robinson - unrevealed objections to Williams… Sharp - Robinson’s 
objections to Williams not important… Shinwell objects to Williams… Sharp - Williams is 
temperamental but devoted… Sharp - Williams has done well.” 
920 He encouraging the Oxford-based Viennese designer and economist Otto Neurath (1882-1945) to 
contribute to the replanning of Bilston; and after Neurath’s sudden death in December 1945 he instead 
engaged Sir Charles Reilly to create an outline plan. Reilly devised and planned in outline a number 
of what became known as ‘Reilly Greens’, small-scale housing developments around green spaces, 
and incorporating communal facilities (including clubhouses at which residents could eat 
communally, as well as district heating and refuse disposal schemes), at both Bilston and Dudley. 
Harwood, E, ‘Neurath, Riley and Bilston, Pasmore and Peterlee’ in Harwood, E, and Powers, A (eds), 
Housing the Twentieth Century Nation: Twentieth Century Architecture 9 (London 2008) pp86-87. 
Neurath was “a fascinating man… political economist, sceptical Marxist, intimate of the Vienna 
Circle, co-editor of the Encyclopedia of Universal Knowledge and inventor of the Isotype system of 
universal signs.”. On the last day of his life he complained to his wife that no-one would want to write 
his biography. “Never mind, you have Bilston, isn’t that better?” was her consoling response. (Boyd 
Whyte, I, ‘Otto Neurath and the sociology of happiness’ in Boyd White, I (ed), Man Made Future. 
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proceed rapidly at Peterlee, what was produced was not to Williams’ liking. He had 
become an increasingly dominant figure, and the PDC Board became less important 
as the fifties wore on.921 In 1955 Williams approached the artist Victor Pasmore, 
then Professor of Fine Art at King’s College, Newcastle, to work as a consultant on 
the design of housing in the town. 
 
“…like a disease over the whole countryside…” 
Pasmore’s first visit to the town was not encouraging. Having been offered the job 
by Williams, he recalled in 1961, “I went the next day and looked at this housing and 
I was horrified. It seemed to spread like a disease over the whole countryside, these 
masses of red brick houses with little holes for windows and a beastly little garden 
lining all these wriggle roads…”, echoing Williams’ own dismay at the “sprawling 
red-bricked streets of the five year old town”.922 Pasmore - following Williams’ 
supposed instruction “do what you like, but don’t do what we have done before” - 
was to devise a new look for the town’s housing based upon a form of cubism, and 
promising the PDC “a series of clearly defined housing communities related to each 
other in form and scale so as to make a total environment, which is both rationally 
practical and emotionally stimulating.”923  
 
Working mainly in the town’s south-west area, after 1958 - when the MHLG finally 
bestowed its approval - he produced a series of estates characterised by clusters of 
flat-roofed cubic or cuboid dwellings interspersed with three- or four-storey point 
blocks of flats. The projects were widely praised by the architectural press.924 
 
Planning, education and design in mid-twentieth-century Britain (Abingdon 2007) p16. Larkham, P J, 
‘People, planning and place. The roles of client and consultant in reconstructing post-war Bilston and 
Dudley’, Town Planning Review 77 (5) (2006) 557-582. Although ‘greens’ were constructed in both 
towns, the loss of direction after Williams’ departure, financial constraints, and the change of political 
control in both Bilston and Dudley led to the abandonment of the more communalistic aspects of the 
plans. 
921 Robinson, J F F, Peterlee: A Study of New Town Development (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Durham 1978) p310. Beveridge was succeeded as Chairman by the Middlesbrough 
Alderman F C Pette in 1952, who was in turn succeeded by Col H H Peile - the pre-nationalisation 
Managing Director of Priestman Collieries, and Chairman of the Weardale Lead Company - in 1957. 
Pette and Peile both kept a low profile in Peterlee, leaving most of the speeches and public 
appearances to Williams. 
922 Grieve, A (ed), Victor Pasmore: Writings and Interviews (London 2010) p94; The Observer, 1 
May 1968, cited by Boyes, op cit p98 
923 ‘Do what you like’: Northern Echo 22 January 1963 cited by Robinson, op cit p111; June 1955 
Report by Pasmore, DCRO NT/AP/1/5/35 cited by Boyes, op cit p101 
924 Sunderland Echo 23 May 1958, cited by Boyes, op cit p101 
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Unfortunately the earliest ‘Pasmore’ contracts for 800 houses and a school were 
awarded in 1958 to a company named Milton Hindle, which went into liquidation 
two years later with just 350 houses built, many of which were “wretched and 
shabby in their details and practical execution.”925 
 
However, as well as finding the means to give Peterlee a futuristic appearance, 
Williams also had more fundamental, structural problems to deal with in the town, 
feeling it essential for Peterlee’s future success that the more light industry should be 
attracted to the town, a belief justified when the coal industry began a sudden and 
severe contraction in 1956. Between 1958 and 1963 40,000 mining jobs were lost in 
the north-east; and the anticipated demand for male employment rose sharply. In 
1950, it had been believed that just 4,950 male (non-mining) jobs would be needed 
by 1971. By 1958 this figure had been revised to 7,680, with an anticipated 
requirement of 12,890 jobs by 1980.926 The MHLG responded by giving the 
Corporation permission to build factories to let but progress was pitifully slow. By 
late 1962 there were only four factories in the town, with 1,093 Workers’, of whom 
just 290 were male, and in 1963 there were fewer than 1,500 non-mining employees 
overall in the town.927  
 
The Hailsham Report 
Lord Hailsham’s 1963 report - which is discussed more fully in chapter 5 - signalled 
a change in policy towards new towns in the region: attempting to build socially and 
economically balanced communities was replaced by a goal of asserting the towns as 
major industrial and employment locations.928 Recognition of the North East as a 
region in transformation made it necessary to promote economic growth; grants and 
other incentives would be provided for industrial diversification.929 Public 
investment was to be concentrated in a ‘growth zone’  approximately comprising 
South East Northumberland, Tyneside, East Durham and Teesside. Peterlee was 
more or less in the centre of this area, although not part of any of the main centres of 
 
925 David Boyes, op cit pp 101-102. Hindle was subsequently gaoled for fraud. 
926 Boyes, op cit pp68-70 
927 Boyes, op cit pp 73, 76-77. The best known enterprise attracted to the town in this period was the 
Tudor Crisps factory, which opened in 1960 and which rapidly became Peterlee’s largest single 
employer (Robinson, op cit, p210) 
928 Boyes, op cit p8 
929 The North East: A programme for regional development and growth (Cmd 2206) (1963) p5 
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expansion: Tyneside, Teesside and Darlington/Aycliffe.930 Peterlee itself would 
benefit from an enlarged industrial area (an extra 90 acres were promised), and from 
the improvement of the A19, one of a number of road schemes promised in the 
Report.931 The A19 proposals were of major importance to the town, hampered by 
inadequate road connections in all directions. Hailsham’s report, argues Boyes, 
transformed the economic fortunes of Peterlee and was “crucial to its continuing 
industrial welfare.”932 The PDC began to promote the town with increased vigour, 
and during the 1960s 15 firms, mostly in the textiles and clothing centre, opened in 
Peterlee, mostly offering female employment, but in its 1966 report the Corporation 
claimed that for the first time more jobs had been created for men than for women. 
This was critically important in a town where male mining employment was falling 
rapidly (15.8% by 1973). The A19 improvements, beginning in 1964, and the 
provision of small advance factories also contributed to this economic advance.933 
 
Also in 1963, the Peterlee and Aycliffe boards were merged; although the 
corporations remained separate entities (until 1985) they were to share senior 
officers.934 The chairman of the joint board was the “inflexible and austere” Colonel 
H H Peile, who had chaired Peterlee since 1957, and who, “to some… lacked the 
creative drive which was badly needed after 1963”.935 
 
While Newton Aycliffe prospered, the former ordnance factory site providing ample 
space for industrial expansion, Peterlee, writes Boyes, “was always destined to be 
the poor relation to Aycliffe… [it] had very little to offer in comparison.”936 
Development was hampered by the underlying coal measures (Aycliffe was not in 
the coalfield); and while Aycliffe was adjacent to the A1, Peterlee’s road 
connections, as noted, were poor. The improvements took time - the extended 
industrial area was designated in 1966 and only then could be provided with 
 
930 The North East: A programme for regional development and growth (Cmd 2206) (1963) p16 
931 The North East: A programme for regional development and growth (Cmd 2206) (1963) pp 6, 22, 
26 
932 Boyes, op cit pp189-191. Peterlee expressed its gratitude by naming part of the town centre 
development ‘Hailsham Place’ (Robinson, op cit p212) 
933  Boyes op cit pp 189-191 
934 Gary Philipson, Aycliffe and Peterlee New Towns 1946-1988: Swords into Ploughshares and 
Farewell Squalor (Cambridge 1988) pp158-159 
935 Boyes, op cit p195 
936 Boyes, op cit p76; In 1964 alone, employment at Aycliffe rose by 40% (ibid p 205) 
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drainage and services, and the A19 improvements were not completed until the 
1970s.937 Furthermore, the Hailsham Report was to introduce a further rival for 
industrial investment, proposing the designation of a third new town for the region at 
Washington.938 This was located between the Tyneside and Wearside conurbations, 
with good transport links; and, from May 1967 part of its area was designated a 
Special Development Area, enabling much higher grants, tax concessions and other 
benefits to potential employers than were available at either Peterlee or Aycliffe.939 
Many other areas in the county also gained SDA status.940 This marked, wrote 
Boyes, an “abandonment of the growth point principles embodied in the Hailsham 
Report, and a return to the old ‘blackspots’ approach exemplified in earlier 
legislation”, and it came about at the time when employment in Peterlee was dealt a 
heavy blow by the closure of three major collieries near the town in 1967-68.941 The 
town only gained SDA status, following further local pit closures, in 1971.942 
 
Enter Dan Smith 
This was the situation shortly to be faced by Smith when, on 1 February 1962, his 
new public relations company, T Dan Smith Associates (TDSA), was appointed 
press and public relations consultants to the PDC.943 Negotiations had begun the 
previous year. It is uncertain who approached who, but Smith was clearly impressed 
by Williams, writing “It is a rare experience for me to leave a business interview 
with the sense of exhilaration that I experienced on my recent visit to Peterlee… I 
am excited by the possibilities that undoubtedly exist in this field .”944   The 
Corporation was to pay TDSA £5,000 per annum (inclusive of the costs of preparing 
and printing brochures and publicity material, and travelling expenses), and TDSA 
were also to act, for a further £5,000, as industrial consultants. “Smith Associates 
 
937 Robinson, op cit, p213 
938 The North East: A programme for regional development and growth (Cmd 2206) (1963) pp26-27. 
Washington was designated a New Town on 24 July 1964 (Stephen Holley, Washington: Quicker by 
Quango (Stevenage 1983) p6) 
939 Boyes, op cit p195 
940 These were Consett, Crook, Spennymoor, Stanley, Bishop Auckland, Durham, Houghton-le-
Spring and Chester-le-Street Employment Exchange Areas. Robinson, op cit p215 note 2. 
941 Boyes op cit p197. Deaf Hill colliery closed in 1967; Trimdon and Wheatley Hill in 1968. 
942 TNA EW 7/1372 Durham New Towns: Management Structure 16 April 1971 
943 DCRO NT/AP/7/1/34, Minutes of PDC 1 February 1962 
944 TWA DF/TDS Box 3874 TDS to AVW 19 December 1961. Williams claimed Smith approached 
him: TWA DF/TDS D2063 Witness statement, Arthur Vivian Williams [cover page with date 
missing; probably late 1973] 
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had established offices in Frankfurt and Paris and they hoped, in the near future, to 
open an office in New York”, Williams assured the Peterlee board.945 
 
Smith recalled: “It was a tough public relations assignment, as I quickly discovered. 
The surrounding local authorities, including the officers of the Durham County 
Council and the regional officers of the various Ministries, were hostile to the 
General Manager… and were reluctant to meet him simply as they said, to be 
insulted.”946 There had been hostile press coverage of housing standards and 
employment in the town, and “an understandable suspicion in the minds of most of 
the journalists to whom I spoke… that all was not well in the town.”947 The firm 
rapidly began to drum up press coverage - recorded in lists of column inches of 
coverage submitted to Williams - and to organise press visits, exhibitions, etc: in late 
September 1962 Smith and Peter Ward were in Norway with an exhibition stand for 
Peterlee at the ‘Gateway to Britain’ exhibition in Bergen and Stavanger.948 This all 
formed part of what Robinson describes as “an attempt to re-interpret Peterlee’s 
functions in the terms of the regional policy prescriptions of the 1960s…regarded as 
part of the process of modernisation and regional revival”: who better, therefore, to 
be a spokesman for the town than Dan Smith, ‘Mr Newcastle’ and the region’s arch-
moderniser?949  
 
At the same time, Smith was introducing his other clients to Peterlee. An undated 
report to the General Manager, dating probably from 1962, includes the 
recommendation ‘Approach Poulson, Bovis and Crudens re industrial development’; 
by December 1962, he had advanced plans to bring the Scottish construction 
company Crudens (with which his name had been linked in Newcastle), to Peterlee. 
On 10 December 1962, he wrote to Williams that two companies, Rima and 
Crudens, had expressed interest in establishing a housing components factory in 
Peterlee, and that Crudens wanted to proceed to firm contracts. “We are proposing, 
 
945 DCRO NT/AP/7/1/34, Minutes of PDC 1 February 1962. The payments were subsequently 
reduced to £4,500 for the PR account and £1,500 for the industrial consultancy, which lapsed in 1964 
or 1965: TWA DF/TDS Box 3914 AVW to TDS notifying him of contract renewals, 1 April 1963, 24 
March 1965, 6 May 1966, 19 July 1967. The overseas offices did not exist, although it is possible that 
Smith had established contacts in those locations. 
946 Amber TDS Unpublished Autobiography p 161  
947 Amber TDS Unpublished Autobiography p 161  
948 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3874 
949 Quote from Robinson, op cit p356 
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subject to the approval of the board, in association with Crudens and Skarne, to 
commence an immediate investigation into the practicabilities of opening associated 
factories in Peterlee and are convinced there exists every possibility of this 
developing into an important employment centre.”950 Crudens also secured contracts 
to build three advance factories - handed over to the Corporation by February 1964 - 
and 100 houses at Acre Rigg, on the west side of the town, on which work started 
that month.951 Crudens’ own factory was opened in June 1965, immediately starting 
production for a 212-house contract for the Acre Rigg.952 Crudens were to go on to 
build several housing developments at Peterlee, particularly in the Howletch and 
South West districts, using the Skarne system-building technique, for which Dan 
Smith was the British representative and Crudens its British licensee.953 At first, the 
Skarne system seemed to offer significant advantages over traditional building 
methods (and the supposed advantages of industrialised building were very widely 
recognised: by 1967 42% of all new housing in new towns was being built by 
industrialised methods).954  While traditional building was vulnerable to disruption 
by the weather, units - whole sections of houses - could be constructed year-round 
under cover. Transported to site by road, they would be erected using cranes, making 
unnecessary the time-consuming erection and dismantling of scaffolding. A four 
storey block of twenty flats could be erected in twenty days, and completed within 
two months.955 “Instead of a skyline dominated by tiles or slates, there are flat roofs 
which help to make the houses seem like cosy boxes for living in rather than 
utilitarian defences against downpours” wrote Ray Thomas in 1969.956 He was right: 
far from being ‘utilitarian defences’, the flat roofs leaked badly. The system-built 
dwellings were poorly finished and their high maintenance and repair costs 
accounted for perhaps half of PDC’s rental income by 1976.957 
 
 
950 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3874 Undated report to General Manager; draft letter, TDS to AVW, 10 
December 1962. Skarne was the Swedish industrialised building system for which Crudens, of 
Musselburgh, was the UK agent. 
951 DCRO NT/Pe/1/1/6 PDC Minutes 6 February 1964, 5 March 1964. It was envisaged the first 100 
houses at Acre Rigg would be built by traditional methods; the remainder by industrialised methods. 
952 Northern Echo 31 July 1965 pp1-2 
953 Boyes, op cit pp231-133 
954  Ibid p232 
955  Ibid p231 
956 Thomas, R, Aycliffe to Cumbernauld: a study of seven new towns in their regions. PEP vol 35 
Broadsheet 516 (London 1969) p905 
957 Boyes, op cit pp233-234 
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A further complication in Dan Smith’s relations at Peterlee came also in 1962 when, 
with the permission of Williams and the Board, he began to employ Kenneth Allan 
on a part-time basis. Allan was a senior officer of the Aycliffe and Peterlee 
corporations, in charge of public relations. Unlike Smith’s colleagues in his growing 
PR empire, Allan a was a qualified member of the Institute of Public Relations and 
was prepared to work simultaneous for the corporations, and, in the evenings, for 
Dan Smith. His role was to act as a go-between or chief of staff at T Dan Smith 
Associates. Peter Ward and other PR executives would report to Allan, who would 
report to Dan Smith.958 “It was cosy” commented Fitzwalter and Taylor in Web of 
Corruption. “Dan worked for Ken Allan’s corporation and Ken Allan worked for 
him.”959 
 
John Poulson also carried out several contracts for the Aycliffe Development 
Corporation - run under a joint senior management system with Peterlee - in the 
1960s, and while no documentary evidence has been found, it seems entirely 
possible that Smith introduced Poulson to Williams, who was also General Manager 
for Aycliffe.960 There are also allegations that Williams received benefits from 
Poulson’s organisation. Tom Toward recalled “I know that Ken Allan went down to 
the Quayside in Newcastle, every three months, I think it was, could be six months, 
regularly, over many years… after the Poulson business blew up… he came to see 
me and said Tom, as you know I’ve been going down to the Quayside to Dan Smith 
Associates PR Ltd or whatever they called it, every so often to get money for Vivian 
- and I think it was £1500 a visit but again that’s just memory, it was cash, anyway - 
and he said, do you know, with this Poulson business going up, I’m going to be the 
 
958 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3911. Memo, TDS to Peter Ward, Robert Nichol, William Nichol, A R 
Hadwin 2 October 1962.”Mr Allan will be responsible to me for co-ordinating the activities of the 
various members of the Organisation, and in this respect he will require a system of reporting to him 
direct… Until we have established an efficient routine, the administrative function will not be an easy 
one, and I therefore stress the necessity of giving Mr Allan your full support…” 
959 Fitzwater, R & Taylor, D, Web of Corruption. The Story of J.G.L. Poulson and T. Dan Smith 
(London 1981) p40. 
960 At Peterlee, Poulson was responsible for a small shop development in 1965, and the making of a 
model for the Arts and Humanities Centre in 1970. At Aycliffe, he gained three commssions to design 
a total of 602 dwellings in 1965 and 1966, and in 1968 gained two contracts to build four small shop 
units. Only the last of these - for one shop - was dated after Dan Smith became Chairman. TNA HLG 
115/995 K L Allan (PDC) to R N Winter, DoE 21 July 1972. Poulson also designed the Norseman 
Hotel in Peterlee and possibly a public house; but these were by private contract with Scottish & 
Newcastle Breweries rather than the Development Corporation. 
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fall guy here, because I’ve been signing it K L Allan, the receipt…”961 The benefits 
included more than envelopes of cash; on 29 April 1965 Poulson wrote to Smith to 
“…wish you and Mr Williams a very happy Cup Final. Please be sure that you cheer 
for the right side!” The trip included a chauffeur driven limousine and 
accommodation at the Dorchester Hotel.962 In a statement given in 1973 to the 
Metropolitan Police, Williams claimed that “I thought Dan was the source of the 
tickets. I did not know it was Poulson”, and stated that he had met Poulson only 
three or four times, the first time being to do with the Norseman Hotel (which, if 
true, would almost certainly have placed it in 1968 or 1969), although in a later 
statement he changed this to a first meeting in 1963. He had received drink from 
Poulson at Christmas - six bottles of brandy and six champagne - for three or four 
years, “just something that was widely practiced”, and Poulson had covenanted 
several hundreds of pounds to the school where Williams’ son was a pupil.963 
 
Open System Building Ltd, a Poulson-controlled company, also had aspirations in 
Peterlee and Aycliffe, and Poulson companies had done a significant amount of work 
in Aycliffe, though by 1967 this was drying up. A representative of Poulson, J G 
Watson reported a meeting with the Chief Architect, Theo Marsden, in November 
1967, suggesting that “as it seems that at present we cannot be certain of further 
housing commissions it may be useful for us - preferably yourself - to have a chat 
with Mr A V Williams, the General Manager, and possibly Mr Marsden.”964 
According to a progress report dated 28 December 1967, “Following unofficial visit 
of Mr K Allan to Pontefract, approaches in official capacity from OSB to be made 
when OK is received from TDS.”965 In February 1968 an OSB progress report 
recorded “We are following up our previous approaches to this Authority on the 
 
961 Interview with Tom Toward, 14 September 2010. However, as Allan was working part time for 
Smith over the same period the need for special visits would scarcely arise: see Allan’s police witness 
statement of 14 November 1973 (TNA J291/159/2) 
962 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3852 JGLP to TDS 29 April 1965. Poulson went on: “Williams told me that 
he is very much a Liverpool man, but just keep him quiet. You know what Yorkshire men are like 
when they are roused, but I know he is a Welshman and well able to look after himself, and I should 
know having a bit of Welsh blood in my own veins!” Williams would have been well satisfied as 
Liverpool beat Leeds 2-1 in extra time. 
963 TWAM DF/TDS Box D2063 Witness statement Arthur Vivian Williams, 1 August 1973; TWA 
DF/TDS D2063 Witness statement, Arthur Vivian Williams [cover page with date missing; probably 
late 1973] 
964 TNA J 291/84 J G Watson to JGLP, 23 November 1967. There is no suggestion that either Watson 
or Marsden were implicated in illegal activity. 
965 TNA J 291/74 OSB Progress Report 28 December 1968 
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strong advice of Mr Dan Smith”.966 The next month Poulson was complaining to 
Smith about Allan “backing out” of an appointment arranged during a telephone 
conversation between Poulson and Allan. “I know, like me, you fully appreciate the 
urgency of getting a positive discussion going with Peterlee as quickly as possible 
and should you encounter Mr Allan during the next few days, I would be grateful if 
you would perhaps stress this aspect of our negotiations.”967  Dan Smith’s 
association with OSB continued after he took the chair of the joint corporations, and 
he was to meet Poulson in June 1969 to discuss OSB matters in relation to Aycliffe 
and Peterlee.968 Poulson was clearly confident of his prospects there and elsewhere 
in the north east, writing in April 1969 to OSB chairman Sir Bernard Kenyon 
“Peterlee and Aycliffe, West Bouldon [sic], Seaton Valley, Blythe [sic] and 
Bedlington are all mine personally and will be starting in the next three months…”969 
 
It appears that Smith was in line for the Aycliffe and Peterlee chairmanships from 
early 1967, the matter being discussed by Smith, Anthony Greenwood and Bob 
Mellish at a number of meetings that year, before being cleared by the Treasury and 
the Prime Minister. On 20th June, Greenwood had mentioned Aycliffe/Peterlee to 
Smith, who, it was recorded, “has from time to time been exhibiting interest in the 
chairmanship of a New Town”, and who “said he would be delighted to consider this 
in about three months’ time… and wanted to accept it provided this did not put the 
First Secretary in an embarrassing position” [because of Smith’s role as Chairman of 
the NEPC]. The delay in appointment was later said to be to allow his PR contract to 
run its course.970 Smith was formally appointed Chairman of the Aycliffe and 
Peterlee Development Corporations with effect from 1 July 1968, at an annual salary 
of £2,000.971 He had relinquished his public relations contract on 31 March.972 
 
 
966 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3849 OSB Progress Report 16 February 1968 
967 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3849 JGLP to TDS 22 March 1968 
968 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3849 J F Rook (OSB) to W Sales (Chairman, OSB) 
969 TNA J 291/73 JGLP to Sir Bernard Kenyon 11 April 1969 
970 TNA HLG 119/995 R N Winter to Mr Fairclough 21 July 1972 mentions the meetings with 
Greenwood and Mellish and the cause of the delayed appointment. TNA EW 7/134 Sir Matthew 
Stevenson (MHLG) to Sir Douglas Allen (DEA) 30 June 1967 relates the meeting of 20 June 1967. 
971 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3857 Anthony Greenwood to TDS 29 December 1967 & TDS’s reply 2 
January 1968; DF/TDS Box 3876. Instrument of appointment dated 21 March 1968, with G R Coles, 
MHLG, to TDS 22 March 1968 
972 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3849 Sir Matthew Stephenson, MHLG to Col H H Peile, Chairman, PDC 8 
March 1968; TDS to AVW 28 March 1968 
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Despite some initial murmurings about his many commitments, including his recent 
appointment to the Royal Commission on Local Government in England, affecting 
his ability to do the job properly, no conflict of interest was seen in Smith taking up 
this new role while remaining NEPC chairman, let alone being a former PR 
contractor to the Corporation.973 Jim Robertson, Chairman of the Northern Economic 
Planning Board, told the DEA that he had no objection; indeed there were precedents 
in that Smith’s leadership of Newcastle City Council was not held to be any 
impediment, and that a current NEPC member - Sir James Steel - had been appointed 
Chairman of the Washington Development Corporation. Robertson did, though, 
wonder at Smith’s motives: 
 
“I would have thought that he would be aiming much higher than this; he is 
always very critical of other public figures who accept what he regards as 
unimportant appointments. It may be that he wants to be in a position where he 
can apply some of his planning ideas in practice. I think he has sometimes 
regretted terminating his association with Newcastle City Council because it 
deprived him of that opportunity. Or it may be that he feels the appointment 
would in some way get him ‘inside’ the New Towns machine. He is taking 
great interest these days in the administration of New Towns policy, largely 
because of the conflict he sees between the interests of the New Towns outside 
the Development Areas and the Development Areas themselves.”974 
 
Robertson’s analysis of Smith’s views is credible; it may also be that Smith sought 
the Peterlee position in order to demonstrate the value of science and technology in 
urban and regional regeneration. The recently-published NEPC report Challenge of 
the Changing North had stressed the relative backwardness of the region in terms of 
its technological development, stating that “[i]t is obvious upon first inspection that 
research and development effort here is seriously out of balance”, the gap between 
the North and the rest of Great Britain showing a shortage of graduate employment 
in the region. There was no government civil research station in the North, and just 
 
973 TNA EW 7/134 T L Beagley (DEA) to Mr Peterson 13 July 1967. Beagley saw the appointment of 
a planning council chairman to a post with special responsibility for one area in a region as being 
“undesirable in principle” and given that Smith “already has so many interests… I doubt if he has the 
time to do the job properly... However I think it would be difficult for us to make a convincing case 
against the proposal.” He also noted that “there have been some signs recently that he would not mind 
stepping down [from the NEPC chairmanship]”. A few days later A W Peterson wrote that “We do 
not see any reason why Mr Smith should not continue as Council [NEPC] Chairman after his 
appointment as Chairman of the Development Corporations has been announced.” (TNA EW 7/134 A 
W Peterson to Mr Burge 17 July 1967). 
974 TNA EW 7/134 J G Robertson to T L Beagley (DEA) 5 July 1967. Peterlee - unlike Washington - 
lay outside the Special Development Area boundaries until 1971. 
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one of the ‘research associations’, while, claimed the report, the government invested 
heavily in industries such as electronics elsewhere, and regional business 
management was unwilling to invest in R&D. 975  
 
The solution, the report argued, was in the long term to increase the amount of R&D 
carried out by industry and by industry-sponsored activity in university and other 
laboratories; urgent short term action, in the form of encouraging regional industry to 
use such facilities as existed, coupled with an intensive programme of “educating 
industry”, together with financial aid for smaller companies, to prevent the situation 
worsening. Government assistance would be required. “This is not just an interesting 
experiment in diversification but a touchstone for the future of the North.”976 
 
“…the marriage of an idea with a physical possibility”: the Peterlee science 
campus 
 
The idea of seeking rather more than conventional ad hoc industrial development for 
Peterlee appears to have emerged in early 1967. Lord Wynne-Jones, the Professor of 
Chemistry at Newcastle University raised the idea of a science campus for the north-
east following a visit to the ‘Research Triangle’ in North Carolina, an early science 
park established in the mid-1950s with the co-operation of the University of North 
Carolina (Chapel Hill), Duke University and North Carolina State University.977 By 
February 1967 Williams had written to Smith about the suggestion and expressing 
interest on behalf of Peterlee, and Smith followed this up by setting up a dinner with 
Wynne-Jones to discuss the matter.978 
 
The idea of a science campus (or science park, or research base) matured as the 
months passed, and gained a new urgency when Peterlee was excluded from the 
 
975 Northern Economic Planning Council, Challenge of the Changing North (London 1966) p14. The 
shortfall was estimated to be in the order of 600 graduate scientists and engineers. 
976 Ibid p57 
977 Smith, T Dan op cit p130. Kenrick Wynne-Jones, created Baron Wynne-Jones in 1964, was 
Professor of Chemistry at Newcastle University. His wife Ann was a long-serving Labour member of 
Newcastle City Council. On the establishment of the Research Triangle, see W B Hamilton, ‘The 
Research Triangle in North Carolina: A Study in Leadership for the Common Weal’, South Atlantic 
Quarterly (Spring 1966) pp 254-278 
978 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3858 AVW to TDS 17 February 1967; TWAM DF/TDS Box 3858 TDS to 
Lord Wynne-Jones 22 February 1967 
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Special Development Areas schedule in May 1967, giving Washington New Town a 
clear advantage over its regional rivals. In June 1967 Williams produced a paper 
examining the potential for research and development (R&D) activities in 
Peterlee.979 Pointing out that British R&D was “less concerned than it should be with 
business motives” and not readily available to smaller companies, “[t]he situation, 
therefore, draws attention to the need to consider ways and means of encouraging the 
establishment of Research and Development Organisations within the region who 
would establish a connection between the technical needs of industry and the 
universities within the region. If this problem can be solved then the region can 
venture forth upon the competitiveness necessary to exploit its unrivalled position 
vis a vis the Common Market.” Peterlee, close to Durham and Newcastle 
Universities and with attractive natural surroundings, could be an outstanding site for 
an R&D base, wrote Williams, adding  “…the town is an expression of the vitality 
demanded in the north east to establish its claim as a region endowed by nature and 
potential to rank high in the European hierarchy of zones of attraction. There is no 
location in the North East more capable of originating and sustaining a base of R&D 
designed to serve the technology of modern industry.” 
 
The 200 acres of the Oakerside district were admirably suited:  
 
“Here a base for R&D establishments could be developed including housing 
and amenities for the technologists and employees involved. The 
Corporation… is able to build for the enterprise and let at rack rent, can 
dispose of freehold land for building… or provide mortgages. There is 
considerable flexibility in the approach whether to the development of 
laboratories, factories, or houses. This is the key to the success of Peterlee as a 
total environment… A strong scientific and technological base in Peterlee 
would serve to improve the economic image of the North East and increase the 
productivity of its fragmented structure. Might it not also magnetise the 
interest of the science graduates, many of whom are engineers and 
technologists at heart, towards the field of industry? To succeed in this 
endeavour could revolutionise the economy of the North East.”980  
 
Smith came up with the idea of a trust to run the project, and on 23 October 1967 
 
979 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3840. A V Williams, ‘Research and Development and Economic Growth. A 
Case for R&D in Peterlee New Town’, June 1967.  
980 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3840. A V Williams, ‘Research and Development and Economic Growth. A 
Case for R&D in Peterlee New Town’, June 1967.  
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wrote to his old friend and former council colleague Ted Short, then Postmaster 
General, asking him to suggest a Post Office nominee for the putative trust. The 
other people and bodies represented, he told Short, might include Sir Isaac Wolfson, 
the Universities of Newcastle and Durham, the Ministry of Technology, ICI, 
Teesside Polytechnic, and the US and Swiss embassies.981 The same day he wrote to 
Williams that he thought GPO’s decision to locate its research project in East Anglia 
“could be re-examined in the light of our Peterlee project” - and suggesting his 
business associate Eric Levine as a possible Trustee.982 
 
By November, Williams told Colonel H H Peile, the PDC chairman, “Dan 
Smith…tells me that he has gone a long way now in pursuit of the matter and has 
made a contact with the American Embassy who, I understand, have exhibited great 
interest since the U.S. Government is about to embark upon an extensive investment 
programme in Western Europe with particularly in view the development of 
scientific enterprise in the United Kingdom… Dan Smith certainly seems to be 
getting things moving but I think he is a little worried lest the approaches he has 
made and the interest he has elicited should reach the ear of competing places in our 
region. He seems pretty confident that with your backing and approval we could take 
this business a very long way.”983 
 
Quite how far this long way might extend was made clear by Williams in a letter of 
23 November 1967 to Smith: “If it comes off it would have not only a regional 
impact of the highest importance but also nation wide ramifications. I have not 
stressed this; it might be as well to confine ourselves for the moment more modestly 
to the regional impact. I have placed great emphasis upon the North Carolina 
example, it points the moral and by specific reference to its structure and working 
provides concrete illustration instead of hypothetical and abstract argument. Above 
all this method saves words.”984 
 
However, it appears that other regional projects were being considered, and, from the 
 
981 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3869 TDS to Edward Short, Postmaster General, 23 October 1967 
982 TWAM DF/TDS to AVW 23 October 1967 
983 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3869 AVW to Col H Peile, Chairman of PDC, 7 November 1967 
984 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3869 AVW to TDS 23 November 1967 
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Peterlee side, it was essential to move fast. Williams wrote to Smith on 30 
November “…we should not be losing out in the race and I agree with you that time 
is of the essence, although no-one in the north east has got what we have to offer in 
terms of this kind of development… we are now preparing a cartoon layout for the 
development of Oakerside as a Research Base. It will only be a rough idea at this 
stage but will certainly give great prominence to the siting of the Research Institute 
on the lines of R.T.I. [Research Triangle Institute] Carolina. This is, I am sure, the 
key to the whole situation and where I think the Trust comes in…”985 This was 
echoed by Smith: “You will see from the attached that our basic idea is being 
accepted. Speed is essential - the first project off the ground makes History.”986 
Williams and Smith were also suspicious of the extent to which the interests of the 
north-east were considered in Whitehall, and especially by Mintech, and had 
commissioned a report by a Dr Stanley Harrison which advocated a regional R&D 
Institute to do for the North East what Mintech did for the UK.987 
 
Early in 1968 Smith attended the formal inauguration of a new IBM computer at 
Newcastle University and there met for the first time and spoke about the Peterlee 
project to IBM UK’s Director of Public Affairs, John Hargreaves.988 IBM UK was, 
“an outspoken, maverick member of the World Trade family” according to Nancy 
Foy, and led the corporation in its external affairs activities, “partly due to the 
commitment and energy of a dedicated IBMer called John Hargreaves, supported 
staunchly by Parry Rogers and UK general manager Eddie Nixon.”989 Hargreaves, 
whose role involved establishing relationships with political figures of all hues, had 
had discussions with Jeremy Bray at which the idea of a science campus in NE 
England or Scotland had been discussed; shortly afterwards, “he had been very 
impressed with Dan Smith’s ideas for Peterlee as an intellectual magnet for those 
 
985 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3869 AVW to TDS 30 November 1967. The Outline plans were even to 
suggest a heliport at the western end of the Oakerside site: TNA EW 9/62 Peterlee Development 
Corporation, Research and Development Project Report, Appendices and Maps October 1968 
986 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3869 TDS to Eric Levine 5 December 1967. Attached was a report of The 
Times 30 November 1967 entitled ‘Research for Industry’, describing a £1 million Mintech project to 
create a network of R&D units connected to the University of Leeds, University College Swansea, 
Strathclyde University, University College Bangor, Cranfield and the UKAEA laboratory, Risley. 
987 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3869 AVW to TDS 23 January 1968 (and expanded views in letters of 16 
and 18 January 1968 to TDS) 
988 Amber TDS Unpublished Autobiography p164 
989 Foy, N, The IBM World (London 1974) p188. World Trade was one of the two main divisions of 
IBM. 
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interested in studying total environment.”990 Hargreaves was an idealist: deeply 
affected by being among the first British troops to enter Belsen at the end of the 
Second World War, he “decided to devote the rest of his life to rectifying the 
imbalance of man’s inhumanity to man”; concluding that while governments were 
part of the problem, multinational companies could become a force for good through 
world trade.991 
 
His reaction to the proposed Peterlee project was extremely positive, as he wrote to 
Smith on 29 April 1968: “Since seeing you I have visited the Research Triangle in 
North Carolina and am wildly enthusiastic. I believe that your scheme can go even 
further since you have the nucleus of Peterlee already. It can be a show piece for the 
world.”992 A day later Hargreaves sent a second letter, even more fulsome in its 
enthusiasm: “More than ever, I am excited at the Peterlee possibilities, and I am 
communicating this to a growing number of people in IBM. We want very seriously 
to examine how we can work with you. I believe that your concept is far in advance 
of Raleigh [the home of North Carolina State University, a Research Triangle 
partner] and can be a showpiece in the western hemisphere…” John Fairclough, “an 
astonishingly brilliant engineer [who] is heading our task force that is studying the 
Peterlee possibilities… knows Raleigh well. I can only say that he is as excited as I 
am.”993 
 
Both the Development Corporation and IBM were interested in broadening the 
intellectual basis of the Science Campus project. In May 1968 Parry Rogers of IBM 
was suggesting a study of the creation of a new community.994 Williams warmly 
welcomed this: the aim of the Corporation was not just to secure IBM but “the 
nucleus of a broad research base on the lines of the RTI set up in North Carolina… 
One imagines that the setting up of a science base would involve, as it does in North 
Carolina, not merely technical aspects of industry and commerce but investigations 
 
990 TNA EW/7/1048 Note of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster’s meeting with B J A 
Hargreaves, IBM, 17 October 1968. Jeremy Bray (1930-2002) was Labour MP for Middlesbrough 
West (1962-70) and Joint Parliamentary Secretary at Mintech (1967-69).  
991 Interview with Colin Bell, former Director of IBM’s Peterlee unit, 5 October 2010. 
992 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3857 BJA Hargreaves, Director of Public Affairs, IBM UK Ltd to TDS 29 
April 1968 
993 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3857 BJA Hargreaves to TDS 30 April 1968.  
994 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3857 T G P Rogers, Director of Personnel, IBM UK Ltd to AVW 22 May 
1968 
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into the field of social science using the technology of the computer. Your ideas are 
entirely consistent with our basic aim. I would, therefore, say that the social study is 
essential in Peterlee since IBM naturally want to know into what kind of world they 
were moving.”995 
 
However, only in April 1968, it seems, did Smith’s plans come to the attention of 
Whitehall. Jim Robertson (who the previous month thought that Smith’s plans “seem 
to have died out”) had informed James Vernon at the DEA on 30 April about the 
science campus plan, adding “I am surprised at IBM being interested as I understand 
from Ministry of Technology papers… that they had opted for Scotland… But 
according to Dan they have no intention of going further north than this region, and 
are interested in the Peterlee project.”996 In June, Robertson was reporting that 
“Although he has been very uncommunicative about these discussions” [with 
“certain industrialists” and others] TDS is assured of private funds for project. “This 
being so, it would seem desirable to ensure that whatever decision is taken as a result 
of the meeting of Ministers on 26th June, it should not prejudice the consideration on 
its merits of Mr Smith’s proposal, which may well prove to be a very attractive 
one.”997 
 
Robertson was in a position to report more fully, after attending a meeting on 10 July 
attended by representatives of the PDC, IBM (John Fairclough, John Hargreaves and 
Parry Rogers), the Vice-Chancellor of Newcastle University, the Director of the 
Science of Science Foundation (Maurice Goldsmith) and the Director of Northern 
Arts. 
 
Robertson wrote: 
“It quickly became clear that IBM are not, as we have been assured from 
MINTECH, interested in a science campus in Scotland; on the contrary, they 
said they would be strongly opposed to any such suggestion. They said they 
had considered many sites throughout the country but the one which, in their 
view, stands out as the best was Peterlee. They were strongly attracted by Mr 
Smith’s idea of developing there not just a science campus but ‘a total 
community project’ of which a science campus would be an important part, but 
 
995 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3857 AVW to T G P Rogers 13 June 1968 
996 TNA EW 9/62 J G Robertson to A W Peterson (DEA) 16 March 1968; TNA EW/7/1048 J G 
Robertson to J W Vernon DEA 6 May 1968 
997 TNA EW/7/1048 J G Robertson, Chairman, NEPB to J W Vernon, DEA 24 June 1968 
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to which would be added important cultural elements and high quality 
residential facilities. This, they believed, could provide an ‘intellectual magnet’ 
which would attract technologists from elsewhere, and evolve in time into a 
unique development of international importance.”998 
 
Smith, reported Robertson, was under no illusion that IBM alone could ensure the 
success of the project, but would form a major part of its appeal. Bosanquet said that 
the two universities could “feed in” several enterprises, including Newcastle 
University’s proposed Institute of Research Technology which he would be “very 
willing” to locate at Peterlee. “When the Vice-Chancellor made his statement about 
University participation, the IBM representatives said that this ‘swept away their 
main worry’ about the project.”999 
 
Robertson advised that if they wanted to interest the government they should make 
plans “with some precision without losing too much time so that it could be 
considered with other similar schemes that were being suggested from other 
quarters”; it was agreed that this be done by the end of 1968, and that Dan Smith 
should let ministers know officially that this was being done. 
 
He continued: 
“IBM made it clear that although the extent of their participation must in the 
end depend on commercial considerations, their interest was more than purely 
commercial; they wanted to be involved in what they saw as ‘an important 
social experiment in how man could have a fuller life.’ I was surprised by the 
almost emotional terms in which the IBM directors - presumably hard-headed 
businessmen - described the proposed experiment as they saw it, but there is no 
doubt that they are seriously interested, and it would clearly be in the interests 
of the Northern Region to encourage their interest.”1000 
 
 Robertson had also spoken with the IBM representatives seeking information about 
ICL’s plans, and was told that ICL was no longer interested in a science campus on 
Teesside, feeling that the were being ‘railroaded’ on that issue “and they have no 
intention of being railroaded anywhere by anybody”. He felt that IBM were similarly 
resistant to outside pressure, but should encouraged if they were attracted to 
 
998 TNA EW/7/1048 J G Robertson, Chairman, NEPB to J W Vernon, DEA 12 July 1968 
999 Ibid 
1000 Ibid 
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Peterlee.1001 
 
Smith wrote to the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Peter Shore) on 25 July 
1968 formally notifying him of progress with the Peterlee project, prompting a non-
commital reply while an interim report from a working group examining the question 
of science parks was awaited.1002 This working group had been set up in July, after 
prompting by Jeremy Bray, and comprised representatives from DEA, the Treasury, 
Board of Trade, DES, the Scottish and Welsh Offices, the Northern Ireland 
Department of Commerce, and the Cabinet Office. Its interim report, produced in the 
autumn of 1968, produced neither conclusions nor recommendations (unless one 
counts a “recommendation that it is premature to decide yet whether the Government 
should designate any Science Campuses”), leaving the issue undecided and advising 
Fred Lee, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the lead minister on science 
campus policy, not to make any statement which “could be interpreted as a statement 
of intent… in favour of science campuses…”1003 By October, DEA officials in 
Whitehall still believed that IBM was “uncertain” about Peterlee and to UK science 
campuses in general.1004 “After expressing unbridled enthusiasm initially IBM have 
been very much more cautious in later comments on the project” commented one 
DEA official, while according to MHLG Peterlee Development Corporation was 
showing “some trepidity” because of the involvement of IBM: “This, it is considered 
may be an anathema to the Government, hence their constant vague reference to 
support in principle.”1005 
 
However, in July 1968 Williams had assured Smith that the Oakerside site, the 
 
1001 TNA EW/7/1048 J G Robertson, Chairman, NEPB to J W Vernon, DEA 12 July 1968. Newcastle 
University later backed away from a commitment to physically build a institute at Peterlee, while 
maintaining its commitment to active participation in the project: TWA DF/TDS Box 3857 Henry 
Miller to AV Williams 8 October 1968 
1002 TNA EW/7/1048 TDS to Peter Shore, 25 July 1968; M S Bremner to Messrs Casey, Vernon, 
Addison & Thorp 8 August 1968 
1003 TNA EW/7/1048 Brief for Meeting between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and IBM, 
17 October 1968. Earlier in the year Fred Lee had expressed a preference for the first science campus 
to be on Teesside: TNA EW 9/62 I R Spence to Mr Hoaen 8 February 1968 
1004 TNA EW/7/1048 Brief for Meeting between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and IBM, 
17 October 1968. IBM had apparently told Mintech in August 1968 that they were “in no way 
committed” (TNA EW/7/1048 M S Bremner to Mr Casey, 24 October 1968) 
1005 TNA EW/7/1048 Pauline Chew to Bremner 22 October 1968. Chew had been asked to report on 
what support PDC was hoping for from Government. It was, she said, “impossible to provide even a 
rough approximation” 
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envisaged location of the Science Campus, should be free of subsidence by the end 
of 1969 and that IBM were seeking a start date of January 1969, with the possibility 
of developing a research/management training centre at Castle Eden in addition to 
the proposed computer base.1006 Williams underlined the need to press forward with 
the Arts & Humanities Centre “In this connection the Baths issue as a starter is of 
great importance…” For a rapid start at Oakerside some coal sterilisation might be 
necessary “otherwise the start may be delayed and I am sure that you would not be 
less horrified than I by such a prospect.” 1007 
 
The Development Corporation publicly unveiled the project in August 1968, when it 
“broke without warning” at a press conference. John Ardill’s report in The Guardian 
mentions “a computer firm” whose proposed establishment would be “The nucleus 
of a complex devoted to high level research into nothing less than the total 
environment in an environment which would be little less than total.”1008 The most 
exciting part of the project, he wrote, was the arts-science integration. “This seems to 
have sprung from the realisation that to attract the PhDs, Peterlee would have to have 
a cultural environment equal to any.” The Sports Council, Northern Arts and the Arts 
Council had been involved, with Sandy Dunbar, Director of the NAA, envisaging 
“something like a cross between the Institute of Contemporary Arts and the 
Bauhaus”1009 
 
By early September 1968 IBM were agreeing in principle to enter into discussions 
about a regional data centre and science centre “working closely on defined lines 
with Newcastle University” and at a later date on development-oriented activity 
associated with the company’s Hursley laboratories. Its prerequisites were the 
involvement of other industries for a balanced community; the development of some 
 
1006 Oakerside is a peninsular ridge of land on the southern edge of Peterlee, bounded to the south by 
the wooded Castle Eden Dene and to the east and north-east by Blunts Dene, and it offered scenic 
views over both valleys. It had been reserved in the Lubetkin plan for a sports and recreation centre, 
and remained undeveloped after Lubetkin’s departure. The site is now occupied by Durham Way and 
associated culs-de-sac, where private ‘executive’ housing was built in the 1980s and 90s. Castle Eden, 
a eighteenth-century gothick mansion, formerly home to the Burdon family of local land- and coal 
owners, had latterly been used by the NCB as area offices but was by the late 1960s surplus to their 
requirements. 
1007 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3857 AVW to TDS 12 July 1968 
1008 The Guardian, 5 August 1968: John Ardill, ‘Total Research the aim of Peterlee plan’ in TNA EW 
9/62 
1009 Ibid 
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higher education facilities at Peterlee; and plans for international facilities at 
Newcastle Airport.1010 The company’s view of its role at Peterlee was articulated in a 
letter from Hargreaves to Fred Lee in October 1968: “a limited one physically, but is 
also a ‘think tank’ one. We regard Peterlee as something separate from our main 
plans in the country, of which we have spoken to Mintec[h] in detail. We see it as an 
exciting social experiment to which we would like to contribute our experience and 
which lies outside the marketing role of this company.”1011 
 
IBM’s domestic rival ICL was unhappy with the proposed development. Warning 
that IBM could get a “virtual world monopoly”, one senior company official tried to 
stall Peterlee: “I would be grateful if you would consider the national and 
international, as well as regional, implications of the reported scheme and sound out 
our reactions as a company before finalising any arrangements with IBM.”1012 ICL 
had been formed by the Mintech-sponsored merger of the two largest British 
computer companies in 1968 in an attempt to create a British company capable of 
competing with IBM and Honeywell. 
 
Lee visited Peterlee in September 1968 and was favourable impressed with the 
project. “I think we can count on his support for it” Robertson told Smith, adding 
that a science campus project at Cambridge was being strongly opposed by the local 
county planning committee. “If you know anybody on that body you might be able 
to encourage that attitude and turn it to this Region’s advantage!”1013 The men at the 
ministry were less enthusiastic. Describing the Peterlee proposals, M S Bremner of 
the DEA wrote that “it is not clear what, if any, efforts have been made to gauge the 
readiness of such industry (apart from IBM) to come to such a campus; nor what 
Government support the Corporation envisages (such ‘support’ is deemed essential, 
and a prior condition of their ‘opening negotiations’ with IBM on the acquisition of 
the site). Prime facie, the study seems very vague as to precisely where one goes 
 
1010 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3860 E F Nixon, Managing Director, IBM UK Ltd to TDS 9 September 
1968 
1011 TNA EW/7/1048 B J A Hargreaves to Fred Lee, 21 October 1968 
1012 TWA DF/TDS Box 3857 B M Murphy, Controller, Strategic Location, ICL to TDS 23 September 
1968 
1013 TWA DF/TDS Box 3876 J G Robertson, Chairman, Northern Economic Planning Board to TDS 
12 September 1968. I have seen no evidence that Smith acted on Robertson’s uncharacteristically 
snaky advice. 
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from here…”1014 The Governmental response was equally vague; but, as Robertson 
summed it up, if it was decided that a science centre be located in Peterlee “so much 
the better, but meantime it is being assumed - I think reasonably - that if the 
Corporation… can attract firms with research and other scientific interests, 
Government will do nothing to frustrate it… It seems to me that for [Dan Smith] to 
go ahead as far as he can by his own efforts - as any Local Authority is entitled to do 
- is the best way of proceeding. This should not cut across the work of your group 
[the Science Campus Working Group], and one hopes that if he can show some 
initial success the Government might be readier to recognise the merits of Peterlee as 
a location for an officially sponsored campus.”1015 
 
At a meeting on 7 November 1968, new opportunities and broader implications of 
the project were discussed.  “The decision of the Corporation to associate with the 
Science of Science Foundation had now resulted in the interest of Dr Bruce Archer 
who had agreed to pursue the possibility of the transfer of the Industrial Design 
Research Unit of the London College of Art [sic] to Peterlee…” Archer said that his 
staff were willing to relocate. Williams outlined negotiations with IBM “who had 
agreed that, subject to certain conditions being fulfilled, they would be prepared to 
enter into discussions with the Corporation with a view to establishing in Peterlee a 
regional data centre, a centre for scientific research and management training and, at 
a later date, a centre for development associated with their Hursley Laboratories.” 
“At a later stage” a Centre for the Arts and Humanities and Sporting Recreation was 
envisaged.1016 
 
Smith and Williams travelled to the United States in November-December 1968, 
visiting inter alia the North Carolina  Research Triangle and organisations of interest 
 
1014 TNA EW/7/1048 M S Bremner to Heaton, 9 October 1968. Jim Robertson was able to reassure 
the DEA about the possible financial implications of Peterlee Development Corporation’s proposals 
by the simple expedient of asking A V Williams. TNA EW/7/1048 J G Robertson to M S Bremner, 11 
November 1968. 
1015 TNA EW/7/1048 J G Robertson to J W Vernon, 27 December 1968 
1016 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3857, note of meeting at Royal Station Hotel, Newcastle, 7 November 
1968. Present were TDS, R D Appleton (Vice Chairman of the PDC), ‘AC’ (unknown), A V 
Williams, D G Christopherson (V-C, University of Durham), Henry Miller (V-C, University of 
Newcastle),  
K Rowntree (Professor of Fine Art, University of Newcastle), Maurice Goldsmith (Director, Science 
of Science Foundation), L Bruce Archer (Royal College of Arts). 
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to the project.1017 Williams reported back to the PDC board on the lessons learned, in  
particular the importance of keeping the universities totally involved in the project 
and the importance the of IBM nucleus. He also reported (at length) on an interview 
with a Dr House, Director of the Washington Centre for Metropolitan Studies, for 
whom 
 
“the IBM centre for environmental studies would probably be idiosyncratic 
and would, in terms of the kind of people it employed, produce a psycho-
drama. The language was picturesque, in fact, this sort of activity can develop 
a society in which, in the first instance, you are talking to yourself… 
Meanwhile it was interesting to hear Dr House confirm that environmental 
studies hitched to the computer in a mathematical game was in the 
technological and industrial field a hot gimmick and once started could treble 
in size in a short time, ‘it works like the hula hoop.’ It was a seminal idea that 
produced a psycho-drama of magnetic attraction.” 1018 
 
The reaction of board members is not recorded. 
 
But DEA remained cautious. In December 1968 JW Vernon told Robertson that: 
MHLG would tell the PDC that nothing it was proposing required consideration by 
the Ministry under the New Towns Act. This would not preclude negotiations with 
IBM for a “precise proposal”, but that “[w]e ourselves, of course expect that before 
the Corporation has reached that stage Ministers will have taken a decision on the 
science campus idea.”1019 
 
Smith was also developing the idea of a parallel organisation at Peterlee to run the 
science centre project. Robertson in February 1969 wrote that “Dan does not 
consider that the members of the New Town Corporation have the qualifications 
needed to deal with the development of a project of this kind, and he has it in mind 
to establish for the purpose a Trust which would include a number of members from 
industry, others from the Universities and Polytechnics in the Region, and a few 
from other (eg cultural) organisations.”1020 Smith also wanted Robertson as a 
member of the trust, which caused consternation in Whitehall. In a revealing memo, 
 
1017 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3858 Manuscript notes on visit to USA November-December 1968 
1018 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3870. General Manager’s Report to PDC, 2 January 1969 
1019 TNA EW/7/1048 J W Vernon, DEA to J G Robertson, Chairman, NEPB 20 December 1968 
1020 TNA EW/7/1048 J G Robertson to Donald Kirkness, DEA, 20 February 1969 
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Donald Kirkness wrote: “Ideally, I would rather Mr Robertson were not mixed up in 
this at all, given Mr Dan Smith’s personality. On the other hand, given that 
personality, it may well be difficult to go as far as that…”, and he supported 
Robertson’s proposal that he act as an assessor rather than a full trust member (a 
compromise approved with “substantial misgivings”).1021 
 
In April 1969 Nixon confirmed IBM’s decision to establish a science centre and an 
application programming development centre at Peterlee, and to take a purchase 
option on 20 acres at Oakerside, envisaging 22 employees at a prefabricated building 
on a rented site by 1970. Increased activity would depend on the project’s progress 
in three areas: the success of the initial IBM venture; the plan for the institute of 
higher education - “I believe this to be very important and the commitment to build 
such a facility will be key” wrote Nixon to Smith; and the commitment of at least 
one other technology-based organisation to establish itself in Peterlee.1022 As the 
project was launched to the press later that month Dan Smith added to the hyperbole. 
It was, he said “the most exciting possibility for the North-east since the launching of 
the Turbinia… It is not just an industrial project, it is a part of the creation of a new 
society of unimaginable possibilities.”1023 Despite this, IBM thought the press 
response disappointing, with Nixon telling Smith that “Assuming their rather 
sceptical attitude reflects the feelings of some of the local ‘men in the street’, I 
believe Peterlee Development Corporation and IBM must take a very close look at 
the subject of community relations. Indeed, I am told that a situation could exist 
whereby the local working class community in particular might fear, at worst, a 
‘Brave New World’ type of environment being created in the area.”1024  
 
1021 TNA EW/7/1048 Donald Kirkness DEA to J W Vernon DEA, 7 March 1969. Also M B Casey to 
Donald Kirkness, 12 March 1969; “substantial misgivings”: Donald Kirkness to J G Robertson 14 
March 1969. 
1022 TWA DF/TDS Box 3860 E R Nixon, Managing Director, IBM UK to TDS 11 April 1969. Sir 
Edwin (‘Eddie’) Nixon (1925-2008) became Managing Director of IBM UK in 1965, bringing radical 
business methods to the company and subsequently instrumental in the establishment of ‘Silicon 
Glen’ in Scotland. Obituary, The Times 22 August 2008: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article4581796.ece accessed 24 September 
2010According to Robertson, regarding the third point “Dan is in touch with several American and 
other foreign firms, one or two of whom he hopes to land before very long” (TNA EW 7/1049 J G 
Robertson to J W Vernon 22 April 1969) 
1023 Evening Chronicle, 29 April 1969, cutting in TNA EW 7/1049 
1024 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3860 E R Nixon, Managing Director, IBM UK to TDS 1 May 1969. A few 
months earlier, a visiting civil servant, J E MacColl, had told his MHLG colleagues of his worries that 
the PDC might be seen as trying “to establish a community of long-haired, master-race scientists” in 
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The locals may not have been wrong to think that way, as it is clear that a form of 
social engineering, albeit a starry-eyed one, was once again on the agenda. In August 
1968 Maurice Goldsmith of the Science of Science Foundation, who had been 
commissioned to report on development proposals, wrote that “We plan to create at 
Peterlee a multi-class community: it is to be founded deliberately on new science and 
technology, which in special relationship with the arts (including entertainment and 
sport) will provide an original environment, of a kind unknown hitherto in the UK, 
designed to ensure economic and social growth. This breadth of vision makes this 
approach fundamentally different from other proposals based simply on a 
mechanical R&D/university linkup… Peterlee will not live and flourish by science 
and technology alone.”1025 This view was also put forward, slightly more soberly, in 
the PDC’s 1969 Annual Report, stating that the Research Centre “will go down in 
the history of the North East as the beginning of the new period when we moved into 
the scientific and technological era… Peterlee represents the marriage of an idea 
with a physical possibility.” 1026 
 
An address by TGP (Parry) Rogers to the 2nd Newcastle Computer Sciences 
Seminar, 11 September 1969, bears quoting at some length, as a comprehensive 
exposition of IBM’s vision for Peterlee, with uncritical appreciation of Dan Smith 
and Maurice Goldsmith: 
 
“The dream of a science city demands the full involvement of science and 
technology on the one hand, of the arts, including entertainment and sport, and 
with a complete interaction and integration of activities in the field of industry, 
education and the public services. The present barriers between these organised 
fields of human activity are surely intolerable. The realisation of this dream is 
 
the town. Boyes, op cit p204 citing TNA HLG/115/1065 Visit of J E MacColl and R Marshal to 
Peterlee, 9 October 1968 
1025 DCRO NT/Pe/1/4/15 Peterlee 1980: Proposals for the development of a New Community (Draft 
First Report). Goldsmith’s report is a splendid example of all kinds of Sixties arcana, from a belief in 
“normative commitment …that is, we can invent the future and go on to construct it” to referencing 
Cedric Price’s sublimely batty Potteries Thinkbelt plan (which “merits study to see how it might be 
adapted to Peterlee and region”); suggested features for the town included a Paperback Books 
Cultural Centre, a Tower of Information (containing “an information centre available… to anyone, 
anywhere” and a “quality restaurant”) , conferences, seminars, an awards scheme, a Centre for Mass 
Communication, and ‘Originals Unlimited’, providing facilities for “the ‘off-beat’, original 
researcher, working on a new frontier, from whom one might expect spin-off”, the basis of which was 
to be a bio-engineering centre to be headed by Professor Heinz Wolff. 
1026 PDC Annual Report (1969) cited in Boyes, op cit p203 
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surely a question of leadership and it is one of the most exciting parts of this 
project that the quality of leadership seems to be there in the form of Dan 
Smith as Chairman of the Regional Development Council and the Peterlee 
Development Corporation, in the form of the two Vice-Chancellors on either 
side of me… in the form of IBM because I believe we can lay claim to the 
industrial leadership of this project and indeed in the form of Maurice 
Goldsmith of the Science of Science Foundation who is providing some 
visionary ideas for us to work on… The enthusiasm which is to be found in the 
project appears incredibly, too, to be communicated to the Government 
because we have the most encouraging support from Cabinet level in the 
Government in our plans and indeed in the involvement of a Government 
research establishment in Peterlee at a later stage… This project is extremely 
important for the next generation at Peterlee because without it it will 
degenerate into a latter day mining village… The Peterlee project, therefore, is 
for Peterlee to grow from its present situation to a science city in 1980 in four 
stages…”  
 
These were (1) from 68-70 the universities locate one or more departments in 
Peterlee; IBM establishes advanced technology activities. A start on executive 
housing …first building to be ready on 16 October… “A number of other industries 
in the chemicals, plastics [and] pharmaceuticals fields have already made a move to 
come to Peterlee and Dan Smith and IBM’s Chairman, Lord Cromer, are working on 
a plan to select the companies we would like to see in Peterlee and make direct 
approach to sell them on this whole project.” An Arts Trust had been established. “A 
Government research centre will come to Peterlee, though one is not yet able to say 
who it will be, and there is a probability of Harrods locating a store in the town.”  
Stage 2 (1970-72) would see development of government and industrial activity and 
joint projects with the universities. In Stage 3 (1972-75) attention would be given to 
environmental research such as traffic control, oceanography, desalination, water 
resources, air pollution. A management training centre and “an institute of some 
appropriate future field” was part of the vision, and “some international project… 
perhaps a UNESCO research centre”, as well as an arts festival and the provision of 
exhibition and conference facilities. In Stage 4 (1975-80): 
 
“we believe the dream of the science city will come to reality… a European 
research centre will be one of the primary activities of the town. It will have 
international renown as a centre for environmental research. It will have done 
work in the field of experimentation in the world of leisure. It will be a place of 
architectural excitement… I believe there is high probability that the name of 
Peterlee will become internationally renowned as a very important step in our 
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design for living in the 1980s.”1027 
 
IBM also contributed ideas for further development: J V Dauman, an assistant to 
Hargreaves, wrote to Smith in September and October 1969 with lists of companies 
and organisations that might be interested in the project as an exercise in “crystal ball 
gazing”.1028 
 
The end of 1969 saw the Peterlee project apparently ‘set fair’ for the future. IBM 
was established in the town; and, wrote John Fairclough, although it was premature 
to make additional specific commitments, “I can say from an overall point of view 
the project is taking on an increasing significance to us and if the present progress is 
sustained we will not only be maintaining our present plans but increasing them.” 
1029  
 
Embarrassing Jeremy Bray: Peterlee and science campus policy. 
The decision to pursue a science campus policy at Peterlee was not universally 
welcomed. Rival moves were under way in the newly formed County Borough of 
Teesside, a ‘sub-region’ which had been designated a growth point in Hailsham’s 
1963 white paper, to create a science campus involving the newly-formed Teesside 
County Borough Council, the Post Office and ICL, the intended British rival to IBM, 
formed in 1968 by the officially encouraged merger of a number of smaller 
companies and which was being actively encouraged by the Ministry of Technology 
(Mintech).1030 
 
 
1027 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3870 Address by T G P Rogers, IBM UK Ltd, to 2nd Newcastle Computer 
Sciences Seminar, 11 September 1969. The third Earl of Cromer (1918-1991) was a former chairman 
of the Bank of England. John Orbell, ‘Baring, (George) Rowland Stanley, third earl of Cromer (1918–
1991)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 
2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/49616, accessed 24 Sept 2010]. In the event, Harrods 
passed up the chance to open a Peterlee branch. 
1028 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3874 J V Dauman, IBM UK, to TDS 3 September 1969 and 7 October 
1969; quotation from latter letter. 
1029 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3860 J W Fairclough, IBM to TDS 22 December 1969. A pioneering 
computer technologist, Sir John Whitaker Fairclough (1930-2003) was Chief Scientific Advisor to the 
Government 1986-1990. At the time of the Peterlee events he was Director of Data Processing for 
IBM UK. Geoffrey Tweedale, ‘Fairclough, Sir John Whitaker (1930–2003)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, Jan 2007; online edn, May 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/90039, accessed 24 Sept 2010] 
1030 Bray, J, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants. Science, politics and trust: A parliamentary life 
(Cambridge 2004) p73 
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Mintech had a history of conflict with the DEA. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, who had 
succeeded the hapless Frank Cousins as Minister of Technology in July 1966, 
records that his public relations advisor told him “that the DEA had been spreading 
some pretty poisonous stuff about Mintech in the past and he thought it was essential 
that they should take a higher view of our importance”; while it was unlikely that 
Benn’s view of Mintech as “the spearhead of an industrial Britain in opposition to 
the old concept of imperial Britain” would find much favour with a department that 
saw itself as the ‘Ministry of Growth’.1031 Relations between Mintech - which 
favoured ICL - and IBM were also difficult, with Benn recording a hostile meeting 
with Eddie Nixon after IBM had been referred to the Prices and Incomes Board in 
March 1968: “He came near to threatening me, saying that if we did this it would 
affect investment policy by IBM in the future… I said I quite understood this but 
that, of course, such pressure would only encourage me even more to take action 
against them.”1032 
 
Williams had been suspicious of growing ambitions on the Tees, which he felt might 
threaten Peterlee’s interests. Writing to Smith in 1967 about regionalism, he 
commented: “ As matters now rest, ‘Big T’ [the new county borough] is in action 
and is anyone seriously going to suggest that it won’t hog the bulk of the resources 
available to the north east without reference to the other growth points within the 
region equally important and, in some respects, more vital to the overall health and 
balance of the region?”1033 
 
The most serious political opposition to Dan Smith’s plans for Peterlee was to come 
from Dr Jeremy Bray (1930-2002), Labour MP for Middlesbrough West and a junior 
minister at the Ministry of Technology (Mintech), and an unlikely but tenacious foe. 
Bray was a high-minded Methodist with a PhD in pure mathematics who had worked 
for several years for ICI on Teesside before being elected to Parliament; in his own 
words, “a one track, mathematical minded technocrat” (the acidic Marcia Williams 
 
1031 Benn, T, Out of the Wilderness. Diaries 1963-67 (London 1987) pp451-452 (12 July 1966) and p 
464 (4 August 1966). 
1032 Benn, T, Office Without Power. Diaries 1968-72 (London 1988) p51 (27 March 1968). In 1969 
Benn proposed favouring ICL for a major Home Office contract, despite IBM being the cheapest 
bidder and ICL “a poor third” “But the Department is not keen.” Ibid p225. 
1033 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3876 AVW to TDS 13 April 1967. ‘Big T’ was the County Borough of 
Teesside. 
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described him as being like “every mad professor of comic fiction”).1034  
 
It was a letter from Bray to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Fred Lee) in 
June 1968 that had prompted the Government to set up a science campuses working 
group, and Bray had urged the development of pilot schemes (including one on 
Teesside) at a subsequent meeting of ministers and officials.1035 Lee had already 
expressed a preference for Teesside as the location of Britain’s first science 
campus.1036 
 
Relations between Bray and Smith had been fairly cordial. Smith was supportive of 
Bray’s aspirations for the creation of a technical university on Teesside, becoming a 
member of the Tees-side University Promotion Committee in 1965.1037 Their 
relationship was such that in 1967 Bray was urging Smith to stand for Parliament,  
suggesting that a by-election might soon be pending at Middlesbrough East.1038 The 
two men had had “many dealings” on ways to stimulate R&D and advanced 
technology in the region. Smith had apparently shown interest in the former US 
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy’s 1967 proposals, formulated at the 
request of US President Lyndon Johnson, to form an international centre to study 
management problems in ‘advanced societies’, bridging the gap between west and 
east1039  “It was an attempt to build a bridge and ease tensions during the Cold War: 
a confidence building measure… we wanted to carve out some activity that belonged 
to the … union of such disciplines as operations research… management science, 
 
1034 Bray (2004) op cit p48; Dalyell, Tam, ‘Bray, Jeremy William (1930-2002), Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, Jan 2006 [http://www.oxford.com/view/article/76970, 
accessed 29 September 2010] 
1035 TNA EW/7/1048 Brief for Meeting between the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and IBM 
17 October 1968. TNA EW 7/1050 M S Bremner to Mr Charles and J W Vernon 5 November 1969 
(attached briefing note on Peterlee) refers to a ‘detailed paper’ by Bray in 1968 recommending the 
establishment of government-sponsored science campuses in Scotland, the North, and “possibly 
Wales”. 
1036 TNA EW 9/62 I R Spence to Mr Hoaen, 8 February 1968. Spence wrote: “The Chancellor of the 
Duchy has commented: “I hope that Mr Dell [Edmund Dell] will press for the first campus to be 
developed at Tees-side. There is ample evidence that Tees-side’s need is greater than that of any other 
area’s.[sic]” 
1037 TWA DF/TDS Box 3910 Jeremy Bray to TDS 7 March 1965; The Times 6 March 1965 p10 
1038 TWA DF/TDS Box 3858 Jeremy Bray to TDS 5 September 1967 
1039 Lyndon Baines Johnson Library Oral History Collection, Transcript, McGeorge Bundy Oral 
History Interview II, 17 February 1969, by Paige E Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJ Library p26 
http://www.lbjlib,utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/McGeorgeB/Bundy%202%20web.pdf accessed 
12 February 2011 
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policy analysis, cybernetics, systems dynamics, and systems analysis”1040 This was 
exactly the kind of rhetoric to attract Dan Smith’s attention. Bray, however, took a 
cooler view, writing to Fred Lee that: “I told Dan that McGeorge Bundy’s proposal 
was not highly regarded in scientific circles in Whitehall, and it would be a great pity 
if a viable proposal for the North East got associated with a half-baked idea from 
elsewhere.” Bray also pointed out that Solly Zuckerman, who had chaired a 
conference at the University of Sussex on Bundy’s proposals, was not in support.1041 
 
Bray also believed that Teesside should become a hub for advanced scientific and 
technological developments and this led him into conflict with Smith’s 
aspirations.1042 In his November 1967 letter to Fred Lee about Dan Smith’s plans he 
argued that “it would be better to put research effort into Newcastle, Durham, or the 
new Technological University of Teesside rather than develop it in isolation in 
Peterlee, as a compromise between parochial jealousies in the North East, but I have 
yet to hear the arguments.”1043  Further complicating factors included an atmosphere 
of distrust between the Department of Economic Affairs (Dan’s overlords at the 
Northern Economic Planning Council, and with an interest in regional economic 
activity) and Bray’s Ministry of Technology, and Mintech’s preference for the 
British computer company ICL over IBM. In Bray’s words, Mintech “was engaged 
on generally interventionist policies in the conventional wisdom of the time. It 
promoted the rationalisation… of computers around ICL…”1044  
 
Mintech was not alone in this view. An MHLG official, J E MacColl, also 
questioned whether IBM should be allowed to “entrench itself in Britain” in this 
way.1045 
 
Smith’s activities had clearly upset Bray and led to some acrimony. In April 1968, 
 
1040 Raiffa, H, ‘Contributions of Applied Systems Analysis  to International Negotiation’, pp 5-6, 
http://media.wiley.com/product_data/exerpt/67/07879588/07879588.pdf accessed 10 February 2011 
1041 TNA EW 9/62 Jeremy Bray to Fred Lee 29 November 1967 
1042 TNA EW 9/62 Jeremy Bray to Shirley Williams (DES) 13 May 1968 outlines his aspirations for 
Teesside which included co-operation with Newcastle and Durham Universities and an ICL ‘software 
house’ linked to a science campus location. 
1043 TNA EW 9/62 Jeremy Bray to Fred Lee 29 November 1967.  
1044 Bray (2004) op cit p73 
1045 Boyes, op cit p204 citing report of J E MacColl to MHLG, 15 October 1968 (TNA 
HLG/115/1065) 
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after what was described by Jim Robertson somewhat mildly as “a talk with Dr 
Jeremy Bray last week about his plans and the incompatibility of this kind on 
Teesside with what he has in mind for Peterlee”, Smith drafted (but did not send) a 
letter protesting at Bray’s attitude. If he and Bray could not agree on one project, 
they might proceed on separate lines and let others decide, he wrote, adding: 
 
I willingly concede, and understand, your desire to secure this development for 
Teesside, but I do not, however, like to be told, as you stated on the telephone 
recently, that “I am the only one being difficult” because my views do not 
happen to coincide with your own. I only became interested in this form of 
development when I knew that the Universities were interested, and have acted 
largely under guidance.  
 
Your assertion that IBM were no longer interested in developing in the North 
was in direct contradiction with my own information, one such source being 
the Planning Board minutes which are available to you. Your conclusion that 
I.C.T. [sic] were now free to develop, if they wished, on Teesside that being 
the only possible and practical site for them, is no longer valid (if it ever was), 
as IBM are still interested in exploring the possibility of coming into the 
Northern Region.1046 
 
And while Smith in May 1968 wrote to Robertson that “I am aware of the activity of 
Jeremy Bray and he is of mine - I am happy that our two conceptions are allowed to 
develop until the end of 1968 and then to let others take the final decision”, Bray was 
lobbying against Smith.1047 In July 1968  he wrote to Shirley Williams, then a junior 
education minister, that the Peterlee science campus plan: 
 
is a private venture project on the part of Dan Smith… with the support of 
some interests in Newcastle University including the retiring Vice Chancellor. 
The computer company referred to is IBM where the proposal is for a ‘data 
centre’ which would be a bureau service in the first place. The IBM person 
who is pushing this is Mr Hargreaves who is a relatively junior member of 
IBM, and not either Mr Nixon, or Mr Fairclough the Technical Director… Dan 
Smith has been keeping these discussions personal to himself until a meeting at 
which Mr Robertson of DEA… was present... I think any development at 
Peterlee is likely to be on a small scale, and I am sure it could not provide the 
kind of environment that ICL are looking for. It is a somewhat opportunist line 
pursued by Dan Smith and Bosanquet, with the support of IBM who want to 
maintain their foothold in the academic world … We should certainly 
encourage Newcastle University interests in a science campus, but I don’t 
 
1046 TNA EW/7/1048 J G Robertson to J W Vernon, DEA, 25 April 1968; TWA DF/TDS Box 3858 
TDS to Jeremy Bray 27 April 1968 (unsent) 
1047 TNA EW 9/62 TDS to J G Robertson 4 May 1968 
252 
 
think this is the way to do it.1048 
 
He followed this up the next month with a letter to Peter Shore, then Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs, saying that there were “real difficulties” about Peterlee 
and that Smith “has already caused us some embarrassment” by approaching 
companies without keeping government, or even the local Planning Board informed, 
and that this had caused “crossed wires” in Mintech’s efforts to get IBM to open a 
unit in Scotland.1049 
 
Robertson had originally considered that the decision would go in favour of 
Teesside.1050 By July 1968 he was advising PDC to advance their plans as fast as 
possible to receive equal consideration with other, central government sponsored 
proposals.1051 By early 1969 he was warning Dan Smith of Mintech’s machinations. 
“You are due to meet Hertzig [sic], of MINTECH, with Vernon Brooks, on 29th 
January. I should perhaps tip you off that Hertzig has, on two or three occasions, 
spoken to me about the Peterlee project when I have met him at meetings of various 
committees in London, and he has always tended to be a bit discouraging about it, 
and indeed about the IBM people who have been involved. He is too condescending. 
I distrust him.”1052  
 
Smith remained no more trusting of Bray. After a meeting at the House of 
Commons, he wrote that Bray (who had suggested a regional committee on science 
campuses to be chaired by Smith) “is taking steps to prejudice the decision by his 
action on Teesside (ie Woodham). I agreed on the necessity for a wider body than 
that of the New Town Corporation and indicated that we would have an ad hoc body 
established before Government could act (action to discuss with AV).”1053 Smith, 
who was, according to Robertson “clearly most seriously concerned lest the 
 
1048 TNA EW/7/1048 Jeremy Bray to Shirley Williams 31 July 1968. Charles Bosanquet was the 
outgoing Vice-Chancellor of Newcastle University. 
1049 TNA EW/7/1048 Jeremy Bray to Peter Shore, 16 August 1968 
1050 TNA EW 9/62 J G Robertson to J W Vernon 21 May 1968, albeit advising that Whitehall should 
not commit too early to Bray’s, and Teesside CB’s proposals while there was the possibility of a bid 
from Tyneside, and while Dan Smith would be urging Peterlee’s case “with his usual force.” 
1051 TNA EW 9/62 PDC Research and Development Project. Minutes of meeting of 10 July 1968 
1052 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3855. J G Robertson, Chairman, NEPB to TDS 16 January 1969. 
Christopher Herzig was Assistant Secretary at Mintech 1966-70. 
1053 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3855 Notes of meeting at House of Commons with Jeremy Bray, 8 March 
1969. J B Woodham was the Treasurer of Teesside County Borough Council.  
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establishment of a regional body… might prejudice the development of his Peterlee 
scheme”1054, responded to Bray’s suggestion stating that “spontaneous regional 
activity” (ie regarding Peterlee) superseded the need for a regional committee on 
science campuses in the north, and expressing the hope that when Woodham met 
PDC representatives (as he was due to do on 31 March) he would be enthused by 
what was envisaged for Peterlee. 1055 
 
Teesside had set out its ambitions in a letter from the Town Clerk of the new county 
borough to the Education Secretary on 19 March, urging again the establishment of a 
technological university on Teesside with a science campus attached, and pointing 
out that Peterlee was not suitable for a university.1056 “Mintech Headquarters are 
clearly going to be a nuisance on this topic” wrote Jim Robertson, though adding, 
perhaps optimistically, that the Mintech regional office in Newcastle favoured the 
Peterlee proposals.1057 
 
Bray had indeed not yet given up being a nuisance on the issue. On 18 March 1969 
he had met M P Hughes, Mintech’s Senior Regional Officer for the Northern 
Region, and suggested the formation of a committee to examine the possible 
locations for a science campus in the region. Although the suggested committee 
would be under the aegis of the NEPC, Smith’s name was not suggested; Hughes 
suggested instead the appointment of Dr William Reid, also a member of the NEPC, 
not least because “Mr Smith might find it embarrassing to refuse agreement to Dr 
Reid and demand the job himself.”1058 On 3 April Bray sent a report to Hughes, in 
preparation for a meeting of ministers (including Fred Lee, Shirley Williams of DES 
and Dickson Mabon of the Scottish Office) with ICL representatives. This set out 
 
1054 TNA EW 9/63 J G Robertson to Mr Thorp 11 March 1969, commenting upon TDS’ letter of 10 
March to Jeremy Bray, cited below. Robertson had actively supported Dan Smith’s fight against 
Bray’s suggested new body, writing to James Vernon  “I must say that I, too, fear the possibilities of 
duplication in all this, and it was in my mind to suggest to you that the machinery the Council 
Chairman [TDS] was in process of building up here should be regarded as ‘suitable alternative 
machinery’…I would see no difficulty in an appropriate link being forged with the Planning Council.” 
TNA EW 9/63 J G Robertson to J W Vernon 6 March 1969 
1055 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3855 TDS to Jeremy Bray, Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Mintech, 10 
March 1969. J B Woodham was the Treasurer of Teesside County Borough, having previously held 
that office for Middlesbrough CB. 
1056 TNA EW 7/1049 M S Bremner to J W Vernon, DEA, 3 April 1969 
1057 TNA EW 7/1049 J G Robertson to J W Vernon, 3 April 1969 
1058 TNA EW 7/1049 M P Hughes, Notes of a Conversation with Dr Jeremy Bray at Millbank Tower 
on Tuesday, 18th March, 1969 
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once again the case for Teesside and the drawbacks of Peterlee, and criticised the 
capability of the northern universities to participate in such a project. Durham had 
“no base in technology and little base in pure science” while Newcastle’s bid to 
become a base for a Mintech Industrial Unit had been “so disappointing” that the 
unit had been placed at Salford instead. Newcastle’s existing industrial contacts 
included “acrimonious” relations with the Tyneside power engineering company 
Reyrolle-Parsons, while its orientation towards IBM “has not contributed to building 
up a UK capability in the way that Cambridge, Manchester, Edinburgh and London 
universities have done…”1059 Peterlee’s achievement in securing IBM’s interest was, 
Bray wrote, due to Mintech and Board of Trade pressure on IBM to expand in 
Development Areas, but the proposal was small scale and “it is unlikely that Peterlee 
will be able to make a major contribution to development in the North East very 
quickly…. Teesside would need at least an undertaking to establish a university there 
before a start could be made on a new science campus there, but this does seem on 
reasonably objective grounds to offer the best medium term prospects in the North 
East.”1060 
 
However, within weeks Smith was to achieve victory. The Ministerial Committee on 
Environmental Planning, formed to advise the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
(Fred Lee), on 24 March recommended that one campus each should be established 
in Scotland, Wales and the North of England.1061   
 
Subsequently the [Northern] Regional Economic Planning Board was asked to 
advise Lee, and in May 1969 submitted its report. Had Peterlee not made the 
progress it had, “detailed examination of various possible locations would have been 
appropriate” and the choice would not necessarily have fallen on Peterlee; indeed, 
the Board of Trade favoured Tyneside as a science campus location. However, the 
enthusiastic support of the universities of Newcastle and Durham for Peterlee and the 
participation of IBM was noted, as was the “abundance” of enthusiasm in the 
Development Corporation. “There was no feature about the Peterlee project that 
 
1059 TNA EW 7/1049 Jeremy Bray to M P Hughes, MinTech (Newcastle) 2 April 1969 with covering 
letter of 3 April 1969 
1060 Ibid 
1061 TNA EW 7/1049 Draft Paper for Northern Economic Planning Board, attached to memo from M 
S Bremner to J W Vernon, 14 April 1969 
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made it undesirable to encourage”, the report stated. The Mintech representatives, 
supported to an extent by the Board of Trade, made a last-ditch effort to sow doubts 
about Peterlee’s capacity to attract science-based industry and R&D, and about the 
greater likelihood of government research establishments moving to the region if 
ICL, rather than IBM, were associated with any science campus. But it was pointed 
out that IBM had committed itself to Peterlee, while ICL’s intentions were 
questioned.  The Committee therefore agreed (with the exception of the Mintech 
representatives) “that the only sensible and practical course for Government to take 
was to support the Peterlee R. & D. project…”1062 On 25 June 1969 Fred Lee wrote 
to Smith that, taking into account the Peterlee plans, with their links to academic and 
industrial research in the region and the steps already taken towards putting the plans 
into practice, “I can assure you that the Government endorse Peterlee as the site for a 
development of this kind in the Northern Region. As he told you, the Prime Minister 
concurs in this decision.”1063  
 
Smith and the Peterlee Development Corporation had achieved a notable victory, and 
one which should stand as one of the high points of his career. An unfavoured new 
town with no track record of hi-tech industry - indeed with little experience of non-
extractive industry at all - remote, and with poor communications, had put together 
in two years an astonishingly visionary scheme, had built a coalition of supportive 
institutions, and had managed to attract IBM - Big Blue itself - to the declining East 
Durham coalfield.  
 
Recognition as the location for the region’s science campus gave the Peterlee 
authorities greater influence in dealing with recalcitrant government departments. 
Following complaints by Smith about the lack of co-operation from government 
departments, and in particular from Mintech, Fred Lee wrote to him on 30 July 1969 
underlining recognition of Peterlee as the science campus for the Northern Region 
and promising that the Ministry of Housing, Board of Trade and Mintech would 
 
1062 TNA EW 7/1049 Report of the Planning Board, attached to R N Stewart to Mr Braun, 5 May 
1969. The Report refers to the ‘Planning Board’; that this was the Northern Economic Planning 
Board, of which Jim Robertson was chairman, is in the draft report on Peterlee circulated to the 
Working Group of the Official Committee on Environmental Planning by M S Bremner, October 
1969, in TNA EW 7/1050 
1063 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3855 Fred Lee to TDS 25 June 1969 
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appoint assessors to the committee being set up by Smith for the campus project if 
Smith so wished. 1064 
 
Ironically, perhaps, Smith may have been having second thoughts about the entire 
science campus concept. “He now takes the view that what we should all be doing is 
considering the development of industry/University research in a regional context, 
and that the idea of concentrating as many activities as possible in one site (as 
suggested by Dr Bray) is outdated… He sees no reason for having, e.g., the Civil 
Service Staff College cheek by jowl with IBM or ICL software centres.”1065 wrote 
Robertson in early April 1969. Later that month Robertson reported that Smith was 
speaking of the science campus concept as “out-dated” and that, in a small region 
such as the North, it was sufficient for the various institutions to be linked without 
necessarily being physically close to each other. His desire to announce the Peterlee 
project was, believed Robertson, to forestall any government announcement of a 
campus elsewhere, and any moves to advocate a science campus on Teesside. 1066 
 
Smith later reported to the Peterlee Science Centre Advisory Committee on his 
return from a visit to the United States about a visit to the ‘Route 128’ area of high-
technology industry and R&D in the Greater Boston area. Although the area was 
“not sufficiently far enough developed in its relevance to industry… [h]e felt 
however that Route 128 could not be ignored when considering the Peterlee concept 
and that in many ways it was an arrangement which was more appropriate than even 
the North Carolina triangle.”1067  
 
Such views were later amplified in a paper he presented to the British Association 
when it met in Durham in September 1970. While urging an expansion of the role of 
the Regional Science Committee established by the PDC “to work out a policy for 
the advancement of the Peterlee regional base for science and technology”, he also 
said that “there should be land allocation in the Tyne, Wear and Tees areas which 
 
1064 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3870 Fred Lee to TDS 30 July 1969 
1065 TNA EW 7/1049 J G Robertson to J W Vernon, 9 April 1969.  
1066 TNA EW 7/1049 J G Robertson to J W Vernon, 21 April 1969 
1067 TNA EW 7/1050 Minutes of Working Party of Peterlee Science Centre Advisory Committee, 10 
November 1969. It was agreed that the Vice Chancellors of Newcastle and Durham Universities be 
asked to visit the Route 128 area “for the purpose of studying its relevance to the Peterlee project.” 
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would only be allowed for industrial growth linked to high technology”, while the 
new  Teesside Polytechnic “could do for Teesside and the North East what MIT has 
done for Boston and its Industrial Route 128...”1068 The NEPC, he urged, should 
devise a strategy with the Yorkshire and NW EPCs and regional universities and 
polytechnics to develop an industrial strategy emphasising science and technology 
and based on strategic locations along the A1-M62-M6 route linking the different 
areas of the three regions. 
 
Smith was also trying to establish science parks elsewhere. On 15 July 1969 he 
hosted a dinner at the Angel Hotel in Cardiff, hoping to establish contacts and 
acquire land options for a similar scheme in south Wales linked to University 
College Swansea.1069 
 
Bray meanwhile had not given up hope of reversing the decision. After Fred Lee’s 
confirmation of Peterlee as the North’s science campus, Bray circulated a paper to 
relevant Ministers on the question of science policy in the north-east, and proposing 
a new high-powered committee to discuss and make recommendations on 
technological policy in the region. Despite doubts about this suggestion, Bray was 
asked to expand his report.1070 He was also present at a meeting between Dan Smith 
and Ministers (headed by Fred Lee) on 22 September 1969, at which he raised again 
his belief that the arguments in favour of Peterlee (and the level of commitment of 
IBM) were not strong enough, only to be in effect rebuffed by Lee’s conclusion that 
“the Government would do everything in its power to assist in encouraging new 
developments at [Peterlee].”1071 The meeting had been requested by Smith because 
of his concern at “the negative attitude of Mintech”.1072 Three days later, Bray 
 
1068 T Dan Smith, ‘Education, Science & Technology: Are They Our Allies or Enemies in the 
Evolution of New Regional Policies?’: paper given to the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science Annual Meeting in Durham, 4 September 1970 (Author’s collection) 
1069 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3864. Note on dinner at Angel Hotel, Cardiff, 15 July 1969. Guests 
included the senior civil servant Idwal Pugh, Mervyn Jones (the chairman of British Gas Wales), Bill 
Sales (a Poulson associate and chairman of OSB), and the property developer John Foulerton (an 
associate and later business partner of Dan Smith) and colleagues from Foulerton’s Mount St Bernard 
Group and the North British Housing Association. 
1070 TNA EW 7/1050 M S Bremner to J W Vernon 27 October 1969. It is unclear whether Bray did 
expand his report before his resignation from the Government. 
1071 TNA EW 7/1050 Peterlee ‘Science Campus’. Meeting with Mr T Dan Smith and Ministers on 
Monday 22 September 1969 
1072 TNA EW 7/1050 M S Bremner to J W Vernon 27 October 1969. 
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committed political hara-kiri over an unconnected issue. 
 
While the Peterlee controversy had been rumbling on, he had been giving most of his 
intellectual attention to the question of economic forecasting, and writing a book 
examining the Government’s record and capability in dealing with the problems of 
modern society. Decision in Government expressed concerns about how the 
government was able to deal with the problems of contemporary technological 
society. As a minister, Bray sought the Prime Minister’s approval for publication, 
only to be brusquely turned down. Wilson forbade Bray to publish, warning him “If 
you do publish you will never again hold office.” Bray resigned from the 
Government on 25 September; Decision in Government subsequently appeared, to 
widespread critical apathy.1073 Two months later the Middlesbrough Evening 
Gazette, under the headline ‘Fight for a Computer Centre is Lost’, reported on the 
collapse of Bray’s (and Teesside CB’s) aspirations, with ICL deciding on an 
establishment at Edinburgh rather than the Tees, and a further hoped-for  project 
going to Leeds.1074 “Although Jeremy has got many talents he has not much idea of 
what is politically advisable” was Tony Benn’s opinion of the affair.1075 
 
Meanwhile, Smith pressed ahead with plans for the Science Centre. The Peterlee 
Science Centre Advisory Committee met for the first time on 18 September, and 
Smith was working on plans for the arts and humanities centre - which he now saw 
as incorporating a TV workshop; “This… could be made to fit in with Dan’s aim of 
developing at Peterlee the role of TV as an educational medium in management and 
in the community at large” reported Robertson.1076 Smith was also trying to persuade 
Sir Patrick Dean, the former UK ambassador to the United States, to play a senior 
role at Peterlee, possibly directing the Science Centre “as [Dan] judges this job is 
beyond the capacity of the Peterlee Administrative staff. (This information he did not 
 
1073 Bray (2004) op cit pp76-80; The Times, 26 September 1969 p1.  “[Decision in Government] 
attracted very little comment in Parliament or the press. It was too technical to find readers among 
MPs and in the media” lamented Bray. However, Dan Smith did give it an approving mention in his 
1970 address to the British Association. Middlesbrough Evening Gazette, 22 November 1969. Cutting 
in TNA EW7/1050. Tony Benn, Office Without Power. Diaries 1968-72. 
1074 Middlesbrough Evening Gazette, 22 November 1969. Cutting in TNA EW7/1050. 
1075 Benn (1988) op cit pp232-233 (3 February 1970) 
1076 TNA EW 7/1050 J G Robertson to J W Vernon 23 September 1969 
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give to the Committee).”1077  Early indications of the centre’s success were very 
positive. Smith told a press conference of four more possible international firms 
ready to invest in Peterlee who he hoped to name in January 1970, and spoke airily 
of turning away unsuitable companies.1078 IBM appeared to be flourishing in their 
temporary quarters on Neville Road, Peterlee. By December 1969 they had decided 
to double their establishment from twenty to forty staff, and were receiving requests 
for transfer to Peterlee from the south. “Dan Smith… spent some time yesterday 
visiting the homes of a number of those who have moved up, and the wives, as well 
as the scientists themselves, expressed themselves as being delighted with the living 
conditions at Peterlee. If this is the case in December, we can be hopeful about those 
who may come in June!” reported Jim Robertson.1079 By the time the Science Centre 
Advisory Committee met on 15 January 1970 the Government had approved 
proposals for preparatory road and drainage works on the Oakerside site and for the 
extension of Peterlee’s north-west industrial area by 313 acres, to be used for high 
technology manufacturing industry “complementary to the development of the 
Science Base.”1080 
 
A further shortfall in the provision of up-to-date amenities in the town was made 
good by the opening of the Norseman Hotel in December 1969 by Dan Smith. 
Designed by Poulson’s practice for Scottish & Newcastle Breweries, it presented a 
bland façade towards the town centre; but in the opposite direction, a space-age 
circular cocktail bar projected out from the main building into space overlooking the 
deep, tree-lined valley of Sunny Blunts. Here, at the heart of Lubetkin’s imagined 
miners’ city, the scientists who would pilot the Peterlee of the future should sip 
Cinzano and eat chicken-in-a-basket alongside the executives, technologists and 
 
1077  TNA EW 7/1050 J G Robertson to J W Vernon 23 September 1969. Sir Patrick Dean (1909-
1994) was Ambassador to the USA 1965-1969. Obituary, The Times 8 November 1994. Dean had 
been suggested to Dan Smith by Lord Cromer, former Chairman of the Bank of England and 
Chairman of IBM UK 1966-70 and 1974-79. Sir Patrick met members of the Peterlee Science Centre 
Advisory Committee at a dinner hosted by the Vice Chancellor of Newcastle University on 22 
October, and professed himself “tremendously interested in the project and… promising to do his best 
to help in every way, exploiting to the full his contacts in the United States particularly…” (TNA EW 
7/1050, note by J Earl 6 November 1969). 
1078 TNA EW7/1050 L W Mandy, COI to J G Robertson, 24 November 1969. The press conference 
followed a visit by Anthony Crosland, Secretary of State for Local Government and Regional 
Planning, to Peterlee on 21 November 1969 
1079 TNA EW 7/1050 J G Robertson to J W Vernon 11 December 1969 
1080 TNA EW 7/1050 Peterlee Science Centre Advisory Committee. Progress Report. 15 January 1970 
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academics flocking to do business in the new town.1081 
 
The Arts and Humanities Centre and the 1974 trial 
From Peterlee’s beginnings as a new town it had been intended that it should act as a 
focal point for the surrounding district, with an entertainment centre providing 
facilities - such as a cinema, bowling alley or swimming pool - which otherwise 
would require travelling to Sunderland or Durham. A plan to provide an 
entertainments centre was announced in 1964, only to fall victim to a government 
economy drive the following year.1082 Work on the planning of a swimming pool 
began in 1967; but almost from the inception of the Science Campus project, it was 
envisioned that a significant input in arts development for Peterlee should be 
included.1083 In March 1968, before his assumption of the chairmanship, he told 
Robertson that “to think of the project [of a science campus in the north east 
generally] in terms only of a scientific campus would be totally inadequate; it would 
be necessary also to include cultural elements, and the ideal would be to have a 
major qualitative investment of this nature which would also be a political counter to 
the run-down of the mining industry.”1084  
 
It was envisaged that the Centre would be modelled on the Midlands Arts Centre at 
Cannon Hill, Birmingham.1085 
 
The Corporation selected a site at North Blunts - a ‘peninsula’ immediately south of 
the town centre overlooking Blunts Dene - for the centre which, it was envisaged, 
would include provision for the arts, recreation and sport; however, it had already 
allocated a site on Howletch Lane, west of the town centre, to Easington RDC for the 
construction of the proposed swimming pool and some design work had been carried 
out by Easington’s chosen architects, Cackett Burns Dick & McKellar. By April 
 
1081 The Norseman is now called the Peterlee Lodge Hotel and on summery days one can sit in a beer 
garden on the roof of the projecting bar and enjoy the surrounding scenery. At the trial of Poulson and 
George Pottinger, counsel cited a letter from JGLP to TDS of 17 May 1968 in which Poulson said he 
would get Pottinger - a senior Scottish Office civil servant - to use his influence with Sir William 
Younger, chairman of S&N, with respect to the Norseman project. (TNA J 291/63, Transcript of Reg. 
vs. Poulson & Pottinger Day 28, pp53-54) 
1082  Boyes, op cit pp154-155 
1083 TNA EW 9/62 Minutes of PDC meeting on R&D Project, 10 July 1968 
1084 TNA EW 9/62 Note by J G Robertson 19 March 1968 
1085 DCRO NT/Pe/1/1/6 PDC Board minutes, 4 September 1969 
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1968 - prior to Dan Smith’s appointment as Chairman - the PDC had begun 
discussions with Easington RDC, asking them to stop work on the baths scheme. 
Easington was at first reluctant, but agreed to defer work at Howletch in July 
1968.1086 Peterlee agreed to pay the architects’ fees for the abortive Howletch 
scheme.1087 According to Eric Simpson, a senior official at the PDC, “The 
Corporation considered that the North Blunts concept had to be designed as an 
integrated scheme rather than as a series of unrelated buildings designed by a 
number of architects. At that stage it was not possible to determine the agencies that 
might be ultimately involved… and therefore, unified architectural control could 
only be secured by the corporation naming an overall planning consultant in the hope 
that such a consultant would be nominated as project architect for each element as it 
proceeded… The Corporation felt that JGL Poulson who had carried out work 
satisfactorily for the Corporation, was a firm of national and international reputation 
who could provide the full range of consultancy services that would be required.”1088 
However, when this was put to Easington TDC at a Liaison Committee meeting in 
July 1968, the PDC deputy chairman, Ralph Appleton recalled being “disturbed and 
surprised at the dictatorial manner which [Smith] adopted to the Local Authority 
representatives…”1089 A similar episode had occurred when Williams and Smith met 
representatives of Darlington RDC to discuss the proposed pool at Aycliffe. Donald 
Vickers, an Aycliffe board member, told police that a feasibility study for swimming 
baths at Aycliffe had been completed by the time Smith became chairman, and 
Darlington RDC had decided to commission R Brown and Partners. “…when the 
Chairman, Mr Smith and the General Manager, Mr A V Williams, made very strong 
efforts to get us to change our architects. Among the phrases used was ‘we want an 
architect of international repute.’ These efforts were strongly resisted, particularly by 
me and Darlington RDC. I think the Chairman finally realised that neither I nor 
Darlington RDC would change our minds… Agreement was finally reached and we 
 
1086 TNA J291/159/4 Witness statement, Eric Simpson (Senior Administrative Assistant, Peterlee and 
Aycliffe Development Corporations), 9 October 1973 
1087 TNA J291/159/4 Witness statement, Eric Simpson (Senior Administrative Assistant, Peterlee and 
Aycliffe Development Corporations), 9 October 1973; TWAM DF/TDS Box 3849, Cackett Burns 
Dick McKellar to Easington RDC 23 October 1970. The firm at first invoiced for £3,432.14.0d based 
on estimated £300,000 cost of the Howletch baths. Eventually a (post decimalisation) sum of 
£2,670.80 was agreed and paid. 
1088 TNA J291/159/4 Witness statement, Eric Simpson (Senior Administrative Assistant, Peterlee and 
Aycliffe Development Corporations), 9 October 1973 
1089 TNA J291/159/4 Witness statement, Ralph Appleton  2 October 1973 
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proceeded with the architect of our choice.”1090 
 
Poulson was ‘tentatively approached’ in May 1969. Williams - acting, he claimed, 
on Smith’s instructions - wrote to Poulson inviting him to a meeting about the 
Centre. “It was about this time that [Smith] first told me that he wanted Poulson to 
have the commission for the project. Knowing nothing against Poulson, I did not 
demur… It was obvious from what he said at the meeting that he was determined to 
commission Poulson‘s for the project”1091 On 18 August Williams wrote to 
Easington RDC saying that the Corporation “wished to appoint” Poulson and on  4 
September 1969 told the Board that “I have informed Easington RDC in accordance 
with discussions at the Liaison Committee, that JGL Poulson will be consultant 
architect for the whole of the arts and humanities centre, who will be working in 
conjunction with Victor Pasmore as the Corporation’s Planning Consultant”, this 
latter wording,  he told police later, amounting to ‘suggesting‘ his appointment to the 
Board.1092  On 12 November Williams wrote to John Poulson informing him that the 
PDC wished to commission his practice as overall planning consultants for the Arts 
and Humanities Centre (Easington RDC commissioned Poulson to design the 
swimming pool component of the plan).1093 This was confirmed at the Peterlee 
Board meeting of 4 December 1969.1094   
 
Ralph Appleton later told the police: “Immediately after the meeting [of 4 September 
1969] I informed the General Manager [Williams] that I was extremely unhappy 
about the decision and about the procedure in that the Board had not been consulted. 
He stated that he shared my view but that this was a fait accompli for it had been 
agreed at the Liaison Meeting, which I had been unable to attend… After the 
meeting the Chairman told me that he knew I was unhappy about the appointment 
but there was extreme urgency and he understood that Messrs. J G L Poulson was a 
very good firm for such a project also he had ‘met’ Poulson… This meeting was the 
 
1090 TNA J291/159/4 Witness statement Donald Vickers, 8 November 1973 
1091 TWAM DF/TDS D2063 Witness statement, Arthur Vivian Williams [cover page with date 
missing; probably late 1973] 
1092 TWAM DF/TDS D2063 Witness statement, Arthur Vivian Williams [cover page with date 
missing; probably late 1973]; DCRO NT/Pe/ 1/4/14 PDC Board Minutes 4 September 1969 
1093 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3849, AVW to JGLP 12 November 1969 
1094 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3849 Minutes of PDC 4 December 1969. Easington RDC had also 
commissioned Poulson “in accordance with agreement reached through the liaison committee that it 
was desirable for only one architect to be involved in the centre as a whole.” 
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first occasion upon which I had heard the name Poulson mentioned in connection 
with this project.”1095 He did not report his suspicions to the MHLG, however, 
because “it could have been argued that the appointment was primarily a matter for 
the RDC, also that the cutting of ‘red tape’ in order to make an appointment without 
delay was expedient.”1096 Williams told police that Appleton’s comments “came as a 
surprise to me. It was from this time that I began to have doubts about Poulson and T 
Dan Smith… but only a worm of doubt, certainly not sufficient to warrant taking it 
back to the Board.”1097  There is no evidence that Appleton voiced any further 
objection during or after the Board meeting on 4 December 1969; indeed, the Board, 
under Appleton’s temporary chairmanship, on 7 May 1970 commissioned  Poulson 
to provide a model of the scheme.1098 Planning continued, and permission was given 
for site preparation for the first phase in mid-1971.1099 Smith was later to comment 
on Appleton’s statement, that “[t]he appointment to which Mr Appleton was 
referring was not that of the Science Park but of a leisure complex associated with it, 
a matter for the Rural District Council. I also had nothing to declare.”1100 
 
Smith had kept Poulson informed on Peterlee progress, writing from the United 
States in November 1968 that “…I am sure the IBM project is on…[on returning 
home] I will then suggest a new arrangement between us to prevent any financial 
interest which may clash and hold the possibility of future trouble.” His concern at 
possible trouble may have been due to his interview with Gordon Mees on 
Wandsworth that month.1101 In November 1969 he made a declaration of interest to 
Williams, citing six directorships (of his painting and PR companies) and adding that 
 
1095 TNA J291/159/4 Witness statement, Ralph Appleton 2 October 1973 
1096 TNA J291/159/4 Witness statement, Ralph Appleton 2 October 1973 
1097 TWAM DF/TDS D2063 Witness statement, Arthur Vivian Williams [cover page with date 
missing; probably late 1973] 
1098 DCRO NT/Pe/1/1/6 PDC Board Minutes 7 May 1970. The appointment of Poulson in late 1969 
did not involve any payment; this first commission under the scheme involved a fee of £1,000. 
1099 DCRO NT/Pe/1/1/6 PDC Board Minutes 3 June 1971. This was for the swimming pool, the only 
part of the proposed centre to be built. The architects, Booth Hancock & Johnson, were Poulsons 
operating under a new flag. 
1100 Smith, T D, Designing History From Hysteria: A Participant’s View of the Poulson Affair. 
Conference on Fraud and Corruption, University of Liverpool, 12-14 July, 1987 (Author’s collection) 
1101 TNA J 291/69 TDS to JGLP 24 November 1968. The “new arrangement” may have been the 
establishment of Progressive Public Relations Ltd in early 1969, of which solicitor John Marron, a Mr 
Andrews were directors, and Mrs Grace Cheeseman (Dan Smith’s personal secretary) Company 
Secretary, under her maiden name of Robinson. Mrs Cheeseman’s understanding was that PPR was et 
up solely to deal with PR for OSB (TNA J291/159/2 Witness statement, Grace Cheeseman, 6 
September 1973) 
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he acted “in a consultancy role” for four organisations - including Ropergate 
Services Ltd, the company which acted as a business service company for the 
Poulson organisation.1102 
 
Resignation 
The dream was never to be realised. Smith’s involvement with the London Borough 
of Wandsworth, and corruption scandals involving the council’s leader, Sidney 
Sporle, had already led to his being interviewed by the police in November 1968. In 
January 1970 Smith was arrested at his home by officers from the Metropolitan 
Police Fraud Squad, and later that month charged with corruption offences relating 
to Wandsworth. He rapidly stepped down - temporarily, he hoped - from his public 
offices, including that of Chairman of Aycliffe and Peterlee Corporations. This latter 
decision came after some heavy hints from Anthony Crosland, who wrote that civil 
service procedure was to suspend “without imputation of any kind… I have no 
power to force you to do this in regard to your chairmanship of the New Town [sic] 
Nevertheless …” 1103 He also received strong advice to follow this course from his 
doctor, who told him that “…if you were to disregard this medical advice I feel you 
would be taking a calculated risk with your health.”1104  
 
John Hargreaves wrote to Smith shortly after he stepped down that “Peterlee loses 
much of its inspiration without you” and his words were mirrored by events.1105 An 
almost immediate sense of unease creeps into the documentary evidence. At a dinner 
hosted by IBM on 16 February 1970 the need to attract a public sector R&D 
establishment was stressed. “Without this, IBM’s buildings ‘were portable’”1106. A 
week later, Howard Marshall, an Assistant Secretary at MHLG, wrote that “one 
cannot but feel a little disturbed that there are as yet no signs of other development 
 
1102 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3849, TDS to AVW 24 November 1969. Mrs Cynthia Poulson was the 
majority shareholder of Ropergate; Poulson held no shares and was not a director. 
1103 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3914 Anthony Crosland to TDS 21 January 1970 
1104 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3914 Dr Lionel Kopelowitz to TDS 21 January 1970 
1105 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3860 BJA Hargreaves to TDS 3 February 1970. A year later, Hargreaves 
wrote about “the gap that had been left in dynamic leadership due to the absence of Dan Smith” (TNA 
EW 9/69 B J A Hargreaves to J G Robertson, 7 January 1971). Hargreaves was then sounding out 
Lord Robens as a possible successor to Dan Smith. 
1106 TNA EW 7/1050 J G Robertson to J W Vernon, 17 February 1970. In a manuscript note on this 
letter, Vernon asks whether the CES [Centre for Environmental Studies] might be asked to set up a 
small project at Peterlee. 
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there.1107 While efforts continued to attract new companies - Air Products Ltd and 
the Belgian medical diet specialists Dietronics Ltd being the front-runners in early 
1970 - and there were hopes that the proposed Urban Transport and Environment 
Centre (UTEC) be located in Peterlee, there were also fears at MHLG that Peterlee 
would lose the advantage of its head start over science campuses in Wales and 
Scotland, and pessimism “about getting Mintech to do anything in terms of its 
research establishments.”1108 Smith’s departure from the chairmanship was seen as a 
major reason for the slowdown in progress. “Dan Smith, who has been a driving 
force behind the whole idea and who has spent much time wooing suitable 
individuals and forms in this country, Europe and the USA has withdrawn 
temporarily from public life… There must now be considerable doubt whether he 
will return…In his absence there has been no one of comparable calibre and 
influence on the Peterlee Dev. Corporation capable of playing a similar role.” wrote 
S W Craig in June 1970, listing among other detrimental reasons Peterlee’s lack of 
Special Development Area status and the old problem of the personality of A V 
Williams, “not an easy man to deal with and we know of cases where he has been 
less than diplomatic in his negotiations with possible developers.” Williams had also 
fallen out with the Mintech Regional Director, Mr R Wood, “which does not make 
the task of getting science based industry into the New Town any easier.”1109 A 
further problem was the rival new town of Washington, located closer to Newcastle 
and with the advantage of Special Development Area status; Mintech staff believed 
that Washington was promoting itself more effectively than was Peterlee as a 
location for industry.1110 
 
Smith’s absence was also seen as critical by Henry Miller, Vice-Chancellor of 
Newcastle University, who wrote to the new Conservative minister Peter Walker 
expressing his worries - and recommending Newcastle’s Tory council leader, Arthur 
Grey, as a replacement for Smith. “…the Peterlee Corporation officers seem to feel 
that all is going reasonably well. From the sidelines, however, things are not so 
 
1107 TNA EW 7/1050 H W Marshall to J W Vernon, 24 February 1970 
1108 TNA EW 7/1050 M S Bremner to Mrs O’Brien 
1109 TNA EW 7/1051 S W Craig to K F J Ennals, MHLG 24 June 1970. That Mintech were still 
proving unhelpful is indicated by TNA EW 7/1051 K F J Ennals (MHLG) to G Blackburn (Mintech) 
15 July 1970; Ennals expressing surprise at a recent statement by Blackburn that “it appears to us 
questionable whether Peterlee has anything special to offer”. 
1110 TNA EW 7/1051 G Blackburn to K F J Ennals 14 September 1970 
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happy. The remarkable impetus that Dan Smith gave to publicising the Science 
Campus project and trying to persuade other concerns to establish their laboratories 
side by side with the IBM venture seems to have run out of steam. I think it is too 
much to expect great progress to be made by permanent officials on further projects 
that clearly need political inspiration.”1111  
 
The failure to attract interest began to gain unwelcome publicity. “North ‘science 
city’ may be doomed by lack of support” ran one headline in the Newcastle Evening 
Chronicle, citing complaints by IBM.1112 And although the latter part of 1970 saw “a 
genuine attempt by a wide range of people interested in the Science Campus concept 
to try and replace the drive that was lost with the temporary retirement of Mr Smith”, 
including securing the UTEC project for Peterlee, little concrete was achieved.1113 
By the end of 1970 John Hargreaves and Sir Patrick Dean together approached Lord 
Hailsham for help with the project. “They represented to me that Mr Dan Smith has 
gone who has been to some extent an inspiring influence, and that they felt that the 
project on which they placed great hoped had “begun to flounder”; and they sought a 
Government research project (In particular, the transport project).1114 
 
Smith’s term of office as Chairman of the Aycliffe and Peterlee Corporations expired 
on 30 June 1971 and, unsurprisingly, was not renewed by the Conservative 
Environment Secretary, Peter Walker.1115 His replacement was the 26-year old 
Dennis Stevenson, “a younger and more vigorous Chairman” according to one 
chronicler of the town, though it would be hard to imagine a more active and 
vigorous Chairman than Smith.1116 Stevenson was no supporter of the Science 
Campus project, although it still remained Development Corporation policy at the 
time that Williams was succeeded by Gary Philipson as General Manager in 
1974.1117 The attention of the PDC was diverted towards attracting employers of any 
 
1111 TNA EW 7/1051 Henry Miller to Peter Walker, 10 September 1970 
1112 Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 23 September 1970 
1113 TNA EW 7/1051 R F B Grimble to K F J Ennals, 5 January 1971. The UTEC project was 
eventually awarded to Bristol. 
1114 TNA EW 9/69 Note by Lord Hailsham, 22 December 1970 
1115 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3914 TDS resigned 5 March 1971 as from 30 June 1971 
1116 Robinson op cit p224 
1117 Philipson op cit p239. Stevenson’s career culminated in his elevation to the House of Lords and 
his appointment as Chairman of the Halifax plc, later HBOS; he resigned this post after the near-
collapse of the bank in 2008. 
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kind to the town. Peterlee’s PR officer described the Science Campus scheme as 
“never a realistic proposition but a public relations gimmick… The Development 
Corporation’s current policy for prompting Peterlee is now based on honesty and 
realism.”1118  The Science Campus plan was finally put to sleep in February 1978, 
when the DoE granted permission to the PDC to develop a first tranche of private 
housing on the Oakerside site.1119 A few months later Eddie Nixon wrote to Dan 
Smith “It is unfortunate that your leadership was missing at a crucial stage of the 
development, but I have concluded that I must face reality.”1120 With the Science 
Campus plan dead, and Bell’s successor as director of the Peterlee operation 
lobbying Nixon for its closure, IBM withdrew from Peterlee in 1979.1121 
 
By 1981 Peterlee had the unenviable record of being the urban area with the lowest 
relative amount of high technology employment in Britain.1122 
 
The Peterlee Indictment  
Following John Poulson’s bankruptcy in 1972 and the subsequent police 
investigations, Smith faced four charges of corruption offences, the most serious of 
which was related to the Peterlee Arts and Humanities Centre. Smith pleaded guilty 
to all four charges, but in later life argued repeatedly that he had not been guilty. An 
examination of the Peterlee charge certainly offers alternative possible explanations 
to the belief that Smith, in receipt of bribes from Poulson, single-handedly took the 
decision to present him with the Arts and Humanities Centre contract.  
 
First, the prosecution’s arguments in formulating the charge against Smith were 
poorly assembled and may have been vulnerable to an informed and energetic 
defence. Prosecution notes on the Peterlee indictment record that “At no stage 
throughout his connection with the Peterlee Development Corporation did TDS 
disclose an interest in JGLP or his practices: very belatedly on 24.11.69 he declared 
an interest in a number of companies including Ropergate Services Ltd, but he did 
 
1118 Sunderland Echo, 17 May 1977 
1119 Philipson op cit p241 
1120 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3913 E R Nixon, Managing Director IBM UK to TDS 3 November 1978 
1121 Email from Colin Bell to author, 28 September 2010 
1122 Begg, Iain G & Cameron, Gordon C ‘High Technology Location and the Urban Areas of Great 
Britain’, Urban Studies vol 25 (1988) p369 
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not even at this stage mention his contractual relationship with JGLP.”1123 But Dan 
Smith’s sole contractual relationship with Poulson was through Ropergate Services 
Ltd; he had no direct contract or agreement with Poulson’s practice or Poulson 
himself. This was the view taken by an anonymous author tasked by the PDC in 
1972 to assess whether Smith was in breach of Corporation standing orders, who 
went further in questioning whether Smith needed to make a declaration of interest at 
all: “On the basis of the facts presently known Smith was not (nor his nominee) a 
member of, or employed by, J G L Poulson Architects per se, with whom the 
Corporation was in contract for defined architectural services. Smith states that he 
was a consultant employed by a company (Ropergate Services?) who provided 
certain services for the Poulson organisation. Nor was Smith a partner in the Poulson 
organisation and so far as we are aware his wife did not have interests either 
pecuniary or by virtue of employment. This may seem to be legal hairsplitting but 
subject to better view I think it would be unwise to consider that Smith had an 
obligation in accordance with Standing Orders to declare an interest in the Poulson 
commissions when these were being considered by the Corporation.”1124 
 
The indictment continued: “There was no officer on the staff of the Peterlee 
Development Corporation who, of his own professional knowledge, thought JGLP 
deserving of a contract from the Corporation, if indeed any of the officers was 
actually aware of JGLP at all.”1125 The suggestion that none of the officials at the 
PDC might have known of Poulson’s work for the Aycliffe Corporation and in 
Peterlee itself strains credibility and would appear to indicate that the charges against 
Smith were put together almost without any great care. Documents on the DPP files 
(TNA J291 series) cited above show that Poulson had carried out no fewer than eight 
contracts, including substantial housing developments in Aycliffe, by 1970. The fact 
of Allan’s work for Smith’s public relations companies was known, as was 
Williams’ receipt of Poulson’s ‘hospitality’. In his statement to the police, Allan 
mentioned Poulson’s earlier contracts at Aycliffe and Peterlee.1126 To suggest that no 
 
1123 TNA J291/159/4 The Queen against Thomas Daniel Smith. Second Indictment - Peterlee 
Development Corporation 
1124 DCRO NT/Pe/1/4/15 Supplementary Document No 1 T D Smith [pencil note: Mtg 21/7/72] 
1125 TNA J291/159/4 The Queen against Thomas Daniel Smith. Second Indictment - Peterlee 
Development Corporation (my italics). 
1126 TNA J291/159/2 Witness statement, Kenneth Allan 14 November 1973 
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senior PDC officials might have heard of Poulson is difficult to accept. 
 
Second, one must also examine the possibility that the suggestion to use Poulson for 
the Arts and Humanities Centre originated other than with Dan Smith. In this 
connection a note from Allan to Smith about the proposed swimming pool at 
Aycliffe is of great interest. Allan wrote: “The commission would be in the region of 
£1,000,000 at least and apart from our previous discussions, I would have thought it 
desirable to appoint an architect who will really give us a building of distinction - 
Richard Brown certainly won’t! In any case, we will be making a substantial 
contribution to this scheme and I would not think it unreasonable to nominate the 
architect. Pearson, the Clerk to Darlington Rural [District Council], is a very 
reasonable man, and if the suggestion comes from you I’m sure it would be 
acceptable. Perhaps we could have a word about it. Ken.”1127 Far from Smith 
deciding that Poulson should design the pool at Aycliffe, he is here being nudged 
towards that position by Allan. If that were the case in Aycliffe, why not in Peterlee? 
Moreover, Allan was more than disingenuous in his statement to the police: “From 
the moment that Mr Smith advocated the commissioning of a single architect he left 
no doubt in my mind that he wanted Poulson for the job. I formed this opinion from 
what Mr Smith said at Board meetings when he named Poulson. I was aware that Mr 
Smith had known Mr Poulson for a number of years, but I was unaware of any 
financial arrangements, consequently when Mr Smith failed to disclose any financial 
interest to the Board I thought obviously that none existed. … I must add that at the 
Board meeting of 4th September 1969 Mr Smith in no way indicated to the Board 
that he knew Mr Poulson, he merely referred to his repute nationally and 
internationally as an architect.”1128 Allan was Smith’s PR chief of staff for years and 
Poulson was one of Smith’s main clients; it would have been very strange had he not 
known of the financial connections between them. 
 
Third, Poulson’s relationship with Allan may have been of longer standing and more 
influential that Allan was prepared to admit to the police. Allan told the police that 
“as far as I can remember” the only time he met Poulson was in February 1970, at 
 
1127 TNA J291/159/7 Manuscript note, KLA to TDS 15 October 1968 
1128 TNA J291/159/4 Witness statement Kenneth Allan 6 November 1973 
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Allan’s request, to ascertain that Poulson was not going bankrupt.1129 Allan had 
certainly met Poulson on at least one previous occasion, and possibly more. In late 
December 1969 or early January1970 he had met Poulson at Aycliffe.1130 And on 20 
January 1970, Poulson wrote to his solicitor, Nigel Grimwood:  
 
“Miss McLeod asked him [Scott] if I could buy ½ dozen bottles of whisky to 
give to the Deputy General Manager of Peterlee and Aycliffe Development 
Corporation where we have 400 houses for OSB and an Arts and Humanity 
[sic] Centre, for which we have been officially appointed by letter, together 
with a £300,000 swimming pool, for which we have been officially appointed 
by letter. Scott prattled on about this, and said in the end that I could not have 
them... He sickened me so much that I have taken the whisky out of my own 
stock… I am dictating this to you in the car going up to County Durham …I 
am seeing the Deputy General Manager at Peterlee, to try and get some 
additional work (hence the whisky I mentioned). There is no-one in my office 
who could even get near him, let alone get work from him, including 
Wilson.”1131 
 
Poulson was in dire financial straits at that point. In June 1969 he had been told that 
he was insolvent, and new arrangements made to control his companies on the 
advice of his wife‘s brother-in-law, John King (later Lord King of Wartnaby, 
chairman of British Airways), with Poulson himself marginalised.1132 At a meeting 
convened on 31 December 1969, Poulson states that he “had agreed to sign away my 
entire organisation”.1133 One can almost sense the clammy, barely suppressed panic 
of that journey: the once-powerful, confident businessman now dictating letters on 
the hoof, no longer able even to draw on the company stock of whisky, driving to 
Peterlee in the middle of winter in order to beg favours. He was desperate to get 
work to keep his empire intact, and the man he turned to was not Smith, with whom 
relations had broken down, nor even Williams, but Ken Allan. The relationship 
clearly had personal aspects to it: he was confident enough to take Allan bottles of 
whisky; he was able to “get near him” where others could not. Allan, indeed was not 
a stranger to gifts of this nature: he “used to get at Christmas lots of gifts, as some 
 
1129 TNA J291/159/2 Witness statement, Kenneth Allan 14 November 1973 
1130 DCRO NT/Pe/4/2/10 JGLP to AVW 5 January 1970. Poulson refers to “my visit to Aycliffe when 
I met your Chief Administrative Officer Mr K L Allan…” 
1131 TNA J 291/159/8 JGLP to N Grimwood 20 January 1970. George Wilson was a former civil 
servant ant the Department of Health who Poulson had recruited in 1968 (Poulson, J, The Price 
(London 1981) p129) 
1132 Poulson, J The Price (London 1981) pp149-155 
1133 Ibid pp156-158 
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senior people do”, including one year a dozen bottles of Krug.1134  
 
Fourthly, by the time that Poulson’s appointment as overall planning consultant for 
the Arts and Humanities Centre was confirmed, the relationship between Smith and 
Poulson had collapsed.1135 The last payment by Ropergate Services Ltd to 
Confersbrook PR (the company of Smith’s that was by then handling Poulson 
money) came at the end of September 1969, and no notice of the cessation of 
payment was given before or after. Grace Cheeseman, Dan Smith’s secretary, 
recorded a series of meetings in October and November 1969, and a phone call on 3 
December. “Although obviously upset, JGLP still maintained he was getting his 
affairs under control and wished TDS to come to another agreement in regard to 
public relations work. TDS thoroughly annoyed, said he had offers elsewhere and 
JGLP had put him in an extremely embarrassing position. After Christmas there was 
an agreement to meet in January 1970, but upon the announcement of the 
Wandsworth case TDS received a telephone call to say JGLP would not be 
available.”1136 This situation raises a number of questions. One reading is that Smith 
was by December 1969 perhaps no longer interested in doing business with Poulson. 
Did Smith, despite his annoyance, preside over the PDC Board meeting the 
following day, 4 December, hoping that the appointment of Poulson would help his 
former friend back on his feet, whether or not this would lead to a resumption of 
their former business relationship? Did he feel that the appointment of Poulson as 
consulting architect was necessary to keep the Science Campus project on track? Did 
he feel that Poulson was indeed the best practice for the job? Whatever the case, it is 
clear that whatever reason he had for approving of Poulson’s appointment, he was 
 
1134 Interview with Tom Toward, 14 September 2010. On the Krug, Toward continued: “he had them 
in his office in cases and he went out to a meeting and when he came back they weren’t there… he 
made enquiries, couldn’t find out… On Christmas day he went to Vivian Williams’ for a meal and 
…Vivian Williams had in his entrance hall this huge long sideboard, and on it were twelve bottles of 
Krug. Ken Allan said to him, ‘They looked like mine’, and Vivian Williams grinned and said ‘You 
can have one back’. On Poulson’s whisky, Toward commented: “Ken Allan was the contact for 
Vivian Williams…The whisky would be intended for Vivian Williams. Ken Allan didn’t have the 
power to take decisions.” Toward believes Allan innocent of wrongdoing: “I cleared Ken Allan of any 
wrongdoing because he… hadn’t done anything wrong, he was an honest lad caught up by 
circumstances, it’s just his association with others because of his link with Vivian Williams sort of 
made people think different” 
1135 eg TWAM DF/TDS Box 3842 TDS to Professor George Jones, 22 July 1976, stating “My 
association with Poulson ended in Sept 1968 and was finalised in Sept 1969”. The second date is 
more reliable than the first. 
1136 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3879. Note (undated) by Grace Cheeseman, signed ‘GC’. 
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not at that point in receipt of money from Poulson, and that there was no certainty of 
the payments resuming in the future.1137 
 
Investigations 
Once the Poulson bankruptcy began to make headlines, Smith’s chairmanship was 
examined for indiscretions, although the paperwork was sometimes missing. “We 
don’t not know what tie-ups Dan Smith may have had with various firms” wrote one 
irritated civil servant. “If our ministers appoint a man as chairman it is hardly to be 
expected that we maintain a detective to check on his private and business 
affairs.”1138 The same officer also had to investigate the unlikely suggestion that 
Smith was a director of Pressdram, publishers of Private Eye.1139 Another more 
tangible link became apparent when the Ministry realised that a company called 
Project Location Ltd had been given an industrial consultancy by PDC in November 
1968, supposedly on Smith’s recommendation; Ron Dilleigh, Smith’s Northampton-
based friend and business associate, was a director of the firm. Ralph Appleton, the 
Deputy Chairman at Peterlee, had raised his disquiet about these associations with 
the Ministry in September 1969.1140 
 
At Peterlee, meanwhile, steps were taken to maintain an illusion of calm. A Board 
Meeting on 17 August 1972, held to consider Allan’s actions, found that the board 
“are satisfied that Mr Allan was not in a position to influence the placing of Poulson 
contracts nor did so. We can find no evidence of any kind to suggest that Mr Allan 
ever had a special association with Mr Poulson.”  The Department of the 
Environment, too, seemingly did not wish to rock the boat, one officer advising a 
junior minister that Andrew Cunningham’s acceptance of a free holiday from 
Poulson “does not even begin to look like sufficient reasons for requiring him to 
resign from the Authority.”1141 Allan resigned at the end of June 19Poul74 “on 
grounds of ill health” and this was greeted “with the deepest regret… the corporation 
 
1137 Poulson, in his memoirs, wrote: “The truth is that I terminated his employment, not the other way 
about, and solely because I had heard that he was to face a further investigation in Wandsworth, and 
we were deeply concerned that no mud should stick to us in the wake of his turbulent career.”  
(Poulson op cit p71) 
1138 TNA HLG 115/995 R N Winter to Mr Fairclough 21 July 1972 
1139 TNA HLG 115/995 R N Winter to Mr Gilbert 24 January 1973 
1140 TNA HLG 115/995 R N Winter to Mr Stirling 20 March 1973 
1141 TNA HLG 115/995 C N Tebay to PS/PUSS(TI) (Private Secretary to Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State) 30 August 1972. There were, of course, more than one holiday. 
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record deep appreciation of the very long and valuable service rendered by Mr 
Allan.”1142 Williams had retired on 16 January 1974, his departure by contrast having 
been marked by complete silence in the records other than functional mentions of 
date of leaving, although the Director of Finance, who served as stand-in until Gary 
Philipson took over the position in March 1974, received a vote of thanks for his 
three months service.1143 
 
Philipson was to write in his 1988 history of the Aycliffe and Peterlee Corporations 
that “[n]one of the offences to which Smith, Poulson and Cunningham pleaded guilty 
were in any way related to the Development Corporations’ business…”.1144 
 
Discussion 
Forty years after the departure of IBM from Peterlee, how can we assess Smith’s 
tenure of the new town corporation chairmanship and his advocacy of the science 
campus project? Was the latter, as Robinson believed, just “a dismal, somewhat 
embarrassing, failure”, or could it have worked?1145 Peterlee gets no mention in the 
history of science parks, “almost certainly… because it failed to develop into a fully 
fledged park”; but it was, as Smith had hoped and striven for, the first in the field in 
the UK.1146 If the arrival of IBM on the ground can be taken as a starting date, 
Peterlee was active by late 1969; the science parks of Heriot-Watt and Trinity 
College Cambridge did not start until 1971. Since that period, and especially since 
the 1980s, the number of science parks has expanded in the UK and elsewhere. By 
the early 1990s there were 38 science parks established in the UK, and 18 more 
under development.1147 Naturally, there would be failures.  Castells and Hall describe 
a headlong rush of regions eager to become new Silicon Valleys: 
 
“A hasty, hurried study by an opportunistic consultant was at hand to provide 
the magic formula: a small dose of venture capital, a university (invariably 
termed a ‘Technology Institute’), fiscal and institutional incentives to attract 
 
1142 DCRO NT/Pe/1/1/7 
1143 DCRO NT/Pe/1/1/7 PDC Board minutes 6 September 1973, 6 December 1973, 3 January 1974, 7 
February 1974, 4 April 1974 
1144 Philipson op cit, p169 
1145 Robinson op cit p220 
1146 Gareth Potts, Towards the Embedded University? (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne 1997) pp170-171 
1147 Nikos Komninos, Intelligent Cities. Innovation, Knowledge Systems and Digital Spaces (London 
2002) p56 
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high-technology firms, and a degree of support for small businesses. All this, 
wrapped within the covers of a glossy brochure, and illustrated by a sylvan 
landscape with a futuristic name, would create the right conditions… to 
become the locus of the new major global industrial center. The world is now 
littered with the ruins of all too many such dreams that have failed… Indeed it 
would almost seem, as some scholars have argued, that the whole world has 
become gripped by ‘high technology fantasies,’ which signify virtually 
nothing.”1148   
 
But Peterlee was hardly an instance of slapping ‘high-tech’ signage on a common-or-
garden industrial estate. It offered most of what is now identified as the key 
requirements of a ‘technopole’ (to use the term favoured by Castells and Hall). For 
example, of the four types of technology intermediation suggested by Komninos - 
university/business collaboration, business networking, finance and other support for 
spin-offs creating new technology-intense industries, and the attraction of innovative 
organisations and the dissemination of research - Peterlee offered all but the third; 
and Smith might reasonably have hoped that Government designation of Peterlee as 
‘the’ science campus for the region might ultimately bring financial support to 
overcome the disadvantage of non-SDA status.1149 And while Heriot-Watt’s 
proximity to Edinburgh may have offered some advantages, Peterlee’s connection 
with both Newcastle and Durham Universities outshone Heriot’s standing, which, 
says Bowyer, was not very high, the university having just 1,000 students  in 1970 
and being short of money throughout the 1970s; yet “[t]his has not inhibited its 
steady development and the healthy growth of the research park…”1150 
 
Also, although Peterlee was neither “emerging from deep agricultural torpor” nor 
indeed is County Durham one of “the idyllic corners of the world” which saw so 
many technopole developments, there were precedents for the impact of new 
technology on  a depressed traditional-industrial background.1151 The Route 128 
corridor around Boston, USA had developed largely accidentally as businesses were 
established near strategic junctions on that city’s orbital freeway. Garreau described 
the consequence: “From the dawn of the computer age, the Edge Cities along Route 
 
1148 Castells, Manuel, & Hall, Peter, Technopoles of the World. The making of twenty-first-century 
industrial complexes (London 1994) p8 
1149 Komninos op cit p25 
1150 Bower, D Jane, Company and campus partnership. Supporting technology transfer (London 
1992) p97 
1151 Quotes from Castells & Hall op cit p7.  
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128 became synonymous with the romance of high technology. Companies that 
made history clustered around the verdant interstates - Digital, Lotus, Wang. The 
Edge-City-driven Massachusetts Miracle of the 1980s in one decade lifted New 
England from the poorest region in America to its richest.”1152 Massachussetts had 
lost its staple textile industries in the inter-war years, but Route 128 brought about a 
remarkable resurgence in computing, electronics and avionics.1153 The process had 
begun when Wang Industries, founded by a Harvard graduate, relocated in the 1960s 
to Lowell, an archetypal mill town which had lost half of its jobs between 1924 and 
1932. Wang was just the vanguard of a great number of technology firms.1154 The 
parallels could not have been lost on Smith. 
 
The question of leadership in the creation of technopoles appears to receive little 
attention. Castells and Hall comment that the Sophia-Antipolis science park near 
Nice was “[m]Most remarkably, and unusually among the schemes considered [in 
their book], it was the notion of an individual, which was fully accepted as a public 
initiative only after a decade of indecision.”1155 If anything, Castells and Hall looked 
upon individual leadership with something approaching suspicion, writing of 
‘Science Cities’ (in their terminology, centres for ‘pure’ scientific research such as 
Akademgorodok in Siberia) that such projects  “also tend to be linked to the all-
powerful will of a Prince (in modern terms, an autocrat or technocrat) with the power 
to create ex-nihilo a new site for science…”1156 Given the respect in which he was 
held by many of the key figures in the project, and the effects upon it of his departure 
from Peterlee, this is perhaps not a completely bad analogy in Smith’s case. 
 
Individual leadership also played a significant role in the development of the North 
Carolina Research Triangle - a major influence on the Peterlee scheme - in the 
person of North Carolina state Governor Luther H Hodges. While a number of 
people associated with the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), Duke 
University and North Carolina State University came up with the idea of a research 
park, it was Hodges who drove it to reality, “with the vigor and drive, the capacity 
 
1152 Garreau, Joel, Edge City. Life on the New Frontier (New York 1991) p74 
1153 Castells & Hall op cit p29 
1154 Ibid p31 
1155 Ibid p85.  
1156 Ibid pp39-40 
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for hard and sustained work, and the flair for salesmanship that have always 
characterised him. His administration as governor was dedicated to broadening the 
industrial base of a relatively poor state, and the Triangle proposal fitted right in.”1157 
The parallels are obvious; the differences equally so. Governor Hodges was a man of 
great power within his state, albeit powers with strict limitations; Smith technically 
had no individual executive power at all, although a great deal of influence. But both 
men were adept in publicising and persuading for their cause, and in building 
coalitions of interests in favour of it. Smith’s efforts on behalf of Peterlee even took 
up a significant part of a 1969 government propaganda film in which he was profiled 
as a representative of booming 1960s Britain: The Pacemakers.1158 
 
Could it have worked? Counterfactuals make bad history, but certain points can 
reasonably be made or argued. Had Smith remained Chairman of the Corporation, 
and had the Labour government been re-elected in 1970, it is entirely possible that he 
could have encouraged further advanced technology enterprises to come to Peterlee 
and to have secured from central government both the ability to offer greater 
financial incentives to relocating companies, and - a very important factor - a 
government research facility for the town. Certainly, the behaviour of his successors 
in office (Appleton and Stevenson) did little to encourage the project, which, at 
Smith’s departure, appeared ripe for ‘breakthrough’. 
 
Gary Philipson argues that “although Dan Smith claimed from the outset the support 
of Ministers and of IBM… in both cases the support given was in principle only.”1159 
This is misleading. As outlined above, IBM had committed themselves to Peterlee 
and their initial establishment was in place by the time Smith stepped down; only 
their continued expansion was conditional. The question of government support is 
 
1157 Hamilton, W B, ‘The Research Triangle in North Carolina: A Study in Leadership for the 
Common Weal’, South Atlantic Quarterly (Spring 1966) pp254-278. Luther H Hodges (1898-1974) 
was Governor of North Carolina 1954-1961 and US Secretary of Commerce 1961-1965. 
1158 Central Office of Information, The Pacemakers, also released as No Two the Same, (1969). These 
were part of a series of short films profiling innovative figures in the arts, culture, town planning etc, 
released for broadcast overseas. The film on Dan Smith, as hagiographic a portrayal as anyone might 
wish for, shows among other things one of his “legendary” dinner parties at which he is discussing the 
Arts and Humanities Centre with guests including the actor John Neville, Arthur Clifford of Tyne 
Tees TV, Leslie Holloway of the Midlands Arts Centre, Leonie Cohn, a BBC producer, and Wilfred 
Burns. 
1159 Philipson op cit pp171-172 
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more open to argument. While support from certain departments, especially Mintech 
and to a lesser extent the Board of Trade, was lukewarm at best, Fred Lee’s 
statement that Peterlee was to be the officially sanctioned science campus for the 
north was unequivocal.1160 One can but conjecture.  
 
The facts, though, are that Smith arrived at an ailing mining town in 1962. When he 
left it in 1970, it had, largely through his efforts, attracted investment by IBM and 
was, however briefly, a town which serious and senior people even believed might 
soon have its own branch of Harrods. The Peterlee project serves also as a 
microcosm of Smith’s career. It was a location where his political will and his belief 
in the possibility of a better future and a new society in the north of England, 
achievable through a marriage of science and technology and the arts, tangled and 
collided catastrophically with his business interests. His guilt or innocence of 
corruption is in one sense irrelevant to the nature of his achievement in Peterlee. I 
have sought to suggest that the situation at Peterlee was of such a nature that while 
his innocence cannot be demonstrated, it would be equally unsafe and unjust to 
assume his guilt. But whether or not he was guilty of corruption in Peterlee, the 
entanglement of interests was his own responsibility and set the conditions for his 
fall, and for the ultimate failure of his aspirations for the town and the region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1160 Boyes, op cit pp204-205 citing TNA HLG/115/1065 DEA Official Committee on Environmental 
Planning, 22 November 1968 
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Chapter 7: A Piece of the Action 
 
I came to the conclusion that I was missing out, that I could combine my real desire 
to give public service with what they call a piece of the action.1161 
 
The end of a career 
Smith’s public life came to an abrupt end on 17 January 1970 on being told by a 
journalist that he was about to be charged with corruption relating to a public 
relations account with Wandsworth borough council.1162 He was formally 
summonsed on 19 January on charges under the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 
1889 and within days had ‘temporarily’ stepped down as chairman of the Northern 
Economic Planning Council and the Aycliffe and Peterlee Development 
Corporations and was never again to occupy public office.1163 Instead, he entered 
upon a seven-year period in which the collision of his public and private interests 
saw him stand trial on three occasions for corruption, serve almost three years of a 
six year prison sentence, be called as a key witness in two further corruption trials 
and as a witness to two official inquiries. In the course of this his business interests 
collapsed and his reputation was all but destroyed. 
 
Smith’s career as a businessman had begun after the end of the war, when, after an 
interlude running a Wallsend café with former ILP colleagues, he began a painting 
and decorating business with another political associate, Bill Nichol. The partnership 
flourished, specialising in the painting of cinemas and in council contracts. The role 
of Smith’s accountant, William Kirkup, as Progressive Party councillor and 
chairman of Newcastle’s housing committee in the mid-1950s, gave rise to gossip, 
but Smith was apparently scrupulous in declaring an interest when his company was 
being considered for a council contract. Ian Bransom, former leader of Newcastle’s 
Conservatives, recalled in 1971 that “Dan would always declare his interest 
whenever he was tendering. People on the Tory side were doing it too. Dan painted a 
 
1161 T Dan Smith, quoted by Chibnall, S & Saunders, P, ‘Worlds apart: notes on the social reality of 
corruption’, British Journal of Sociology 28 (2) (1977) p 143 
1162 TWAM DF.TDS Box 3913, unpublished memoir by Ada Smith p 50 
1163 Newcastle Journal 20 January 1970, 26 January 1970 
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lot of council houses. It was fair. You would lose a lot of good men in councils if 
you said that no one was allowed to carry out work for the local authority.”1164 
Eventually he gave up tendering for council contracts, because, according to 
Alderman Arthur Grey (Bransom’s successor as Tory leader): “Dan felt resentment 
at having to leave the council while a tender was being discussed. He felt it was 
undignified because he seemed to be singled out for personal discussion and he knew 
it. He decided to go for no more tenders because of what some people on the council 
were doing to him.”1165 
 
The Crudens Affair 
By the late 1950s he was losing interest in painting and decorating. Having maybe 
been influenced by Vance Packard’s work on the American advertising industry The 
Hidden Persuaders, Smith turned his attention to the new field of public 
relations.1166 He had encouraged Newcastle City council to appoint PR consultants to 
handle a corporate account, and this contract was awarded to JKT Public Relations, 
formed by three specialist correspondents from the Evening Chronicle, Jack Ramsey, 
Ken Dodd and Tom Bergman.1167 While the contract was being debated in Council, 
Conservative members “accused an unnamed Labour councillor of having a financial 
interest in JKT”, while Smith invited his critics to take the matter up with the Town 
Clerk if they had any evidence. “Dan’s coolness under fire, and the support of his 
Labour colleagues, won the day.”1168 Soon afterwards, probably in early 1961, Smith 
came into contact with a Scottish building company, Crudens, whose north east 
England agent was a local councillor in Chester-le-Street named Bob Urwin, an old 
acquaintance of Smith. Crudens had obtained the UK licence for the Swedish Skarne 
industrialised building system. Urwin and his colleague Sid McCullough sought 
Smith’s help in promoting it to local authorities; meanwhile, JKT had begun to act as 
PR agents for Crudens. According to Fitzwalter and Taylor, Smith proposed setting 
 
1164 Northern Echo 9 July 1971 
1165 Ibid 
1166 Ibid  1971 mentions Smith being influenced by The Hidden Persuaders. I have come across no 
references to it in Smith’s writings or recorded interviews. 
1167 Fitzwalter, R & Taylor, D, Web of Corruption. The Story of JGL Poulson ond T Dan Smith (St 
Albans 1981) pp 37-38. Jack Ramsey was local government correspondent, Ken Dodd (who soon 
dropped out of the company to take up a journalistic post in Manchester) the industrial correspondent 
and Tom Bergman wrote on culture and the arts. The firm drew its name from their initials 
1168 Ibid p 38. Jack Ramsey denied that Smith ever had a financial interest in JKT (Interview with Jack 
Ramsey 3 March 2010) 
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up a new PR company to pursue local authority contracts which an outraged 
Bergman denounced as “a bribe collection agency”.1169 Jack Ramsey recollects 
Smith trying to detach him from Bergman for a similar (if not the same) venture, 
with Ramsey warning Smith that he would probably end up in Durham Gaol.1170 
Both versions end with Smith storming out.1171 
 
Smith’s interest in Crudens caused local controversy in January 1962 when a report 
presented by the housing committee to the council recommended inviting Crudens, 
which previously had not worked in Newcastle, to tender for three proposed new 
high-rise blocks of flats in Newcastle. Conservative leader Ian Bransom moved that 
the contract be given instead to Wimpeys, adding “I had hoped that Councillor Smith 
would be back, as I wanted to ask him why this great preference was being shown  
for… Crudens, who, as far as I know, have never done any work in this city for this 
Corporation…If the reference back is not acceptable to the Socialists, I suggest that 
the matter be referred to the Minister of Housing and Local Government to see what 
he thinks about this sort of thing. I think it is a bit sinister, a bit strange and a bit 
unsavoury.”1172 Rumours were spreading about Smith’s supposed interest in 
Crudens, and causing upset in the Labour Group as well as outrage in the 
Conservative opposition. In June 1962 the Labour chairman of the Housing 
Committee, Cllr Tom Collins, resigned, allegedly over Smith’s ‘behind the scenes’ 
behaviour regarding housing contracts, and his deputy, vice chairman Jonathan 
Burton resigned in early July after Dan Smith was re-elected housing chairman, a 
post he had held from 1958 until May 1961.1173 A bitter dispute broke out between 
Smith and his former ILP colleague Jack Johnston.  
 
1169 Ibid p 39.  
1170 Interview with Jack Ramsey 3 March 2010 
1171 Fitzwalter & Taylor’s assertion that “If there was to be a PR war in Newcastle, Smith was 
determined to win it” seems rather melodramatic, and their assertion that  he “[took] with him JKT’s 
latest journalistic recruit, Peter Ward, and the Burton and Crudens accounts” does not accord with 
Ramsey’s recollection that he and Bergman had suggested Ward move to Smith’s employment when 
Smith had asked their advice when the row had simmered down, and that JKT  continued to work for 
both Burtons (and the Newcastle-based Jackson the Tailor, which was to take Burton over) and 
Crudens (Interview with Jack Ramsey 3 March 2010) . 
1172 Newcastle City Council, Proceedings 1961-62, 17 January 1962 pp 750-751 
1173 Newcastle Journal 4 July 1962 p 5; 6 July 1962; 7 July 1962; Fitzwalter & Taylor op cit, pp47-48. 
Collins resigned ostensibly because of ‘pressure of work’, later claiming it to have been in protest at 
Smith’s actions in brining pressure to bear for the council to approve a contract for the builder 
Leslie’s, a subsidiary of Bovis, at a time when Smith was establishing a triangular business 
relationship with Bovis and Poulson. 
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Smith was subsequently to deny repeatedly that he had been working as a PR 
consultant for Crudens. He had, he said, been negotiating with them as he wanted to 
secure the UK licence for Skarne, believing it to be the best building system in 
Europe. Skarne suggested Smith set up a PR company to handle them and so 
Nicholas PR was established with Bill Nichol.1174 
 
Smith was still considering the matter at a meeting of T Dan Smith Associates on 9 
October 1962, when it was noted he would meet Crudens representatives on 16 
October to discuss the possibility of PR work for them.1175 But Poulson did not 
believe the Skarne system was financially viable; and he was now the more 
important business partner for Smith who was later nto write that  “My interest in 
Skarne and Crudens never came to fruition.”1176 
 
His practice of not attending meetings of the Housing Committee and Council at 
which Crudens was discussed (and thus not having to declare an interest) was, Smith 
later explained, because he had been warned in 1961 by a former police officer that  
a meeting of building company representatives and councillors on both sides were 
planning to campaign against him on the allegations that he had had Crudens placed 
on the city’s list of contractors. He was advised not to attend any meetings at which 
Crudens was discussed, and, he said, followed this advice until the committee 
decided to approve the scheme. He then declared an interest, because Smiths 
Decorators had priced Bills of Quantities for the project.1177 
 
Jack Johnston claimed, however, that Smith was actively lobbying for Crudens 
within the Labour group. In an interview for Amber Films in the mid-1980s, he 
 
1174 Author’s Collection, Draft paper for Conference on Fraud and Corruption, University of 
Liverpool, 12-14 July 1987 pp13-14 
1175 TNA J291/66 Report of Meeting held on 9th October 1962 
1176 Draft paper for Conference on Fraud and Corruption, University of Liverpool, 12-14 July 1987 
pp13-14; Author’s Collection 
1177 Draft paper for Conference on Fraud and Corruption, University of Liverpool, 12-14 July 1987 pp 
13-14; Author’s Collection. The story may sound far-fetched but was repeated by Smith in interviews. 
Corroboration, however, may be provided by Ada Smith’s memoir (I do not believe that she would 
take wifely loyalty to the point of writing outright untruths); she also named the officer as Dale, 
although this was subsequently struck out in the draft. TWAM DF.TDS Box 3913, unpublished 
memoir by Ada Smith, unpaginated fragment. 
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recalled that, as a member of the housing committee, he had pressed for imaginative 
design of blocks of flats.  At a meeting of Labour members prior to a housing 
committee meeting to assess the various proposals for the three sites, he recalled, 
 
Mrs Scott [Cllr Mrs Kate Scott] was there, she had just come back on to the 
committee and she said ‘now before we look at these we have to agree to 
Crudens.’  I said, ‘You fancy one block, fair enough, I might fancy another 
block and we will go on what the committee thinks is the nicest looking 
block’. ‘No, no, none of that’ she says, ‘I have been talking to Dan about 
this… and what Dan says is what we want is new blood in the city. Crudens 
is… a reputable firm and they have got a good block there and we all plump 
for that.’ 1178 
 
Johnston declined to vote on the proposal at this or subsequent meetings.1179 He was 
later deselected as a Labour candidate.1180 
 
In late 1962 the Conservatives announced their intention to ask Sir Keith Joseph, 
Minister of Housing and Local Government to hold an inquiry into the decision, and 
asked Newcastle North MP William Elliott to speak to the Minister. Joseph did not 
call an inquiry, but refused loan sanction for the three blocks, effectively killing the 
deal.1181 The council housing committee in July 1963 voted in favour of an inquiry 
into the debacle, but once again Smith called the bluff of his opponents, telling the 
press “If any council member or citizen feels that I have personally in any way 
contravened the law, then surely the facts should have been placed before the proper 
authorities…”, and persuaded the Labour group to support him. A motion 
authorising the proposed inquiry was heavily defeated.1182 
 
1178 Amber, Transcript of interview with Jack Johnston pp 64-65. 
1179 Ibid. Johnston , by the time of the interview, was expressing considerable animus against Dan 
Smith, of  whom he said, “Dan… came into the Labour Party and then on to the Council in the first 
place because he was in business… and the better contracts he got the more successful he would be… 
Probably he had forgotten all about his socialist background and socialist roots… after [joining the 
Labour Party] he was for Dan 100%... He pushed the city forward in order to make himself more 
prosperous” (Transcript pp 57, 69). Smith claimed that Johnston’s animosity was the result of a 
workplace argument: he had employed Johnston as a painter for a while, and the two fell out when 
Smith refused to take Johnston into partnership. 
1180 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3853. Message from Roy Hadwin to TDS 8 February 1963: “Tell Mr Smith 
that Jack Johnston was beaten as the prospective candidate for the Armstrong Ward last night. Mr 
Stabler was elected.” 
1181 Newcastle Journal 20 December 1962 p3; Fitzwalter & Taylor, op cit pp 103-104 
1182 Ibid pp 104-105. A few weeks later, on 12 October 1963, the re-advertised contract for the three 
blocks was awarded to Brims, a local subsidiary of the Swan Hunter shipbuilding company, at a 
higher price and for fewer flats than Crudens’ tender. One of the blocks, Mill House in Spital 
283 
 
 
John Poulson 
Smith first came into contact with the Poulson organisation in November 1961, when 
Poulson’s Teesside representative, Alec Mallory, arranged a meeting. This took 
place on 1 December, and by 6 February Smith had been appointed as a consultant to 
Poulson, Smith specifying in his acceptance that he would not act in any matter 
connected with Newcastle.1183 Smith was attracted by what he saw as the advanced 
nature of Poulson’s firm, which, unlike the great majority of architectural practices at 
the time, offered a ‘total’ multidisciplinary service, employing architects, surveyors, 
civil engineers, acoustic engineers, heating and ventilation engineers and other 
professionals. He saw Poulson’s struggles against the hostility of the architectural 
establishment as analogous to his own desires to modernise local government, 
writing two decades later that “The fragmented nature of local govt… [was] 
designed to maintain and encourage the division of the professions: engineers, 
surveyors, architects and planners were all in departmental cocoons and looked to 
‘THEIR’ committee for support against other committees… That drove Poulson to 
buy his friends.”1184 
The initial intent was a triangular relationship with Poulson and the builders Bovis. 
Bovis chairman Harry Vincent had a meeting with Smith in mid-1962 at which he 
was concerned that Smith should clarify his position with Newcastle’s Town Clerk, 
and seemingly rattled Smith with his warnings. Hearing of this, Poulson wrote to 
Vincent “Very rightly you were not only protecting Bovis Holdings’ interests but 
[Smith’s] as well, and the dangers and difficulties had been so strongly emphasised 
regarding this position that it had assumed in his mind quite a predominant factor. 
Naturally a man in such a high position as he would be a fool to have endangered his 
position, and I respectfully suggest that Councillor Smith is no fool.”1185 The deal 
 
Tongues, was to be the home of Dan and Ada Smith after they were forced to sell their house on 
nearby Belle Grove Terrace in 1983. 
1183 TNA J291/66 Alex Mallory to TDS 24 November 1961; Report by Mallory to JGLP on 1 
December meeting, 5 December 1961; JGLP to TDS 6 February 1962; TDS to JGLP 8 February 
1962. 
1184 Amber, drawer 2, untitled document on corruption written circa 1988 (Opening words ‘It was 20 
years ago, in 1968…’) 
1185 TNA J291/66 JGLP to Harry Vincent 12 June 1962. 
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was agreed that Smith’s PR operation should identify and introduce Bovis to town 
centre development schemes, and that Bovis would employ Poulson as architect.1186  
Smith was using his influence to get Poulson more widely known, and a key field 
was County Durham. In December 1962 Poulson thanked Smith for an introduction 
to the county council and doubled his pay.1187 Not long afterwards, Smith arranged 
for Poulson to meet Andrew Cunningham, then chairman-elect of the County 
Council.1188 A letter from Poulson to Smith in early 1964 gives a good indication of 
the range of locations and projects on which the pair were actually or potentially 
interested. The list included Washington New Town, Darlington, Gateshead, 
Warrington, Leeds, Keighley, Bradford, Bolton, Liverpool, Tynemouth, Chester-le-
Street, Putney, Clydebank, East Ham, Hexham, Killingworth, Blaydon, Whitehaven, 
Peterlee & Aycliffe, Anderton Cross, Glasgow, Livingstone, Felling, and 
‘Hospitals’.1189 
 
OSB 
Enthused by the possibilities of industrialised housing production, Smith had 
registered a company called Open System Building Ltd in July 1964. In March 1966 
he sold it to “persons associated with JGL Poulson” – the majority of the shares were 
held by Cynthia Poulson, and John Poulson’s sole official interest in the company 
was as an architect licensing it to use his plans in marketing and constructing 
system-built housing.1190  
 
 
1186 TNA J291/66 Harry Vincent to JGLP 18 June 1962: on the satisfactory introduction of a scheme, 
Smith to receive 1% of estimated building costs; on planning approval granted, another 1.5%. 
1187 TNA J291/74 JGLP to TDS 14 December 1962, thanking Smith for the introduction to the County 
Architect’s Department via Alderman Sid Docking. Smith’s reply thanking Poulson for the pay 
increase was fulsome, to say the least: “You are the most outstanding man it has been my privilege to 
meet and I wish you and yours health and prosperity for the future.” (TNA J291/74 TDS to JGLP 24 
December 1962)  
1188 At a dinner at the Three Tuns Hotel in Durham. TNA J291/66 TDS to JGLP 28 December 1962. 
Apart from Smith, Poulson and Cunningham, others invited to the dinner on 17 January were 
Alderman Docking, County Architect G W Gelson, Deputy County Architect Les Parnaby, and 
Poulson’s Teesside representative Alec Mallory. 
1189 TNA J291/66 JGLP to TDS 21 January 1964. Hospitals were one speciality of the Poulson 
practice. 
1190 TNA J291/159/4 Document compiled by Company Fraud Department, Metropolitan Police 6 
April 1974 giving biographical details of TDS. 
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At a board meeting on 4 August 1966, an agreement for Dansmith PR to act as PR 
consultants was discussed: terms would be embodied in a letter rather than a formal 
agreement.1191 
 
OSB managers were optimistic at first. Smith told the board in July 1967 that he 
estimated construction of 3,200, 5,000, 7,500 and 8,000 houses for the years 1968/69 
to 1971/72. He advised “that we must convince the professional men who are 
advising the local authorities. Normal advertising methods were quite useless. We 
must increase our staff if we are proposing to try to [compete] with the larger 
companies. If we choose our sites, however, we can build up to 10,000 houses a year 
with little more than our existing organisation.” Despite this, there were worrying 
intimations: the General Manager, S J Bell, reported that contact had been made with 
over fifty authorities “with varying degrees of success”; but work on 44 houses had 
begun (in OSB’s home town, Pontefract). In discussing estimated accounts for 1967-
1968, figures of 6,000 sales delivering a profit of £200,000 were posited. Smith 
demurred, giving his opinion that 1,500 was more realistic, offering a profit of 
£25,000. Poulson argued that this figure was too low and followed up after the 
meeting by sending Smith an angry letter accusing him of lack of commitment.1192 
At the October 1967 meeting the board approved the allocation of areas allocated to 
the proposed contractors according to a map drawn up by Poulson, and the new 
General Manager, G R Shearing (Bell had been sacked) announced 1,377 confirmed 
houses and 650 “safely anticipated”.1193 
 
Still hopeful, Shearing reported in January 1968 that OSB was “negotiating, 
tendering or positively discussing” over 10,000 houses, and that by mid-1968 should 
 
1191 WYAS CC3/1/2, ‘Extracts from OSB Minute Book’, Meeting of Directors 4 August 1966; 
Author’s Collection, Transcript of public examination of Thomas Daniel Smith 24 July 1972 paras 
322-325.  Poulson was not present at the 4 August meeting. 
1192 WYAS CC3/1/2, ‘Extracts from OSB Minute Book’, Meeting of Directors 11 July 1967. Reginald 
Maudling was appointed to the OSB board at the AGM on the same day, telling directors that he 
“may be able to help the company in Birmingham”; his son, Martin Maudling, had been a director 
since 30 January 1967. 
1193 Ibid, Meeting of Directors 11 October 1967. Shearing had been appointed on 24 July 1967, and 
reported not to OSB’s chairman, Sir Bernard Kenyon, but to Poulson, despite the latter ostensibly 
being a contractor to the company. The ‘confirmed’ houses were in Pontefract (94), Whitburn (20), 
Mexborough (36), Sunderland (265), Castleford (200), Doncaster (350), Southlands (12) and Hebburn 
(400). Those ‘safely anticipated’ were at Saltburn with Marske (125), Normanton (50), Adwick le 
Street (350), Dearne (5), and Bentley with Askey (126). 
286 
 
have started 2,000, with an even higher rate in the second half of the year. He was 
also preparing a new film, and OSB was to have a stand at the National Housing and 
Town Planning exhibition at Brighton, at a cost in excess of £2,000. At the AGM the 
same day, Poulson noted that by 31 October 1968 they expected work to have started 
and fees of over £250,000 received on more than 4,000 houses. “The Board 
expressed pleasure at the excellent prospects which the future so obviously holds for 
the Company.”1194  
 
By June, however, disappointment was setting in. Shearing reported just 54 
completions, 172 houses under construction, and 994 “contracts agreed”; in contrast 
to the optimism of 1967, the minutes record dolefully that “the last figure was open 
to some doubt. It was noted that the activities of the General Manager during his 
period with the Company had not produced a single contract.” The only bright spot 
was that the NBA had certified the OSB system on 1 April.”1195 
 
By July 1969, a year after the period for which Poulson had confidently predicted 
profits of £200,000, OSB was still making a loss: £36,836; the regional contractors 
for the system had still not all been appointed. A new chairman, Bill Sales, estimated 
a break-even point as 2,000 houses a year.1196 In October 1969 – by which time 
Smith’s connections with Poulson’s empire had been effectively terminated by the 
cessation of payments - the board approved contracts for 24 houses with 
Southborough UDC. Sensing the way things were going, the Maudlings resigned 
their directorships.1197 
 
Wandsworth 
Smith’s business career, as well as his political life, ground to a halt after he was 
charged with corruption in 1970. His remaining PR contracts dried up, and he was 
asked to step down from his post with Euroways, a property development company 
 
1194 Ibid, Meeting of Directors 12 January 1968, AGM 12 January 1968. 
1195 Ibid Meeting of Directors 19 June 1968. This was “a most significant event and a sure indication 
that quality of its product had been proved.” 
1196 Ibid, Meeting of Directors 21 July 1967. Kenyon had resigned and Sales was appointed chairman 
on 11 July. Sales had worked his way up from ‘pit boy’ to chairman of the Yorkshire division of the 
NCB, and was a recipient of gifts from Poulson. He was to receive a suspended prison sentence and a 
fine of £5,000 for Poulson-related corruption offences in 1974. 
1197 Ibid, Meeting of Directors 14 October 1969.  
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he had been running since the late 1960s with John Foulerton of the Mount St 
Bernard group.1198 The trial of Smith, Sidney Sporle, whom Smith was alleged to 
have bribed in order to secure a PR contract from the London Borough of 
Wandsworth, and other defendants also accused of bribing Sporle began on 8 
February 1971 but  Smith’s barrister, Jeremy Hutchinson QC, persuaded the judge 
that his client should have a separate trial.1199 Sporle was convicted on 23 March of 
seven charges, including accepting a bribe from Smith, and was sentenced to six 
years imprisonment.1200 Smith’s trial began on 29 June 1971, and on 9 July he was 
found not guilty.1201 That Sporle was found guilty of being bribed by Smith and 
Smith not guilty of bribing Sporle may not be such an inconsistency as it might 
appear. Smith was already employing Sporle, who at the time was deputy leader of 
Wandsworth council, as a consultant for OSB, advising on housing opportunities in 
SE England (except with Wandsworth and the South London Housing Consortium) 
when Fleet Press Services, a company acquired at Kirkup’s suggestion, applied for 
the Wandsworth PR contract.1202 Sporle had failed to declare his interest at the 
council meeting which awarded the contract to Fleet Press Services (run on a day-to-
day basis by Kirkup), but there is no evidence that Smith was paying him with the 
intent of gaining the PR contract or that he knew that Sporle had not declared an 
interest. 
 
Wakefield: the scandal breaks 
 
1198 Eg Author’s Collection, Lionel Jacobson to TDS 18 June 1970 informing Smith of Burton’s 
appointment of in-house PR and terminating the agreement with him; Fitzwalter & Taylor op cit         
p 195. Euroways sought to develop trading estates at strategic sites on Britain’s expanding motorway 
network. Smith was also working with Foulerton on interests related to North Sea oil development 
and seeking to develop Edinburgh as the main port for North Sea exploitation. 
1199 Newcastle Journal 9 February 1971 p 7 
1200 The Times 24 March 1971 p 4, 25 March 1971 p 5 
1201 Evening Chronicle 8 July 1971 p 1 
1202 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3861, TDS to Sidney Sporle 2 November 1966: “I confirm that I will pay 
your Company an amount of £12.10s.0d per unit on all sales effected through your introductions. As 
discussed, this arrangement would exclude the London Borough of Wandsworth and the South 
London Housing Consortium where, I appreciate, you have a direct interest and are not free to work 
with me.” TWAM DF/TDS 3869 contains a carbon copy of a police witness statement of Colin 
Maitland Shaw, dated 17 June 1971, in which Shaw described recommending Sporle to Smith as a 
potential southern England agent for OSB, and was present at a meeting of Smith and Sporle in 
Newcastle in November 1965. “During the interview I can recall that Mr Smith had made the point to 
Mr Sporle that if there were to be any negotiations in Battersea with the Battersea Council, either Mr 
Sporle would have to declare his interest or would have to withdraw from the job and give it to 
someone else. This is a familiar problem with Companies and Executives who have political 
affiliations or positions. Mr Smith, Mr Sporle and myself, understood this well and apart from being 
mentioned there was little or no discussion on it.”  
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Poulson’s finances had been getting steadily worse since the late 1960s. Warned that 
he was insolvent in June 1969, he turned to his brother-in-law, John King, to help 
him out of his difficulties.1203 On New Year’s Eve 1969 he effectively signed away 
his rights in his businesses, but his personal financial situation worsened and on 4 
January 1972 he filed for bankruptcy.1204 The public examination into Poulson’s 
bankruptcy began at Wakefield County Court on 13 June 1972, with Smith’s role 
being raised on the first day.1205 On 3 July Muir Hunter QC, counsel for the Trustee, 
pressed Poulson on the reason for payments to Dan Smith, and gave a total figure for 
payments between 1 March 1962 and 28 February 1970 as £155,000. “Phew” was 
Poulson’s response, “…It is fantastic. I had no idea it was this big.” What did Smith 
give you in return? asked Hunter. “Well, I can’t answer that question I’m afraid. I 
can’t see anything positive as a result of it.” 1206 This set the tone for Poulson’s 
replies to the questioning of Muir Hunter, and it created a damning impression of 
Smith. The transcripts convey a powerful image of Muir Hunter – sarcastic, goading, 
playing to the gallery – and an increasingly enfeebled Poulson, bleating variations on 
“I don’t know, because he never produced anything”, “I can’t remember as far back 
as that, sir…” and “I can’t remember any of the details. sir”.1207  
 
Nor was Muir Hunter any softer on Smith, harrying him on details of his financial 
relationship with Poulson, the absence of invoices and contracts accounting for 
Poulson’s payments, and the role played by the consultants employed by Smith on 
Poulson’s behalf. Smith was to recall Hunter as “like Vyshinsky in the Moscow 
trials… ruthless, unprincipled and… excessively using the power that he 
undoubtedly had… unjust and unfair.”1208 Hunter  alleged that the absence of 
invoices was because Smith’s dealings with Poulson were not bona fide and that 
Smith “had been looting Mr Poulson’s funds for your own private concern”.1209  
 
 
1203 Poulson op cit pp149-155; Fitzwalter & Taylor op cit pp182-185. John King (1917-2005) – later 
Lord King of Wartnaby, chairman of British Airways – had married the sister of Cynthia Poulson. 
1204 Poulson op cit pp156-163; Fitzwalter &Taylor op cit pp 202-203 
1205 WYAS CC3/1/3 Transcript of public examination of John Poulson 13 June 1972 paras 369-387 
1206 WYAS CC3/1/3 Transcript of public examination of John Poulson 3 July 1972 paras 1038-1041 
1207 Ibid paras 1420, 1422 and 1437. 
1208 TDS Archive disk 41A. Andrey Vyshinsky (1883-1934), chief prosecutor at the Moscow show 
trial of Kamenev and Zinoviev, 1936. 
1209 Author’s Collection, Transcript of public examination of Thomas Daniel Smith, 25 July 1972 
paras 672, 783. 
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He poured scorn on Smith’s consultants, claiming that they were not genuine. 1210 
The idea that councillors could be of any real use in this field was derided. Of Colin 
Dews, a Castleford alderman, Hunter remarked that Dews was “a colliery bricklayer 
who does not attend work regularly at the colliery; he is a local magistrate, an 
Alderman of Castleford Council, and resides in a terrace type house in a working 
class area. Do you still wish to say that Mr Dews was a consultant on town 
planning?” 1211 
 
Muir Hunter was far from infallible, although obituaries highlight his “devastating 
skill” and “fearless and tenacious cross-examination”.1212 His tactics against Poulson 
were emphasised by Poulson’s defence counsel at his subsequent trial: Douglas 
Herrod QC claimed that on forty occasions Hunter had “interrupted Poulson... to 
thrust documents he had not seen for years into his hand and demand an immediate 
answer. These answers, he said, were given widespread publicity from which many 
assumed Poulson’s guilt 18 months before he stood trial.”1213 At one point Hunter 
read from a letter from Poulson to Smith touching on vacant positions at the newly-
established Washington New Town Development Corporation. “…[C]an you give 
me a name for chairman and also for General Manager” wrote Poulson, which 
Hunter interpreted as evidence of a conspiracy, rather than a simple request for 
‘insider’ information on who was to be appointed: “Who at the Ministry gave you… 
the right to appoint the Chairman and General Manager?” Poulson: “Nobody.” … 
Hunter: “What was he going to do? His friend at the Ministry would nominate Mr 
Poulson’s choice?” Poulson’s reply of “Nonsense” was brief and to-the-point, 
although by that stage it is doubtful whether anybody noticed.1214     
 
 
1210 Ibid para 673 
1211 Author’s Collection, Transcript of public examination of Thomas Daniel Smith, 24 July1972 
paras 443-455. Smith replied: “I do. I think nothing that you have read out there is in any way 
derogatory of [sic] Mr Dews.” 
1212 Obituaries of Muir Hunter (1913-2008) in The Guardian 26 November 2008 p38 and The Times 
27 October 2008. 
1213 Obituary of Muir Hunter, Daily Telegraph 23 October 2008 p 29 
1214 WYAS CC3/1/3 Transcript of public examination of John Poulson 29 January 1973 paras 5871-
5875. Perhaps because of his assertive demeanour, Muir Hunter was able to get away with such 
behaviour unchallenged, so it is pleasant to record Poulson turning the tables at the January session: 
Hunter described him as being in “an increasingly impossible corner because you do not wish to let 
down your friends.” “I do not have any friends now, thanks to you” was the architect’s response 
(Obituary of Muir Hunter, Daily Telegraph 23 October 2008 p 29). 
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Smith gave a rather more definite description than Poulson of the work done on his 
behalf, telling the hearing that he had introduced Poulson to two hundred authorities 
in Great Britain, though neither man made anything like a solid defence of their 
activities. 1215 
 
Hunter summed up the process of making contacts with local authorities as “Mr 
Poulson’s lieutenants – paying people to be nice to Mr Poulson’s staff. It is quite 
simple, is it not?” Smith: “Paying people to hear what Mr Poulson’s organization 
had to offer, which was something quite substantial.”1216  Examining a list of names, 
Hunter commented “Now, when we discover who these people are… then we will 
find, will we not, that they are all either government officials, municipal officials, 
new town officials or trade union officials; is that right? Every single one.” Smith: 
“A large number of them; not all of them.” Hunter: “Right; and so you were, on Mr 
Poulson’s instructions and with his money, paying money to persons in public 
service to procure favours for Mr Poulson?” Smith: “I would say not… I negotiated a 
fee with Mr Poulson and I was free to deploy that fee the way I wanted to, and I 
deployed it with what I believed to be honourable people, who, if they had interests, 
would declare them.”1217 
 
The significance of the Wakefield hearings is not only that they finally brought the 
Poulson affair to widespread public attention, but that Hunter’s cross-examinations, 
whether pertinent or wayward, set the tone for the subsequent trials and contributed 
very largely to the creation of the popular perception of Smith as an archetypal 
corrupt and corrupting councillor.1218 After a slow start – just one reporter present at 
the second session on 3 July – media interest was piqued by mention of Reginald 
Maudling and his subsequent resignation as Home Secretary on 18 July.  The third 
session, on 1 August, was “a sell-out… standing room only…”1219 The subsequent 
proceedings were given immense press coverage, and The Sunday Times Magazine 
 
1215 Author’s Collection, Transcript of public examination of Thomas Daniel Smith, 25 July 1972 
paras 985-1004 
1216 Ibid 
1217 Ibid paras 1032-1036 
1218 Concerns about Poulson had first been aired in 1970 by Ray Fitzwalter in the Bradford Telegraph 
& Argus, and were subsequently taken up by Private Eye. Raymond Fitzwalter and David Taylor, 
Web of Corruption. The Story of JGL Poulson and T Dan Smith (St Albans 1981) pp 1-2 
1219 Fitzwalter &Taylor op cit p 212 
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devoted a large part of one issue to reprinting extracts from the transcripts.1220 
Poulson’s solicitor attempted to have the hearings stopped because of the danger of 
prejudicing any trial of Poulson, to no avail.1221 The danger was very real, and even 
Fitzwalter and Taylor concede that “as Poulson had incriminated himself in the 
bankruptcy court and compromised others by his evidence, the architect and his 
accomplices could not be given a trial strictly free from prejudice…”1222 
 
There can be little doubt but that Smith came across poorly at Wakefield, and that he 
felt intimidated by Hunter. He failed, as Poulson had failed, to make a robust 
justification of the operation and value of his public relations activities. 
Nevertheless, the proceedings at Wakefield were a one-sided affair; they were not a 
criminal trial, and Smith’s legal representative, his solicitor, Tom Ogle, did not act in 
the role of ‘defence counsel’, challenging a prosecution case. For reasons that will be 
examined below, Smith pleaded guilty at his subsequent trial in April 1974, so again 
nothing but the prosecution case was heard, and this was not subject to close 
examination and challenge. 
 
Cunningham 
On 29 April 1965 Poulson wrote to Smith raising, among other matters, the issue of 
Durham and Cunningham: “Dan, we ought to see this gentleman. There is an awful 
lot he can do, and there is an awful lot not being done.”1223 Within a few months 
Freda Cunningham, Andrew Cunningham’s wife, had been given a position with one 
of the Smith PR companies. For 21 months between November 1965 and July 1967 
she was paid between £65.14.5d and £66.6.0d a month by Cladan PR Ltd, a Smith 
company.1224 She was subsequently ‘employed’ by Vinleigh PR. Leslie Pullen, the 
managing director of Vinleigh, a company set up by Smith, Pullen and Eric Levine 
after Smith’s split with Kirkup, told police he had received a handwritten note by 
Smith instructing him to pay Mrs Cunningham. Faced with a statement recording a 
payment as ‘Staff notes AC - £1,000’ he responded “I take this, as I would have in 
 
1220 The Sunday Times Magazine 24 September 1972 pp 20-41, with an artist’s impression of Muir 
Hunter gazing balefully at a crestfallen Poulson on the front cover. 
1221 Fitzwalter & Taylor op cit p 212 
1222 Ibid p 263 
1223 TNA J291/67 JGLP to TDS 29 April 1965 
1224 TNA J291/159/3 Witness statement by Cyril Speight, Manager’s Assistant, Barclays Bank Ltd, 
Market St Newcastle, 22 November 1973 
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1968, to refer to Andrew Cunningham, an alderman in the North Country. I always 
regarded Mr and Mrs Cunningham as synonymous. I had no idea why Mr or Mrs 
Cunningham were receiving wages from my company, but I had no reason to suspect 
it was for any unlawful purpose. I did later, in discussion with Smith question the 
payment of persons in Local Government and he said it was in order, so long as that 
person did not influence matters in which they had an interest, which they had not 
declared.”1225  
 
Smith was to claim that Freda Cunningham was legitimately employed arising out of 
the need to promote the Skarne housing system, Andrew Cunningham suggesting to 
Smith that “wor lass will [do] that”.  
 
Well, yes, of course she could, if that’s OK by her, because Mrs Cunningham 
was a thousand times more acceptable in Durham than her husband ever was… 
I knew if she said come along for cocktails and see the exhibition that this 
would be far more successful than if Andy said it because the people hated 
Andy, whereas nobody hated Mrs Cunningham. 1226 
 
Smith wrote to his solicitor, John Marron and to Pullen that Mrs Cunningham’s 
employment ended at the end of December 1968 (she was subsequently given 
‘employment’ as an administrative assistant by OSB in October 1969, as Poulson 
became increasingly desperate for orders to shore up his collapsing concerns, and 
after his break with Dan Smith).1227 
 
Pullen had also sent a message to Grace Cheeseman, Smith’s confidential secretary, 
about the cessation of Mrs Cunningham’s employment by Vinleigh, writing “No 
further payments to A Cunningham (we actually pay Mrs Cunningham) and 
 
1225 TNA J291/159/3 Witness statement by Leslie Pullen, 19 October 1973 
1226 Author’s Collection, Transcript of Interview with David Taylor 12-13 January 1974 p32. Smith 
went on to state (pp 35-36) that he believed that Mrs Cunningham did not know that she was on 
Smith’s payroll at that time. 
1227 TNA J291/69 TDS to John Marron 18 January 1969 stating that Mrs Cunningham was employed 
by Vinleigh up to 31.12.68; TDS to Leslie Pullen 30 January 1969 “The business connection between 
Mrs F Cunningham and myself ended on 31st December 1968”. TNA J291/69 Vivian Baker 
(Poulson’s accountant)  to ‘May F Anderson’ (Freda Cunningham) 21 October 1969 offering post as 
administrative assistant for OSB; TNA J291/94 M F Cunningham (Freda Cunningham)  to R C 
Moorehouse & Co (Solicitors) 18 May 1972, stating she was employed by Ropergate Services 
(Poulson’s service company) as administrative assistant and adviser on interior decoration  between 
21 October 1969 and 31 January 1970. 
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therefore no payment has been made for January”1228 His recognition that payments 
to Mrs Cunningham were, in reality, payments to Andrew Cunningham render 
Smith’s defence that Freda Cunningham was legitimately employed scarcely 
credible, however accurate his assessment of the Cunninghams’ respective personal 
charms may have been. And while his payments to Sidney Sporle and other local 
government figures might well be justified as payment to consultants for advice, 
information and acting as ‘agents of influence’ outside their own authorities, the 
disguising of payments by the employment of Mrs Cunningham in a sinecure 
designed to channel money to Cunningham raises legitimate suspicions. 
Were they bribing? 
From mid-1967 Poulson appears to have become increasingly unhappy with Smith’s 
work. In July he wrote to complain at Smith’s attitude at an OSB board meeting: 
“Are you going to sit back and let us do all the work and pay all the money?” 1229 
Two months later was chiding him again, for failing to send information to Reginald 
Maudling and suggesting a lack of belief in OSB.”1230 He was still dissatisfied in 
February 1968, commenting angrily on the absence of progress in the North East and 
in Hammersmith.”1231  Smith employee Peter Ward was the subject of a philippic in 
September 1968: “[He] is a waste of time… He has sent in some invoice for £209 
expenses. Out of that he has got nothing… he is just not earning his keep.... He is 
just idling his time away and we are paying for it.”1232  
 
 
1228 TNA J291/69 Leslie Pullen to Grace Cheeseman 3 February 1969 
1229 TNA J291/68 JGLP to TDS 13 July 1967 
1230 TNA J291/68 JGLP to TDS  9 September 1967. Smith sent a hurt response protesting “of course I 
believe in OSB – no one in BRITAIN is more identified with this system than I am – in the MOH 
[Ministry of Housing] – the NBA [National Building Agency] and in Local Government; indeed apart 
from working on OSB and architectural work for you – I do no other work at all. Whoever makes 
suggestions to you about me – they are the disloyal ones. I am 100% loyal. You have done more for 
me than any other person in Britain, and even if for some reason not clear to me you wish to end our 
association – I for one would retain the kindest thoughts for you and your family.” (TNA J291/68 
TDS to JGLP 17 September 1967) 
1231 TNA J291/68 JGLP to TDS 2 February 1968, criticising Peter War whose failings included an 
inability to make appointments: “He may say things will be happening there in another month and 
then it will be another month and so on and then other people will get in before us.” Conversely 
Bradford “looks like coming to life” because Maudling intervened with the vice-chaiman of housing 
“whom he knows”. 
1232 TNA J291/68 JGLP to TDS 13 September 1968. Ward ceased to be employed on OSB work from 
the end of September 1968 (WYAS CC3/1/3 Transcript of public examination of John Poulson  7 
August 1972 para1975)                                                        
294 
 
This does not convey the impression of a well-oiled corruption machine. It is 
possible, of course, that Ward and his employer Smith were corrupt but inefficient, 
or that they were ‘outbid’ by rival contractors; but it is also possible Smith’s PR 
operations on Poulson’s behalf were largely or completely legitimate.1233  
 
 An OSB progress report of 28 December 1967, written by Peter Ward, lists 55 
authorities with which Smith’s organisation or OSB had been in contact. Notes 
include comments such as “Darfield: Slow progress despite fair pressure from PW 
and OSB. They do not appear to be able to make up their minds” and records of 
visits, exhibitions and ‘film shows’. For Chester-le-Street RDC, the report read 
“Surveyor and engineer says officially – ‘We are still shopping around,’ but RH 
[Roy Hadwin] says we have nothing to worry about – OSB ‘will be all right’.”1234 
Chester Rural was the political base of Bob Urwin, a long-standing Smith associate, 
but one who, like Smith, knew when not to attend a meeting.1235 The report also 
outlined progress at Castleford: “PW [Peter Ward] informed by Ald. Drews [sic; 
Colin Dews] that ‘D Day’ is Monday next. Council has received OK from NCB to 
go ahead ‘and this is far more houses than we thought’ he told me. As regards 
Monday’s meeting, Colin says that OSB should pull it off: ‘I am not unduly 
worried,’ he said, ‘because OSB will get it.’ At the foot of the report, under the 
heading ‘Notes to TDS’ Ward wrote “Re Colin Drews (sic), and his letter to you: My 
view is that if OSB do pull it off on Monday, we should give him a retainer similar 
to Roebuck. If they don’t, then I suggest we meet him again for some straight talking 
with him as to what he reckons he can do for us in other authorities.”1236 This final 
phrase, in other authorities, is important as it indicates that the suggested retainer 
could reasonably be interpreted as payment for Dews assisting OSB in getting work 
elsewhere, rather than as a reward (or bribe) for using his influence to get OSB the 
contract in Castleford 
 
 
1233 Or at the very least, no more illegitimate than the activities of their rivals. 
1234 J291/74 OSB Progress Report, 28 December 1967 
1235 Fitzwalter & Taylor op cit p 179 “Whenever Sid McCullogh tendered for work with Chester-le-
Street RDC, Urwin left the meeting and had a drink in the chairman’s room while the matter was 
being discussed.” Urwin and McCullough were later convicted of corruption offences. 
1236 TNA J291/74 OSB Progress Report 28 December 1967.  
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Writing to Sir Bernard Kenyon on OSB matters in 1969, Poulson stated “You can 
see how entertaining you are doing to get any particular job and whether it is 
worthwhile… An authority giving us 750 houses obviously has to have more spent 
on it for entertaining than does an authority only giving us 25…” 1237 
 
This document, too, was in the DPP files, presumably as it was held to provide 
evidence of corrupt activities; but again, it sits in that indeterminate area where 
lobbying overlaps with the provision of inducements. Entertainment of clients covers 
a broad spectrum – Smith’s PR company would take councillors from potential 
client authorities to Pontefract, to see OSB houses in situ; that they were provided 
with hospitality and (if necessary) accommodation seems scarcely unreasonable; the 
same would apply, in a more muted way, to the trips for councillors to Paris, where 
at least some of the time would be spent in viewing building systems in operation. 
 
 
Leeds Trial 
Smith was arrested on 5 October 1973 by DCS Peter Westley and DCS Kenneth 
Etheridge at 13 Belle Grove Terrace.1238 The house was searched – Smith pointing 
out the location of documents – and he was taken to Newcastle’s Market Street 
police station.1239 “Unlike many of the Poulson conspirators he was helpful and 
courteous to the police” commented Fitzwalter and Taylor, who surmised that “in 
private Smith recognized the inevitable…  He was bound for prison and the best he 
 
1237 J291/73 JGLP to Sir Bernard Kenyon, OSB 11 April 1969. Kenyon was chairman of OSB. 
1238 There is a certain piquancy in Etheridge’s leading role in the Poulson investigation, given that he 
was extremely fortunate himself not to have faced criminal charges for corruption. As an officer at the 
Metropolitan Police’s West End Central police station, covering Soho, Etheridge was exposed by the 
Sunday People in 1972 as having accepted a holiday in Cyprus from a West End night club owner. 
Instead of a Crown Court trial, Etheridge faced a Metropolitan Police internal investigation, which, 
perhaps unsurprisingly given the endemic nature of corruption in the Met at that time, cleared him of 
wrongdoing. The Guardian 3 June 2011 p 36 (obituary of Etheridge), The Times 9 March 1972 p 2, 7 
June 1972 p 2. 
1239 TNA J291/159/2 Witness Statement by Peter Westley, 18 October 1973. On being told that the 
police wished to search the house, Smith told them ‘“You’re welcome to look anywhere. I took some 
papers to Wakefield, but there are some upstairs. They are in no particular order, I had debated 
whether to keep them or destroy them.’ Mr Smith then conducted us over the four floors of the house. 
He indicated a number of papers in the sideboard in a third floor bedroom, and a number of cartons 
and cases in a third floor rear room.” On leaving, the police took with them four suitcases, 3 
cardboard boxes, a travelling case and a briefcase, all containing documents. 
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could do was to plead guilty to the minimum number of charges.”1240 This does not 
accord with Smith’s recollections or those of other witnesses. 
 
By 1974 Smith was in a very poor state of health, his doctor, Lionel Kopelowitz, 
writing to his solicitor that he was suffering from coronary artery disease and 
myocardial ischemia requiringmedication, rest and medical care. Dr Kopelowitz was  
concerned at the effect of the stress of the case on his patient. In addition, Smith was 
suffering from a urinary condition which had required at least two operations, one in 
early March, which would need a period of convalescence. He wrote: “In my opinion 
I consider that it would be detrimental to his condition if this trial was held at the 
Leeds Crown Court. I am firmly of the view that this trial should take place at the 
Newcastle Crown Court so that those responsible for Mr Smith’s medical care can be 
readily available should the need arise.”1241 
 
Smith’s medical condition is relevant not just because his doctor’s concerns were 
ignored by the prosecuting authorities but because it materially affected Smith’s 
approach to his forthcoming trial. Physically ill, utterly demoralised and “sustaining 
himself on Carlsberg and heart tablets”, he was in neither the physical nor mental 
condition to face a potentially long trial in a city eighty miles from home.1242 It may 
be that he did not wish to think about the forthcoming ordeal – he told David Taylor 
in January 1974 that he hadn’t looked closely at the charges of corrupting 
Cunningham – and so the subsequent legal advice came as a shock.1243   
 
On reading the charges against him, Smith claimed astonishment at the weakness of 
the Crown case.1244 But meeting his legal team, he encountered “a noticeable 
 
1240 Fitzwalter & Taylor op cit p 226 
1241 TNA J291/71 Dr Lionel Kopelowitz to Tom Ogle, 13 March 1974 
1242 Interview with Clifford Smith, 9 October 2008. Both Dan and Ada Smith feared that a prolonged, 
highly stressful trial could prove fatal to him (TWAM DF/TDS Box 3913 Unpublished memoir by 
Ada Smith, additional page 4) 
1243 Author’s Collection, Transcript of TDS interview with David Taylor, 12-13 January 1974 p 30: “I 
think the charge is conspiring with Mrs Cunningham to corrupt her husband… I haven’t really looked 
at the charge, you know, and what it means because I don’t believe in doing today what you can put 
off till tomorrow in these things. I think that the experience of the last five years has taught me that 
the only way you can retain any sense of sanity at all is that you literally live for the day. So far as that 
part of the question is concerned I haven’t yet got down to what my defence will be…” 
1244 Author’s Collection, Draft paper for Conference on Fraud and Corruption, University of 
Liverpool, 12-14 July 1987 p 42. Of the charges he wrote ““…although there were many more strands 
in it than confronted me in Wandsworth, none of them amounted to anything like the well publicized 
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absence of enthusiasm, as at no point was any reference made to the transparent 
weaknesses in the prosecution case.” He was told that there was little chance of a 
‘not guilty’ verdict, and, after considering the matter over lunch, “with a sense of 
utter doom I told my son, ‘I no longer have the strength of body or the agility of 
mind to carry this fight forward’” and returned to tell his barrister, David Savile, that 
he would plead guilty – “surrendering abjectly in a manner totally alien to my 
normal character.”1245    
 
Smith’s trial began at Leeds Crown Court on 24 April 1974, alongside Andrew 
Cunningham and Poulson. Freda Cunningham had also been charged, but it was 
decided at the last moment not to proceed against her. All three men pleaded guilty – 
Smith to one charge of conspiracy (relating to Peterlee) and four charges of 
corruption. Counsel Peter Taylor laid out the prosecution case:  
 
Ostensibly he was said to be acting as a public relations consultant. Never was 
a phrase so grossly abused. He operated from a series of companies he formed, 
used them for a while and then allowed them to decay, shifting personnel and 
money from one company to another in a manner not only bewildering and 
confusing but, we submit, was deliberately so, a maze through which he hoped 
no one could follow his tricks. Despite the complex of companies, the truth 
was that Smith acted simply as a limb of the Poulson organisation. He was 
paid not fees, but a salary, which increased ‘by leaps and bounds’ so that in all 
Poulson paid nearly £156,00 in the years 1962-9. The money was not paid on 
invoices or against any fee note, or for the most part to any of his companies, 
but to Smith personally. He then distributed it to himself and between his 
companies… 
 
[Smith’s activity] was not a public relations exercise to bring Poulson’s merit 
to the attention of councils. The method was by the back door – by using a 
fifth column within the local councils not openly, but stealthily and secretly 
and for reward…For that purpose Smith employed number of men who were 
in local government and councils and whom he termed consultants, but who, in 
fact, had no experience in relation to which they could be consulted. Smith 
delegated to them the task of influencing their own councils to give work to 
 
master corruptor [sic] image which was by then tagged on to me….” The Peterlee charge (discussed 
in the previous chapter) “was so incompetently laid as to almost lead one to conclude that it had been 
drafted for the purposes of losing the case, and… was being presented as the only charge where I was 
alleged to have used my direct influence on Poulson’s behalf, whereas in all the other indictments I 
was held to have used [others] to undertake the allegedly corrupt acts.” 
1245 Author’s Collection, Draft paper for Conference on Fraud and Corruption, University of 
Liverpool, 12-14 July 1987 pp 42-43; Interview with Clifford Smith, 9 October 2008. 
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Poulson and to lobbying and influencing important men in other councils, 
using political affinity as the contact. 1246 
 
On 26 April he was sentenced by Mr Justice Waller to a total of six years 
imprisonment: six years on the conspiracy charge, and twelve months on each of the 
corruption charges (these four to run consecutively, but concurrently with the 
conspiracy sentence). Three other offences were also taken into consideration.1247 
 
The prosecution case as related in the press mirrors the narrative created by Muir 
Hunter at Wakefield. It contains significant areas where reasonable doubt may be 
expressed. Although Smith’s business affairs were complex, and a large number of 
public relations companies were associated with him at one point or another, Poulson 
money (as established at Wakefield) was paid to only three of the public relations 
companies established by or associated with Smith: Dansmith PR, Vinleigh PR and 
Progressive PR, and with little or no overlap. The “maze through which he hoped no 
one could follow his tricks” really did not exist. Taylor’s assertions that councillors 
could be of no use to Poulson’s business interests except as the recipients of bribes 
echoes Hunter’s lofty dismissal of Dews. There is an underlying assumption that no 
legitimate lobbying or public relations work was carried out for Poulson, yet 
following an extensive police investigation into Smith’s activities only four local 
councillors were charged, of those who had received payment as consultants from or 
via Smith, and one of those was Cunningham, whom Taylor described as “not a 
mere lieutenant to Smith but an equal member of the triumvirate” and in receipt of 
inducements directly from Poulson.1248 If the intention behind the payments to Dews 
and Roebuck had been to ‘purchase’ housing contracts that they could award, then 
Smith had gone for very small fry: Mexborough and Castleford were not large 
 
1246 Daily Express 25 April 1974 p 6 
1247 TNA J291/159/1; J291/159/4 – Smith signed admissions of conspiring with Sidney Charlton 
Docking of Durham CC between 1 January 1962 and 31 May 1967; of conspiracy with Colin Dews of 
Castleford BC between 1 August 1967 and 21 August 1969; and conspiring with Tom Roebuck of 
Mexborough UDC between 1 November 1966 and 31 August 1969. Taylor was subsequently to lead 
the prosecution in the trial of Judith Ward in 1974 and of Stefan Kiszko in 1976; Waller was judge at 
the Ward trial. Both defendants were victims of major miscarriages of justice, their convictions being 
separately overturned in 1992. 
1248 Daily Express 25 April 1974 p 6. The others were Dews, Roebuck and Eddie Newby of Bradford, 
the sole ‘big fish’ to be accused of complicity with Smith. In addition, Smith’s employees Peter Ward 
and Roy Hadwin were charged. 
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authorities.1249 He would need to have hired very many such consultants to provide 
OSB with enough business, if OSB’s business were done in the manner suggested by 
the prosecution; but he did not. If the intention was for Dews and Roebuck to lobby 
or otherwise seek to persuade other local authorities in the interests of Poulson, 
which may be more likely, then nothing illegal was necessarily being proposed. 
 
Castleford had granted a contract to OSB before Colin Dews had even met Smith. 
Only in November 1967 did Dews approach Peter Ward seeking a meeting with 
Smith to offer his services as a PR man; Ward told Smith that Dews was “the strong 
man of Castleford CB  [in fact a municipal borough] who has done an enormous 
amount of work on behalf of OSB with the Castleford contract of 200 houses… He 
is extremely well known in Yorkshire and a power on the West Riding County 
Council. I feel it would be a useful meeting from our own interests, and would 
suggest... that we could arrange to meet him…1250 
 
Dews’ eagerness to enter the world of PR was to cause some concern in early 1969 
when he wrote to Leslie Pullen at Vinleigh: “Further to our little talk on phone, 
please don’t forget to thank Dan for letter, everything satisfactory to me, and let me 
assure you know [sic] one knows of my connection in any shape or form.”1251 Pullen 
wrote to Smith “I am not too happy about [Dews’] 1st paragraph. Surely it is not a 
question of who knows his connections but of his declaring any actual interest. As 
you wrote the original letter to him perhaps you should write again emphasing [sic] 
this point.”1252 Smith’s reply has not been found, but the exchange presents various 
possibilities. These include: that Dews was, as implied by Hunter and Taylor, bribed 
to act covertly for Smith and Poulson, and that a warning to declare interests, if 
given, had been given with ‘a nod and a wink’. Alternatively, it was genuinely 
expected that Dews would declare interests where appropriate. Pullen’s concerned 
reaction indicates he believed this to be the case; and as an experienced advertising 
 
1249 Whitaker’s Almanac, 1964, gives an estimated 1962 population of 40,420 for Castleford, 
Mexborough was too small to be listed individually, as its population was less than 20,000. 
1250 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3848, Peter Ward to TDS 29 November 1967. Dews was concerned that his 
employers, the NCB, might become difficult about time off for his local government activities and 
asked Smith “maybe you could use a part time public relations officer for OSB in this area, or maybe 
someone else you know of.” (TWAM DF/TDS Box 3848 Colin Dews to TDS 6 December 1967) 
1251 TWAM DF/TDFS Box 3848 Colin Dews to Leslie Pullen 19 January 1969. 
1252 TWAM DF/TDFS Box 3848 Leslie Pullen to TDS 23 January 1969 
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man prior to joining Smith one might not expect him to be naïve about the uses to 
which PR contracts could be put. What may be inferred is that Dews was possibly 
acting illegally for Smith’s interests since he was recruited in late 1967/early 
1968.1253 
 
William Kirkup 
A plea of ignorance may sound disingenuous, but there is little doubt that Smith was 
often not involved closely with the day-to-day running of his companies. As with his 
painting and decorating companies, he would set enterprises up but leave managers 
in charge and switch his attention to other projects (one could argue that he followed 
a similar pattern in his leadership of Newcastle City Council, moving from 
committee chairmanship to committee chairmanship according to the particular 
needs of the moment). As well as employing Peter Ward and Roy Hadwin to run 
many of the PR companies, Smith was also heavily reliant on his accountant, 
William Kirkup, who acted in many cases as Smith’s ‘managing director’. Smith had 
first met Kirkup when setting up his first companies in the late 1940s, and Kirkup 
remained his accountant for around two decades, even when, in the 1950s, Kirkup 
was a Progressive Party councillor and chairman of the Housing Committee for a 
while, in which capacity he would have dealt with tenders for painting municipal 
housing submitted by Smith’s Decorators. Ada Smith, who had no high opinion of 
her husband’s judgement of character, distrusted Kirkup; but when in October 1963 
Smith had a heart attack, she wrote, Kirkup took over the running of many of 
Smith’s businesses; at one point Poulson rang her, urging her to get rid of Kirkup.1254 
 
Kirkup certainly became much more closely involved in Smith’s companies.1255 This 
involved not just administrative work; Kirkup was taking an active PR role on 
Poulson’s behalf, for example introducing Max Tetlow of Poulson’s practice to the 
 
1253 TWAM DF/TDS Box 3848, Peter Ward to TDS 29 November 1967.   
1254 TWAM DF.TDS Box 3913, unpublished memoir by Ada Smith, unpaginated fragment. 
1255 Fitzwalter & Taylo, op cit p106; Amber (drawer 2, white padded envelope) letters from JGLP to 
William Kirkup 18 November 1963 relating to a project in Durham City; 3 & 5 December 1963 
relating to projects in Newburn (an Urban District just west of Newcastle); and Kirkup to JGLP 2 
December 1963 re Newburn and Warrington indicate  that Kirkup had rapidly taken the helm in the 
absence of Smith. 
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chairman of the Central Development Committee in Bolton and lobbying for 
Poulson to become consultant architect to the Bolton scheme.1256 
 
Kirkup remained a key figure up to the point where Smith and he severed their 
business relationship in or around June 1967.1257 He had possession of the Dansmith 
PR account and cash book from the time of Smith’s 1963 heart attack until the split. 
In 1966 Kirkup had moved from Newcastle to London , and in March 1972 he 
moved to Spain.1258  
 
Muir Hunter paid little attention to mention of Kirkup by Poulson or by Smith, and I 
have seen no evidence that any effort was made to get him to attend as a witness 
either the Wakefield hearings or the Leeds trial. Given his closeness to the heart of 
the Smith business for a major part of the 1960s, this seems a strange oversight. 
Kirkup did give a statement to the police in March 1974, a brief and bland affair: 
“Although during the period that Mr Smith was ill I did my best to keep the 
companies ‘ticking over’, I received verbal instructions from Mr Smith and complied 
with them. I never considered myself as operational in the public relations field...” 
Although he and his partner were signatories for the Cladan PR account (which had 
paid Freda Cunningham), “Virtually all of the expenditure by that company was 
made at the direct direction of Mr Smith…”. Shown a document headed ‘Newcastle. 
JGLP. Salaries’ with the initials AC, SD and RU, he commented “I cannot recall 
anyone ever being employed who had the initials AC and of course as this is a 
projection the initials may have stood for a proposed employee.”1259  
 
Smith’s recollections were rather different. Before he had fully recovered from his 
heart attack, he stated, Kirkup had decided to move to London and Smith agreed to 
 
1256 Amber, drawer 2 file 9, William Kirkup to JGLP 10 January 1964. Max Tetlow was a highly 
regarded planner who had been chief planner at MHLG before joining Poulson. Kirkup wrote to 
Poulson that “In subsequent discussions I asked that you be suggested to the Committee as Consultant 
Architect for the new scheme. I was informed, at that stage, that we were a little late but I have now 
heard that you have been included in a short list for the Consultant appointment.” 
1257 TNA J291/159/3 Witness statement by Eric Levine, 7 November 1973. 
1258 TWAM DF/TDS Box D2063 Witness statement by William Kirkup, 12 March 1974 
1259 TWAM DF/TDS Box D2063 Witness statement by William Kirkup, 12 March 1974 
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transfer most of his business interests to Kirkup, and to agree to Kirkup signing 
official correspondence on his behalf.1260  
 
He also agreed to set up T Dan Smith Associates (London) Ltd as a new company to 
be “the operative London company handling, among others, the Poulson Ropergate 
account. I only learned in January 1969, after my break with Mr Kirkup, that the 
Poulson fees had, since Mr Kirkup took over the administration in 1963, been 
channeled through what had always been the company through which I handled my 
own clients:- [Dansmith] PR Ltd. Almost £100,000 of Poulson fees were handled by 
Kirkup in that way.”1261 
 
Smith clearly believed – or presented himself as believing – that Kirkup had been 
running the businesses for his own benefit and that he (Smith) had little say in the 
matter. Where the truth lies is now hard to identify, not least since so little effort was 
made to identify Kirkup’s role and activities. 
 
A strategic blind eye? 
Smith claimed some years later that it was his discovery of a corrupt relationship 
between Poulson and Cunningham that led him to break the relationship with 
Poulson.1262 Poulson, in his autobiography, claimed it was he who had terminated the 
relationship because he believed that Smith was under investigation.1263 
 
1260 “I was left to agree the transfer of all but my decorating business interests, or recommence to 
build another business administration in Newcastle. I chose the easiest option and was left in 
Newcastle with one full-time and one part time employee to assist myself and the PR journalist staff 
working on our northern assignments. All accounts were administered by Kirkup and the London 
office, as were the finances of all the companies. Foolishly I began to condone the use by William 
Kirkup of my signature on official correspondence above the line:- ‘dictated by Mr Smith but signed 
in his absence’, a practice which worked admirably for me when I dictated the letters and was a 
regular visitor to the Newcastle office but which had catastrophic consequences when I was a very 
irregular visitor to the London office and did less and less of the actual dictating.” Author’s 
Collection, Draft paper for Conference on Fraud and Corruption, University of Liverpool, 12-14 July 
1987 p 19 
1261 Ibid 
1262 TDS Archive disk 41A: Smith had told Poulson that he was not prepared to carry on, adding “‘I 
don’t like your relationship with Cunningham’…  I had spoken to Cunningham and said ‘look, Andy, 
so far as I’m concerned I want nothing more to do with Poulson and you’… I think I’d heard about 
some holidays that he’d organized or something like that and so Cunningham said to me ‘OK, I would 
prefer to handle my own affairs in any case’”.  
1263 Poulson op cit p71 
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Yet it is clear that Smith’s business relationship with Poulson ended effectively in 
September 1969 when the regular payments from Ropergate Services ceased.1264  
Also, there is evidence that Smith had known of Cunningham’s holidays at 
Poulson’s expense as early as 1964. In January of that year Poulson had written to 
Smith that “I shall be sending you all the information re Andy Cunningham’s 
holiday and you can deal with him, not me.”1265 Three years later, Poulson was 
writing again: “Your very dear friend, Councillor Cunningham, rang this morning… 
He then went on to say ‘what about holidays this year’… Miss McLeod will make 
these arrangements and send details to him and to you.”1266 Quite why Poulson’s 
office needed to involve Smith with the arrangements is unclear.1267 
However, assertions that Smith’s association with Poulson formed a secretive 
conspiracy ignore the fact that the association appears to have been quite well 
known. A 1971 profile of Smith in the Northern Echo (published after his 
Wandsworth acquittal but many months before Poulson’s bankruptcy and before his 
dealings with Smith were supposedly revealed at the Wakefield hearings) is 
significant as it includes an accurate description of his links with Poulson and 
method of working, without any hint of shock or revelation: 
The public relations companies’ major business, however, was with town 
centre developers like the Pontefract-based JGL Poulson architects’ empire, as 
well as with system building firms, and here Dan Smith’s widespread contacts 
in local government proved invaluable. A former employee of the Smith PR 
business said: ‘The operations would conform to a pattern. Dan knew a lot of 
prominent councillors in the Labour Party. Where he thought a council would 
be interested in a redevelopment scheme, he would give one of his contacts a 
ring. This would be a committee chairman or someone else placed suitably to 
have a big say in where contacts would be placed. He would say he was 
working for a PR firm as a consultant, and would make an appointment for 
 
1264eg TWAM DF/TDS Box 3842 TDS to Professor George Jones, 22 July 1976, stating “My 
association with Poulson ended in Sept 1968 and was finalised in Sept 1969”. The second date is 
more reliable than the first; TWAM DF/TDS Box 3879. Note (undated) by Grace Cheeseman, signed 
‘GC’ 
1265 TNA J 291/66 JGLP to TDS 21 Jan 1964, though as Smith was then recuperating from a heart 
attack it may be that he did not see that letter. 
1266 TNA J291/67 JGLP to TDS 7 Jan 1967. Poulson’s reference to ‘Your very dear friend’ is 
presumably sarcastic. 
1267 Poulson, writing of Cunningham’s eleven holidays at his expenses, claimed he arranged the first 
but knew little of the following ten because Cunningham took most of them for granted. “He 
telephoned my secretary and asked her to arrange things, often when I was away. I still do not know 
how some of the holidays were sanctioned… But I do know that Dan Smith had a hand in them; those 
first tickets, for the holiday in Portugal, went through his office. I personally had them directed to 
him, so that he could make a present of them to his old friend and ‘contact’”. (John Poulson, The 
Price (London 1981) p 74) 
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someone from the PR firm. Councillors were appointed as consultants to the 
PR firm.1268  
 
Asked at a Commons Select Committee enquiry whether clients would have known 
about the Poulson-OSB link, Smith commented “Everybody knew about it because 
we were holding exhibitions all over the country. We were not working in our 
stockinged feet as most people think we were.”1269 
An examination of Smith’s way of working in Newcastle and elsewhere shows that 
he believed that he was careful in acting within the law. In both the Crudens 
controversy and at Peterlee there is evidence that he was actively negotiating with 
interested parties but that he was careful to declare an interest before participating in 
official meetings of the city council and the development corporation respectively. 
Notes on the Peterlee indictment record that “At no stage throughout his connection 
with the Peterlee Development Corporation did TDS disclose an interest in JGLP or 
his practices: very belatedly on 24.11.69 he declared an interest in a number of 
companies including Ropergate Services Ltd, but he did not even at this stage 
mention his contractual relationship with JGLP.”1270 This is contradictory: Smith’s 
agreement was formally with Ropergate, Poulson’s service company, rather than 
with Poulson personally; and the accusation of belatedness is irrelevant since his 
declaration was made before the first board meeting Smith presided over at which 
Poulson was discussed.  
He may have been let down by a laxer approach taken by his business associates in 
local government. Had Sporle declared an interest when the Wandsworth PR 
contract was being discussed, Smith would never have found himself in the dock at 
the Old Bailey. The same would be true of Dews, Roebuck and Newby. Smith 
repeatedly claimed that he believed that his clients would declare their interests 
where appropriate, but it is impossible now to tell whether he was sincere in this or 
 
1268 Northern Echo 8 July 1971.  However, openness was not invariably the case. In 1963 Smith wrote 
to Poulson about Peter Meldrum, Lord Provost of Glasgow: “I got his agreement to accept a retainer 
(on condition it was on the LP [Labour Party] contract as far as the world outside is concerned) this I 
agreed and put the figure as we agreed at £1250.” This duplicity, it would seem, was on the insistence 
of Meldrum rather than Smith or Poulson. (TNA J291/66 police typed copy of TDS to JGLP 12 April 
1963) 
1269 Report from the Select Committee on Conduct of Members (London 1977) p 58 
1270 TNA J291/159/4 The Queen against Thomas Daniel Smith. Second Indictment - Peterlee 
Development Corporation 
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turning a strategic blind eye on occasion.1271 It does seem clear that he believed that 
as responsibility for declaration of interest belonged to his clients, it was no longer 
his responsibility. Where the direct ‘line management’ of consultants was not 
undertaken by Smith, any responsibility for oversight did not rest with him: at Peter 
Ward’s trial, Smith said “It was Mr Ward’s responsibility to me, and not mine to Mr 
Ward, to ascertain that these people were behaving honestly.”1272  
But in his relations with Andrew Cunningham the system fails altogether. He might 
have been able – barely - to claim Cunningham as a consultant, but the payments 
routed via Freda Cunningham stretch credulity. One may wonder why a careful man 
acted in such a way, or why he became involved in passing on information about 
Cunningham’s holidays, and in employing Freda Cunningham. Perhaps having Mrs 
Cunningham as a notional employee was more palatable to Smith than having to deal 
on a regular basis with Cunningham himself. Perhaps it was at Poulson’s behest, to 
tie Smith more closely to the Poulson-Cunningham arm of the ‘triumvirate’, and 
Smith was unwilling or unable to refuse his main paymaster. 
 
This certainly appears to have been the case with Roebuck. As a witness at the 1975 
trial of Peter Ward, Roy Hadwin and Thomas Roebuck, Smith told the court that 
Roebuck (who had been paid a total of £1,462 by Smith) had been forced upon him 
by Poulson. Asked by the Judge, “You felt that Poulson had become your dictator?” 
Smith replied “Of course. I went away from that meeting doing what I was told – 
and I was supposed to be a very powerful man.”1273 A further instance of Smith’s 
deference to Poulson was revealed at Wakefield when he said that Poulson had 
“permitted” him “time off” to serve on the Redcliffe-Maud Commission: “I couldn’t 
have undertaken the job, shall I say, if he had objected to it.”1274 
 
Prison and after 
 
1271 The Times 31 January 1975 p 4: Smith told the trial of Ward, Hadwin and Roebuck “I do not want 
to try to excuse myself, but at the outset I am sure that the councillors employed by us would declare 
their interests always. That was my intention and the company’s intention.” 
1272 The Times 4 February 1975 p 4 
1273 Evening Chronicle 3 February 1975 
1274 Author’s Collection, Transcript of public examination of Thomas Daniel Smith, 25 July 1972 
paras 1157-1158 
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Smith served just under three years imprisonment, initially at Walton gaol in 
Liverpool, and then largely at the open prison at Leyhill in Gloucestershire. The 
period at Leyhill was subject to frequent interruptions, however. Smith was called as 
a witness at the 1975 trials of Peter Ward, Hadwin, and Roebuck and of Newby; he 
gave evidence to the Royal Commission on Standards in Public Life (the ‘Salmon 
Commission’) and to the House of Commons Select Committee on Conduct of 
Members. Most seriously, he stood trial again, in 1975 at Birmingham, on charges of 
fraudulent trading relating to his brief period (1971-1973) as a director of Ron 
Dilleigh’s company, Dilson Electricals. By this time Smith had recovered his health, 
and something of his former self-confidence. With his defence counsel (David Savile 
again) he mounted a vigorous defence; the presiding judge ordered that he be found 
not guilty. 
 
On leaving prison, aged 61, he took up work with the Howard League for Penal 
Reform at its offices in North Shields, and subsequently set up an organisation to 
help potential young offenders through the provision of arts and sporting facilities. 
His subsequent retirement was anything but quiet. Unlike Cunningham, who spent 
the final decades of his life in seclusion, or Poulson, who wrote his autobiography 
only to see it recalled and pulped on legal advice, Smith maintained an active public 
presence.1275 He was frequently invited to give talks at institutions around the 
country; he was an inveterate writer of letters to the press; although his glory days as 
a frequent guest on national programmes such as A Word in Edgeways and a 
castaway on Desert Island Discs was past, he continued to appear on local radio and 
television. He rediscovered his past as a grass roots activist: working for the local 
pensioners’ movement, and, after he and Ada moved from Belle Grove Terrace to 
the nearby Mill House flats in 1984, an active member of the tenants’ association. He 
founded a patients’ group for his local medical practice, and was a founder member 
of a friends group for his local park.1276 He was eventually re-admitted to the Labour 
Party (he had not been expelled, but his membership had lapsed while he was in 
prison). He travelled widely, both to give talks and to visit his family in Britain and 
abroad. He continued to paint and write poetry, and worked on several books, 
 
1275 Cunningham died, aged 100, in 2010 (Obituary, Daily Telegraph 29 October 2010); Poulson died 
in 1993. 
1276 The Friends of Leazes Park, an active group still in existence. 
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including a second autobiography; but none was published. He was, however, the 
subject of, and featured in, a full length film by the Newcastle-based Amber film 
collective, T Dan Smith – A Funny Thing Happened On The Way To Utopia. He may 
have retired, but could never be said to be retiring. 
 
Dan Smith died on 27 July 1993 after suffering a heart attack. 
 
Approaches to scandal 
 Fitzwalter and Taylor’s history of the Poulson affair is used to question the British 
response to scandal, and the failure to carry out a comprehensive investigation: the 
machinery existed “but the will to use it was never there” with the consequence that 
“a mountain of publicity produced not even a molehill of effective reform.”1277 They 
claim, justifiably enough, that “truth was a scarce commodity in the Poulson scandal. 
One character after another in the drama disclaimed all knowledge of corrupt 
intent… Had there been a public inquiry into Poulson all of these truths, half-truths 
and downright lies could have been weighed in the balance.”1278 Their account, 
however, appears reliant upon the partial narratives of Muir Hunter and Peter Taylor, 
assuming that the ‘downright lies’ and ‘half truths’ prevailed, and that little in the 
way of ‘truth’ could be found in the statements of the major participants. This has 
militated against a more nuanced understanding of Smith’s career. 
 
Alan Doig argues that the Poulson affair highlighted the problem of investigating 
widespread corruption and of comprehending its nature. Citing the claim of an 
Attorney General that new anti-corruption laws were unnecessary because “the 
concept of corruption, when properly explained by a judge, is one which is readily 
understood by juries”, Doig adds “…it is even more important that those who may 
be faced with corruption in their jobs should understand it before the judge explains 
it to them in court.”1279 The issue is simple: “Corruption is bribery and bribery is 
corruption… a transactional offence that concerns the use or proposed use of 
inducements or rewards to influence actions or decisions by politicians and public 
 
1277 Fitzwalter &Taylor op cit p 262, p 1.  
1278 Ibid p 268 
1279 Doig, A, Corruption and Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics (Harmondsworth 1984) 
p25 
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servants to ensure an outcome specifically favourable to the donor. The Victorian 
legislators, faced with the problem of distinguishing transactions they wished to 
outlaw from the multitude of innocent dealings, chose not to legislate against 
specific transactions. Instead criminality was determined by the legislative presence 
of ‘corruptly’, a word with a long historical pedigree…”1280 It is a view at variance 
with the “negotiated classification of behaviour” described by Chibnall and 
Saunders, in which “the same act may be open to a variety of interpretations 
according to which set of criteria is considered appropriate in a given situation.”1281 
 
Doig argues that standards of conduct in public life are most effective when public 
and private morality share a high degree of compatibility, but that the 1960s began to 
see divergence, exemplified for example by the greater involvement of local 
authorities with private businesses (with their laxer standards), and warned against 
by the MP Francis Noel-Baker’s strictures on the new field of public relations.1282 
 
Yet Doig does not – cannot? - define a line between lobbying and corrupting, 
hospitality and inducement. He gives the example of Roy Hadwin defending the 
practice of wining and dining councillors: “I don’t think there is a business in this 
country where a businessman doesn’t take a client out to lunch, it just happens we 
were dealing with councils, they are the ones that are buying the houses. I don’t 
think there is anything morally wrong with that.”1283 But adds that “the sting in the 
search for council contracts was not, however, in the techniques, but the motives that 
promoted them.” To illustrate this he quotes Hadwin’s boss, Dan Smith, “laying 
down the strategy to Poulson.” 
 
 
1280 Ibid pp25-26 
1281 Chibnall & Saunders op cit p139 
1282 Doig op cit pp 348-356. Noel-Baker warned in 1961 that “Offers from business interests can be 
very tempting particularly if they involve fees, retainers or expenses without an obligation to keep 
‘office hours and demand no special qualifications. Even more attractive to some [MPs] is a private 
appointment (as ‘advisor’ or ‘consultant’) that need not become generally known. At the same time, 
the growth of so-called ‘public relations’ in all its aspects… means that Members of Parliament have 
themselves become more attractive allies for business interests than they have been in the past. The 
door, in fact, is open for a new form of political corruption and there is an uneasy feeling in 
Parliament and outside, that its extent could be much greater than the known or published facts 
reveal… in the new ‘grey’ zone that is growing up, the interests are often not known and not 
declared.” 
1283 Doig op cit pp 354-355 quoting ‘The Rise and Fall of John Poulson’, World in Action (ITV April 
1973) 
309 
 
The basis for success… is top contact and someone on the ground to drink 
pints and make friends with the rank and file I know the people we need. The 
prizes are great, but we will miss some of them needlessly unless we take steps 
forward now.1284 
 
Neither the ‘strategy’ of lobbying in the boardroom and the public bar, or the 
‘technique’ of lunching councillors, necessarily imply or involve corruption. 
Corruption was possible but not essential to ‘the motives that promoted’ the search 
for contracts; the motive was to sell houses, not necessarily to sell them corruptly. 
Doig quotes Cunningham: “Where does public relations end and corruption begin? 
You haven’t got to be a monk and sit in some cell all your life. You’ve got to talk to 
people.”1285 The view was echoed by Poulson: “Somebody is going to have to sit 
down and work out just what is entertaining and what is corruption so that 
everybody will know where they stand.”1286 The grey area remains grey. 
 
A quite different approach is the anthropological, exemplified by Gerald Mars, 
whose work applies the ‘grid’ and ‘group’ methodology devised by Mary 
Douglas.1287 Douglas defined ‘grid’ as the strength of social categories imposed by a 
culture (thus the caste system of India would be a strong grid; liberal western society 
weak), ‘group’ emphasised collectiveness as opposed to individualism. Mars applied 
this concept to the workplace, classifying four occupational types according to weak 
or strong grid, and weak or strong group, with ‘grid’ assessed in terms of autonomy, 
insulation (isolation), reciprocity (how much one can give to others) and 
competition. “Weak grid jobs… are those with an overall absence of constraints 
and… the freedom … to transact with a wide range of others.” Those typified by 
weak grid and weak group he called ‘hawks’, a group defined by individual 
entrepreneurialism.1288 Mars sees Smith as a ‘hawk’, and notes society’s 
ambivalence to hawks and to their freebooting activities.  
 
1284 Doig op cit p 355 quoting Tomkinson, M & Gillard, M, Nothing to Declare. The Political 
Corruptions of John Poulson (London 1980) p 66 (TDS to JGLP 1 March 1964) 
1285 Doig op cit  p359 
1286 Chibnall & Saunders op cit p 130 
1287 Mars, G Cheats at Work. An Anthropology of Workplace Crime (Aldershot 1994) 
1288 Mars op cit pp 24-26. The other groups were ‘donkeys’ (strong grid, weak group – ‘isolated 
subordination’ typified by supermarket check-out staff), ‘wolves’ (strong grid, strong group – ‘tight 
work groups’, typified by dockers and miners), and ‘vultures’ (weak grid, strong group – ‘loose work 
groups’, typified by delivery roundsmen). Other ‘hawks’ named by Mars include arms dealer Adnan 
Kashoggi and the middleman ‘fixer’ Sidney Stanley of the postwar Lynskey Tribunal notoriety. 
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We tend to despise our most successful men precisely because of their success. 
Admiration for the frontier pattern of success – log cabin to White House – is 
tempered by a cynicism or contempt for the way it is achieved. And in the UK 
the price paid for men of flair like T Dan Smith, who made the north east of 
England hold up its head, is the sort of corruption that the Poulson 
investigation revealed. One problem that all hawks have to face, therefore, is 
the resentment, envy and occasional outrage that society shows when fiddles 
become visible. This is because there is only a blurred line between 
entrepreneurialism and flair on the one hand and sharp practice and fraud on 
the other. Society needs to admire and reward the first but suspects, and often 
rightly so, the presence of the second.1289 
 
Their activities are determined by where they stand in social, class and occupational 
structures: “The Poulsons and the T Dan Smiths are able to fiddle on a grand scale 
because their whole style of operating belongs with individualistic hawks. The 
supermarket cashier has to confine her fiddles to ringing short on the till because her 
physically and socially restricted style of work belongs with the insulated and 
subordinate donkeys.”1290 
 
Mars’ analysis, useful for typologising Dan Smith vis-à-vis his associates and his 
employees, in terms of explaining his behaviour strays towards stating the obvious. 
A different analysis, examining structural processes in the building industry, does 
however offer an explanation of how Smith’s role in the Poulson affair developed. 
 
Patrick Dunleavy’s history of postwar British housing policy describes how 
government policy – both actively, through manipulation of subsidy, and negatively, 
through its failure to reform the structure and boundaries of local authorities, 
encouraged the employment of industrialised building techniques to provide an in 
situ solution for urban housing shortages; “By building high-rise/high density 
schemes, it was claimed, a direct attack could be mounted on inner city housing 
conditions without altering the planning system, the local government structure, or 
the existing balance of social pressures.”1291 This led to an “enormous expansion of 
construction activity” in the early 1960s which altered the relationship between 
contractors and councils. “Whereas in the past contractors had stood rather apart 
 
1289 Mars op cit pp 48-49 
1290 Ibid p 164 
1291 Patrick Dunleavy, The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain 1945-1975 (Oxford 1981) pp 99-103 
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from housing authorities, the new contracting and tendering procedures associated 
with industrialized building placed a premium on the development of close or closed 
relations between local authorities and particular firms.” At the same time, the 
government was actively encouraging industrialised ‘system’ building (Housing 
Minister Sir Keith Joseph told the 1963 Conservative Party Conference that 
industrialisation would increase housing output to 400,000 dwellings a year), and the 
number of ‘systems’ proliferated: 240 in production or development by late 1964.1292 
As the number of systems grew, so did the pressure on firms to gain contracts. “The 
sine qua non of success for firms was access, and the means of obtaining access 
diversified.”1293 Construction companies, a contemporary journal noted, “employ 
armies of men to find housing programmes large enough to warrant a reasonable 
product of their reinforced concrete monoliths. These men are high pressure sales 
staff.”1294 Such firms offered “ever more lavish enticements” – sophisticated 
presentations, entertainment, foreign trips. “An increasing number of public relations 
firms and consultancies were employed to gain local authority contracts, a trend 
pioneered by T Dan Smith’s multiple PR outlets. The final element in this 
development was the growth of corruption which the Poulson and other scandals 
have demonstrated was clearly linked with the industrialized building campaign.”1295 
 
Whether Smith did pioneer the use of PR firms for acquiring building contracts is 
uncertain; but it is clear that the ‘hard sell’ and the pressure on firms to get business 
did lead to significant levels of corruption. Fitzwalter and Taylor note that after 
Poulson there were “dozens of police investigations into local government 
corruption… all of them had a great deal to do with the way building contracts were 
awarded in the sixties.”1296 Doig chronicles numerous instances of construction-
related (and other) municipal corruption, including those of Maurice Byrne, a former 
Mayor of Pontefract who acted as PR for Carlton Contractors, a subsidiary of 
Trafalgar House; Sid McCullough, a County Durham builder with numerous district- 
and county council associates; and the widespread corruption in south Wales, an area 
 
1292 Ibid pp 115-123 
1293 Ibid pp 120-121 
1294 Official Architecture and Planning cited by Dunleavy op cit p 121 
1295 Dunleavy op cit p 121. It is unclear whether Smith did in fact ‘pioneer’ the use of PR companies 
in this field. 
1296 Fitzwalter & Taylor op cit p 270 
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which “managed to combine redevelopment schemes similar to those of Birmingham 
with an entrenched one-party domination not dissimilar to that of the north-east, 
together with added ingredients of an enfeebled local press, geographical isolation, 
and a quiescent public.”1297 Most flamboyant of all was Alan Maudsley, 
Birmingham’s City Architect, who accepted bribes from a small architectural 
practice, Sharp & Ebery, which, from doing virtually no council work in 1966, 
gained fees of £730,000 from the city between then and 1973, and from executives 
of a major city construction firm, Bryants.1298  
 
Most relevant to the Smith case is that of Peter Day, accused alongside Smith and 
others in 1971 or bribing Sidney Sporle. While Smith won the right to a separate 
trial, Day was convicted and gaoled alongside Sporle. Day had been an agent for 
John Laing Construction Ltd, and claimed that the £500 he had paid Sporle was 
payment for consultancy work. No suggestion of impropriety by Laing was made in 
court, despite Laing’s MD having met Sporle for the two men to sign Sporle’s 
contract of employment. Laing, whose corporate tone was established by the austere 
John Laing, a member of the Christian Brethren, had a reputation for extreme 
probity, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that if even they were complicit in 
providing inducements to potential clients, then the practice was endemic in the 
construction industry and not confined to a few exceptional ‘bad apples’.1299 
 
1297 Doig op cit pp 180-198 
1298 A Poulson employee, J G Watson, reported on having visited Maudsley in 1967 but was not able  
to explain OSB at length (TNA J291/84 J G Watson to JGLP 28 November 1967) .1298 In contrast to 
the often dowdy corruption of the Poulson affair, with its curious running theme of carpets and other 
items of interior décor, Maudsley enjoyed the high life, spending much of his ill-gotten gains on 
gambling, night clubs, and women. A gaming club employee named Doris Day told the Bryants trial 
that ‘Mr Maudsley called her ‘Dorry’ and was nearly always drunk when she saw him’ …“At one 
stage Jim Sharp [one of the convicted architects] asked me to live in a flat on the firm. I’d imagine 
that he and Bryants had a flat where girls stayed to entertain them. I told them I was not interested.” 
At the conclusion of the Bryants trial, Mr Justice Melford Stephenson commented that the accused 
and Maudsley had turned Birmingham into “a municipal Gomorrah”. Even after conviction (when he 
received a fairly lenient two-and-a–half years), he showed a commendable chutzpah, successfully 
appealing to get his pension restored by Birmingham City Council. (The Times 4 September 1976 p1, 
12 April 1978 p2, 21 April 1978 p 4. Doig op cit pp 182-185) 
1299 Obituary of Sir Maurice Laing, The Guardian 25 February 2008 p33; Alan Thorpe, ‘Laing, Sir 
John William (1879-1978)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2004; online edn, Sept 2012 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/48743, accessed 9 Nov 2012].  
Ada Smith, writing of the flat in Hill Street, Mayfair, London that Smith rented between 1967 and 
1969 with his Northampton-based friend and business associate Ron Dilleigh, recorded that: “One 
thing that I did notice in the flat was that letters for people unknown to us kept on being delivered and 
Mr Dilleigh would always take these away and say that he would deal with them. There was one 
name that cropped up more than a few times on letters which Mr Dilleigh took away to deal with, a 
name which had no meaning to us at all, at the time… Mr Peter Day… [Dan] mentioned this to me 
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Smith’s role in the Poulson affair can be seen in a somewhat different light if 
measured against the analysis of corruption scandals put forward by John Garrard. 
For Garrard, scandals are not straightforward affairs of good and evil but are 
“slippery phenomena” which “rest… heavily on human perceptions…”. Scandals are 
“essentially public phenomena, wherein hitherto private behaviour, sometimes… 
resting on private systems of mores and values, often persistent and tolerated over a 
long period of time, is publicly revealed and then widely deemed morally 
outrageous, thereby scandalising large numbers of people.”1300 They involve people 
in public life – though standards vary, so businessmen can get away with more 
financial malpractice than politicians. “Indeed, the mismatch between expectations 
in the public and business worlds may well be a potent generator of conduct that 
turns out to be scandalous, particularly for businessmen-turned-politicians, or where 
politics, as it increasingly does due to the ever-expanding role of government, 
involves contact and negotiation with business.” Garrard cites the Poulson affair as 
an example of this. 
 
A similar view was adopted by Chibnall and Saunders, using Poulson’s relationship 
with George Pottinger as a model, which case they saw as “the authoritative 
imposition of the legal category of ‘corruption’ on behaviour which had previously 
been regarded as largely unproblematic within a particular situational morality.”1301 
This was the argument that “common behaviour within a group cannot reasonably be 
considered deviant – ie everybody does it, it cannot be wrong.”1302 
 
Garrard also describes scandals as being largely concerned with behaviour that is “or 
is taken to be, symptomatic of much wider patterns, involving far greater numbers of 
people of the same kind…”; and they tend to arise in groups. “This may be less 
because such behaviour has suddenly become more common than because behaviour 
which in the past was widely practised and tolerated comes up against a public 
 
with some concern… it bothered him and he could never get a straight answer to this from Mr 
Dilleigh.” (TWAM DF.TDS Box 3913, unpublished memoir by Ada Smith p 41) 
1300 Garrard, J, ‘Scandals: a tentative overview’ in Moore, J & Smith, J (eds), Corruption in Urban 
Politics and Society, Britain 1780-1950 (Aldershot 2007) p 27. Italics as in original. 
1301 Chibnall & Saunders, op cit p 142 
1302 Ibid p 143 
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tolerance that is changing (partly as a result of initial revelations) and/or media 
competitively eager to reveal.”1303 He draws parallels with scandals involving public 
officials in northern towns sparked by the ‘Salford Gas Scandal’ of 1887-88, and the 
‘Cash for Questions’ controversy of the mid-1990s, but the point could equally apply 
to the rash of local government corruption scandals, of which the Poulson affair was 
only the most famous, in the mid 1970s. Further, while the behaviour being 
condemned may be  
 
clearly heinous and criminal, dramatically at variance with public value 
systems… More often, the behaviour is located in a grey zone, on the hazy 
borderlines between what is publicly permissible and impermissible. This is an 
area of activity that Anthony Barker has called ‘not unlawful’ rather than either 
illegal or legal. … the individuals and/or groups involved may even see their 
behaviour as morally defensible, or neutral, or at least capable of being 
rendered respectable.1304 
 
Scandals often arise when… public standards and values are shifting. People 
engaged in hitherto tolerated or condoned private behaviour suddenly find 
themselves on the wrong side of a shifting public moral borderline…1305 
 
Smith’s involvement with Poulson was clearly located in this liminal area, the ill-
defined borderlands where lobbying shades almost imperceptibly into corruption, 
and it may be that he was simply unlucky to have been active at a time of radical 
change to the “moral borderline”. His ‘legalistic’ attitude towards his activities and 
the declaration of interests have been touched on above, and he appears to have 
believed that this was within the law. His views of his own actions admit only very 
equivocally to any wrong-doing at all, and display inconsistencies. As noted above, 
Smith in 1987 told a conference that he had decided to plead guilty because he felt 
he was not strong enough to fight on, and was not being encouraged by his legal 
team to defend the case.1306 At the trial of Ward, Hadwin and Roebuck he told the 
court “I was corrupt because I condoned things on many occasions. I think I would 
accept that I was the corrupter, although on the other hand I was as much corrupted 
 
1303Garrard op cit  p 31 
1304 Ibid p31. Garrard cites Barker, A, The Upturned Stone: Political Scandals in Twenty 
Democracies and their Investigation Processes (Essex Papers in Politics and Government, University 
of Essex 1992) p 20. 
1305 Garrard op cit p 36 
1306 Author’s collection, Draft paper for Conference on Fraud and Corruption, University of 
Liverpool, 12-14 July 1978 pp 42-43; Smith’s recollection confirmed in interview with Clifford 
Smith. 
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as I corrupted others.”1307 And to a parliamentary committee he maintained “I 
believed that the people that we employed… had declared interests. Therefore, there 
was nothing improper in their associations with the local authorities…If I believed a 
Councillor was declaring his interests and he reported to me that the Council had 
decided to go ahead with the scheme, I would write on it, ‘Great’. But when I found 
that the Councillor had not declared his interests and I had written on ‘Great’ then I 
accepted the responsibility, for no other reason. On six occasions I saw documents 
where men who had behaved improperly in my view and on the occasion of those 
charges I had to plead guilty; the only occasion – I have only pleaded guilty once and 
I pleaded guilty for that reason.”1308 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1307 Evening Chronicle 3 March 1975 
1308 Report from the Select Committee on Conduct of Members (London 1977) p 60 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
Hill Street in Mayfair, London W1, in the late 1960s was home to The Beatles’ 
management company NEMS, and also to the flat shared by Dan Smith and his 
friend and collaborator Ron Dilleigh. It is a pleasing coincidence – might Smith and 
the Fab Four have passed each other in the street? – that highlights an important 
question about Smith’s career: was he essentially a figure of the Sixties? 
 
Much has been written about that decade, examining changes in popular music and 
popular culture, in the introduction of liberal social policies (such as the suspension 
of capital punishment for murder in 1965 and its abolition in 1969, the Sexual 
Offences Act 1967 and the Abortion Act 1967), and in the changes in sexual mores. 
Historical debate continues about the extent to which the 1960s was a revolutionary 
decade, exemplified by the works of Arthur Marwick and Gerard DeGroot.1309  
 
From a chronological point of view, Smith was pre-eminently a man of the Sixties. 
The period in which he was a man of some power and influence extended from 1958, 
when the Labour Party gained control on Newcastle City Council, to early 1970, 
when he stepped down from public office following his arrest in the Sporle case.  It 
could be argued that his origins in the North East helped him attract attention, just as 
musicians, poets and writers were able to benefit from a media increasingly turning 
its attention away from the capital. And the Sixties can be seen as an era of 
optimism, typified by Harold Wilson’s 1963 speech on “the white heat of the 
technological revolution”, whereby it was held that science, technology, education 
and planning could transform British life and society. 
 
Could Smith have flourished in any other decade? This question raises the issue of 
‘structure versus agency’ – was what happened in Newcastle and the North of 
England in the 1960s the product of economic and social forces, or could an 
individual exercise sufficient influence to have a significant effect on the course of 
events? In the case of Smith, it is tempting to give the answer “both of the above.” 
 
1309 Marwick, A, The Sixties. Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, 
c.1958-c.1974 (Oxford 1998); DeGroot, G, The Sixties Unplugged. A Kaleidoscopic History of a 
Disorderly Decade (London 2008) 
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Undoubtedly his personal qualities, intelligence and drive would have helped him in 
other periods, but the Sixties was a fertile period for innovation in planning and local 
government.  
 
The lifting of building restrictions and increased availability of loan finance enabled 
local authorities that were not war-damaged towns and cities or new towns to begin 
to implement major redevelopment plans; and Newcastle’s was the first of this new 
wave, in 1961. Smith’s plans for Newcastle chimed with developments in education: 
Newcastle introduced the comprehensive system to its secondary schools, and 
Smith’s administration commenced the building of the (previously planned) 
‘education precinct’ in Newcastle city centre.  
 
Newcastle took a leading role in the modernisation of local government 
administration, replacing traditional modes of administration with a council cabinet 
system, with the introduction of a chief executive (or ‘city manager’) to run the 
council. And Smith was able to solidly link developments in the city of Newcastle 
with a wider regional agenda as regionalism increasingly became part of the post-
1945 zeitgeist.  
 
But – Newcastle was a pioneer in many of these fields, and it was a pioneer very 
largely because of the work of Smith. It was under his guidance that the city council 
reformed its creaking planning structure, creating an independent planning 
department, one of the first for any major British urban centre, led by a chief 
planning officer who could no longer be outranked by other council chief officers, 
and tasked with creating a plan for a new Newcastle. Similarly, it was Smith’s 
initiative that led the city to appoint a ‘City Manager’ – chief executive in modern 
parlance – to take over the administrative functions of the town clerk and act as a 
leader in an administrative structure which formerly lacked such a role (the town 
clerk being traditionally just ‘first among equals’), and thereby – it was hoped – 
provide dynamic leadership in place of interdepartmental squabbling. That the City 
Manager could be, and was, appointed from outside the local government profession 
was another innovation.1310 
 
1310 Eliot (1971) op cit pp149-162 
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Smith’s views of the role of the regional capital as an engine for regional economic 
regeneration, and his views of the need for regional administrative and political 
structures were, as I have commented, consistent with the zeitgeist, but he was far 
from being just a beneficiary of changing times; he was an active figure in seeking 
change. Through writing, through media appearances, in his role as Chairman of the 
Northern Economic Planning Council and through his work for Crowther Report and 
the Redcliffe Maud Commission he was an energetic and consistent advocate for 
regional government in the United Kingdom. 
 
An appreciation of Smith’s personal qualities – positive and negative – is of huge 
importance in assessing his career. He had a strong will, and energy, displayed in his 
ability to progress so high within the (admittedly enfeebled) Independent Labour 
Party, although his work as a covert Trotskyist agent attempting to hollow out the 
ILP also shows an unscrupulous streak, particularly in the treatment of those 
members seen as opposing Trotskyist interests. He showed skill in organising a 
group to reenergise the Labour group on Newcastle City Council and, in power, to 
put forward a coherent programme of development and reform. He was an intelligent 
man, albeit without the benefit of extensive formal education, but did not have a chip 
on his shoulder about this, and retained an admiration for academics and experts, 
sometimes uncritically so. He had in many respects an absence of ego. This, more 
than in any other feature of his character of career, gives the lie to the frequent 
accusation that Smith was the British equivalent of “an American city boss” – a 
Robert Moses or Richard J Daley figure.1311 Smith did not occupy roles for long 
periods: he was leader of the Labour group at Newcastle city council for six years 
before voluntarily resigning; and his enthusiasm for his subsequent post as chairman 
of the NEPC was also waning by the later 1960s. And far from monopolising power 
in his own hands, a feature of his governance of Newcastle council was his efforts to 
set up other powerful positions – the Chief Planning Officer masterminding the 
transformation of the city, and the City Manager ensuring that the council’s work 
was carried out swiftly and efficiently – which under other circumstances could have 
 
1311 On Moses, Caro, R, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (1974); on Daley, 
Spinney, R G, City of Big Shoulders. A History of Chicago (2000) pp213-240 
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been seen as rivals to the council leader. His leadership of the Labour group, too, 
was not based on institutional networks of control. The group of Smith ‘loyalists’, 
mostly ex-ILP and/or RCP, described as his Praetorian Guard – Ken Sketheway, Ted 
Fletcher, Jack Johnson, Roy Hadwin – was too small (and in some cases unpopular) 
to control the group; nor was Smith able to dispense safe seats through his control of 
a major trade union locally (as Andrew Cunningham was able to control Durham 
County Council Labour group through his domination of the GMB in the region).  
 
Smith’s control was based on intangibles. A word frequently (almost invariably, I 
found, in the course of interviewing for this thesis) used about him is ‘charisma’ and 
it would seem that Smith possessed this to a high degree. He was undoubtedly a very 
capable public speaker. This must have helped his advance in the ILP and the pre-
1959 Labour Party; it would have enabled him to win over world-weary officials in 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, and seasoned business executives in 
IBM. It made him a regular figure on the broadcast media: not just local news 
programmes, but on national radio (he had a good relationship with the prominent 
BBC producer of talks, Leonie Cohn) and television – where a documentary, Dan’s 
Castle, examined his ideas and ‘the state of the north’.1312 
 
But charisma by itself is not enough to explain Smith’s success. He was able to 
develop, express and execute many of the ideas which formed his vision for 
Newcastle and the region, exemplified by his piloting of the Newcastle development 
plan through the council and ministry approval, by his reconstruction of Newcastle 
city council’s administration, and, perhaps most remarkably, by his achievement in 
having Peterlee – one of the more obscure postwar new towns –  declared the 
location of Britain’s first science campus.  
 
In achieving these, and other, things, he showed an undogmatic ability to step 
beyond ideological and organisational barriers. He was able to work closely with 
members of rival political parties – for example, as a campaigner for Britain to join 
the European Common Market, he worked closely with the leader of the 
 
1312 Dan’s Castle (BBC Television 1965) 
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Conservative group on Newcastle council, Ian Bransom.1313 In developing council 
policy, he looked beyond his councillor colleagues and fellow Labour Party 
members to seek advice from academic staff at the local university college. Leading 
architects – Basil Spence, Arne Jacobsen and Robert Matthew – were persuaded to 
form a design panel to advise on the city redevelopment policy. Perhaps the best 
example of this flexibility is the close working relationship that Smith, a senior 
figure in the Labour Party in NE England, was able to form with John Poulson, the 
Deputy Chairman of the National Liberal Party, an organisation that was shortly to 
be absorbed into its long-term partner, the Conservative Party. 
 
This quality is tied in with Smith’s skill at networking. Perhaps not a clubbable man 
in the formal sense (though he was a member of the Reform), he seems to have been 
very good at forming relationships with work contacts, and of developing these 
relationships. Thus his contacts with the businessman Geoffrey Crowther, initially 
when Smith served on Crowther’s steering committee for the Buchanan report, 
which developed when Trust House hotels, chaired by Crowther, became the 
intended operator of a large new hotel (to be designed by Arne Jacobsen) in the 
centre of Newcastle. One might also note the willingness of several of Smith’s 
business contacts to travel to Gloucestershire to address the business club that Smith 
has established while incarcerated in HMP Leyhill. 
 
It was this ability to network that made Smith such a tempting target for John 
Poulson. Poulson was anxious to expand his business with labour-controlled local 
authorities, and saw Smith as the ideal man to provide information and introductions. 
Smith, a man whose ability to judge character was as poor as Poulson’s was refined, 
was very impressed by the architect.1314 In particular he was struck by the way that 
 
1313 The two were joint chairmen of the NE Regional Committee of the United Europe Association: 
Evening Chronicle, 11 December 1962 p7. 
1314 Ada Smith held this opinion of her husband.  “I had learned that Dan had one fatal weakness and 
that was that he was a pathetically bad judge of character. He was always willing to believe the best 
about people despite some lessons bitterly learned. Not so me. I had an ability to read between the 
lines, to interpret looks and nuances in the voice and I frequently made my doubts known to Dan 
about this or that person. He was inclined not to believe me and say that I was too sensitive but he 
was forced to admit on a few occasions that what I had suspected earlier had in [end of page]” 
Unpaginated autobiographical fragment in TWAM DF/TDS Box 3919 
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Poulson had broken through the restrictive rules and traditional practices that were 
prevalent in architecture and construction, to create an integrated company that could 
provide design, engineering and project management services. In Smith’s eyes 
Poulson was a man who could ‘get things done’, in much the same way that Smith 
sought to ‘get things done’. In this thesis I argue that Smith was not necessarily 
guilty of all the charges for which he was gaoled in 1974. Rather, he was drawn into 
Poulson’s network, probably became increasingly aware that Poulson was engaging 
in dubious practices, while at the same time believing that his own actions remained 
on the right side of a rather vague line, or zone, dividing the licit from the illicit. That 
Poulson became bankrupt and brought down many others in his fall, deserving or 
undeserving, was for Smith a matter of bad luck as well as of his own bad judgement 
and habit of sailing close to the wind. That he was, by 1973-74, thoroughly 
demoralised and suffering from major health problems, and feeling that his legal 
team was not enthusiastic to fight what in retrospect seems a flimsy prosecution case, 
was worse luck. 
 
But if we challenge the myth of ‘Smith the corrupt councillor’, we must also 
challenge the heroic myth. His career ended in failure, and that failure had several 
aspects. Firstly, it came about as a result of his own misjudgements and possibly 
misdeeds. It was entirely because of his own actions that he had to stand down from 
public office in January 1970.  
 
Secondly, many of the achievements of his period of power and influence were 
relatively short-lived. Initiatives undertaken in Newcastle spluttered to a halt: the 
development plans, the creation of dynamic new roles within the administration all 
fell by the wayside. Economic difficulties, the 1973 oil crisis, a national mood 
turning against urban motorways, and (ironically) local government restructuring put 
paid to the larger concrete ambitions of the Smith-Burns plan; a failure of ‘agency’ 
caused the post of City manager to wither into irrelevance. 
 
Possibly it was his experience as a member of a self-defined revolutionary 
‘vanguard’ in the 1940s that led him to believe that creating ‘leadership’ posts would 
enable his urban reforms to continue. His vision in Newcastle was to falter after 
1965: as discussed in chapter 4, the creation of a city manager post did not in itself 
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guarantee that the impetus behind the redevelopment plans would continue. The 
removal of an inspirational leader led to stagnation. This was the case also, and very 
visibly, in Peterlee: Smith’s resignation as Chairman led to his science campus 
project, which had seemed on the verge of success, coming to a complete halt. 
 
Thirdly, he misjudged the prospects of the NEPC developing into a form of regional 
administration. Joining the NEPC seemed a natural progression; in his period as 
leader of Newcastle council he had moved from committee chairmanship to 
committee chairmanship according to the priorities of the moment, setting projects in 
motion and them moving on; moving from the council to the NEPC was a similar 
step, with the exception that chairmanship of the NEPC gave no power, just the 
possibility of influence. In less than a year-and-a-half, economic pressures would 
derail the regionalist agenda of George Brown, and render the influence of the 
NEPCs and their chance of gaining greater responsibilities minimal. A harsh but not 
unfair assessment of Smith’s (almost) five years chairing the NEPC would be that he 
had wasted his time. 
 
It would be historically misleading to remember Smith solely for the circumstances 
of his fall; an assessment of his complete career, its successes and failures in the 
short and the long term, is required.  
 
 He was a resourceful and innovative local government leader, and a leading 
advocate for local government reorganisation and for regional government. A study 
of his career casts some further light on the ideology and activities of British 
Trotskyism in the 1940s, and how the revisionist doctrines of James Burnham and 
Anthony Crosland could be put into practical effect, not at a national level, but in a 
middle-sized English city. 
  
Many of the initiatives introduced in Newcastle during his period of control led the 
way in Britain: independent planning departments; chief executive officers. The 
‘conservation districts’ embodied in the 1963 plan led the way to the creation of 
statutory conservation areas in 1967. Smith’s vision for Newcastle and North East 
England looked beyond the traditional industries of coal, steel, shipbuilding and 
engineering, for which he had no sentimental regard. He sought a new industrial 
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framework based around advanced technology, around education, and around 
leisure. His encouragement of the arts as a potent economic driver – and the presence 
of higher education institutions in city centres filling a similar role – occurred long 
before ‘culture-led regeneration’ became popular.1315 And the shape and appearance 
of modern Newcastle – both in what was built, and what was saved from 
inappropriate redevelopment -  still owes a great deal to the 1961 plan. And his 
efforts to encourage a regional layer of government and administration might still 
inform the present day experiments with ‘combined authorities.1316 
 
In the early period of writing this thesis, I received an email from a noted writer on 
politics who said, jokingly, “I hope you don’t disprove too many of the legends that 
have grown up around Dan.” I hope I have. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1315 Sometimes dated to the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign of the early 1980s as in this article: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/3649100/Birthplace-of-a-cultural-revolution.html . The 
author, while focusing on NewcastleGateshead, makes no mention of the 1960s initiatives. 
1316 I doubt he would be impressed by the North East being divided into three combined authority 
areas, still less so by two of them being divided by the River Tyne. 
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